The emergence of mood in Heidegger’s phenomenology by Hadjioannou, Christos
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
	  
 
 
The emergence of mood in Heidegger’s phenomenology 
 
Christos Hadjioannou  
PhD Candidate in Philosophy  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX  
July 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   2	  
Summary	  
 
This thesis offers a genealogical-exegetical account of Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood 
(Stimmung), focusing on his Freiburg and Marburg lectures from 1919 to 1925. In Being and 
Time, moods manifest the transcendental factical ground of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) in 
which an understanding of Being is constituted. However, throughout Heidegger’s work, moods 
have operated as the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, 
the defining character of each historical epoch and as the enactmental urgency that will bring 
about an ‘other’ beginning.  
 This thesis contextualizes Heidegger’s accounts of mood within the broader 
phenomenological project concerning the constitution and grounding of meaning.   
 The first part of the thesis examines the neo-Kantian challenges to philosophy as well as 
Husserl’s response. It further explores the problems Heidegger identifies in Husserl’s 
phenomenology and shows how Heidegger offers a grounding of phenomenological 
understanding in lived experience, in order to provide a concrete account of a phenomenological 
“beginning” (Anfang). Heidegger’s turn to affects constitutes a radicalization, rather than a 
repudiation, of Husserlian insights.  
 The second part of the thesis explores Heidegger’s earliest accounts of affective 
phenomena in his interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle, where the terminology of Being 
and Time is developed for the first time. This involves an analysis of Heidegger’s accounts of 
love (Liebe) and joy (Freude) as they figure in the 1920 lecture course Phenomenology of 
Religious Experience, and analyses the emergence of Angst and other grounding moods 
(Grundstimmungen). The thesis then looks at Heidegger’s early interpretation of Plato and 
Aristotle in the lecture courses immediately prior to Being and Time, where the technical notion 
of disposition (Befindlichkeit) emerges, as well as his first analysis of fear (Furcht).  
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Introduction 
 
 
I. Overview 
 Generally speaking, activity has been linked to the process of “creating” and passivity 
to the process of “receiving”.1 Both had already been posited by Plato, as two basic 
characteristics of being. In Aristotle we meet these two characteristics as the last two of his 
categories, the ninth and the tenth: “[...] how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what 
suffering (Affection).”2 “Affectus and passio were used commonly as philosophical terms for 
Latin translations of the Greek term pathos.”3 There exists a long history of affective 
phenomena that began with the ancient Greeks and has gone on to Sartre and to Hartmann, 
while undergoing a dynamic transformation: “from thumos to pathos and affectus, then from 
passion to emotion and feeling”.4 Heidegger’s philosophy has extensively covered affective 
phenomena, despite the fact that he did not develop full clarity on the distinction between 
emotion, feeling, passion, affect and mood. These have played a significant role in Heidegger’s 
entire philosophy. His analyses of Angst in Being and Time (BT), and of boredom in the 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (FCM), have been the 
obvious reference points for scholars who wished to show the importance Heidegger ascribes to 
affective phenomena. Much has been written on Angst partly because it is the fundamental 
mood [Grundstimmung] identified and analyzed in BT which is widely accepted as Heidegger’s 
magnum opus.  
 Heidegger’s project in BT can be analyzed from various perspectives. It can be seen as 
an engagement with the entire history of philosophy as regards the implicit or explicit 
understanding of Being. It can be seen as a critique of modernity, a critique of rationalistic and 
subjectivistic accounts of the human condition (Dasein instead of subject and rational animal), a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Robert Zaborowski, “From Thumos to Emotion and Feeling. Some Observations on the Passivity and Activity 
of Affectivity”, History and Philosophy of Psychology, 12(1), (2010), pp. 1-25. 
2 Ibid, p. 2. 
3 Ibid, p. 7. 
4 Ibid. 
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transcendental project of understanding and meaning in general, etc. In any case, mood remains 
an irreducible element and a key to understanding Heidegger’s task.  
 Generally speaking, Heidegger’s treatment of affective phenomena is terminologically 
disparate and inconsistent. Whilst he does at various times (for example, in the Nietzsche 
lectures) acknowledge distinctions between affect, mood, emotion, feeling, and passion, he does 
not conscientiously define them, or keep them distinct. However, in BT his accounts of 
affective phenomena are indicated by the words Stimmung (mood) and Befindlichkeit 
(disposition).5 But throughout his long career, Heidegger uses various words and concepts in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In their forthcoming article “Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time” (Philosophy 
Compass), Andreas Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman provide a comprehensive account of how Befindlichkeit has been 
translated into English by various scholars, and rightly argue that no translation is really adequate to the German 
notion. Hence, they opt to leave Befindlichkeit untranslated. Whilst I agree that the safest option is to leave the word 
untranslated, I still think that we can translate it as “disposition”.  
 They are right in saying that Macquarrie and Robinson’s (1962) use of the phrase “state-of-mind” is 
problematic since Befindlichkeit is philosophically neither a “state”, nor does it refer to a “mind”; this is the most 
misleading translation of all, from a literal point of view. However, “state-of-mind” is an actual expression in 
everyday English that would be semantically equivalent to Befindlichkeit. Hence, if we are to stick to the 
phenomenological principle of starting from expressions used in everydayness, and use words said from οἱ πολλοί, as 
well as the hermeneutic principle of starting from the more familiar and moving to the least familiar, then “state-of-
mind” is not such an inappropriate term. But it does introduce significant problems once the ontological analysis 
proceeds, and thus must be avoided.  
 Haugeland uses “findingness,” whilst he had also used “sofindingness” (see 2013), without noting the 
drawbacks of these renderings. I think that whilst “findingness” is indeed the most linguistically accurate translation 
into English, since it is constructed from the same root verb finden, it is psychologically dry and relays a neutral 
spatiality, and is also too static. It does reveal the factical aspect though (the sense of “inheritance”). In addition, it 
sounds awkward in English.  
 Elpidorou and Freeman then note how Guignon (1984) uses “situatedness,” dismissing it because it lacks 
the important sense of finden in Befindlichkeit. I would add that whilst “situatedness” as a category is indeed linked to 
Befindlichkeit, translating the latter as “situatedness” risks conflating Befindlichkeit with another technical notion, 
that of Situation. Situation (as well as Lage) are not basic existentiales of Being-in-the-World; they are closed-off for 
the inauthentic Dasein, but they are disclosed to the resolute Dasein. Situation has its foundations in resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit] (see BT §60), which may or may not be enacted, whereas Befindlichkeit is a basic existentiale that 
is always already there since it is a condition of possibility of Dasein. In sum, translating Befindlichkeit as 
“situatedness” is too close to committing a categorical mistake, according to the inner logic of BT.  
 Elpidorou and Freeman then note how Dreyfus (1991), Blattner (2007), and Crowell (2013) all translate 
Befindlichkeit as “affectedness” or “affectivity”. They rightly argue that this captures the notion that Dasein is always 
already affected by and feels things, which is an important element of Befindlichkeit. The drawback of these notions 
though, they argue, is that they call to mind Kant’s notion of “receptivity” and thus import the very subject/object 
distinction that Heidegger attempts to overturn. Whilst they are right in their sensitivity to any notion that imports the 
subject/object distinction which Befindlichkeit is meant to overcome, I cannot see why the issue of receptivity is 
particularly reminiscent of Kant and not, say, Plato’s πάσχειν. In any case, whilst Befindlichkeit is indeed, from a 
historical perspective, Heidegger’s way of making sense of what have been historically termed as “affective 
phenomena”, he himself does not want to reduce Befindlichkeit to Affekt. In fact, in BT Heidegger explicitly writes 
that these “phenomena [associated with Befindlichkeit] have long been well-known ontically under the terms ‘affects’ 
and ‘feelings’ and have always been under consideration in philosophy” (BT, M&R, p. 318; §29), and then goes on to 
mention Plato and Aristotle on πάθη, the Scholastics, as well as volition and other accounts that take affects to be of 
epiphenomenal character. So “affectivity” is indeed inadequate, as Elpidoforou and Freeman argue, but for more 
reasons than the ones they invoke. What is more, Befindlichkeit is indeed something more than affect, precisely 
because Befindlichkeit is, philosophically speaking, more than a passive being affected: it is also about having a 
comportment, in the sense that it requires a certain, even minimal, (relational) enactment that relates to an other. For 
this reason, “disposition” is, in my opinion, the best option for translating Befindlichkeit. Elpidorou and Freeman note 
that Carman (2003), Dahlstrom (2001), Kisiel (1992), and Wrathall (2001) all use “disposition” or “disposedness”, 
but they think that this is not a good word because it suggests more of an ontic state than an ontological structure, and 
thus fails to adequately convey Befindlichkeit’s ontological depth. In this context, they invoke Haugeland’s (2013) 
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order to indicate affective phenomena: Empfindung, Gemüt, Affekt, Gefühl, Befindlichkeit (and 
Grundbefindlichkeit), Sichbefinden, Stimmung (and Grundstimmung), Gestimmtsein, 
Gestimmtheit, Leidenschaft, Motivation, Disposition, πάθος, διάθεσις, affectio. Some of these 
notions are consistently used in a pejorative sense (despite the lack of a clear definition), or in 
the context of his encounter [Auseinandersetzung] with the notions used by other philosophers 
(and thus, neither simply dismissively nor approvingly).6 In any case, most of the notions that 
Heidegger uses in his own phenomenological descriptions of affective phenomena, appear, 
disappear, and sometimes reappear throughout his career, in inconsistent ways.   
 These inconsistencies though are not only characteristic of Heidegger’s terminology for 
affective phenomena, but are also characteristic of most of the central notions in his work, and 
an inevitable “product” of his own method and hermeneutic style of philosophizing. Let us 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
argument that “disposition” risks implying subjectivity as well as conflicts with an established philosophical usage of 
the term, and carries behavioral connotations. Whilst I share these concerns to a certain extent, I still think that 
“disposition” is a suitable translation of Befindlichkeit. I cannot see why “disposition” (and its cognates) fails to 
render ontological depth. In principle, any notion whatsoever can be ontologically reduced and convey ontological 
depth. The fact that “disposition” is an already established philosophical term is not a sufficient reason for avoiding 
the word, since phenomenology in general offers the potential for appropriation and radicalization of any given 
notion, in a way that could free it from its baggage, based on phenomenological evidence. After all, if we are to 
accept Haugeland’s argument, then even the very word Dasein already has an established philosophical usage in the 
German Idealist tradition, but that did not stop Heidegger from using it and offering a phenomenology of Dasein. As 
regards the behavioural connotations of “disposition”, again, as long as an ontological reduction is in place, then that 
should not be a problem. Besides, the very same issue of “behaviourism” can be raised for other pertinent notions as 
well, for example the notion of Verhalten, which in everyday German means “behaviour”, or Haltung, which would 
normally be translated as “attitude” or “posture”, or Verfassung, which would normally be translated as “state” or 
“condition”, but that did not stop Heidegger from using these words. Granted, the notion of Befindlichkeit did fall 
prey to an anthropological interpretation, along with other notions used in BT, and that might have contributed to 
Heidegger’s favouring of Stimmung in his future analyses. But still, the behavioural connotations of Befindlichkeit 
cannot constitute a sufficient reason for Heidegger’s general replacement of Befindlichkeit with Stimmung (and 
Gestimmthkeit) since if that were the case he should have also minimized the usage of several other notions, such as 
the notions of Verhalten and Haltung. So the behavioural connotations of a notion in themselves should not be a 
reason for avoiding such a notion. “Disposition” is an appropriate translation of Befindlichkeit, as it is a word that can 
account for the foundation of “affective phenomena”, it conveys the sense of situatedness in an environing world, and 
it also has the sense of findingness (being disposed is how one find themselves “available”), without reducing it to 
sheer passivity but seeing it as a kind of comportment. It is a word that conveys how Dasein is “positioned” in the 
world, and how it is oriented in it. In addition, it is a word in everyday English that precisely refers to what 
Befindlichkeit also refers to in everyday German. Another reason why we should translate Befindlichkeit as 
“disposition” is that Heidegger himself on a couple of occasions uses the French word Disposition, in order to refer to 
the same phenomenon. Finally, a genealogical account of the notion of Befindlichkeit in BT makes it clear that this is 
how he rendered the Aristotelian category of διάθεσις, a word whose best translation in English is indeed 
“disposition”. If one accepts the “Aristotelian reading” of BT, then one has to accept the homology between 
Befindlichkeit and διάθεσις. 
 Elpidorou and Freeman finally note how Stambaugh (1996) translates Befindlichkeit as “attunement” and 
note that the problem with this translation is that this is how Stimmung is often translated, and this introduces 
confusion as regards their distinction. Indeed, if one were going to use “attunement”, then it would have to be a 
translation for Stimmung. Even though Heidegger is not entirely clear and consistent in a philosophical distinction 
between Stimmung and Befindlichkeit in BT, something that contributes to the extinction of the word Befindlichkeit in 
his post-BT analyses, we would still need to translate the two words (Befindlichkeit and Stimmung) differently, and 
“attunement”, if it is to be used at all, is much closer to the word Stimmung (or Gestimmtheit) than Befindlichkeit.     
6 For example, Empfindung is a notion used by Kant and Husserl that is associated with the sensuous or bodily aspect 
of affective phenomena, something that rests on the conceptual distinction between matter and form that Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account aims at overcoming. 
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recall that he himself chose to include all of his manuscripts (published material, lecture 
material, even his private notebooks) in the complete edition (Gesamtausgabe) of his work, and 
prefaced it with the motto “Wege – nicht Werke” meaning “Ways – not works”, because he 
considered his philosophical path to be one ridden with failed (but not futile) attempts to give 
expression to the problem of the meaning of Being. So whilst the deeper problem maintains a 
certain unity, Heidegger’s style, angle, and (unavoidably) words used vary, as does the 
“success” and cogency of each “attempt”. Affective phenomena are always a fundamental part, 
and always form a constitutive ground of the world, and of the various epochs of the history of 
Being. At the same time, they are constitutive of any understanding of Being, and hence each 
way of understanding Being is grounded in affect (mood), and affect is also what supplies the 
impetus behind the transition from one way of understanding Being (and world) to another. 
Affects have operated as what might be described as a transcendental “normalizing”, providing 
the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, the defining 
character of each historical epoch, as well as the enactmental urgency [Notwendigkeit] that will 
bring about Heidegger's, famously elusive, “other” cultural beginning.         
 Looking at the way affects operate in the early work, it can be argued that the turn from 
the existential analytic of Dasein to the history of Being is, truly, without radical breaks. Right 
from the beginning, affects indicate an origin [Ursprung] that is neither subjective nor 
objective, but rather an in-between [Zwischen], and thus beyond the subject-object and passive-
active dichotomies.  
 As I will show in this introduction, several important problems and enigmas persist in 
Heidegger’s analyses of affective phenomena, especially as regards his texts after BT. I shall 
mention the most important of these problems, as raised by certain Heidegger scholars. The 
ultimate goal is to consider in depth all of these problems and try to resolve them. Such a 
comprehensive project would take several years and a lot of space in order to be achieved – 
more space than a PhD thesis can accommodate. However, this thesis undertakes the task of 
how affective phenomena emerge and operate in the early work of Heidegger, contextualizing it 
and explaining it. In my opinion, this is a necessary and enlightening task that can already 
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resolve certain questions, whilst also setting the foundations for better understanding and 
resolving the problems and enigmas of the later Heidegger.  
 My thesis offers a genealogical-exegetic account of Heidegger’s early phenomenology 
of moods, through an analysis of his Freiburg and Marburg lectures that took place from 1919 
to 1925. I reconstruct and analyze the questions that Husserl's phenomenology attempted to 
resolve, and show how it is in this context that affects become central for Heidegger. The first 
part of the thesis looks at Heidegger’s initial turn to phenomenology, and considers the neo-
Kantian problems that Heidegger faces, as well as how Husserl’s phenomenology affords an 
initial breakthrough in resolving these problems. I explore how Heidegger goes beyond Husserl 
in order to offer a concrete grounding of phenomenological understanding in lived experience 
and provides a concrete account of “beginning” [Anfang]. I also investigate how Husserl’s 
account of intuition, which is the foundation of judgment and of ontological understanding, is 
restricted to a neutral grasp that excludes feeling at the foundational level. I assess the resultant 
inadequacies of Husserl’s account and show why Heidegger turns to affects so as to provide a 
factical ground for phenomenological understanding. This part of my thesis situates Heidegger’s 
early account of affects in relation to Husserl, Heinrich Rickert, Paul Natorp and Wilhelm 
Dilthey, and shows how Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn to mood constitutes a radicalization of, 
as opposed to a clear turning away from, Husserlian insights.  
 The second part of my thesis thematically explores Heidegger’s earliest accounts of 
particular affects, as well as the way the affective terminology of BT is developed for the first 
time in his interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle. The first section of this part analyzes 
Heidegger’s accounts of love [Liebe], joy [Freude] and Angst (as well as astonishment 
[Staunen], shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], and dread [Gruseln]), as they figure in the 1920 
lecture course entitled Phenomenology of Religious Experience. I show how love is the very 
first affect that Heidegger pays attention to. In addition, I uncover an overlooked structural 
connection between love and Angst. It is through the experience of the love of God that the 
person arrives at the experience of radical groundlessness and experiences Angst.  
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 In the second section of the second part, I look at Heidegger’s early interpretation of 
Plato and Aristotle in the lecture courses leading up to the writing of Being and Time, in which 
the technical notions of disposition [Befindlichkeit], comportment [Verfassung] and mood 
[Stimmung] are first developed, and show how they correspond to the Aristotelian notions of 
διάθεσις, ἕξις and πάθος. In this context, I show how Heidegger’s account of mood in Being and 
Time ultimately leads back to Aristotle’s category of continuum, συνέχον, as Heidegger found it 
in Aristotle’s Physics. It is through this category that Heidegger understands, and interprets, 
Aristotle’s notion of comportment.  
 
II. Fundamental moods and persistent issues 
In BT, Heidegger offers an existential analytic of Dasein, where he identifies the basic 
constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. He further identifies four basic structures 
(existentiales) that constitute this ground, and disposition is identified as one of them. 
Disposition is an a priori constitutive part of Dasein’s facticity (which is the way we are 
concretely thrown in a historical situation). Apart from facticity, Heidegger also identifies 
Dasein’s existentiality, which refers to the authentic or inauthentic way Dasein can exist. Both 
are possibilities that Dasein can understand itself. Dasein is either authentic, which means that it 
can “choose” to transparently understand itself in the fundamental way it is, or it can exist 
inauthentically, which means that it flees in the face of its being.7 In effect, authenticity and 
inauthenticity are the grounds on which a particular Dasein understands and projects its own 
possibilities.8 There is no agreement amongst scholars on whether Heidegger’s distinction 
between authentic and inauthentic being are two different actual ways of existing, or whether 
the distinction is a formal one that refers to distinct, parallel ways that the human being 
understands its own being. No matter what it is, the most important issue here is the connection 
between facticity and existentiality: how these definite ways of existing (authentic and 
inauthentic) are a priori grounded in facticity and the role that fundamental mood plays in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 BT, §9. 
8 BT, §12. 
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relation. The most crucial question is whether disposition is the structure that enables Dasein to 
overcome its inauthenticity and acquire authenticity.  
 Philosophical understanding, that is, the deeper structure of truth, nature, and the 
essence of the subject, has historically been the object of consideration of philosophy. Since 
Plato, the question of how one becomes interested in such essential questioning, i.e. of how one 
becomes sensitive to essence and truth, has been central. How does one begin to philosophize? 
Fundamental mood is identified throughout Heidegger’s works, but especially in his later 
works, as the force behind such a beginning – as that which lies at the origin of the 
philosophical conversion, whereby one wonders about the nature of being(s). Mood is also 
identified by Heidegger as the structure that discloses “being-there” in its thrownness; the 
structure that discloses Being-in-the-World as a whole, and enables intentional directedness to 
emerge; the structure that enables the primary discovery of the world as something that matters, 
as such. A better understanding of the emergence of mood in Heidegger’s overall project can 
only be achieved by further investigation into his earlier works. This is not to claim that a more 
comprehensive genealogy resolves these issues, but sometimes it dissolves some of these 
problems by showing how they are wrong-footed. But inevitably, some problems still persist, 
especially as regards questions of what constitutes fundamental moods as fundamental, and 
Heidegger’s choice of particular moods. 
 The young Heidegger is searching for a “binding task” that supplies a compulsion to 
our thinking, a necessity [Notwendigkeit] for “initiating historical change”.9 Fundamental 
moods are what philosophically awaken humanity and form a philosophical culture, whereby 
we become captivated by the discovery that objectivity, presence itself, is encounterable 
through the grasp of the world of nature. Heidegger’s position is that the “world-horizon”, that 
is, the initial discovery of a world as such, stands open in and through fundamental moods. It is 
through a fundamental mood that humans discover the “world” in general, and the possibility of 
“truth”. Whereas modern philosophy holds that “truth” is a function of propositional logic, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Klaus Held, “Fundamental Moods and Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture”, in Reading Heidegger: 
Commemorations, ed. John Sallis, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 290. 
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equation between subjective representation and objective reality, Heidegger argues that it is pre-
predicative mood that “founds all predicative truth”, and the “bindingness of philosophical 
propositions is thereby placed on an entirely new foundation that runs counter to the tradition”, 
a tradition that placed the foundation of truth in judgement.10 Moods are what supply the 
requisite bindingness – Heidegger turns to mood in his search for the ground of meaning and 
truth.11 This thesis takes inspiration from this insight and further analyzes moods in terms of 
bindingness, especially in chapters two and three. 
 Fundamental moods have the power of initiating historical change, and Heidegger’s 
analysis of the history of Being after BT is a hearkening to historical moods, a possibility 
opened up in the resolute moment, that is, the moment when Dasein transparently understands 
its essential nature, its facticity, and its transcendent futural possibilities in BT. The issue of 
becoming authentic and how fundamental moods are implicated in this becoming, as well as 
how fundamental moods are implicated in the very history of metaphysics, is crucial. Moods are 
fundamental only if they are enacted, that is, only if they partake in the “process” of becoming 
authentic. Heidegger believes that not every mood is fundamental, and also that every 
fundamental mood can be either authentically had (enacted) or inauthentically had. Each 
fundamental mood has the capacity for formative historical action, but it also has an inauthentic, 
derivative manifestation. 
 Resoluteness involves a readiness to be receptive to being overcome by a fundamental 
mood, and this awakening cannot come from reason-driven will, argues Held.12 Held argues that 
this must come from mood itself, since there is no appeal beyond authentic moods. But is it the 
authentic mood itself, or is it another mood that simply does this, awakening us to the 
fundamental mood? 
 A strange problem arises here. In this thesis, I argue that Heidegger’s turn to mood 
originally takes place because of the problem of grounding the phenomenological beginning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid, p. 288. 
11 We will see in the next chapter what “bindingness” means. For the moment, suffice it to say that it is like the 
“reason” that legitimizes the knowledge of truth. 
12 Ibid, pp. 292-293. 
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Heidegger turns to mood to ground the phenomenological epochē. 
 
III. Mood in Being and Time 
Overview of Being and Time 
Being and Time is indisputably Heidegger’s magnum opus. In this chapter, I will give a 
schematic description of what kind of project BT comprised, and how affects (disposition and 
moods) figure in it.  
 In BT, Heidegger raises the ontological question of the meaning of Being, and this 
question leads him into a description and interpretation of the particular way that Dasein exists 
and (vaguely) understands the meaning of Being. It is an ontological project, which means that 
it examines the essential characteristics of the being of beings, characteristics that follow from 
inspection and analysis as regards the way they are, and the ground that enables their very 
being. The first task in BT is to re-awaken the forgotten question of the meaning of Being, as it 
was initially raised by Plato.13 Heidegger raises this question so as to identify and explicate the 
transcendental horizon upon which the understanding of Being depends. As it will turn out, the 
aim of BT is to show how time is this very horizon: the meaning of Being depends on time. In 
other words, Being has to be grasped in terms of time.14 
 But this relationship between the meaning of Being and time is covered up, just as the 
question itself, as a genuine aporia, is not manifested in our normal, everyday existence. On the 
other hand, we, Dasein, are not total strangers to it either. We must have a certain familiarity 
with the meaning of Being, a “vague understanding of Being”,15 otherwise we wouldn’t be in a 
position to raise the question in the first place, since raising a question involves a certain 
minimal, vague understanding of that which the question addresses and seeks.16 Hence, the 
ontological endeavour, that is, the philosophical investigation of Being, must start by 
“interrogating” the being that raises the question of Being in the first place, since s/he is the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 19 (SZ, 1). 
14 Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 25.  
15 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 25 (SZ, 5-6).  
16 Richard Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 29. 
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who also vaguely understands it. Thus, Heidegger’s first task in BT is to carry out an 
“existential analytic” of Dasein, in which he will describe the peculiar way Dasein exists in its 
everydayness, describe the basic structures that make up Dasein’s existence, and how the 
meaning of Being manifests itself in Dasein’s everydayness. Here, Heidegger makes a 
distinction that helps set up BT’s ontological project: the distinction between “ontological” and 
“ontic”. The former pertains to Being as such in general, whilst the latter refers to any particular 
being, matters of fact about a being or a kind of being (for example, “natural beings” vs. 
“artifacts”). The existential analytic of Dasein that Heidegger carries out in the beginning of BT 
is an ontological investigation, not an ontical one; it is an analysis of the Being of Dasein.  
 It is widely accepted that Heidegger rejects the traditional philosophical definition of 
man as “rational animal” on the basis that it is a derivative definition that does not do justice to 
the way man’s rational understanding is constituted. Heidegger’s phenomenological account 
redescribes the being of man, Dasein, in terms of care [Sorge].17 As Steven Crowell puts it, 
Dasein’s “rationality cannot be understood ontologically by beginning with developed logical 
systems or the ‘derivative’ [Abkünftig] domain of theoretical assertions in the sciences. Its 
meaning must be clarified through categories of Dasein’s being as care.”18    
 Despite the fact that Being and Time is an unfinished project, it succeeds in offering two 
things: a phenomenological account of how Dasein exists and understands itself and the world 
in its everydayness and what kind of structure this involves, and a deeper transcendental account 
of how the meaning of Being involved in this existence is founded on a, normally concealed, 
more original and deeper understanding of temporality. Heidegger published Division I and 
Division II of the first part, and these two divisions more or less correspond to the two things 
mentioned. Both Division I and Division II lay out the conditions for existing in a world, and 
the second division making explicit the presuppositions of the first. This is characteristic of 
phenomenology as a method, which is not just about describing the world and life in a new way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Steven Crowell, “Responsibility, Autonomy, and Affectivity”, presented at The German Philosophy Workshop, 
University of Chicago (April 19, 2013), retrieved from 
http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/germanphilosophy/2013/04/11/april-19-steven-crowell-on-responsibility-
autonomy-and-affectivity/ 
18 Ibid. 
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and describing “that which proximally and for the most part does show itself” but rather, 
ultimately, with the ground that lies hidden and yet “belongs to what thus shows itself.”19  
 In the opening sections of BT, Heidegger points at the crucial fact that being is an issue 
for Dasein.20 Dasein comports itself in various ways, such that each comportment is 
(pre)ontological, in the sense that it has a vague understanding of Being and of itself, which is 
an issue for it. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its “existence” [Existenz], that is, it 
understands itself through the way it comports itself towards its possibilities of being. Dasein 
always understands itself in terms of its existence.21 Thus, the question of what constitutes 
existence is an urgent one, if we are to properly raise the ontological question of the meaning of 
Being, and the interconnection [Zusammenhang] of these structures is called “existentiality.”22 
This is why an existential analytic of Dasein is the first task for ontology. Existentiality is the 
structure that enables Dasein to exist either authentically or inauthentically.23 These are both 
ways for Dasein to have a definite character, which are a priori grounded in Being-in-the-
World.24 As Being-in-the-World, Dasein understands its existence as a “fact”, in the sense that it 
is thrown in a World, and its existence is already bound up “with the Being of those entities 
which it encounters within its own world.”25 This is what Heidegger calls Dasein’s “facticity” 
[Faktizität]. One key question that Heidegger is grappling with is how can existentiality and 
facticity go together, how do they have an ontological unity, and whether facticity belongs 
essentially to existentiality.26 Dasein’s facticity is primarily revealed through disposition 
[Befindlichkeit] and moods, which account for Dasein’s thrownness [Geworfenheit]. This is 
Dasein brought before itself as Being-in-the-World, inheriting a fallen way of being a Self that 
is proximally and for the most part inauthentic.27 Can we then “discover” within facticity the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 59 (SZ, 35). 
20 Ibid, p. 32 (SZ, 12). 
21 Ibid, p. 33 (SZ, 12). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, p. 78 (SZ, 53). Heidegger also mentions a third possibility of existing: that of “indifference”.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, p. 82 (SZ, 56). 
26 Ibid, p. 225 (SZ, 181). 
27 Ibid. 
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structure that enables Dasein to overcome its inauthenticity, that is to exist either inauthentically 
or authentically, which is Dasein’s existentiality? As Heidegger says: 
If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to its 
function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provisional task of 
exhibiting Dasein’s Being, it must seek for one of the most far-reaching and 
most primordial possibilities of disclosure—one that lies in Dasein itself. The 
way of disclosure in which Dasein brings itself before itself must be such that in 
it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner. With what is thus 
disclosed, the structural totality of the Being we seek must then come to light in 
an elemental way.28   
 
Heidegger then points out that the phenomenon that satisfies these methodological requirements 
is the fundamental mood of anxiety: “As one of Dasein’s possibilities of Being, anxiety—
together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it—provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly 
grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being.”29 Hence, Heidegger identifies a particular 
aspect of the existential constitution of Being-in-the-World, i.e. a disposition, which enables 
Dasein to become authentic and hence reveal the unity of existentiality and facticity.30   
 Part I, Division I, of BT explores how Dasein exists in the world in its everydayness, 
which is the normal, familiar way of being.31 This involves a description of how Dasein 
understands itself and its world, how the meaning of Being-in-the-World is manifested in 
everyday practices. This is the way Dasein exists primarily and for the most part, and it is in this 
everyday way of existing that the understanding of beings, the world, as well as self-
understanding, is originally manifested. Meaning is primarily disclosed pre-conceptually and 
pre-theoretically. Intentionality, the capacity to understand and refer to any kind of thing 
(objects, concepts, relations, etc.) is thus shown to be grounded on and to emerge out of a more 
primordial level of practical existence.  
 So in Part I, Division I, Heidegger describes how Dasein’s basic constitution is Being-
in-the-World [In-der-Welt-Sein], whose structure is then reduced to care. The structure of 
Being-in-the-World becomes the topic of analysis as the structure that needs to be further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid, p. 226 (SZ, 182). 
29 Ibid, p. 227 (SZ, 182). 
30 In §40 of BT, Heidegger says that disposition and understanding enable Dasein to disclose to itself ‘information’ 
about itself as an entity. Anxiety is a distinctive mood because in anxiety Dasein gets brought before its own Being; 
Anxiety reveals the Being of the totality of the structural whole (BT 229/184). 
31 Polt 1999, p. 36. 
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described and elucidated. Division I is an analysis of the structures of how Dasein understands 
itself inauthentically [uneigentlich], that is, it understands its Being in terms of beings whose 
Being is presence-at-hand [Vorhandensein], hence failing to understand itself authentically, 
owning up to its “truth”. In this context, meaning (the meaning of Dasein itself and of its world) 
is “always a matter of understanding [itself] within publicly available normative space”.32 as 
anyone who inherits a self-understanding from the public domain. This mode of understanding 
is how das Man exists, a way of existing that involves an inauthentic self-understanding, 
reminiscent of Husserl’s notion of “natural attitude”.33 The way Dasein exists in everydayness 
is, as said above, Being-in-the-World, a structure which is constantly whole.3435    
 In Division II, Heidegger sets about a re-interpretation of the basic structures of 
everyday Dasein identified in the previous division, hinting at a “transition” into a deeper, more 
fundamental, authentic self-understanding.36 In this context, Division II investigates phenomena 
such as death, conscience and resoluteness: it provides a phenomenological account of how the 
self achieves resoluteness [Entschlossenheit], a particular form of disclosedness 
[Erschlossenheit].37 Resoluteness involves an understanding and an embracing of our freedom 
in the face of ultimate limitations of our being-towards-death [Sein zum Tode].  
 Heidegger does not mean that Dasein can become authentic in the sense of purposefully 
differentiating oneself from others and society, changing the way one exists or acts in the world, 
creating idiosyncratic values and norms, etc. Authenticity is an ontological understanding that 
amounts to nothing practical, but rather is an “anticipatory resoluteness” where Dasein 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Crowell, 2013.  
33 Heidegger generally identifies das Man with inauthenticity that is overcome in authentic understanding, but several 
scholars have argued that this is a simplistic way of understanding das Man. I agree with them, especially on the 
thesis that das Man is not a state that can be overcome by authenticity, but due to limited space, and since this issue 
of BT does not have a direct bearing on the arguments I am proposing in this study, I cannot get into this complex 
issue. Some scholars also reject parallelisms made between Heidegger’s notion of “inauthenticity” and Husserl’s 
notion of “natural attitude”. In my opinion, Heidegger and Husserl here do overlap, and a parallelism is useful, but 
again, I cannot go into more depth at this point beyond pointing out an operational resemblance. 
34 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 225 (SZ, 180). 
35 Anxiety is what reveals the world as world, in its totality (BT 231/187). 
36 Tanja Staehler, in her article entitled “How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible?”, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 15(3), (2007), pp. 415-433, rightly argues that even though Heidegger mentions 
“authenticity” and “inauthenticity” as “possibilities” of Dasein, (e.g. see BT 235/191), there is no evidence of an 
argument in BT for a “transition” whereby Dasein “can move from inauthenticity to authenticity in such a way as to 
leave inauthenticity behind”, pointing out that the emphatic connection of authenticity to a “moment” [Augenblick] is 
indicative of how precarious “authenticity” is.   
37 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 343 (SZ, 297). 
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understands its ownmost potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnen] as anticipating [vorlaufen].3839 As 
Heidegger writes, “Anticipation discloses this possibility [i.e. resoluteness] as possibility. Thus 
only as anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being.”40 This anticipation is the anticipation of death. As Heidegger writes: 
“As Being-towards-the-end which understands—that is to say, as anticipation of death—
resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be.”41   
 The internal connection of resolution with anticipation, then, allows Heidegger to 
rethink Dasein’s essential finitude, a finitude that is hidden in the “fallen” state of everydayness 
of das Man. Finitude is constitutive of Dasein, and resoluteness reveals that Dasein is in essence 
an ecstatic standing out, an opening of, Being. Heidegger thus tries to rethink care, Dasein’s 
basic constitution is Being-in-the-World, in terms of its ontological unity. 
 In a key section of Division II of Being and Time (§65), Heidegger further focuses on 
the claim that temporality is the ontological meaning of Dasein’s Being as care. Anticipatory 
resoluteness is the authentic mode of care, and “[t]emporality reveals itself as the meaning of 
authentic care.”42 Temporality is “the unity of a future which makes present in the process of 
having been.”43 So Heidegger identifies temporality as the unity that is the ground of care itself: 
“The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.”44 
 
Disposition and the constitution of Being-in-the-World 
The first task in BT is to describe how Dasein exists in its everydayness and analyze the 
constitutive, basic structures of existence. Dasein is essentially a being who is always “there”, 
whose being is constituted and manifested as Being-in-the-World. Dasein is always already 
embedded within a World, within a complex referential system of meaningful relations. Dasein 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid, p. 354 (SZ, 307, §62). 
39 The fundamental mood of Angst is primarily distinguished from fear on the basis of their respective “objects”: 
whilst fear’s object is an entity within-the-world, anxiety does not have a definite object, no determinate threat. 
Anxiety’s “object” is Being-in-the-world as such, and this means that in anxiety no particular involvement 
[Bewandtnis] arises. Hence, its outcome cannot be a determinate prescription (BT 231/186). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, p. 353 (SZ, 305). 
42 Ibid, p. 374 (SZ, 326). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, p. 375 (SZ, 327). 
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and world are not different or distinct entities, but rather Dasein is itself the disclosedness of its 
“there”.45 Being-in-the-World is the basic state of Dasein,46 and Being-in is the “formal 
existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential 
state.”47  
 Heidegger in his analysis breaks up the phenomenon of “Being-in-the-World” and 
firstly analyzes the “worldhood” of the World. In the next chapter, in §§28-38, he analyzes the 
phenomenon of Being-in as such. The analysis of Being-in is an analysis of Dasein’s “there”, 
the way the “there” [Da-sein] of Dasein is constituted. In this chapter, Heidegger offers an 
analysis of the existential constitution of the “there” as well as an explication of the everyday 
Being of the “there” and the falling of Dasein.48 Heidegger’s chief aim is to redescribe the 
constitution of Being-in in such a way that being-in is not understood as a present-at-hand 
“insideness” where one entity is in another entity, a container.49 
 Dasein’s “there” is ontologically constituted by four basic structures (existentials): 
disposition [Befindlichkeit], understanding [Verstehen], fallenness [Verfallensein] and talk 
[Rede].50 In effect, these four structures are the transcendental conditions of Dasein’s “there” 
that are identified through phenomenological description (as opposed to a logical derivation). 
Dasein’s “there” is co-constituted by these basic structures. There cannot be a “there” unless 
there is disposition and understanding, and each of these is equiprimordial, meaning that they 
operate together at the same time, each of them enabling the other and together constituting 
Dasein’s “there”. Understanding is always accompanied by disposition, and disposition is 
always accompanied by understanding, and each cannot be what it is without the other.  
 Insofar as disposition is an existentiale, this means that Dasein is always already 
disposed, finds itself in a disposition, just like for Kant the object-encountering subject is 
always already in space and time. Disposition is primarily manifested through moods. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid, p. 171 (SZ, 133). 
46 Ibid, p. 78 (SZ, 53). 
47 Ibid, p. 80 (SZ, 54). 
48 Ibid, p. 171 (SZ, 133). 
49 Ibid, p. 170 (SZ, 132). 
50 Heidegger is not consistent on whether talk is one of the existentials, sometimes excluding it or exchanging 
fallenness with talk. In §68 he lists all four. But this inconsistency need not concern us at this point, as disposition is 
consistently identified as one.  
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Heidegger makes clear that Dasein is always in some mood,51 since it is a basic structure of its 
existence, and this holds even when we appear to not have a mood, being indifferent or neutral, 
which is one way of describing the “impartial” character often attributed to the theoretical 
attitude. But Heidegger explicitly says that mood is a necessary condition for being “there” in a 
world, and the appearance of not having a mood is not the real absence of mood altogether but 
rather a particular way of being disposed towards our mood.  
 Heidegger analyzes the basic structures one by one. In §29 he analyzes being-there (Da-
sein) as disposition. The German word he uses to refer to the structure of disposition, 
Befindlichkeit, is a substantive derived from the reflexive verb sich befinden, which literally 
means “finding oneself”. In everyday context, the colloquial German phrase “Wie befinden Sie 
sich?” means “how do you feel?” or “how is it going?” or “how are you faring?”, etc. It refers to 
the way Dasein finds itself situated, affected by and attuned to the world, and this is a 
fundamental way through which the world and particular entities in the world are disclosed to 
Dasein in a meaningful way.  
 Heidegger distinguishes between the ontological level of the phenomenon and the ontic 
level. Disposition is an ontological structure, and the ontic way in which this ontological 
structure is manifested is mood. Even though moods (as with other affective phenomena such as 
emotions and feelings) are normally taken to be psychological phenomena and hence the 
domain of psychology, Heidegger argues that psychology cannot see the ontological import of 
mood and he seeks to outline its structure from an ontological perspective. The way we slip 
from one mood to another is ontologically significant, and this phenomenon must be analyzed 
in terms of what it shows about Being, about being-there.  
 Heidegger identifies three essential, ontological characteristics of disposition. First: 
dispositions disclose being-there in its thrownness, and mostly in the manner of evasive 
“turning away”.52 Second: moods disclose Being-in-the-World as a whole, and enables 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid, p. 173 (SZ, 134). 
52 Ibid, p. 175 (SZ, 136). 
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intentional directedness to emerge.53 Third: disposition shows a disclosive submission to the 
world, which enables the primary discovery of the world as something that matters, as such.5455  
 These three characteristics are ontological; that is, they are essential characteristics of 
the being of Dasein, characteristics that follow from inspection and analysis as regards the way 
they are, their very being. But before Heidegger identifies these characteristics, he needs to first 
analyze the phenomenon of disposition (mood) and provide phenomenological justification, lest 
he falls into a dogmatic assertion. In this context, and in typical hermeneutic fashion, Heidegger 
addresses his predecessors and the tradition he is encountering – a long tradition that 
consistently ignores the affective, or relegates it to the realm of non-being.  
 Heidegger begins by noting how we slip from one mood to another. Moods change, 
they are transient, and because of this precariousness, philosophy ignores them. Their 
contingent character appears as arbitrariness and relative to the individual subject; since 
philosophy is the study of essence and the a priori, then it must focus on that which does not 
change, hence that which is susceptible to change is banished from the area of study. But it is 
precisely this transience, contingency, and “irrational nature” that Heidegger wants to take 
seriously, because through it, through the shifting moods, a particular, albeit recalcitrant, aspect 
of being-there reveals itself (which ultimately has to do with the historical nature of being).  
 It is not only the transience of moods that puts off philosophical investigation, but also 
their enigmatic character. What they reveal does not match epistemic conventions, does not fit 
epistemic schemas and criteria, and hence they do not “make the cut”. Why we slip from one 
mood to another, says Heidegger, we do not know. This enigma is inherent to the disclosure of 
moods. Moods disclose the sheer fact of the “there” without any further qualities. One could 
argue that an enigma is precisely the absence of disclosure, namely that moods are of no 
epistemic value whatsoever since all they offer to understanding is an enigma. But Heidegger’s 
philosophical move goes the other way: instead of applying rigid epistemic criteria onto an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid, p. 176 (SZ, 137). 
54 Ibid, p. 177 (SZ, 137-138). 
55 Macquarrie and Robinson consistently translate Angehen as (a cognate of) “mattering”. This misses the temporal 
character of the German word that Heidegger uses. Angehen also means “the approaching” that concerns us; concern 
could also be used, but the word is used to translate besorgen. 
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obstreperous and vague phenomenon, Heidegger expands the very meaning of meaning and 
what counts as ontological significance, by taking moods seriously, ontologically speaking. 
 This phenomenological breakthrough into the affective culminates in the three essential 
characteristics of disposition, which open up the entire ontological project and the insights 
afforded by the moment [Augenblick]. This breakthrough is not afforded from the outside, but 
rather it is initiated immanently, from within the inner “logic” (structure/manifestation) of 
disposition itself. This is the most important phenomenological gain regarding moods: their 
ability to initiate a phenomenological beginning per se. This capacity to afford a beginning is 
what we should see first, since it also helps us interpret and understand the first ontological 
characteristic of mood. 
 
Mood: Being-there as burden 
The primary, most originary insight given by mood is burden. Mood manifests being “there” in 
a particular way – it manifests it as a burden [Last],56 and this is a character of being that is 
crucial for the ontological project of BT. The meaning of “burden” is not made immediately 
clear though, and some interpretive work needs to be done. Burden is operating in three distinct 
(albeit interrelated) senses. Firstly, in the existentiell sense, i.e. in the sense of biographical 
difficulty. Secondly, in an epistemic sense, i.e. in relation to understanding: being-there is a 
burden to understanding, in the sense that it is an obstacle to it, it is something that challenges 
and antagonizes cognitive understanding, it is a puzzle that cannot be understood. (It is like an 
unreasonable fact that we simply have to accept.) Thirdly, and most importantly, in an 
ontological sense: being-there is a burden in the sense that being-there is an ontological question 
that oppresses and demands metaphysical articulation (explanation to follow). Let me analyze 
each of these three senses in some more detail.  
 The first sense of burden is the everyday sense, the existentiell sense. Life is difficult, 
tough, entangled in constant worry, intrinsically tied to problem-solving. Nothing happens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid, p. 174 (SZ, 134). 
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automatically: we have to carry ourselves through activities, take care of tasks, and all of this 
within the rigid constraints of the environment, physical limits, and intellectual complications.   
 The second sense of burden is epistemic. Disposition, mood, orients and motivates 
understanding,57 but it also delimits understanding whilst enabling it. Mood is always a burden 
to understanding, a burden it necessarily bears and can never shake off. It is like a constant 
puzzle that is there and confuses understanding, an ever-present aporia that makes 
understanding understand its own limits. Even Dasein’s apparent “lack of mood” 
[Ungestimmtheit], connected to “neutral” theoretical understanding, manifests the “there” of 
being as a burden (theoretical understanding is never free from constraints).58  
 The third sense is ontological.59 The burdensome character of being-there that mood 
discloses relates to the very fact that existence is an issue for Dasein, that it is concerned with 
the meaning of its existence. The burden is Dasein’s own demand for ontological 
understanding, indicating Dasein’s metaphysical condition and the need for the attainment of 
self-understanding, self-transparency, and freedom (or autonomy).60 In BT, Heidegger explicitly 
ties the notion of “burden” with Dasein’s freedom and responsibility for ontological grounding, 
and guilt in the avoidance of it:61 The demand for ontological grounding is there, as a burden 
that Dasein can either take up or ignore, a demand for self-transparency and self-understanding 
that Dasein can either shoulder or ignore. But Heidegger does not spell out how the burden of 
mood makes this metaphysical demand for self-transparency and grounding. He does so later on 
though in FCM, where he says that “if [man] is to become what he is, in each case [he] has to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In certain respects, moods can be said to be the “desire” that motivates understanding, even though moods cannot 
be reduced to “desire” and it would be a mistake to use desire here, since desire in modern and post-Kantian 
philosophy became associated with the striving subject. Let it be noted, however, that in his earlier accounts of how 
affective phenomena accompany understanding, Heidegger sometimes uses the word desire [Begehren]. What is 
more, in lectures preceding the publication of BT, Heidegger explicitly associates the phenomenological notion of 
intentionality (which was the Brentanian concept that allowed for the emergence of phenomenology) with ὄρεξις 
(desire).    
58 Ibid. 
59 I do not mean the “ontological”, as often ascribed to Division I, in opposition to the “ethical-existentialist” ascribed 
to Division II, where the second is so called in order to indicate a certain divergence from the former. This is a false 
dilemma that I do not subscribe to. According to my interpretation, both divisions are ontological (Cf. Withy 2012; 
Crowell 2013). 
60 For an explicit thesis on this, see Crowell 2013. 
61 See, for example, §§54, 58.  
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throw Dasein upon his shoulders […]”.62 The awakening of fundamental mood is equal to the 
acknowledging and embracing of oppressiveness [Bedrängnis] that is at each time given in the 
fundamental mood!63 In Heidegger’s own words: 
This liberation of the Dasein in man does not mean placing him in some 
arbitrary position, but loading Dasein upon man as his ownmost burden 
[das Dasein als seine eigenste Bürde aufladen]. Only those who can truly 
give themselves a burden are free. [Nur wer sich wahrhaft eine Bürde 
geben kann, ist frei] […] We must therefore really question what this 
attunement gives us to question, we must question concerning what 
oppresses [bedrängt] us in this fundamental attunement and perhaps 
simultaneously vanishes as a decisive possibility.64 
  
And a couple of pages later, Heidegger speaks about how philosophy is an expression of 
freedom, which only arises “where there is a burden to be shouldered” [Freiheit ist Nur, wo das 
Übernehmen einer Bürde ist], a burden that “always represents an imperative and a need that 
weighs heavily upon man’s overall mood, so that he comes to be in a mood of melancholy [Im 
Schaffen ist je nach seiner Art diese Bürde ein Muß und eine Not, an der Mensch schwer trägt 
im Gemüt, so daß ihm schwer zumute ist].”65 
 This ontological character of moods, the character of burden, is key in understanding 
the specific purpose that fundamental moods play in Heidegger’s ontological project. 
Fundamental moods supply the demand for an ontological beginning. This is the most important 
operation that fundamental mood affords to ontological understanding. Several commentators 
have pointed out how fundamental mood is associated with a beginning, a break, an 
unsettledness capable of attuning to authenticity.66 
 In “Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected ‘Problems’ of ‘Logic’”, a lecture delivered 
in the Winter Semester of 1937-38 (whilst Heidegger was also writing the Contributions to 
Philosophy), Heidegger offers an illuminating analysis of how fundamental mood inaugurates a 
beginning in philosophy, articulating a connection between mood, necessity and burden as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 FCM, p. 165. 
63 FCM, pp. 166-167. 
64 Ibid. 
65 FCM, p. 182 (my italics). 
66 For example, see Held 1993, Mulhall 1996, Haar 2002, Staehler 2007, Capobianco 2012, Withy 2012, and Crowell 
2013. 
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opening of “space of meaning”.67 Referring to the Greek beginning of philosophy, Heidegger 
writes that fundamental mood supplies the need [Not] and necessity [Notwendigkeit] for the 
beginning, and this need “arises from the distress of not knowing the way out or the way in”, 
which is a compelling metaphysical burden that begets philosophy.68 
 Klaus Held writes that Heidegger’s general project aims at awakening a new culture 
that is brought about via a binding task, which is supplied by fundamental mood.69 In this 
context, mood supplies a compulsion, a necessity [Notwendigkeit] (or, the other way around: 
necessity “speaks” through mood), and as such fundamental mood has “the power of initiating 
historical change”.70 The burden is Dasein’s own demand for ontological understanding, a 
demand supplied by mood. Held also draws a direct connection between the awakening of 
fundamental mood and resoluteness, and considers mood to be that which “leads Dasein from 
inauthenticity into authenticity.”71 Tanja Staehler also accepts that mood supplies the motivation 
behind the movement from inauthenticity to authenticity, even though she (rightly) rejects the 
possibility of a clear transition from inauthenticity to authenticity, where inauthenticity is 
somehow left completely behind,72 and she also points out that the connection between anxiety 
and authenticity in BT is not clear.73  
 Katherine Withy offers the most comprehensive treatment of fundamental mood in BT 
and the capacity to disrupt everydayness and initiate the philosophical attitude. Withy makes a 
compelling argument in an article entitled “The methodological role of Angst in Being and 
Time”,74 where she makes the case that Angst disrupts the movement of falling “by arresting the 
movement towards entities” and enables the philosophical attitude to arise, out of a failure, a 
breakdown, of the everyday.75 In the same vein, Richard Capobianco articulates the burden of 
mood thus: anxiety transforms being-in-the-world into “not-at-homeness” [Nicht-zu-Hause], 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Cf. Crowell 2001. 
68 See BQP, §§32-36. 
69 Klaus Held, “Fundamental Moods and Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture”, in Reading Heidegger: 
Commemorations, ed. John Sallis, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 287. 
70 Ibid, p. 290. 
71 Ibid, p. 293. 
72 Staehler 2007, p. 419. 
73 Ibid, p. 427. 
74 Katherine Withy, “The Methodological Role of Angst in Being and Time”, Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, 43(2), (May 2012). 
75 Ibid, p. 200. 
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revealing the fundamental character of facticity as “radically negatived finite existence”, 
unsettled at the core of its being.76 According to Capobianco, in anxiety one is ‘unsettled’ 
[unheimlich]: “Angst brings Dasein back from its absorption in the world of the they. Dasein is 
shaken to the core of its being, and ‘being-in assumes the existential “mode” of not-at-homeness 
[Un-zuhause].’”77 Hence, Angst has the power to inaugurate, to “move” Dasein from its 
absorption into the ontic and the world, to the uncanny, which constitutes the beginning of the 
ontological.  
 But not all moods manifest the ontological burden and this is a key to understanding 
fundamental moods and why Heidegger prioritized certain “negative” moods when it came to 
burden, particularly Angst and shock. Even though mood will be a necessary condition for 
grounding and inaugurating a beginning, it will not be a sufficient one, not least because not all 
moods manifest the burden. The fact that we have moods, the fact that we have a disposition, 
does not automatically bring Dasein face to face with ontological burden. On the contrary, some 
moods do the opposite: they cover up the burden! In addition, even fundamental moods that 
reveal the burden have the tendency to be covered up by declensions.78 Oppressiveness is 
covered up, the burden removed, and Dasein is dragged to a “fall” into the ontic. Moods can 
both conceal as well as unconceal the burden of existence. This refers to the aforementioned 
epistemic sense of burden, where mood is a burden to understanding, in the sense that it clouds 
understanding by hindering its grasp in such a way that understanding is motivated to turn to 
objects so as to alleviate this burden. In order to better understand this, we need to see 
Heidegger’s analysis of how moods disclose. This will illustrate why Heidegger ascribes 
priority to certain “negative moods”. 
 Heidegger’s preference for “negative moods”, especially in BT, is a consequence of the 
manner in which he analyzes how moods disclose the burden of being “there”. In BT, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Richard Capobianco, Engaging Heidegger, (London: University of Toronto Press, 2010), p. 53. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Heidegger consistently employs dualisms that orient his analyses: authentic and inauthentic, ontological and ontic. 
Each authentic/ontological manifestation has a corresponding inauthentic/fallen one. One way to understand this is by 
using the grammatical paradigm of declension (inflection). A fundamental mood’s burden can be covered up by 
falling into an objective state, in the same way that a noun inflects (for example, a change in grammatical case). 
Whilst Heidegger does not make this linguistic connection in BT, he makes it expressly in Chapter 2 of his 1935 
lecture Introduction to Metaphysics. 
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Heidegger will particularly turn to Angst and fear, and the way he justifies this has led 
commentators to believe that it was unavoidable for Heidegger to associate ontology with 
negative moods (especially since the methodological need that reveals the burden is one of 
unsettling that brings about uncanniness), and rightly so.  
 
Five theses on mood and disclosure 
Moods can either disclose or conceal the burden. Disclosure is not automatic, since some moods 
conceal the burden, but also since those that unconceal the burden are unstable, precarious, and 
susceptible to immediate change. In §29 of BT, Heidegger offers five theses regarding 
disposition/mood and facticity, three of which I reconstruct thus: 
 
1. Disposition is a binary way of relating to the relatum of facticity 
2. Facticity is a burden. 
3. In everydayness, disposition turns away from the burden, through moods of elation that 
alleviate the burden.  
4. These moods of elation are “distorting moods” [Verstimmungen].  
5. Distorting moods depend on, and betray, more fundamental (negative) moods (e.g. the 
mood of joy is dependent on a more primordial fear which is truer to the burdensome 
character of being-there) 
 
How does disposition disclose? Through the first thesis, Heidegger tells us that disposition is 
manifested as either a “turning towards” or a “turning away” [An-und Abkehr] (174/135). In 
saying this, he sticks to a traditional theory of affective states, consistent with Aristotle’s notion 
of movement as µεταβολή, and his account of πάθη in the Rhetoric as movement between two 
extremes: the “calming” [ἡδύ] and the “upsetting” [λυπηρόν], the “beneficial” [συµφέρον] and 
the “harmful” [βλαβερόν].79 The second thesis holds that facticity is always already (i.e. 
necessarily) a burden: difficult, painful, and threatening. The third thesis holds that, for the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed account of Heidegger’s Aristotelian heritage on affective phenomena. 
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part, mood turns away from the burdensome character of Dasein, with moods of elation 
[Enthobensein] being exemplary of this “turning away” as they alleviate the burden (174/135). 
In Heidegger’s own words: “Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first essential characteristic of 
dispositions that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and—proximally and for the most 
part—in the manner of an evasive turning-away.”80 Turning away is therefore identified as 
phenomenologically more valuable, in the sense that it is the primordial manifestation of the 
“facticity” of the “there”.  
 Dasein’s thrownness is disclosed as disposition, as Befindlichkeit. Thrownness can only 
be revealed in a particular way: it is a finding of one’s “there”, not through a direct perceptive 
seeking, but rather primarily through the movement of “fleeing” [es sich immer schon gefunden 
haben muß – gefunden in einem Finden, das nicht so sehr einem direkten Suchen, sondern 
einem Fliehen entspringt] which is enacted by way of disposition [Diese Abkehr ist, was sie ist, 
immer in der Weise der Befindlichkeit].81  
 Since Dasein turns away from the burden of facticity via moods of elation, it follows 
that these moods of elation are “distorting moods” [Verstimmungen] (the fourth thesis). And 
since distorting moods are reactionary, they are derivative and hence depend on, and betray, the 
more fundamental, negative moods (fifth thesis). Moods such as joy are dependent on a more 
primordial fear, which is truer to the burdensome character of being-there, and which itself 
depends on the more fundamental mood of Angst. 
 In this context, the first essential characteristic of moods that Heidegger identifies 
seems to rely on – and affirm – a distinction between mood and that which mood (un)conceals, 
i.e. the burden of facticity. The distinction is inevitable if some moods conceal facticity. And 
this distinction causes some problems. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 175 (SZ, 136); translation modified. 
81 Ibid, p. 174 (SZ, 135). 
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Problems caused by the theses   
Firstly, Heidegger’s binary way of describing mood operation replicates the dichotomy of 
truth/deception (being/non-being), and is dangerously close to an essentialism based on the 
principle of non-contradiction, as well as representationalism. Secondly, facticity, the “there”, 
becomes like a “state of affairs” to which mood relates, and mood is like a subjective “state”. 
Thirdly, it separates moods along the axis of pleasure and suffering, giving a clear 
methodological priority to negative moods that – at first glance – excludes positive moods such 
as love, joy and hope. 
 These problems arise because Heidegger qualifies “thrownness” (facticity) in a way that 
resembles ahistorical essentialism: being-there is a burden, a kind of suffering, regardless of the 
situation and historical particulars, and regardless of how one feels “on the surface” and what 
kind of mood one finds oneself in in its “everydayness”. There are moods that reveal the deeper 
essence of being-there, and then there are derivative, superficial moods that cover it up. This 
essentialist interpretation is further consolidated by the fact that moods of elation alleviate the 
burden, and they do so by turning away from it, something that does not affect the ontological 
status of facticity (which remains burdensome), but rather is a mere veiling of it.8283 Such an 
essentialist reading is encouraged by the monopoly of Angst in BT, but by its “replacement” by 
shock [Erschrecken] in Heidegger’s later works, and Heidegger’s comprehensive insistence on 
negative moods, which dominate his ontological discourses.848586 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Ibid.  
83 “For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it, and 
least of all does it do so in the mood of elation [Enthobensein] when this burden has been alleviated.” Ibid. 
84 Perhaps the most comprehensive and compelling statement regarding the priority of “negative moods” is made in 
FCM, where Heidegger explicitly associates burden, philosophy and philosophical moods with the mood of 
melancholy [Schwermut]. As he writes: “In creative achievement this burden always represents an imperative and a 
need that weighs heavily upon man’s overall mood, so that he comes to be in a mood of melancholy [Im Schaffen ist 
je nach seiner Art diese Bürde ein Muß und eine Not, an der der Mensch schwer trägt im Gemüt, so daß ihm schwer 
zumute ist]” (FCM, p. 182). And then: “As a creative and essential activity of human Dasein, philosophy stands in 
the fundamental attunement of melancholy. This melancholy concerns the form rather than the content of 
philosophizing, but it necessarily prescribes a fundamental attunement which delimits the substantive content of 
philosophical questioning” (FCM, p. 183). 
85 Schrecken as a fundamental mood corresponds to the historical dimension of Angst, as a sort of Angst’s “epochal 
counterpart”. This is something that Michel Haar insightfully points out in his essay “Attunement and Thinking”, in 
which he pairs these two moods and tries to make sense of their affinity. Inter alia, Haar is interested in pointing out 
how, and explaining why, Angst disappears from Heidegger’s later works. In trying to explain this disappearance, 
Haar analyzes moods in terms of historicality, that is, in terms of the way a fundamental mood relates to metaphysics 
as such, reveals metaphysics as metaphysics, as well as how the mood belongs to a particular historical epoch. Haar 
identifies an ahistorical relation between Angst and metaphysical understanding, thus explaining Heidegger’s 
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 The danger in this essentialist interpretation is twofold: first, it misses the precise nature 
of the methodological exigency that urges Heidegger to turn to moods in general so as to ground 
ontology; second, it makes it impossible to see moods other than Angst, fear, terror (etc.) as 
fundamental, moods, such as love, hope, marvel, etc. This thesis points out how “positive” 
moods, such as love, have a central role even before BT, and sharply focuses on the 
methodological reasons that usher Heidegger to turn to mood in general in order to ground the 
project of fundamental ontology. In this context, the essentialist interpretation is a problem that 
must be overcome because it entertains a misreading that hands over the inaugural capacity of 
moods in BT to phenomena of threat and uncanniness,87 as if the binding necessity cannot come 
from positive moods such as love. Or, it misleads the reader of Heidegger to take BT as an 
attempt to articulate a metaphysics of fundamental uncanniness that later turns to a metaphysics 
of homeliness.88 The problem with such interpretations is that they resolve the unresolvable 
conflicting essence of fundamental moods: their capacity to offer unity as well as urgency and 
ecstasis. They are the transcendental ground that unifies experience, they compel to action 
(movement), and they refer to an Other, to an exteriority. It is Heidegger’s own textual 
formulations that facilitate such a reading and interpretive problems. 
 As mentioned earlier, in BT Heidegger seems to hold that “facticity” and “disposition” 
are not the same phenomenon. He seems to posit that “facticity” is like Da-Seins “state-of-
affairs”, like an “essential”, “factual” correlate, which disposition can either turn towards 
(affirm) or avoid (negate). If that is so, disposition cannot be constitutive of facticity, but rather 
is merely something that either conceals or unconceals it. If we accept this, mood loses its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dropping of Angst in terms of the shifting away from the transcendental phenomenology of the analytic of Dasein 
towards an epochal understanding of Being itself. In this context, Haar draws on the contiguity between Angst and 
Schrecken, arguing that the latter is the historical correlative of the former: after the Kehre, Angst becomes 
reabsorbed in Schrecken. See Michel Haar “Attunement and Thinking”, in Heidegger Reexamined: Art, Poetry, and 
Technology, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 149-162. 
86 Tanja Staehler pointed out to me that in the ‘Contributions’, Heidegger suggests that there is only one fundamental 
mood that presents itself differently at different historical moments. Something along these lines is also suggested in 
BT where he subsumes most fundamental moods as “modes of fear”, but also in FCM when he refers to melancholy. 
87 Or: unsettledness. 
88 For example, see Capobianco 2010. 
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ontological import and retains a restricted epistemological role, subservient to the ontological 
project of BT.89  
 Thrownness and mood should not be taken to be two different entities, but rather as the 
same phenomenon addressed in two different ways, each having a distinct methodological 
function – they refer to the same ontological basic structure. Moods disclose thrownness by way 
of moods, and moods disclose thrownness. Thrownness is the “burdensome character of 
Dasein” [Lastcharakter des Daseins], says Heidegger. But why does Heidegger insist on the 
burdensome character of Dasein, what kind of statement is this, and how can this statement hold 
in situations where the disposition of Dasein is joyful since joy is also a mood and hence a 
manifestation of thrownness? 
 Indeed, Heidegger’s strong association of thrownness with “burden” and “fleeing” 
seems like an ahistorical essentialist statement that being-there is necessarily a kind of suffering, 
a burden. This essentialist interpretation is further consolidated by the fact that Heidegger says 
that the mood of elation alleviates the burden but only by turning away from it, not by really 
removing it.9091 The essentialist interpretation can be overcome by a careful analysis of 
“facticity” which is a burden that can be alleviated.   
 
Burden as facticity/thrownness 
In BT, mood discloses and is evidence for the “there” as sheer “that-it-is”, and this “sheer fact” 
is disclosed in a way that the “from where” (the source, the reason) and the “where to” (the 
purpose) remain in darkness.92 Mood is the very delivery into a “there”. Mood is at the same 
time an “illumination” of the “there” but it is also “veiledness” of the “there” that clouds the 
source and purpose (rational understanding) of the “there”. This “veiledness” is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 If the distinction were an ontological one, then a mood of elation would at the same time constitute an overcoming 
of the “factical nature” of the Da of Dasein – something that is ontologically impossible. Sitting comfortable on a 
chair makes the fact that I am sitting on it disappear altogether, and recede into the background, but in no way does it 
mean that I am not sitting on the chair. Likewise, when my feeling of my body stops being an issue for me, it does 
not mean that I have stopped having a body altogether. 
90 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson p. 174 (SZ, 135). 
91 “For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it, and 
least of all does it do so in the mood of elation [Enthobensein] when this burden has been alleviated.” Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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ontologically insignificant. Rather, it is that which discloses a fundamental characteristic of 
Dasein: “that it is”. Heidegger calls this “thrownness” [Geworfenheit].93 We are thrown 
“there”.94 Heidegger further elaborates on the phenomenon of thrownness by referring to the 
phenomenon of facticity [Faktizität].95 As he says: “The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to 
suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.”96 Moods disclose the facticity of Dasein. But 
what is facticity? Τhe history of the term “facticity” is important here because it helps us better 
contextualize and understand what and how moods reveal in BT,97 which clarifies what 
“burden” means and why “burden” is not an existentiell notion, but rather an epistemic and 
ontological one.98   
 Facticity was a notion firstly used by Fichte and widely employed by German Idealists 
and neo-Kantian philosophers, as well as Dilthey. Schelling used the notion as pertaining to the 
distinction between the “what” of being and the “that” of being (a distinction that grounded his 
Positive Philosophy). “What” refers to being qua essence, whilst “that” refers to being’s 
contingent existence.99 Existentiality is the very facticity of coming into being. Schelling 
distinguishes positive from negative philosophy upon this very distinction: negative philosophy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Ibid. 
94 We should be careful not to think that we exist in any way prior to being “thrown”. Rather, our very existence is 
(in part) thrownness. Thrownness is constitutive of existence, of being-there.  
95 Thrownness is a formal indication that Heidegger uses to refer to what others have called facticity. Whilst this 
indicates that Heidegger is trying to offer his own phenomenological description without being entangled in the 
traditional vocabulary, it seems to me that Heidegger here makes sense of thrownness in terms of facticity, and thus 
reverts to the language of German Idealism. I do not think this is a problem though, because we can think of this the 
other way round: Heidegger tries to rethink facticity in a new way, making sense of facticity in terms of moods and 
thrownness.  
96 Ibid. 
97 In my opinion, the only work of Heidegger that offers a systematic exposition, and can therefore be called a 
“treatise”, is BT. In this context, moods can be said to have an “operation”, but such a systematic role cannot really 
be ascribed to other works of Heidegger where moods play a prominent role. 
98 The three senses were mentioned earlier in the text. 
99 This is also reminiscent of the distinction Aristotle draws in Posterior Analytics where he analyzes the 
demonstrative syllogism. In that context, Aristotle distinguishes between understanding of ‘the fact’ (τὸ ὅτι) and 
understanding ‘the reason why’ (τὸ διότι). See Michael Beaney, “Analysis”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, retrieved from 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/analysis/>. It seems to me that facticity, as it was employed by 
German Idealists and appropriated by Heidegger, and the kind of “understanding” associated with mood and facticity 
in BT, is a descendent of this early Aristotelian distinction. A deeper analysis could point out the extent to which 
such a reference to Aristotle would be permissible and/or points out the critical boundaries of such a genealogical 
argument, however this exceeds the scope of this study. Suffice it to point out that whilst in BT facticity and the kind 
of “knowledge” revealed by disposition and mood has nothing to do with syllogistic thought (at least explicitly), and 
would normally be interpreted as something resisting, or recalcitrant to, logic, what is disclosed by disposition and 
mood would still always already be necessarily accompanied by (the equiprimordial) understanding, and hence that 
which is disclosed by mood must be taken to have understanding always accompanying it, and hence a 
complementary, corresponding way of articulating it in terms of understanding, from the perspective of understanding, 
despite the fact that understanding and disposition should not be formally conflated. 
	   40	  
is rational philosophy that is concerned with the essence, the ‘what’ character of being, and 
positive philosophy is concerned with the pure actuality of the existence of “that” being which 
comes into its being. From this perspective, being is not a settled entity that is conceptually, 
rationally given, but rather is that which comes into being, it is becoming. Insofar as this coming 
into being is not a finished entity but still becoming and contingent, it cannot be conceptually 
grasped and explained. Existence and movement cannot resolve into a logical category because 
they cannot be grasped by conceptual understanding.100  
  As Heidegger says in §29 in BT, “the ‘that-it-is’ of facticity never becomes something 
that we can come across by beholding it [Das Daß der Faktizität wird in einem Anschauen nie 
vorfindlich].”101102 Disposition discloses facticity in a manner whereby it remains an “inexorable 
enigma” which cannot be measured against the “apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of 
something”, but at the same time, Heidegger argues, without being simplistically banished to 
the realm of the “irrational”.103104  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 We must not forget that Heidegger’s project is an attempt to develop an ontology of becoming and temporality. In 
this respect, his closest ancestor is Aristotle (Heidegger repeatedly appeals to Aristotle’s Physics). Disposition and 
mood must be seen in this context of becoming. This explains Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotelian vocabulary, 
especially on affects, and his attempts to develop an existential analytic that would take moods and affects beyond 
Aristotle’s naturalism. The notion of Verfassung in BT is telling. Verfassung refers to the aspect of the existential 
structure of Befindlichkeit that accounts for the possibility of falling, in so far as falling is a certain movement that 
presupposes a stratum. In this context, Verfassung is the answer to the question of „Welche Struktur zeigt die 
»Bewegtheit« des Verfallens?” (GA 2, 177). Heidegger does not explicate this, but in §29 there are two ways that 
mood can fall: the first is through moods of elation, which cover up the burden; the second, which Heidegger does 
not explicitly mention (but which is discernible from context), is the falling from fundamental mood to its derivative 
(from Angst to fear). This is the fall from Befindlichkeit to Verfassung, from “disposition” to “constitution”. Whilst in 
BT there is no explicit connection with Aristotle, Heidegger draws the connection in “Vom Wesen und Begriff der 
Φύσις”, where Heidegger for the first and – to the best of my knowledge – only time identifies Verfassung with 
ῥυθµός, which is a determinate category of physical movement (see Chapter 4 for more on this topic). 
101 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson p. 174 (SZ, 135). 
102 I take it that the critical reference to seeing [Anschauen] is primarily directed at Husserl’s phenomenology. 
Disposition and mood discloses being in a way that a phenomenology based on Anschauen cannot grasp. 
103 Ibid, p. 175 (SZ, 136). 
104 According to my reading, Heidegger does not want moods to be understood as simply the binary opposite of 
rationality, i.e. as that which is irrational and remains completely absent. In my opinion, whilst Heidegger wants to 
clearly retain, to some extent, an irreducible incompatibility between moods and rationality, his hermeneutic position 
does to a certain extent overlap with linguistic realism, arguing for a quasi-organic relationship between moods and 
concepts; moods are, after all, definitively involved in concept formation. Moods are recalcitrant to rational 
understanding, but they can also be described to be “logos-like”, and in a way “present” in rational understanding. 
This is why, in What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger can argue that Angst enables us to speak about the Nothing. In a 
sense, Heidegger is consistent with Aristotle’s position in Peri Hermeneias, where in Chapter 1 he says that spoken 
sounds are symbols of affections in the soul. [Ἔστι µὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθηµάτων σύµβολα, καὶ 
τὰ γραφόµενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράµµατα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν µέντοι ταῦτα 
σηµεῖα πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήµατα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁµοιώµατα πράγµατα ἤδη ταὐτά.] 
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 The way mood discloses the “there” of Dasein is not through “beholding” 
[Anschauen],105 but rather it discloses being-there as kinesis, in a dynamic and pre-conceptual 
way: the “there” is disclosed as a “turning towards” or “turning away” from something [An- und 
Abkehr].106 Everyday dispositions are a self-effacing movement that pushes Dasein away from 
its own facticity, towards a self-misunderstanding and an accompanying misinterpretation of 
selfhood, worldhood and being. This counterintuitive way of indicating disclosure is indeed 
enigmatic, from a logical point of view, but the conservation of the enigmatic character of the 
disclosure of moods is crucial. Heidegger further expands on the “enigmatic character” of that 
which mood discloses that cannot be grasped by theoretical cognition, trying to tease out and 
offer a “positive” account of the mode of disclosure of moods.  
 Mood is therefore a phenomenon that resists conceptual understanding and constitutes 
an epistemological burden. This is the second sense of burden as described earlier. It is in this 
precise movement from the negative phenomenon to the positive, from the recalcitrant 
becoming to the positive description, the indication, that the burden is unavoidably identified 
with a family of “negative moods” which gives it a positive epistemic content. Epistemic 
burden is a burden to understanding, and in the case of facticity it is a burden that relates to a 
particular ontology/metaphysics. Here, it is the being of Da-Sein that gives the burden to 
understanding, and so the epistemic burden is not just an indeterminate burden put to a generic 
understanding, but it is a particular burden associated to the being of Da-Sein (which in BT will 
be the “temporal”/“historical”) – it is an epistemic burden associated with a particular 
ontological understanding.107108  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Here, Heidegger clearly moves beyond Husserl’s phenomenology, which is based on “beholding” [Anschauen] [I 
would have rather translated Anschauen as “seeing” or “viewing”]. I believe that in this sentence Heidegger is tacitly 
criticizing Husserl, whose phenomenology failed to take moods as anything other than a “founded” level of 
intentionality. 
106 As I will show later, this is indeed very close to Aristotle’s notion of movement as µεταβολή, and Aristotle’s 
account of πάθη in the Rhetoric, as συµφέρον or βλαβερόν, and as ἡδύ or λυπηρόν.         
107 This point is made clearer when one considers this: the burden placed on understanding regarding the being of a 
particular object, say the being of nature, is a different burden from the one placed on understanding by the being of 
Da-Sein. Likewise, the mood that makes manifest this burden would also differ.   
108 Heidegger makes clear that fundamental moods are an epistemic burden with a particular ontological demand and 
ontological space, in BQP, where he says that the need “arises from the distress of not knowing the way out or the 
way in [Nicht-aus-und-ein-Wissen]; but that is by no means to be understood as a perplexity in some particular 
circumstances or other. What then is it? Not knowing the way out or the way in: that is to say, out of and into that 
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 The ontological essence of the facticity to which mood and burden refer in BT must 
come into relief in order to understand what facticity means, which mood can alleviate the 
ontological burden, which mood can take the burden, and why the mood that takes said burden 
is inevitably essentialized. Facticity in BT is the being of Da-Sein, the being of becoming, 
which is inherently “unsettled”. Hence, the mood associated with being-there as being-unsettled 
is Angst, and that is why Heidegger thematizes that mood in BT. Angst is specifically suited for 
the purposes of the ontological project particular to BT.  
 It bears repeating that BT is a project meant to awaken the question of the meaning of 
Being – in this context, the fundamental mood to be awakened must offer the ground for 
ontological authenticity, that is for overcoming inauthentic understanding and bringing 
temporality, the temporal character of Da-Sein, into relief, as that which constitutes care and 
Being-in-the-World. BT strives to show how the primordial unity of the structure of care lies in 
temporality. 
 Let us also not forget that there is circularity involved here, which in some respects 
compromises the methodological “purity” of the project. A circularity that Heidegger does not 
deny – rather he urges the reader to embrace it. The grounding mood to be awakened is already 
presupposed by that which is sought, by the interpretation proposed and the conceptual 
language employed. Hence, awakening the fundamental mood is not a matter of discovery that 
moves into the transcendental ground without presuppositions. This shows that the fundamental 
mood is contingent on the ontological project at hand. Fundamental mood and concepts 
mutually define and delimit one another.109 Hence, Angst is chosen to be awakened based on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which such knowing first opens up as an untrodden and ungrounded ‘space’. This is a ‘between’ where it has not 
been determined what being is or not-being is.” (BQP, §35).  
109 In Basic Questions of Philosophy (BQP), Heidegger talks about how metaphysical questioning comes out of a 
necessity that is internally defined and delimited (“destined”) by the enacted fundamental mood. He explicitly says 
this when he analyzes the “first beginning”, i.e. ancient Greek philosophy. Heidegger writes that the Greeks began 
thinking as an inquiry into beings as such, in terms of an experience of unconcealedness (αλήθεια) as the basic 
character of beings (φύσις). But the Greeks did not deem truth itself and its essence worthy of any original 
questioning. It was not out of superficiality or of a debility in the power of thinking that the Greeks did not ask the 
most original question of ἀλήθεια but out of being equal to their destiny: “Their destiny was something into which 
they were compelled ever anew, something their thinkers, despite being basically different, nevertheless understood 
as the same, something that for them was therefore a necessity. Every necessity lays hold of man out of a need. Every 
need becomes compelling out of, and within, a basic disposition” (GA45, p. 112; my italics). [Ihre Bestimmung war 
Jenes, zu dem sie immer neu hingezwungen wurden, Jenes, was die in ihrer Art grundverschiedenen Denker doch als 
das Selbe ergriffen, Jenes, was daher für sie eine Notwendigkeit war. Alle Notwendigkeit springt auf den Menschen 
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internal phenomenological necessity, the internal burden, of BT. This contextualizes Angst 
within particular historical demands, and in doing so relativizes Angst but without 
compromising its capacity to ground. Heidegger does not say this in BT, and this silence on his 
behalf misleads readers into thinking that Angst is an ahistorical mood, which is the ground of 
essentialist ontology.110 However, in FCM, Heidegger offers a number of theses on fundamental 
moods, four of which support my argument.111 
 
1. Metaphysical questions can be drawn out from every fundamental attunement [aus 
jeder Grundstimmung des Daseins entfalten lassen].112  
2. Which fundamental attunement we choose to awaken is not arbitrary. We do choose 
freely, but “in the deepest sense we are bound and compelled as well” [Wir wählen 
zwar in gewissem Sinne und sind dabei frei, doch wir sind im tiefsten Sinne gebunden 
und gezwungen].113 
3. The choice involves binding ourselves to the intrinsic character of metaphysics itself. 
[Die Wahl ist ein Sichbinden an den in der Metaphysik selbst liegenden Zwang, den 
Einsatz eines bestimmten endlichen Daseins zu vollziehen, d.h. aber alle Darin 
beschlossene Bedingtheit seines Fragens zu übernehmen].114 The particular 
fundamental attunement is awakened when “we actually summon up the effort to be 
there [da zu sein].” This does not relativize fundamental attunement, nor does it make 
the awakened fundamental attunement as the “absolute” one.115 
4. When we ask from a particular fundamental attunement, this does not mean that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
zu aus einer Not. Jede Not wird nötigend aus einer und in einer Grundstimmung.] 
110 Michel Haar, in his essay “Attunement and Thinking”, in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), p. 170, raises the issue of whether anxiety is also trans-epochal. In his own 
words: “Such a mood [Angst] is temporalization of time and source of thought as well as source of history. This 
mood is not radically caught in history or floating above history as a ‘spirit of the times,’ but is the matrix in which 
being becomes an epoch. As such, it seems to be situated both within and outside of history. Is there not by this fact a 
‘trans-epochal’ privilege attached to anxiety, and that in several respects?” 
111 In FCM, Heidegger makes two incompatible statements regarding fundamental mood and philosophy. On the one 
hand, he states that philosophy is always associated with melancholy [Schwermut]; on the other hand, he speaks of 
the relative freedom in choosing which mood to awaken. 
112 FCM, p. 181. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 FCM, p.182. 
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attunement overwhelms the others, prevents them or reduces their significance.116  
 
The first and fourth theses make it clear that no one fundamental mood can monopolize 
metaphysics. It cannot be true therefore that Angst should monopolize. The second thesis makes 
it clear that, on the one hand, there is a choice involved in the mood that is awakened, but on the 
other, the mood is not arbitrarily chosen but is rather bound and compelled to do so by the 
metaphysical questions raised. Heidegger here acknowledges the aforementioned circularity. 
Finally, the third thesis further clarifies what determines the choice to awaken a particular 
mood: the decision is determined by the intrinsic character of metaphysics to enact being-there, 
to embrace the responsibility posed by the burden of the particular, historical, being-there. 
  
Disposition: neither subjective nor objective 
Having seen the first ontological characteristic of mood, and how it discloses and becomes an 
ontological burden, let us see the other two, which are: moods disclose Being-in-the-World as a 
whole and enable intentional directedness to emerge; and moods show a disclosive submission 
to the world, which enables the primary discovery of the world as something that matters, as 
such. In order for these two characteristics to make sense, we must understand how moods are 
neither subjective nor objective, but rather “in-between”. This is a critical distinction that serves 
as a compass in distinguishing Grundstimmung from normal, everyday moods. Fundamental 
mood is neither subjective nor objective; it is neither about the subject nor about an object, but it 
reveals the “there” in a pre-intentional way. 
 The fundamental way mood discloses the “there” of Dasein is such that it overturns the 
modern paradigm of the human being as autonomous rational agent.117 A mood does not 
disclose the “subjective” aspects of human being, in the modern sense of subject which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 FCM, pp. 181-182. 
117 This is the Cartesian paradigm of selfhood that permeates Kant and that is also inherited by Husserl.  
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rational and autonomous. A mood is something that assails us [Die Stimmung überfällt], but it 
comes neither from the “inside” nor from the “outside”.118 
 Fundamental mood constitutes and discloses meaning before the subject-object, 
internal-external, data form, and also outside of the passive-active dichotomy. Fundamental 
mood discloses worldhood as the originary “in-between” which is neither side of an intentional 
relation, and therefore mood is that level of meaning that is “pre-intentional” but which enables 
intentionality to emerge. Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood therefore is crucial for his 
rejection of the subject-object model of understanding the relationship between human and 
world.119 Heidegger articulates “what” mood discloses thus: “The mood has already disclosed, 
in every case, Being-in-the-World as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself 
towards something.”120 There are two important transcendental arguments here. Firstly, that 
mood is neither objective nor subjective, but rather something more originary that constitutes, 
and discloses, that which comes before the very distinction between the two poles, between a 
subject and an object; and also secondly, that it is what enables directedness in the first place. 
Disposition, mood, is what allows for anything to matter for Dasein, in general [Diese 
Angänglichkeit gründet in der Befindlichkeit].121 
 Fundamental mood discloses our prior embeddedness in the world, that is, in a 
“system” of meaningful references and relations, our inevitable “immersion” in meaningfulness 
as a whole. This means that mood is not about a particular object or thing, but rather is about 
meaningfulness itself in general. Fundamental mood is not about being thrown against a 
particular object that is present-at-hand and that affects us in such and such a way, but is pre-
objective. Fundamental mood is horizonal, background disclosure of the “there” that cannot be 
attributed either to a subject or an object, which are derivative modes of disclosure. As I show 
in the thesis, this is Heidegger’s phenomenological version of “categorial intuition”, whereby 
Being in general is pre-reflectively grasped and disclosed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson, p. 176 (SZ, 136). 
119 See Lauren Freeman, “Toward a Phenomenology of Mood”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 55(4) (2014), 
pp. 445-476. 
120 Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson p. 176 (SZ, 137). 
121 Ibid, p. 177 (SZ, 137). 
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 As mentioned, this characteristic helps Heidegger distinguish between fundamental 
mood and normal mood. Remember how the characteristic of “in-betweenness” is crucial for 
the formation and experience of ontological burden, which is at the beginning of 
ontology/metaphysics. Everyday mood on the other hand has an object, and its epistemic 
demands and conditions of possibility of fulfilment of those demands are different. Angst is a 
fundamental mood, whereby no object can satisfy its oppressiveness, whereas its derivative, 
fear, is not a fundamental mood because it refers to an object and an intentional relation. 
 These two ontological characteristics can also be summed up thus: disposition is the 
foundational ground, the unifying ground that enables meaning in general to emerge. 
Disposition is like the transcendental “space of meaning”, the “container” that enables 
subjectivity and objectivity to emerge. The second and third ontological characteristics of mood 
pertain to the unifying, “gathering”, transcendental character of mood. In addition, this unifying 
character is not one of willing, or one of active synthesis, but rather is closer to a “world-
submissive synthesis”.122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 It is tough to name this transcendental phenomenon, as it is neither an “act” nor a “passive syn-thesis”. The most 
appropriate word to use would be “dia-thesis”, disposition, which is indeed the Aristotelian notion that Heidegger 
renders as Befindlichkeit. Perhaps the best way to describe this is as a transcendental diathesis, a transcendental 
dispositioning.   
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Chapter 1: Heidegger’s Early Freiburg Lectures and the Neo-Kantian Predicament 
I. The narrative  
Introductory remarks 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an account of the most pressing philosophical problems 
that shaped Heidegger’s early thought, especially with regards to the way it influenced his turn 
to affective states in order to identify the ground out of which phenomenology (philosophy) 
emerges.  
 The central textual and philosophical operation that the mature Heidegger ascribes to 
mood [Stimmung] is a key characteristic of his phenomenology. In BT, it is through mood that 
Dasein is brought before its facticity, and later on it is through mood that the truth of the 
Nothing is manifested, and it is through mood that the urgency and necessity of the “other 
beginning” is effectuated.  
 The young Heidegger tries to relocate the foundation of truth, on pre-propositional 
levels of understanding. The foundation is what legitimizes and justifies objectivity and logical 
validity. Heidegger relocates the foundation in pre-reflective levels of existence, in which the 
criterion for all truth, including the truth of propositional logic, is grounded. Mood also figures 
prominently in late Heidegger, for example in the lecture What is Philosophy? (1955), where 
he, following Plato and Aristotle, determines wonder, a mood, as the archē of philosophy. 
Before that, in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (1936-38), Heidegger envisioned 
a cultural transformation that would constitute a “new beginning” of thinking, whose beginning 
he connected with a fundamental mood [Grundstimmung]. In this context, it has been argued 
that moods supply the “binding necessity” for the cultural transformation that Heidegger 
himself envisioned.123  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See Klaus Held’s “Fundamental Moods and Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture”, in Reading 
Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). But there are other 
Heidegger scholars who have written on the important grounding capacity of mood in relation to the “other 
beginning” that the late Heidegger envisions. For example, Tracy Colony writes the following: “The importance 
which Heidegger accorded the grounding attunement of Contributions is unequivocal: ‘All essential thinking requires 
that its thoughts and sentences be mined, like ore, every time anew out of the grounding-attunement. If the 
grounding-attunement stays away, then everything is a forced rattling of concepts and empty words’ (C, 16). And yet, 
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 But what would “binding necessity” mean, and why would Heidegger locate it in mood, 
as opposed to, say, predicative judgment (Urteil) as his predecessors did? According to Klaus 
Held, bindingness is that which binds our thinking, because in it lies a compulsion, a necessity 
[Notwendigkeit].124 I take “binding necessity” to refer to the motivating ground of intentional 
acts. Its function is comparable to that of the categorical imperative; that is, the condition for the 
possibility of moral action; however, it is a transcendental imperative that is neither a natural, 
external law, nor an internal, voluntaristic construction. It is like the “reason” that legitimizes 
the truthfulness of acts, necessarily binding on Dasein insofar as it resolutely commits to 
complying with it in intending anything at all. By ascribing binding necessity to mood, the pre-
predicative truth of mood is what legitimizes predicative truth. In this way, “bindingness of 
philosophical propositions is […] placed on an entirely new foundation that runs counter to the 
tradition. […] Traditionally, truth has its place in judgment” and it is precisely this logical 
tradition that Heidegger aims to radicalize.125 As this chapter shows, this was the most pressing 
problem that neo-Kantian philosophers, as well as Husserl, tried to resolve, and in any attempt 
to better understand Heidegger’s preoccupation with this problem, we must see how neo-
Kantian philosophers and Husserl affected his thought. 
 The young Heidegger126 utilizes Husserlian terminology in order to radicalize the 
traditional conception of truth. The most fundamental problem for Heidegger, at the time, had to 
do with the methods of philosophy itself, the way philosophy is able to access and articulate 
transcendental truth. In this context, the main question had to do with the very nature of 
phenomenological understanding and the formation of philosophical conceptuality. Heidegger’s 
early Freiburg lecture courses thematized these basic questions concerning the very definition of 
philosophy and its relation to life, and most importantly how philosophy gains access to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
what is the grounding attunement of Contributions? Is the attunement that is the sustaining source of this ‘questioning 
along a pathway’ something that is already present as a continuous uninterrupted support? It would be more accurate 
to say that the grounding attunement of Contributions is an attunement that remains something to be unfolded 
through the enacted thinking and saying of Contributions itself. What this thinking is a preparation for is the breaking 
in of what Heidegger describes as: ‘the grounding-attunement of thinking in the other beginning’ (C, 11)”. Tracy 
Colony, “Attunement and Transition: Hölderlin and Contributions To Philosophy (From Enowning)”, Studia 
Phaenomenologica, VIII (2008), p. 429.  
124 Held 1993, p. 287. 
125 Held 1993, p. 288.  
126 I am referring to the early Freiburg period and some of his Marburg period, so roughly from 1919 to 1925. 
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appropriate situation out of which philosophical interpretation develops (the hermeneutic 
situation).127 In this context, the young Heidegger developed, in the early 1920s, the notion of 
“factical life experience” [Faktische Lebenserfahrung], and re-defined the phenomenological 
project as a “hermeneutics of facticity”,128 the task of which was to indicate the fundamental 
characteristics of the situation out of which philosophical understanding and conceptuality 
emerges. 
 This radical relocating of the binding necessity of philosophy on mood was something 
that was already developing in Heidegger’s thought in the decade preceding the publication of 
the Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning), in his hermeneutic of facticity. A narrative is 
needed in order to recreate the reasons that ushered Heidegger to ascribe a pivotal role to mood. 
The question becomes one of precisely when and how Heidegger’s own phenomenology turns 
hermeneutic and to what extent the pivotal function of mood is related to a radicalization of 
Husserlian phenomenology and the infusion of it with certain Diltheyan insights. 
 It is impossible to trace an exact linear development of Heidegger’s thought or to 
recreate an objective storyline. Heidegger was affected by various strands of philosophy,129 
especially neo-Kantians (and here it is also important to note the very diversity that existed 
within neo-Kantianism itself), hermeneutics (Dilthey), Lebensphilosophie, Husserlian 
phenomenology, medieval Christian theology, and last but not least, Aristotle. None of these 
traditions, schools and thinkers fit in a pure and unmediated doxography; what we have are 
sedimented positions that mutually affect each other. 
 It is important to look into Heidegger’s early years, starting from his early Freiburg 
period, in some detail. Heidegger enjoyed a long career, his thought full of bifurcations, 
impasses and circularities (both fruitful and vicious). In effect, certain themes and insights 
gained in the early Freiburg period are abandoned in the Marburg period but recur in the later, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Anne Granberg, “Mood and Method in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit”, in Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation: 
Phenomenology in the Nordic Countries, ed. D. Zahavi et al. (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), p. 
94.  
128 Granberg 2003, p. 95. 
129 To the extent that he was even accused of syncreticism (see Friedman 2000). 
	   50	  
post-Kehre, period. Thus, looking at the early Freiburg period helps us also to understand 
conceptual developments in the late period. 
  
Two competing interpretations of Heidegger’s early phenomenological period 
One must look into Heidegger’s early Freiburg years in order to understand his 
phenomenological breakthrough to the so-called “hermeneutics of facticity”, and how these 
issues shaped the increasingly important role that Heidegger came to ascribe to the disclosive 
and grounding character of the affective, pre-reflective experience, which he later calls “mood”. 
The disclosive character of moods is realized by throwing into relief the way philosophical 
understanding [Verstehen] is bounded with, and opened up by, comportment [Verhalten], which 
is the way the self relates to that which is given.  
 Comportment allows for the manifestation of the grounding character of the affective 
(pre-reflective) level of intentionality. As such, comportment has an enactmental character – it 
is a relating that operates both in an epistemological and ontological way. Comportment 
expresses the unity of both the methodological and existential origins of understanding and is 
thus the very ground of philosophical enactment [Vollzug] (and of all kinds of intentional 
enactments in general, on all levels and expressions of factical life). We will see in some detail 
how Heidegger defines philosophy as comportment, and how this move serves as a bridge for 
his turn to Aristotle, which follows right after Heidegger moves to Marburg, and which must 
also be embedded and interpreted within the context of the Natorp-Husserl affair, to which 
Heidegger was responding.    
  Some interpreters accuse the young Heidegger of indulging in “syncretism”,130 trying 
to situate himself in a very philosophically “busy” context that is an admixture of parallel, 
concurring and also antithetical spiritual currents: the two distinct neo-Kantians schools, 
Lebensphilosophie, hermeneutics, phenomenology, etc. The syncretistic reading of the young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See Andreas Vrahimis. Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy. (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2013.)  
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Heidegger is an unfair interpretation that signifies a failure to properly assess and understand 
where Heidegger is coming from and where he is trying to go.  
 Once these lectures are approached with the necessary fidelity and care, a clearer 
structured problematic manifests itself with Husserlian phenomenology as the basis of 
Heidegger’s approach. And once the Husserlian influences are better defined, this would also 
resolve another problematic interpretation of certain Heidegger scholars: the one that takes his 
early phenomenological period as a “stint” that is fundamentally incompatible with his late 
philosophy – the interpretation that reads the middle and late Heidegger as eventually 
abandoning Husserlian insights, rather than radicalizing them from within. 
 Such a reappraisal of Heidegger’s early Freiburg period also reveals the indispensible 
Husserlian elements of his work, and effectively undermines, or weakens, the “christian” 
interpretations of his thought, and qualifies the overtly religious tone that certain interpreters see 
in Heidegger’s philosophy. These interpretations draw from Heidegger’s appropriations of 
Christian terminology. During his early Freiburg years, Heidegger appropriated several notions 
and themes from Christian theology that remained in operation throughout his Marburg years 
and made it into Being and Time: notions such as Fallenness and Care [cura] (St. Augustine), 
the notion of Angst (Kierkegaard), and more broadly Heidegger’s thematization of facticity 
[Faktizität]. 
 It is not only the thematic and notional appropriations that lend support to these 
interpretations, but also Heidegger’s biography as well as some of his self-descriptions 
contained in correspondence. As regards Heidegger’s religious mentors, the biographies out 
there, as well as his own accounts, refer to his relation to religiosity, his Church scholarship, and 
his deep relation to his mentor, the theologian Carl Braig: even after switching from theology to 
philosophy, Heidegger kept attending Braig’s lecture course on dogmatics because of his 
interest in speculative theology.131 Heidegger spoke of how, through Braig, he came to see the 
significance of Schelling and Hegel for speculative theology in a way that brought speculative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Martin Heidegger. “My Way to Phenomenology” in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (London: The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1972), p. 75.  
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theology in tension with the dogmatic system of scholasticism.132 And indeed, in following these 
words one can think that the young Heidegger turns to a phenomenology of religious life in the 
Winter Semester of 1920-21 contra Aristotle, while approvingly taking note of Luther’s strong 
dislike of Aristotle because of his influence on the “hellenization of Christianity”.133 The 
wording and the textual spirit indeed could lead someone into passing Heidegger off for a 
Christian philosopher of some sort. His approach to Luther and Paul is sympathetic, subscribing 
to a particular rhetoric of endorsement. But we must not forget that Heidegger keeps qualifying 
his idiosyncratic Christianity and hints at a certain tension between philosophy and religion in 
the conventional sense. Biographical background attests to this. 
 In December 1918, Heidegger’s wife, Elfride, paid a visit to Father Krebs, the Catholic 
prest who in 1917 had presided over the wedding ceremony of the Heideggers, in order to 
inform him that they were not intending to have their child baptized because Martin had lost his 
faith in the Catholic church.134 Following this visit, Heidegger sent a letter to Father Krebs on 
January 9, 1919, in which he informed him about this decision, also informing him that it was 
his phenomenology of religion that had transformed his basic standpoint. It is important to take 
note of the fact that Heidegger already ascribes priority to his obligations as a phenomenologist 
and philosopher.135 
 In a letter to Karl Löwith on August 19, 1921, Heidegger identifies his philosophizing 
as irrevocably attached to his own facticity and existing, and he acknowledges a certain 
“Christian side” in this.136 But this Christian side is contingent. His hermeneutics of facticity 
does not emerge out of Christianity, but is encountered within an already enacted 
phenomenological analysis. One may well argue that the factical situation of Heidegger 
comprises a necessary existential experience out of which, and in which, his phenomenology 
emerges. This is correct, and this means that we are faced with a certain circularity as regards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 I take it that “dogmatic system of scholasticism” refers to neo-Aristotelian ontology here.   
133 See PRL (GA 60). 
134 Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1926, ed. Theodore Kisiel and 
Thomas Sheehan (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), p. 95. 
135 Ibid, p. 96. 
136 “It has always been clear to me that neither you nor Becker would accept the Christian side of me, and I have 
never understood you to be seeking agreement in this connection” (Ibid, p. 100). 
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the foundations of his own “Christian” facticity and his phenomenology: the two are different 
aspects of the same situation that feed back into each other. However, my point is that while his 
phenomenology describes an overall project, a method that is not exhausted, his “Christianity” 
is only contingently related to his philosophical method. The proximity with Husserl, neo-
Kantianism and other issues of philosophical nature, are more fundamental for his philosophy 
than his “Christianity” is. The method is more important than the “worldview”. 
 If one were to take Heidegger’s “Christianity” at face value, as well as all those critical 
remarks against Aristotle in his lectures on religious experience, one would be very perplexed 
by what Heidegger does the very next year, after the Augustine lectures! Next year, during the 
Winter Semester of 1921-22, Heidegger delivers a lecture course on Aristotle, the so-called 
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: a lecture course that signifies the beginning 
of his protracted Auseinandersetzung [encounter] with Aristotle that culminates in BT. If our 
approach to Heidegger’s works takes his “Christianity” as fundamental, and if we take at face 
value the apparent opposing dualism of religious experience vs. dogmatic neo-Aristotelian 
Scholastic ontology, then we would think that when he turns to Aristotle, he “switches sides”. 
But the truth is that Heidegger’s phenomenological method is such that his encounters are not 
endorsements of any Weltanschauung, meaning that he neither unqualifyingly endorses, say, the 
anti-Aristotelian Christianity of Luther, nor does he unqualifyingly endorse Aristotle.  
 One way out of this apparent contradiction is given by Theodore Kisiel in The Genesis 
of Heidegger’s Being and Time, where he relies on Heidegger’s own information, on a letter 
sent to Karl Löwith in particular,137 where Heidegger justifies his “turn” towards Aristotle by 
appealing to certain extra-philosophical reasons, matters of practical necessities that encouraged 
him to go for Aristotle. Heidegger says that the choice of Aristotle was not “philosophically 
free”, as what he really wanted to do was focus on theology, but his students’ poor theological 
background prevented him from doing so. He therefore opted for Aristotle, as that would 
provide his students with a more comfortable philosophical environment. 
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 If we take this explanation to be exhaustive, then one could still assume that 
Heidegger’s main concerns were irrevocably Christian-theological: an Augustinian-Lutheran 
who appropriates the Christian vocabulary through and through. And in fact, several 
commentators who continue with Kisiel’s line of thought emphasize the strong “Christian”, or 
“mystical”, side of Heidegger’s phenomenology: John Van Buren’s book The Young Heidegger, 
endorsed by certain Derrideans, such as John Sallis and John Caputo, is the most important 
example of this reading. William Richardson’s comments are telling: “Van Buren spells out 
Heidegger’s debt to the Christian religious tradition in great detail. Concepts such as care, 
understanding, mood, anxiety, death, authenticity/inauthenticity and kairological time all have 
their antecedence in it”.138  
 But this interpretation undermines the other influences of Heidegger’s philosophy, 
especially Husserl. Self-biographical support for this is ample. In a later letter to Rudolf 
Bultmann, Heidegger wrote that his work was aiming at a radicalization of ancient ontology, 
which, at the same time, was aiming at a universal extension [Ausbau] of ancient ontology’s 
relation to the area of history. The foundation of this problematic, writes Heidegger, took its 
vantage point from “the Subject” in the sense of “human Dasein”, with Augustine, Luther and 
Kierkegaard being philosophically important for the construction of a radicalized understanding 
of Dasein and with Dilthey as being important for the interpretation of the “historical World”. 
Aristotle and the Scholastics were important for the rigorous formulation of respectful 
ontological problems, while all of this was made possible through the method, and in line with 
the idea of scientific philosophy, established by Husserl.139    
 In his essay ‘My Way to Phenomenology’, Heidegger writes that as he “practiced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire: Essays in Honor of William J. Richardson, S.J., edited by 
William J. Richardson and Babette Babich, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), p. 288. 
139 My emphasis. The original reads: “Inhaltlich wäre nur zu sagen, daß meine Arbeit zielt auf eine Radikalisierung 
der antiken Ontologie und zugleich auf einen universalen Ausbau derselben in Bezug auf die Region der Geschichte. 
Das Fundament dieser Problematik bildet der Ausgang vom »Subjekt« im rechtverstandenen Sinne des 
»menschlischen Daseins«, so daß mit der Radikalisierung dieses Ansatzes zugleich die echten Motive des deutschen 
Idealismus zu ihrem Recht kommen. Augustin, Luther, Kierkegaard sind philosophisch wesentlich für die 
Ausbildung eines radikaleren Daseinsverständnisses, Dilthey für die Interpretation der »geschichtlichen Welt«. 
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phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the 
same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, [his] interest leaned 
anew toward the Logical Investigations”,140 and especially the sixth logical investigation whose 
scope covered the determination of “the manifold meaning of being”.141 Thus, Heidegger’s turn 
to Aristotle after religious experience, and his encounter with Aristotelian thought which 
typified (what I call) his “middle period” took place within his hermeneutics of facticity which 
was enabled through Husserlian phenomenology. This neither means that Heidegger merely 
applied Husserl’s phenomenological method, nor that he abandoned it; rather, he radicalized it. 
Heidegger’s response to Richardson is telling:   
Now if in the title of your book, From Phenomenology to Thought, you 
understand ‘Phenomenology’ in the sense just described as a philosophical 
position of Husserl, then the title is to the point, insofar as the Being-question 
as posed by me is something completely different from that position. […] If, 
however, we understand ‘Phenomenology’ as the [process of] allowing the 
most proper concern of thought to show itself, then the title should read 
‘Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being.’ [Ein Weg durch die 
Phänomenologie in das Denken des Seins, C.H.] This possessive [of Being], 
then, says that Being as such (Beon) [das Seyn, C.H.] shows itself 
simultaneously as that which is to-be-thought and as that which has want of a 
thought corresponding to it.142  
 
In order to come to terms with Heidegger’s later philosophy, we must discern a general 
phenomenological economy encompassing the whole of his work, and see how this goes back to 
Husserlian phenomenology. But such an appraisal would require us to understand his early 
phenomenological work not as a “stint” but as an indispensible and very fruitful encounter with 
Husserl and neo-Kantianism. In this context, it would be fruitful to see how, as Richardson 
writes, “[f]rom the very beginning, Heidegger’s exclusive preoccupation, hence the unique 
sense of his way, has been to lay a foundation for metaphysics”.143  
 What is in order then is to be able to identify how the young Heidegger’s 
phenomenological breakthrough, whose key insights make up the phenomenological economy 
that runs through all of his periods, connects with Husserlian phenomenology as well as neo-	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Kantianism. Kisiel’s interpretation is inadequate, and an alternative interpretation must be 
sought. The most important interpreter and commentator to pursue this is Steven Crowell. 
Crowell sees Heidegger’s crucial discovery of Formal Indication in continuity with neo-Kantian 
problems and especially with Husserlian phenomenological terminology. Matthew Burch sums 
up the two major approaches thus:  
 
[S]ome argue that formal indication is Heidegger’s first pass at a non-reflective 
approach to what he would later call the ‘Event of Being’; others contend that 
the method is Heidegger’s refinement of Husserlian phenomenology. Theodore 
Kisiel offers the most developed version of the former thesis, while Steven 
Crowell lays out the best defense of the latter. […] On the one hand, Kisiel 
represents those who argue that Heidegger dedicated his career to the ‘Event of 
Being’, with the exception of a notable (and errant) voyage into the 
metaphysics of subjectivity.144  
 
Dermot Moran also lends his support to Crowell’s interpretation. While Crowell endorses 
Kisiel’s view of Heidegger as a philosopher of philosophy whose basic question was: how is 
philosophy possible?, “he is rightfully critical of the absence of the figure of Husserl from 
Kisiel’s account”.145 This thesis attempts to enrich Crowell’s interpretation.  
But in spite of siding with Crowell, I part with both him and Kisiel (and van Buren) on 
their failure to see the continuities between Heidegger’s early pre-BT phenomenological work 
and his late work (i.e. the Contributions to Philosophy: from Enowning). Crowell sees the 
Contributions as, more or less, a wrong turn.146 But I think that had he seen the relation of mood 
in the young Heidegger’s phenomenology as an appropriation and radicalization of Husserlian 
terminology, he would have also seen a continuity between the young “Husserlian” Heidegger 
and the late Heidegger of the Contributions, in which Heidegger performs his thought exercises 
on the other beginning (and where moods have a prominent role).  
 As we have seen in certain key autobiographical remarks of Heidegger, the 
phenomenology of subjectivity that Husserl embarked upon was not an insignificant, erratic part 	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in the development of Heidegger’s thought. Any genealogical account of the “affective” in 
Heidegger’s thought must pay heed to this aspect of his philosophy.  
Heidegger’s turn to Husserl should not be taken as a stint, or as an “exception” to a 
certain Heideggerian religious or mystical allegiance that some interpreters take for granted. 
There are genuine philosophical reasons that lead Heidegger to embrace Husserl in the first 
place, and the “radical breaks” that appear in Heidegger’s phenomenology do not appear so 
radical once we take a closer look at Husserl’s work at the time.  
 
Heidegger and Husserl as post-neo-Kantians 
We need to approach both Heidegger and Husserl as post-neo-Kantian philosophers. That is to 
say: as post-Kantian philosophers who are deeply engaged with the neo-Kantian problems of 
the early twentieth century, who participate in a serious dialogue with their contemporary neo-
Kantian philosophers and who try to resolve problems that they think neo-Kantian philosophers 
are facing. I am using the term “neo-Kantian” here in a very broad sense; indeed in such a way 
that even Dilthey qualifies as a neo-Kantian.  
 I endorse Crowell’s thesis147 that while phenomenology “attempted to go beyond Neo-
Kantianism by rejecting the dualism of appearance and thing in itself, yet in many ways it 
remained squarely within it, specifically in its suspicion of both speculative metaphysics […] 
and naturalism”.148 The young Heidegger did share with Husserl the neo-Kantian vision of 
overcoming psychologism as well as reestablishing the transcendental status of philosophy as 
“Queen of sciences”. At the same time, Heidegger was responding to the neo-Kantian 
predicament (as Heidegger himself saw it), whereby transcendental philosophy was left with an 
unbridgeable cleft between “being” (the factical level of the cognitive act) and ideal “logic” 
(value). Heidegger thought that Husserl’s phenomenology indeed offered a way of connecting 
these “two realms” through his notion of categorial intuition, which is given in sense-perception 
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as it was articulated in an earlier work of Husserl (in the Logical Investigations, Husserl 
grounds the truth of “state of affairs” [Sachverhalt] to intuition). 
 In one sense, the young Heidegger’s turn to affectivity was an attempt to ground the 
transcendental philosophy of Husserl back to facticity. Even if some commentators find the 
approach to the young Heidegger from a neo-Kantian perspective to be slightly alienating vis-à-
vis the rest of Heidegger’s periods, it is my conviction that Heidegger’s early turn to the 
hermeneutics of facticity develops out of an encounter with transcendental-philosophical 
concerns which he does not exactly turn his back on. Besides, the explicit transcendental aspects 
of his approach do not subside: this is indicated by the retainment of the Kantian transcendental 
notion of a priori in BT.  
 Heidegger, along with Husserl, shared with neo-Kantian philosophers the vision of 
overcoming psychologism, which came hand in hand with the aim of restoring the 
transcendental status of philosophy as the “Queen of sciences”. The problem of psychologism, 
also called the “Psychologism dispute” [Psychologismus-Streit], had to do with the relationship 
between logic and psychology. The dispute was fought over most intensely in Germany and 
Austria between 1890 and 1914; indeed, during this period pretty much all of German-speaking 
philosophy was engulfed in the dispute, and it is in this environment that Heidegger’s own 
philosophy developed.149 The dispute centered on the question of whether logic is a part of 
psychology and whether psychology is the science most appropriate to the study of the structure 
of logic. Even though Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl were the most prominent figures 
involved in the dispute, the neo-Kantian philosophers Paul Natorp and Heinrich Rickert also 
shared this concern.150 
 With psychologism taking over the “realm of logic”, a traditional philosophical area, 
and the other sciences having already attained epistemological superiority in the realm of 
“objects” and nature, philosophy would become redundant. The response to this problem 	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150 As has been pointed out by scholars, even though the label “neo-Kantian” is broadly used to describe the 
philosophical contributions of some philosophers, upon closer investigation the label fails to clearly demarcate the 
essential characteristics that unify said philosophers. In this chapter, the philosophers of interest labelled as neo-
Kantian are Paul Natorp, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask, as well as Wilhelm Dilthey.  
	   59	  
involved a definition of what philosophy was, what its role and area of study would be, and how 
it would relate to the other sciences. Thus, neo-Kantian philosophers distinguished philosophy 
from the empirical sciences by calling the specific theme of philosophy as Geltungsbereich 
(realm of validity). Husserl also had a similar response: he called it “phenomenological 
immanence”, but later changed it to “transcendental consciousness”.151 Both neo-Kantians and 
Husserl, but also Heidegger, concerned themselves with meaning and the grounding role that 
philosophy must have as regards the truth of all other sciences: philosophy has precedence as it 
studies meaning qua meaning.152  
 At stake was the establishing of a transcendental science that would ground the a priori 
principles of transcendental logic, i.e. claim its binding necessity and universality.153 Also at 
stake was the way in which concepts were formed, in relation to matter, as well as how we 
could access and attain transcendental knowledge. The disputes amongst neo-Kantians ensued 
from different interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, its aims and scope. The neo-
Kantians, as we will see, were divided into two “opposing schools”: the so-called “Southwest 
School” and the “Marburg School”. The respective philosophers that mostly affected Husserl 
and Heidegger, from these schools, were Heinrich Rickert and Paul Natorp; thus we will focus 
on these two as representatives of said schools, and examine the relevant characteristics in these 
two thinkers that pertain to our subject matter. We will identify those aspects of their thought 
that Heidegger adopted, and also the predicaments to which Heidegger reacted. 
 The neo-Kantian predicament (as Heidegger saw it) was that transcendental philosophy 
was left with an unbridgeable cleft between “being” (the factical reality of the intentional act) 
and the ideal “logic” (its validity and/or value). This cleft was especially exacerbated by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Crowell 2001, p. 3.  
152 I agree with scholars who hold a “continuity thesis” in relation to Heidegger’s works. Tom Sheehan believes that 
the unifying character encompassing Heidegger’s whole corpus is the problem of “meaning”, and I generally agree 
with his interpretation, but with some critical reservations (which I cannot get into here). Mahon O’ Brien puts it 
eloquently: “Sheehan argues that though Heidegger might have jettisoned the ‘transcendental-horizonal approach of 
1926-28’, that is not what die Kehre is concerned with. Sheehan is right of course; my only qualification here would 
be that the dynamic involved in Heidegger’s approach in Being and Time is not something which his later work is 
entirely bereft of. Rather this amorphous, evolving attempt to think and say die Kehre is already latent in Heidegger’s 
non-subjectivist attempts in Being and Time and the intimations of the shape which his approach was going to take 
are already identifiable”. Mahon O’ Brien, Heidegger and Authenticity: From Resoluteness to Releasement, (London: 
Continuum, 2011, p. 120). See also: Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift, (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).  
153 Crowell 2001, p. 33. 
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epistemology of the Southwest School of neo-Kantians, which maintained a radical break 
between the forms that make up logical judgment and the unsynthesized manifold of sensation; 
in other words, the gap between form and matter.   
 It is important to remember here that in this context, the locus of truth is the validity of 
the logical judgment itself, something that Husserl’s phenomenology did not reject. Quite the 
contrary, Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology of ideal meaning (or ideal object) reconfirmed the 
status of propositional judgment as being the locus of truth, even if Husserl managed to make 
some important contributions in distinguishing between the ontological status of a propositional 
judgment and that of an act-transcending state-of-affairs [Sachverhalt], the former being truth-
bearing, the latter being truth-making.154 Heidegger thought that Husserl’s phenomenological 
discoveries did offer some significant progress towards reconnecting the realm of validity that 
makes up the truth of Logos, in its correspondence with a state-of-affairs, and the givenness of 
experiential sensation, by acknowledging the interrelation between the moments of “judging 
act”, the “judgment-content” and the indicated “state-of-affairs”, as being derivative of the 
respective (more foundational) level of intuition, as given in the respective moments of 
“presenting act”, “content of presentation” and “object of presentation”.155    
 But for Heidegger the problem of locating the necessity that binds the truth of a 
transcendental judgment and the factical realm of temporal being still persisted in Husserl’s 
work, especially as he proceeded in Ideas I, through his dependence on a reflective method and 
the accompanying marginalization of Dasein (temporal existence). Heidegger thought that 
Husserl’s phenomenology indeed offered a way of connecting these “two realms” through his 
notion of categorial intuition which is given in sense-perception as it was articulated in an 
earlier work of Husserl: in the Logical Investigations Husserl grounds the truth of “state-of-
affairs” [Sachverhalt] to intuition. Categorial intuition was, in Heidegger’s opinion, the most 
important discovery. For example, in the 1925 Summer Semester lecture course entitled History 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 See Barry Smith, “Logic and the Sachverhalt”, The Monist, 72(1), (January 1989), pp. 52-69. 
155 Ibid. 
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of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (GA 20),156 Heidegger explicitly associates categorial 
intuition and its relation to sensuousness with the Kantian conceptual pair of form and matter: 
“Sensuousness is characterized as receptivity and understanding as spontaneity (Kant), the 
sensory as matter and the categorial as form.”157 
 Despite Heidegger’s initial reservations with Husserl’s phenomenological method, he 
later wholeheartedly embraced Husserl. Heidegger was initially sceptical because of Husserl’s 
own ambiguity and regression as regards his refutation of psychologism that notably takes place 
in Husserl’s fifth investigation on “The Meaning of Brentano’s Delimitation of ‘psychical 
phenomena’”, section nine, in the Logical Investigations, where he “falls back with his 
phenomenological description of the phenomena of consciousness into the position of 
psychologism which he had just refuted”.158  
 But in 1913, when Ideas I was published in the Yearbook for Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Investigation, Husserl offers there a clearer transcendental account of 
phenomenology. In Heidegger’s own words:  
“Pure phenomenology” is the “fundamental science” of philosophy which is 
characterized by that phenomenology. “Pure” means: “transcendental 
phenomenology”. However, the “subjectivity” of the knowing, acting and 
valuing subject is posited as “transcendental.” Both terms, “subjectivity” and 
“transcendental,” show that “phenomenology” consciously and decidedly 
moved into the tradition of modern philosophy but in such a way that 
“transcendental subjectivity” attains a more original and universal 
determination through phenomenology.159  
 
In effect, this “transcendental revision” that Husserl makes in Ideas I (which, according to 
Derrida, was merely explicating what was already implicit in the Logical Investigations, and I 
agree),160 enabled the Logical Investigations, “which had so to speak remained philosophically 
neutral”, to “be assigned their systematic place”.161 Indeed, Heidegger considered Husserl’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel, Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press (1992). 
157 Ibid, p. 70. 
158 Martin Heidegger. “My Way to Phenomenology”, trans. Stambaugh, in On Time and Being (London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 76. 
159 Ibid, p. 77. 
160 See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. 
Allison and Newton Garver, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).   
161 Ibid. 
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Logical Investigations to have supplied a kind of breakthrough [Durchbruch].162 But the genesis 
of phenomenology as a method, and the breakthrough that Heidegger saw in the Logical 
Investigations, is not disengaged from the historical and contemporaneous context, the overlaps 
with neo-Kantianism, including Dilthey. 
 Concerning Heidegger’s (and Husserl’s) relation to neo-Kantianism, let us not forget 
the fact that Heidegger wrote his doctorate and habilitation under Rickert.163 During his studies 
at Freiburg, Heidegger firstly came under the influence of Heinrich Rickert’s version of neo-
Kantianism (that of the so-called “Southwest School”) and subsequently to the phenomenology 
of Edmund Husserl. Husserl succeeded Heinrich Rickert at Freiburg in 1916 after the latter had 
taken over Windelband’s chair in Heidelberg.164 
 Inevitably, all these interactions mean that if one were at the time to push Heidegger 
towards an operational definition of “phenomenology”, one would be perhaps surprised to 
realize that certain neo-Kantians would be identified as “borderline phenomenologists”, not 
excluding Dilthey. One could point out that Dilthey was not a neo-Kantian philosopher; 
however, in the broad way that I understand and define neo-Kantian philosophy, Dilthey should 
pass as one (and here I am probably in disagreement with Crowell: amid all the diversity in 
Dilthey’s thought, one can safely say that there is one enduring theme that holds it all together, 
and that is his determination to write a Critique of Historical Reason).165 Despite his strong 
opposition to the a priori, Dilthey in some sense did work under the spell of Kant, and did 
endorse the critical aspects of Kant’s method. In a sense, Dilthey wanted to extend Kant’s 
critique so as to cover the aspects of historical and social knowledge, not just mathematical and 
natural-scientific knowledge that restricted Kant’s own project.166 Dilthey struggled with 
Windelband and Rickert for the leadership of this movement towards the philosophy of history 
and culture.167  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Martin Heidegger. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Scott. M. Campbell. (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013), (GA 58), p. 13. 
163 Friedman 2000, pp. 4-5. 
164 MWP, p. 78. 
165 Herbert Arthur Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, (London: Routledge & Paul, 1952), p. xii. 
166 Ibid, p. xxvi. 
167 Ibid, pp. xii-xiii. 
	   63	  
 In terms of the development of Heidegger’s phenomenology, we should not see it as an 
issue of oppositional choice between Husserl and Dilthey. And this is not because Heidegger 
himself manages to meaningfully bring aspects of the two together in BT, but rather, for a much 
more important reason that commentators, including Crowell perhaps, tend to miss: not only 
does Dilthey incorporate some of Husserl’s insights from the LI, but also Husserl re-
incorporates some Diltheyan insights, already in the decade of 1910-20, as we see in his (then) 
unpublished notes of Ideas II.  
 Heidegger’s radicalization of the Husserlian notions of Verhalten, Motivation and 
Tendenz is based on the combined insights of Husserl and Dilthey. The development of these 
notions is an essential part of this thesis’ narrative, because that is how Heidegger will make 
sense of affective phenomena in his early phenomenological accounts. Motivation and tendency 
will be the notions Heidegger will initially employ in order to indicate how affective states form 
the ground of conceptual understanding (of intentional life, in general) and set philosophical 
motion in place, enabling the philosophical comportment to emerge. I will return to this point 
later on, explaining why and how Heidegger identified a certain continuity between Dilthey and 
Husserl, as well as between Husserlian phenomenology and Christian theology. This becomes 
clear once one pays appropriate attention to Section Three of Ideas II, entitled “The Constitution 
of the Spiritual World”, where Husserl analyses the “personalistic attitude”, which he opposes 
to the “theoretical attitude”. In that context, Motivation is identified as the fundamental 
lawfulness of the spiritual world. What is important to note is that Husserl in that part explicitly 
identifies Dilthey as the thinker from whom he took inspiration on these insights. This is 
important because Heidegger’s early affective vocabulary will involve precisely the usage of 
these terms. 
 In the Summer Semester of 1923 lecture titled Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), 
Heidegger says that “even Dilthey, who originally came out of history and theology, 
conspicuously relied on [the] Kantian approach”.168 It is important to take note of this because it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Martin Heidegger. Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Translated by John van Buren (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1999) (GA 63), p. 54. 
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is Dilthey from whom Heidegger takes the concern for historicity before turning his 
phenomenological analyses towards it. And the young Heidegger does take Dilthey to be 
striking some important phenomenological chords: the sentence just quoted comes from a small 
section that Heidegger entitled On the history of “phenomenology”,169 something that shows 
that Heidegger did in some respects see Dilthey to be conducting a sort of phenomenology.170 
What is more, we must come to see how Heidegger acknowledges how Husserl felt obligated to 
Dilthey for the establishment of phenomenology and the eminence of it. As Heidegger says in 
‘My Way to Phenomenology’:  
Later in Freiburg, he [Husserl] often told the story of how the Logical 
Investigations came to be. He never forgot to remember the Max Niemeyer 
publishing house with gratitude and admiration, the house which took upon 
itself the venture of publishing, at the turn of the century, an extensive work of 
a little-known instructor who went his own new ways and thus had to estrange 
contemporary philosophy, which ignored the work for years after its 
appearance, until Wilhelm Dilthey recognized its significance.171 
 
But the implication of phenomenology with neo-Kantians – beyond Dilthey – is also evident, 
according to Heidegger, in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Heidegger considered Husserl’s 
breakthrough not as one pertaining to a change of topic or area, but rather “simply” as one of 
changing the way of access. Ultimately, Husserl’s phenomenology did not amount to a shift in 
the domain of questions being asked by neo-Kantians, but instead was a matter of method. In 
Heidegger’s own words:  
Husserl’s Logical Investigations were not really understood and perhaps to this 
day still are not. Epistemology still does not understand that all theories of 
judgment are basically theories of presentation (cf. H. Rickert, The Object of 
Knowledge – its foundations are utterly dilettantish). Regarding what its object 
was, nothing had changed in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Rather, what was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Ibid, p. 51. 
170 Besides, Dilthey himself considered Husserl’s early “descriptive phenomenological method” to be similar to his 
own “descriptive and analytic psychology”, and adopted a key Husserlian position that forms the crux of my analysis 
in this chapter. Namely, Dilthey adopts Husserl’s position that psychic acts “have contents that are related to the 
objects of the world by means of attitudinal stances [Einstellung]”. Elisabetta Basso, “Kierkegaard’s Influence on 
Wilhelm Dilthey’s Work”, in Kierkegaard’s Influence on Philosophy. Tome I: German and Scandinavian Philosophy, 
ed. Jon Stewart, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), p. 93. It is interesting how Dilthey also wants to bring the attitude to the 
forefront; however, in my opinion, Husserl would take issue with Dilthey in that he, Dilthey, is aiming at developing 
a “theory” that “regresses” from the object to the attitude, which reminds one of Natorp’s “reconstructive” method. 
As Basso puts it, for Dilthey, the “aim of theory of knowledge (Theorie des Wissens) would be thus to regress from 
objects to attitudes, in order to uncover the structural nexus of knowledge as grounded on cognition, feeling, and 
will” (Ibid). In any case, the important point here is to take note of how Dilthey (inter alia, also) adopts Husserl’s 
notion of Einstellung. 
171 MWP, p. 82. 
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drummed into the philosophical consciousness of that time was simply the 
question of access. The subject matter remained the same – the only thing 
different was the how of interrogating and defining it, i.e., description versus a 
constructivistic and deductive method.172   
 
And as far as the subsequent turn to Aristotle is concerned, the mature Heidegger says that the 
“step-by-step training in phenomenological ‘seeing’” he received from Husserl “was fruitful for 
the interpretation of Aristotle’s writing”.173 In the essay ‘My Way to Phenomenology’, 
Heidegger writes that as he himself “practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning 
in Husserl’s proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of 
Aristotle in a seminar, [his] interest leaned anew toward the Logical Investigations”174 and 
especially the sixth logical investigation whose scope covered the determination of “the 
manifold meaning of being”.175 
 What is most important to prove is how Heidegger’s early account of affective life is 
performed in line with Husserlian phenomenological notions. Heidegger analyzes factical life in 
terms of the underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen]. Motivation and 
tendency are in fact the two key formal indications, or “categories”, that Heidegger employs in 
order to phenomenologically analyze how theories, belief-systems, or Weltanschauungen, are 
factically developed from within life itself. In this respect, we must come to see how Heidegger 
inherited, incorporated, and radicalized Husserlian notions, how this fell within the context of 
neo-Kantian discourse, and what kind of problems his analyses responded to and resolved.   
 Heidegger’s eventual turn to Aristotle, the decisive turning point as regards his 
phenomenological appraisal of affects, can only be properly understood in relation to his 
utilization of Husserlian phenomenology. In this context, it is crucial to recapture Heidegger’s 
turn to Aristotle and his subsequent encounter with Aristotle’s works and the appropriations that 
ensued, in its relation to Heidegger’s “tacit” dialogue with Paul Natorp, and the criticisms 
Natorp directed against Husserl’s phenomenology, and whose criticism significantly shaped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 PIA, pp. 55-56. 
173 MWP, p. 78. 
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Heidegger’s turn to a hermeneutics of facticity, in the context of which his phenomenology of 
moods emerged.176  
 In this context, it is useful to thematize and follow a particular strand of conceptual 
connections that bring together the way Husserl appropriates the notion of intentionality 
[Intentionalität] from Brentano so as to develop his own phenomenological response to 
psychologism, offering an alternative way out from the then dominant neo-Kantian method, 
along with its shortcomings (which we will see).  
 An exchange between Husserl and Natorp exposed the “deficiencies”, or “weaknesses”, 
of Husserl’s formulations, especially the reformulations that take place in Ideas I (as opposed to 
the earlier formulations of the Logical Investigations) with respect to the way of access granted 
by phenomenology to intentionality, and the way this access enframes intentionality within a 
theoretical conceptual realm due to the reflective nature of access. In order to resolve this 
problem, Heidegger will dig deeper into aspects that, on the one hand, are indeed implicit in 
Husserl’s accounts, and on the other, are suppressed by Husserl’s accounts. Unpacking these 
aspects involved a genealogical understanding of the notion of intentionality that Husserl 
derives from Brentano, which ultimately leads back to the medieval conception of directed 
consciousness, derived from Aristotelian ὄρεξις (desire).177     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 The tacit dialogue between Heidegger and Natorp, once thematized, enables us to understand various twists and 
turns of the young Heidegger, especially in his transition from Husserl to Aristotle, and the effect this has on 
Heidegger’s own phenomenology of moods. The most explicit indication of the importance of this dialogue is found 
in Heidegger’s introductory remarks for his lecture on Plato’s Sophist, which took place just a month after Paul 
Natorp’s death, while Heidegger was teaching at Marburg University in the Winter Semester of 1924-25 (published 
as Gesamtausgabe, Volume 19). Even though there were other references in past lectures from Heidegger’s early 
Freiburg time, concerning his deep appreciation for Natorp’s criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology, in the lecture 
on Plato’s Sophist he is much more direct and extensive, dedicating the course to Natorp. In the prelude dedicated to 
Natorp, Heidegger writes (inter alia): “Natorp was one who was best prepared to discuss Husserl. This is 
demonstrated by his works ‘Zur Frage der logischen Methode,’ 1901, where he takes up Husserl’s Logische 
Untersuchungen, Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, and furthermore by his ‘Husserls Ideen zu einer 
reinen Phänomenologie,’ which was published in 1914 and again in 1918, where he treats Husserl’s Ideen. Natorp’s 
instigations were determinative for Husserl himself” (PS, pp. 2-3).     
177 Heidegger draws the explicit connection in the Summer Semester of 1923: “Husserl was influenced here by the 
work of Brentano, and this was the case not only regarding his method in that he adopted Brentano’s method of 
description, but also regarding the basic definition of the domain of experience as his subject matter. Brentano had 
characterized consciousness of something as intentionality. This concept arose in the Middle Ages and had at that 
time a narrower sphere of application, it meant a volitional being-out-for-something and going-toward-it (ὄρεξις) 
[desire]” (OHF, p. 55). “Hierfür wurde Brentanos Arbeit wirksam, und nicht nur methodisch, sofern Husserl die 
deskriptive Methode übernahm, sondern auch die Grundbestimmung der region. Brentano hatte Bewußtsein von 
etwas charakterisiert als Intentionalität. Dieser Begriff entspringt im Mittelalter und hat da eine engere Sphäre, er 
bezeichnet das willentliche Aussein auf etwas (ὄρεξις)” (OHF, p. 70). Heidegger reiterates the connection of 
intentionality to Aristotle’s notion of ὄρεξις in HCT (1925), in the context of refuting Rickert’s objections to 
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II. Neo-Kantian Philosophy and the Problem of Grounding [Begründung] 
The Southwest School of neo-Kantianism and Heinrich Rickert   
The neo-Kantians were divided into two camps. One of them was the so-called Southwest 
School of neo-Kantianism, which was founded by Wilhelm Windelband and further developed 
by Heinrich Rickert. They were called neo-Kantian because they actively put themselves in the 
trajectory of Kant’s critical project, seeing themselves as inheritors of it, but ultimately trying to 
push it further, since they saw it as unfinished in its attempts at establishing the transcendental 
grounds (i.e. “grounding”) of the sciences, scientific truth and objectivity. The Marburg School, 
which included Natorp, viewed Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a “theory of science”, which 
meant that philosophy only had indirect access to being mediated through scientific theorizing, 
whereby the object is that which is given in scientific judgments; in this context, transcendental 
logic is “a theory of knowledge that (in Natorp’s words) brings ‘ultimate unity’ to the system of 
sciences by uncovering the principles, or categories, according to which the sciences construct 
being”.178 In Heidegger’s own words, the Marburg School’s works (the Marburg School 
included Hermann Cohen, Natorp and Ernst Cassirer) were “predominantly attempts at 
advancing and radically grounding logic”.179 For those from Marburg, the idea of science 
culminated in consciousness, i.e. the way something is objectivized in the subject, and in that 
context the logical foundation of the sciences manifested/disposed itself as “the basic problem 
of objectivizing overall”.180 
  The problem that Rickert grappled with is better put as the problem of the relation of the 
faculties of Understanding (concepts) and Sensibility (intuitions). According to Kant, the a 
priori ground that enables the establishment of a relation between these two faculties is the 
transcendental schema. The Kantian transcendental schema, insofar as it is meant to provide an 
a priori ground for the knowledge attained by transcendental judgments, must be purely 
intelligible and thus void of all empirical content, but also at the same time it must be sensible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intentionality, saying that Rickert’s (ambivalent) criticism of Brentano is not enough to do away with the richness of 
intentionality (HCT, pp. 46-46).   
178 Crowell 2001, p. 26. 
179 BPH, p. 6. 
180 Ibid, p. 8. 
	   68	  
Thus, the transcendental schema is the ground that enables the relation between the two 
heterogeneous faculties of understanding and sensibility. The schema bridges the cleft between 
pure concept and pure intuition in including universality and sensibility.181 
 The difficulty that the Southwest School faced was, as has already been noted, a difficulty 
of expounding the ground of transcendental knowledge, partly as a critical response to 
psychologistic readings of Kant. At stake was the need to identify the binding necessity of a 
certain area of knowledge, namely to show that it is necessarily valid and binding to the subject.  
 In this context, the Southwest School understood bindingness in a cultural way, i.e. in a 
way that bindingness would effectively have a practical bearing on cultural values (in 
opposition to the more speculative approach of the Marburg School). For the Southwest School, 
only the ideality of cultural values could provide for such a bindingness, because it affords 
validity that goes beyond pure thought and reaches the realm of cultural reality.   
 The Southwest School identified the realm of logic, i.e. the ideality of logic, with that of 
value,182 which is about judgment that has validity [Geltung], in opposition to mathematics that 
the Marburg School privileged, which is indeed ideal but not valid, i.e. binding, in a meaningful 
way.183 The position that mathematics is ideal but lacks validity and thus lacks bindingness 
marks an attempt at resolving the dualism between the logical realm of categories and the pre-
conceptual realm of fact/sensation (“heterogeneous continuum”). 184 While the ideality of 
mathematics idealism is ahistorical and in no way connects with spatiotemporal reality, the 
ideality of logic has a meaningful bindingness in its validity. At the same time, this does not 
reduce validity to empirical psychology, and therefore the ideality of meaning is retained, thus 
differentiating the Southwest neo-Kantian project from psychology.   
 The Southwest School turns the gulf between pure logic and “reality” (as well as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Vrahimis 2013, p. 42. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Rickert distinguishes between mathematics and logic on the basis of the distinction between ideality and validity: 
Mathematical entities are “ideal” – they are timeless, necessary, and so on – but they are nevertheless not “valid” 
(that is, capable of truth and falsity). Hence: the “ideal” realm of mathematical entities is distinct from the logical 
realm of “valid” propositions; for the latter, but not the former, belongs to the “ideal” realm of value (ibid). 
184 Crowell 2001, p. 27. 
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gulf between pure logic and psychology) into the gulf between value and fact.185 Rickert 
maintained that the differentiation between psychological being and sense, from Logic and 
Psychology, must be upheld, and for this precise reason commended Husserl for showing that 
pure logic had not yet achieved a full delimitation from psychology.186 Rickert is in alliance 
with Husserl on this score, and this is something we must keep in mind. However, Rickert 
tacitly maintained that nobody, including Husserl, managed to resolve the problem of offering a 
ground for ideality that would not alienate it from historical being. In Rickert’s words, whereas 
a complete “system of epistemology” must find a way back “from the transcendent values at 
rest in themselves to the psychological process of cognition […] this way back has been cut off 
[…] [by] an unbridgeable cleft between being and value [ideal logic]”.187 Let us now offer a 
brief presentation of Rickert’s philosophical position, identifying the characteristics of his 
approach that affected the young Heidegger. Thus, we will achieve some clarity as to how 
Heidegger inherited from Rickert his interest in the historical in its tension with the ideal, but 
also how certain shortcomings on Rickert’s part paved the way for Heidegger’s appreciation of 
Dilthey and Lask. 
 Rickert identified how the Marburg School’s approach subjugated the particular to the 
universal, matter to form, in a way that closed off access to the reality of the historical. The 
transcendental idealism of the Marburg School developed an approach to validity based on the 
epistemological model provided by the natural sciences. In this respect, validity is broadly 
construed as a “universal law of nature” that is valid irrespective of the specificity of historical 
events. It is a universality that is value-free and does not depend on consciousness or intuition. 
As an alternative to this understanding of validity, Rickert tried to develop a historical approach 
to validity whereby science is meant to deal with the validity of cultural phenomena that are 
conceived as meaningful, as objects possessing value. He thus makes a logical distinction 
between the value-free natural sciences and a historical science that is oriented around a concept 
of value. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Rickert 1909, p. 218, quoted in Friedman 2000, pp. 33-34. 
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 Thus, Rickert has a value-laden approach to concept formation that takes a cultural-
historical perspective in trying to make sense of the interplay between form and matter. While 
the validity of ideal scientific concepts of the natural sciences is not conditioned through 
representations of reality (their validity being unconditional and general), the validity of cultural 
values is conditioned and grounded on historical specificity. To approach the value-laden 
cultural reality, historical concept formation must proceed in an “individualizing” direction, its 
interest being not in general laws but in understanding unique “value-individualities”.188  
 Rickert’s approach would ascribe to judgment the crucial operation of binding together 
the two heterogeneous realms of ideal validity (i.e. the homogeneity of form) and experiential 
“reality” (i.e. the heterogeneity of singular matter). For Rickert, judgment is a kind of “ethics of 
thought” whose operation reconfigures bindingness in an ethical way. Transcendental truth 
attains an ethical bindingness through the act of judging that bears the binding necessity of an 
“ought” that compels the judging subject into taking a specific position. Steven Crowell writes 
that Rickert’s (Baden School’s) theory of judgment goes back “to Windelband’s idea of logic as 
the ‘ethics of thought’ and ultimately to Lotze’s theory of ‘validity’ (Geltung) as a ‘value’”,189 
which involves two moments: a moment immanent to the subject in which irrational material is 
combined via logical form, and a moment of affirming or denying the synthesis. In this context, 
the object of knowledge is “not a function of thinking alone, as in Marburg formalism, but is of 
interest, position taking, and decision”.190 
 I submit that this aspect of Rickert’s philosophy is important for Heidegger’s own 
approach, and is part and parcel of the methodological issues that Heidegger will have with 
certain aspects of Husserl’s phenomenological method, especially vis-à-vis the epochē, as well 
as Husserl’s marginalization of feeling. On the one hand: Heidegger will clearly adopt Husserl’s 
strict differentiation between philosophy as phenomenology and philosophy as Weltanschauung. 
The role of philosophy, according to Husserl’s phenomenological science, is not to lay down the 
conditions of possibility of a particular Weltanschauung, since that does not challenge scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Crowell 2001, p. 27 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
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naturalism. And this is something that Rickert’s philosophy effectively does: even though 
Rickert opposes the naturalism of the Naturwissenschaften and counterbalances it with a 
cultural science of the historical, due to the aforementioned sensitivities towards the singular 
and the spatiotemporally particular, nevertheless his differentiation between the two sciences is 
not one that overcomes naturalism or Weltanschauung. In this respect, as I will soon indicate, 
Dilthey is much more succesful in articulating a science of history that more effectively moves 
towards an overcoming of naturalism and Weltanschauung, something that Heidegger will 
identify and embrace.  
 On the other hand: Heidegger will find Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology that depends 
on a bracketing of position-taking as “bloodless”.191 Indeed, Heidegger does inherit something 
from Rickert’s philosophy, contra Husserl, and this has to do with Rickert’s attentiveness to the 
concrete historical situatedness that Rickert’s philosophy of culture attempted to vindicate. 
According to Heidegger’s own interpretation, it has to do with how Rickert tried to articulate 
the grounds of binding necessity in a way that is better attuned to the existential reality of acts 
of judgment, something that Husserl failed to do on account of his dependence on reflective 
intuition which exiled feelings (as well as values) from the “foundational level”, relegating them 
to the founded levels of intentionality.192  
 Heidegger continues in the same direction as Rickert in believing that something in 
judgment supplies the binding (necessity) of existence and essence, but Heidegger radicalizes 
judgment by going before even propositional judgment and into the primary hermeneutic act of 
ἀληθεύειν, building on Lask’s and Husserl’s discoveries in the Sixth Investigation of Logical 
Investigations: there Husserl connects essence with intuition, thus grounding discovery of the 
categories not in the act of judging, but in the direct act of intuition.193 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger: Letters to his Wife 1915-1970, selected, edited and annotated by Gertrud 
Heidegger, trans. R. D. V. Glasgow, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), p. 33. 
192 I am conscious of Heidegger’s fervent critique of “philosophy of value”. We must not however conflate the late 
Heidegger’s critique of value with the argument I am trying to make here concerning the young Heidegger. Besides, 
the argument I am trying to make here is not that Heidegger was interested in vindicating or developing a philosophy 
of value per se; rather, I am trying to tease out certain insights that philosophy of value importantly retains, which 
early Husserlian phenomenology misses, especially vis-à-vis the historical situatedness of value and the “practical” 
aspects of it (in juxtaposition to the “theoretical”).   
193 Friedman 2001, p. 55. 
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 According to Heidegger, for Rickert “the problem of philosophy is the Validity of 
Axioms”, and “axioms are norms, laws, propositions, that is, ‘representational bindings’” whose 
validity “ought to be”.194 Establishing a binding necessity of an ethical nature is therefore the 
task that philosophy must undertake. Heidegger, in his Kriegsnotsemester lecture,195 says that 
establishing a binding validity means establishing an originary foundation, i.e. that of the 
origin.196 The connection made here between the categories of “foundation” [Begründung], 
“origin” [Ursprung] and also necessity [Notwendigkeit] are crucial for understanding the 
operation of moods, especially as they are described in the late Heidegger. We will see these 
categories returning in Heidegger in later texts precisely in the context of addressing 
fundamental moods. We cannot get into this now, but it is important to keep this indication as a 
guide, as the connection between these categories and the affective level of experience 
(feelings) is already made in Heidegger’s analysis of Rickert. Even if Heidegger does not 
provide a clear account of how these categories connect, it is crucial to note the intention and 
direction that his thought takes early on.  
 During that early lecture, Heidegger indicates that for Rickert philosophy is about the 
validity of such representational bindings [Vorstellungsverbindungen],197 which, while it itself 
cannot be proven, grounds all proofs with immediate evidence. Heidegger then poses the 
question: how will this immediate evidence of axioms be shown, through which method?198 
 For Rickert, says Heidegger, it is judgment that supplies the binding necessity of the 
two realms,199 the realm of beings and the realm of validities, even though Rickert is unable to 
develop in detail this binding role of the judgment for the transcendental subject. Even though 
Heidegger will adopt Emil Lask’s position that Rickert did not manage to achieve clarity with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 “Axiome sind Normen, Gesetze, Sätze, d.h. ‘Vorstellungsverbindungen’. Deren Geltung Soll dargetan werden”, 
(GA 56/57, p. 31). 
195 See KNS. 
196 “…der Aufgabe der Begründung des Ursprungs, des Anfangs” (GA 56/57, p. 31). 
197 “Representational connections” would perhaps be a better translation, but it is important to stress the contiguity 
between Verbindung and Verbindlichkeit, which is better rendered as “bindingness”. 
198 “‘Es handelt sich für die Philosophie um die Geltung solcher Vorstellungsverbindungen, welche, selbst 
unbeweisbar, allem Beweisen mit unmittelbarer Evidenz zugrundliegen.’ Wie Soll die unmittelbare Evidenz der 
Axiome aufgezeigt werden? Wie, d.h. auf welchem Wege, mit welcher Methode?” (GA 56/57, pp. 32-33). 
199 “So kommen wir zu zwei Welten, einer seinden und einer geltenden. Zwischen ihnen aber steht, sie durch sein 
Urteilen miteinander verbindend, das theoretische Subjekt, das so allein seinem Wesen nach verständlich wird, und 
ohne das wir auch von seienden oder realen ‘Gegenständen’ der Erkenntiss nicht sinnvol reden könnten” – Heinrich 
Rickert’s Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, p. XI [find the exact quotation]. 
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respect to establishing the connection between these two realms, he will commend Rickert’s 
contribution as regards the rejection of a method of “indifferent consideration” [teilnahmslosen 
Betrachten].200  
 Heidegger is sympathetic to Rickert’s position on how judging [Urteilen], contra 
presentation [Vorstellen],201 does not happen in an “indifferent consideration”; rather it belongs 
in the same class as feeling [Fühlen] and willing [Wollen], which opposes the class of 
presentation.202 Heidegger takes note of Rickert’s ascription of a practical comportment 
[Verhalten] to the act of judgment, and in addition to the fact that for Rickert what holds as 
valid [gilt] for judgment must also be valid of cognition [Erkennen]. In this context, cognition is 
deemed to be a process [Vorgang] that is determined through feelings, through the affective, 
that is, through appetite [Lust] or slackness [Unlust],203 and thus feelings foundationally connect 
with the act of judgment and knowing in general. Note how this in a way anticipates 
Heidegger’s later turn to Aristotelian hermeneutics of everydayness, where he will explicitly 
identify the fundamental relationship between the λόγος ἀποφαντικός of rhetoric, pathos and 
understanding. This sympathy that Heidegger shows towards this aspect of Rickert’s position is 
also in line with his selective criticism of certain aspects of Husserl’s analyses, and the adoption 
of certain others. It is, though, completely contradictory with Heidegger’s 1925 analysis of 
intentionality and evidence, where he explicitly criticizes Rickert for insisting that knowing 
cannot be representing, whilst he himself, without acknowledging it, takes Brentanian 
intentionality “as the foundation of his theory of judgment and knowledge.”204 In effect, 
Heidegger argues,    
 Rickert’s position as regards judgment in its relation to feelings and appetite [Lust]205 
determines the feeling that accompanies the experience of judgment as the certainty [Gewißheit] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Perhaps “impartial” would be a more literal translation of “teilnahmsloser”, but it makes more sense in this 
context to translate it as “indifferent”. 
201 I have translated Vorstellung here as presentation. But it could also be translated as representation of imagination.  
202 “Urteilen geht nicht auf im teilnahmlosen Betrachten, ‘sondern es kommt in dem Bejahen oder Verneinen ein 
Billigen oder Mißbilligen zum Ausdruck’”. […] “Vorstellen in die eine Klasse, und das Urteilen, Fühlen und 
Wollen…in die andere”. (GA 56, pp. 186-187). 
203 “Im Urteil ein ‘praktisches’ Verhalten” (Ibid); “was für das Urteil gilt, auch für das Erkennen gelten muss […] 
Das Erkennen also ist ein Vorgang, der bestimmt wird durch Gefühle, d.h. durch Lust oder Unlust” (GA 56, p. 187). 
204 HCT, p. 34. 
205 One is tempted to translate Lust as desire here, but I retain desire for Begierde. But it is important to note the 
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of evidence [Evidenz], which constitutes the bindingness of judgment, giving to the judgment 
the character of necessity [Notwendigkeit].206 This is an important moment for our own 
research: the evidential certainty that constitutes the bindingness of judgment is ascribed to 
feeling and appetite! Feeling and willing are identified as fundamental parts of this bindingness. 
What is also significant is how this kind of evidence is juxtaposed to “indifferent 
consideration”, which is reminiscent of Husserl’s own criterion of evidence, the “principle of 
principles” as it results from the institution of the epochē. As we will see in the section on 
Husserl’s phenomenology, Husserl’s commitment to the epochē led to the prioritization of 
originary presentive intuition [originär gebende Anschauung].207 As we will see, Husserl took 
the presentive level of intentional acts to be founding, but he took intentional acts of feeling and 
value to be founded. This is something that Heidegger will rectify through his own 
phenomenological accounts. (In effect, as we will later see, Heidegger re-interprets the 
categorial intuition, and what it means to be “founded” in a way that enables him to see 
categorial intuition already in operation in sensuous, simple intuition. I don’t think this is 
supported by textual evidence, and I think Heidegger is inconsistent on this.)208 However, it 
must be noted that Husserl did impart to motivation, a manifestation of willing, the most central 
role as regards the constitution of the unity of intentional experience [Erlebnis].    
 Let it be noted here that Husserl explicitly criticized a version of Rickert’s thesis in 
Ideas I, where he dissociated the evidence supplied by eidetic seeing from feeling.209 In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
closeness of the operation of the two notions and how both of them would be the translation of the same ancient 
Greek word: ὄρεξις. 
206 “Dieses Gefühl ist ‘Gewißheit’ (Evidenz) […] ‘Zugleich erlebe ich Mich als durch das Gefühl der Evidenz 
gebunden’ […] ‘Das eine oder andere Urteil ist immer notwendig’. Die Evidenz, ‘das Gefühl’, gibt einem Urteil den 
Charakter der Notwendigkeit (eine Notwendigkeit des Sollens)” (GA 56, p. 188). 
207 See Ideas I, §24. 
208 See Dahlstrom 2001, p. 74. 
209 “To be sure, they speak of evidence; but instead of bringing it, as an act of seeing, into essential relations with 
ordinary seeing, they speak of a ‘feeling of evidence’ which, as a mystic index veri, bestows an emotional coloring on 
the judgments. Such conceptions are possible only as long as one has not learned to analyze kinds of consciousness in 
pure observation and eidetically instead of theorizing about them from on high. These alleged feelings of evidence, of 
intellectual necessity or whatever else they may be called, are no more than theoretically invented feelings. This will 
be acknowledged by everyone who has brought any case of evidence to actually seen givenness and has compared it 
with a case of non-evidence of the same judgment-content. One then immediately notes that the tacit presupposition 
of the affective theory of evidence, namely that a judging which is the same with respect to the rest of its 
psychological essence appears on one occasion with affective coloring and on another without it, is fundamentally 
erroneous; and that, rather, an identical upper stratum, that of an identical stating, as a mere significational 
expressing, on the one occasion conforms step by step to a ‘clearly seeing’ intuition of an affair-complex, whereas on 
the other occasion a wholly different phenomenon, a non-intuitive, perhaps a wholly confused and unarticulated 
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context, I submit that Heidegger, in trying to press phenomenology towards a direction where 
feelings occupy the fundamental ground of intentional life, gets closer to Rickert’s position (in 
some of his lectures) than he is ready to admit, partly as a response to Husserl, but without 
rejecting all of Husserl’s phenomenological discoveries.  But before I move into this, let’s look 
at a place where Heidegger explicitly criticizes Rickert for associating “evidence” with 
“feeling”. As Daniel Dahlstrom notes, Rickert’s talk of a “feeling of evidence” is an outcome of 
his failing to appreciate the true character of intentionality, and his “construal of evidence as a 
matter of feeling goes hand in hand, Heidegger submits, with Rickert’s insistence that the 
concept of intentionality is ‘dark, metaphysical, dogmatic.’”210 This would indeed be an 
inconsistency, violating the principle of non-contradiction, but only if it concerned a statement 
said of something in the same respect. I believe that the context in which Heidegger attacks 
Rickert’s association of evidence with feeling is not the same as when he commends Rickert for 
attacking “indifferent consideration” and reverting to feeling as testament for evidence. To start 
with, one cannot defend Heidegger’s attack on Rickert in the 1925 lecture, based on a defence 
of Anschauung that Heidegger ties with his defense of intuition. Heidegger’s searh for 
something deeper than intentionality in his own phenomenology will remain unsatisfied by 
Anschauung, and this is explicitly shown when in 1927 he will explicitly associate Stimmung 
(and Befindlichkeit) contra Anschauung. So despite what Heidegger says in the 1925 lecture 
about Anschauung, and what, for example, Dahlstrom says about not reading anschauen in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
consciousness of an affair-complex functions as the lower stratum. With the same justice in the sphere of experience 
one could conceive the difference between the clear and faithful judgment of perception and any vague judgment of 
the same affair-complex as consisting merely of the former being endowed with a ‘feeling of clarity,’ while the latter 
is not” [Zwar spricht man von Evidenz, aber anstatt sie als Einsehen mit dem gewöhnlichen Sehen in 
Wesensbeziehungen  zu bringen, spricht man von einem »Evidenzgefühl«, das als ein mystischer Index veri dem 
Urteil eine Gefühlsfärbung verleihe. Solche Auffassungen sind nur solange möglich, als man es nicht gelernt hat, 
Bewußtseinsarten rein schauend und wesensmäßig zu analysieren, statt über sie von oben her Theorien zu machen. 
Diese angeblichen Gefühle der Evidenz, der Denknotwendigkeit, und wie sie sonst genannt sein mögen, sind nichts 
weiter als theoretischerfundene Gefühle. Das wird jedermann anerkennen, der irgendeinen Fall von Evidenz sich zu 
wirklich schauender Gegebenheit gebracht und mit einem Fall von Nichtevidenz desselben Urteilsinhaltes verglichen 
hat. Man merkt dann sogleich, daß die stillichweigende Voraussetzung der gefühlvollen Evidenztheorie, nämlich daß 
ein dem übrigen psychologischen Wesen nach gleiches Urteilen einmal gefühlsmäßig gefärbt und das andere Mal 
ungefärbt sei, grundirrig ist, vielmehr eine gleiche Oberschicht, die des gleichen Aussagens als bloßen 
bedeutungsmäßigen Ausdrückens, das eine Mal Schritt für Schritt angepaßt ist einer »klar einsehenden« 
Sachverhaltsintuition, während das andere Mal als Unterschicht ein ganz anderes Phänomen, ein nicht intuitives, ev. 
ganz verworrenes und ungegliedertes Sachverhaltsbewußtsein fungiert. Mit demselben Rechte könnte man also in der 
Erfahrungsphäre den Unterschied zwischen dem klaren und getreuen Wahrnehmungsurteil und einem beliebigen 
vagen Urteil desselben Sachverhalts bloß dahin fassen, daß das erstere mit einem  »Klarheitsgefühl« begabt sei, das 
andere nicht]. (Ideas I, pp. 39-40).  
210 Dahlstrom 2001, p. 65. 
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Kantian way, or not ascribing it too much of a “mental power”, but instead interpreting it in its 
ordinary, everyday sense of “observation or examination”,211 this position is negated by 
Heidegger himself in the way he introduces Befindlichkeit in BT- precisely as something that 
Anschauung cannot grasp; hence, Heidegger wants to rearticulate the unthematic categorial 
grasp in a non-sensuous way.  In addition, Dahlstrom himself accepts that Heidegger’s reading 
of the categorial intuition in 1925 is in some sense “more Heidegger” than Husserl, in the sense 
that “Heidegger links the question of the categorial intuition to the question of truth much more 
emphatically than Husserl does”, the reason for this greater emphasis being strategic on 
Heidegger’s part, even though, granted, Dahlstrom believes that this is not an artificial linking 
on Heidegger’s behalf.212 In addition, when Heidegger attacks Rickert in 1925, his concern is to 
offer a deeper analysis of intentionality and categorial intuition than Husserl ever did, and in 
this context he failed to see what was at stake in Husserl’s discovery of intentionality. But 
Heidegger’s understanding of intentionality in terms of desire, and the association of categorial, 
unthematic, pre-reflective grasp with feeling, is nowhere to be found in the Logical 
Investigations either, so in that respect –in associating feeling with truth and presentation- 
Rickert is closer to Heidegger than Husserl is, even if Heidegger will not admit it in the context 
of the 1925 lecture (despite the fact that Rickert’s explanations were utterly inadequate and 
missing the point of intentionality).  
 Heidegger in a way continued in the same direction as Rickert in identifying and trying 
to close the gap between the universally ideal and the historically concrete, logical form and 
intuitive matter, the problematic relation between the faculties of understanding and sensibility 
that Kant resolved through transcendental schematism. But, as mentioned earlier, Heidegger did 
not think that Rickert managed to articulate a theory of validity that would necessarily bind the 
two realms together and overcome the predicament. Rickert’s “ethics of thought” did have a 
positive appeal to Heidegger, especially in the way feelings and appetite bestowed the sense of 
necessity and evidence, and especially in the way of responding to the shortcomings Heidegger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Ibid, p. 76. 
212 Ibid, p. 80. 
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saw in the Husserlian method. 
 The key to understanding Rickert’s failure of offering a phenomenology of the 
historical, and how Dilthey was the one who more effectively moved towards a resolution of 
this problem, is found in the criterion by virtue of which Rickert distinguished between natural 
science and historical science. For Rickert, the distinction between historical and natural science 
is merely epistemological rather than ontological. The opposition between history and natural 
science is the logical difference between the general, i.e. that which is universally valid and the 
real, individual world of the spatiotemporally specific event and change.213 This is the key 
difference between Dilthey and Rickert which will be decisive for Heidegger. According to 
Dilthey, the opposition between the natural sciences [Naturwissenschaften] and the historical, 
spiritual, sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] is not merely a logical, epistemological, opposition, 
but rather an ontological difference. The being of the objects that the natural sciences study is 
ontologically different from the being that the spiritual sciences study (i.e. the human being). 
 Rickert in the end did not manage to overcome the neo-Kantian distinction between the 
realm of pure logic, which is what supplies validity and binding necessity, from spatio-temporal 
objects (that are on the side of being, existence). This distinction led to the inability of 
connecting the logical realm with the real world of temporal being [Sein], and the problem of 
establishing a binding necessity from within experience and intuition itself. Emil Lask pointed 
out how this problem persisted in Rickert, a position that Heidegger shared and whose exigency 
for resolution took on board. It is with this failure in the background that Heidegger moved 
towards a more originary hermeneutic of ἀληθεύειν, building on Lask’s and Husserl’s 
discoveries in the Sixth Investigation of the Logical Investigations: it is there that Husserl 
connected essence with the intuition of being, thus grounding the discovery of the ontological 
categories in (categorial) intuition.214  
 Before we move on to the next section on the Marburg School’s most relevant 
philosopher for the purpose of this study, Paul Natorp, let me recapitulate the main arguments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 I am thankful to Phillip Homburg for this insight. 
214 Friedman 2000, p. 55. 
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of this section that are relevant to our genealogical approach to the young Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of affects.  
 In many ways, the young Heidegger shared with Rickert his suspicion of both 
speculative metaphysics and the naturalism of psychologism, and shared the vision of 
reestablishing the transcendental status of philosophy as “Queen of Sciences”. Heidegger wrote 
his doctorate and habilitation under Rickert and during his studies at Freiburg, Heidegger firstly 
came under the influence of Rickert’s version of neo-Kantianism. Heidegger accepted the task 
of distinguishing philosophy from the empirical sciences by trying to identify the realm of 
philosophy in a non-empirical way. What neo-Kantians called the “realm of validity”, 
Heidegger called meaning, and he identified a grounding role that philosophy must have as 
regards the truth of all the other sciences: philosophy takes precedence as it studies meaning qua 
meaning. Heidegger also inherited from Rickert the problem that speculative approaches have in 
grasping the historically particular: Logical formalism is a homogeneous continuum that fails to 
connect with the heterogeneous continuum of matter. In this respect, Rickert identified and 
explored the discontinuity between concept and reality, form and matter, universal and 
particular and tried to resolve the two-world problem.   
 Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Rickert determines the feeling that accompanies 
the experience of judgment as the certainty [Gewißheit] of evidence [Evidenz] which constitutes 
the bindingness of judgment, giving to the judgment the character of necessity [Notwendigkeit]. 
Let it be noted in passing that Husserl explicitly criticizes a version of this thesis in Ideen I, 
where he dissociates the evidence supplied by eidetic seeing from feeling. 
Ultimately, Rickert’s project failed to offer a solution to the problems it identified 
through its transcendental cultural philosophy, especially in the way it failed to articulate a 
proper philosophy of historicity the way Dilthey did.   
 This is an important moment for our own research: the evidential certainty that 
constitutes the bindingness of judgment is ascribed to feeling and appetite (cf. Husserl on 
Indication and Motivation, Chapter 3). 
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Natorp’s criticism of Husserl 
Heidegger crucially found Husserl’s eidetic method to be susceptible to a criticism made against 
him by Paul Natorp. According to Natorp, the fact that Husserl relied too much on reflective 
intuition ultimately did not contribute anything new to what the neo-Kantians were already 
doing, which led Heidegger to the position that Husserl was not able to overcome the 
methodological problems (of theorization) that he was saying he overcame through the 
epochē.215  
 Natorp had certain ties with Husserl, and Natorp was instrumental in steering Husserl 
away from psychologism (i.e. positivism), and would also inspire Husserl to later move from 
static to genetic phenomenology.216 Husserl’s phenomenology was also, like the Marburg neo-
Kantianism of Natorp, a transcendental philosophy, but whereas Marburg neo-Kantianism 
retained a method of presenting the a priori principles of transcendental logic, Husserl grounded 
his theory of the a priori on an appeal to intuition.217 
 Husserl’s phenomenology is in agreement with Natorp on the search for a 
transcendental ground (even if for Husserl this is not explicitly stated in the LI, it becomes 
explicated later on). This is also the idea that the young Heidegger has about Husserlian 
phenomenology, when he concedes that the problem of transcendental constitution, even if “not 
the most original or final”218 problem of it, is indeed “a genuine core of phenomenology”.219  
 But some important disagreements between Natorp and Husserl persist, and the way 
these critical differences were uttered (primarily in the form of criticism from Natorp against 
Husserl) caused Heidegger himself to sharpen his own phenomenological stance. The gist of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 This criticism was particularly aimed against the content of Ideas I, since the LI did not include an explicit 
reference to the epoché as such, even though the reduction was already implied. For example, see Derrida’s essay 
Speech and Phenomena, Introduction and Sign and Signs [proper reference needed].  
216 Crowell 2001, p. 32. See also Dan Zahavi’s “How to Investigate Subjectivity: Natorp and Heidegger on 
Reflection”, Continental Philosophy Review, 36 (2003): pp. 155-176. Zahavi addresses a defining moment in the way 
Natorp affected Husserl in a footnote: “It is worth mentioning that it was Natorp who in Allgemeine Psychologie 
introduced the famous distinction between a static and a genetic investigation (Natorp, 1912, p. 285) that was later to 
become so important to Husserl. (Husserl carefully read Allgemeine Psychologie in September 1918)” (Zahavi 2003, 
p. 172). 
217 Crowell 2001, p. 32. 
218 It is important to note how for Heidegger, while agreeing on the essential compatibility and indeed qualified 
alliance between neo-Kantian concerns and phenomenology, insofar as they are transcendental projects, 
phenomenology does not get exhausted in this. There are overlaps but more importantly differences. However, at this 
point it is more useful to first point out the overlaps, before venturing on to show Heidegger’s radicalization of 
Husserlian phenomenology and distancing from neo-Kantian philosophy.  
219 BPP, p. 13. 
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disagreement is this: According to Natorp, it is from inner life, “subjectivity”, that all things 
must spring, as with Kant; but whereas Natorp agrees with Husserl on the transcendental 
priority of the subject, he disagrees that this can be grasped in immediate reflection: rather, 
mental life is reconstructed via a process of “subjectification”, through a “regress” from an 
objectification which has a different kind of priority.220 For Natorp, the subject is indeed the 
ground out of which objectification (exemplified by science) occurs, but methodologically 
speaking we start with the objects and through them reflectively reconstruct the corresponding 
subjectivity that allows them to emerge in the first place. (We will see how this disagreement is 
articulated by Natorp in a way that Heidegger will find important to respond to precisely due to 
the effectiveness of Natorp’s critique). 
 This neo-Kantian version of scientific philosophy differed from Husserlian 
phenomenology in both form and aim, writes Crowell: firstly, in excluding the possibility that 
we can have access to transcendental subjectivity either by a practical orientation in the world or 
conscience, or in intuition in general; secondly, in taking scientific objectification as the ideal 
objectivity from which it proceeds and which it wants to ground, by recovering a universal 
transcendental subjectivity from which objectification springs.221 Natorp denied the 
phenomenality of the pure ego, as he held that it cannot be objectified, nor can it present itself at 
all, without ceasing to be genuinely subject.222 In this regard, Natorp retains a sort of 
transcendentalism for the subject that can never become an object for direct intuitive 
investigation: the two (i.e. subject and object) are in a reflective relation; however, one can 
never really become the other, since that would collapse the very irreducible difference between 
the two necessarily opposing poles. 
 Heidegger himself understands Natorp’s methodological remarks to have a critical 
bearing on Husserl’s phenomenological method of descriptive reflection itself. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Crowell 2001, pp. 30-31. In the lecture course Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression (GA 59), Heidegger 
writes of Natorp’s philosophical psychology as follows: “It is supposed to apprehend the ‘ultimate, fulfilled reality’, 
‘life’ in the full sense of its concretion; at least it has to methodologically determine and pre-delineate this task as the 
task of an infinite process which can never be completed: ‘restoration of the entire concretion of the experience’” 
(PIE, p. 77, my emphasis). 
221 Crowell 2001, p. 31. 
222 Ibid, p. 32. 
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phenomenological method developed in Ideas I by Husserl, says Heidegger as early as 1919, 
moves through acts of reflection.223 In reflection we set ourselves in a theoretical manner [sind 
wir theoretisch eingestellt].224 And even phenomenological reflection, argued Natorp, reaches 
out and grasps the evading stream of experience and thus stills the stream.225  
 These particular problems that Natorp identified in Husserl’s descriptive method, and in 
any descriptive method whatsoever, emanate from Natorp’s own belief about what (logical) 
concepts are and how they correlate to their respective objects. Heidegger appropriately quotes 
Natorp’s analysis on this: “For the pretension of phenomenology to remain mere description 
does not change anything of the theoretical character. Because description already also operates 
in concepts”. 
 Natorp, like Rickert, doubted that Husserl’s idealism, which was based on intuitive 
givenness, was in a position to claim scientific status, which requires that the evidence given is 
able to justify and explicitly ground all of its assertions about transcendental cognition, because 
phenomenology could not provide the binding necessity or the universality demanded through 
the “evidence” afforded by the faculty of sense-intuition. Obviously, the vision of Natorp and 
Husserl appeared to be similar in its grounding intentions, but the evidential apparatus differed. 
As Crowell put it: “The question of whether philosophical cognition is grounded in concepts 
(logic) or intuitions (evidence) remains a crucial point of contention between phenomenological 
and neo-Kantian modes of thought”.226 
 As I already mentioned, Natorp’s criticisms of Husserl were instrumental in steering 
Husserl towards new directions; however, not all of these criticisms were successful in bearing 
a positive effect, from a Natorpian point of view, on Heidegger. Natorp’s rationalism and 
epistemological reading of Kant’s CPR (namely that the transcendental philosophy of the CPR 
should be a theory of scientific knowledge) and the way his criticisms, in Heidegger’s eyes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 GA 56/57, p. 99: “Die phänomenologische Methode bewegt sich durchaus in Akten der Reflexion”.  
224 GA 56/57, p. 100: “In der Reflexion haben wir es dastehen, sind darauf gerichtet, machen es zum Objekt, 
Gegenstand überhaupt. D.h. in der Reflexion sind wir theoretisch eingestellt.” 
225 GA 56/57, pp. 100-101: “[…] wir machen einen Griff gleichsam in den abfließenden Strom der Erlebnisse und 
greifen eines oder mehrere heraus, d.h. wir ‘stellen den Strom still’, wie Natorp, der bis jetzt als einziger 
wissenschaftlich beachtenswerte Einwände gegen die Phänomenologie vorgebracht hat. (Husserl selbst hat sich bis 
jetzt dazu nicht geäußert.)”.  
226 Crowell 2001, p. 32. 
	   82	  
effectively highlighted the rationalistic tendencies of Husserl’s phenomenology were 
instrumental in pushing Heidegger farther away from “theoretical rationalism” towards the 
direction of practicality. As Michael Friedman put it: “In a direct encounter with the most 
eminent contemporary representative of neo-Kantian ‘rationalism,’ he was able to stake out his 
own claim to be the author of a fundamentally new kind of philosophy destined to replace the 
hegemony of the neo-Kantian tradition and to supplant the remaining ‘rationalist’ tendencies in 
Husserlian phenomenology as well”.227 
 Some scholars have suggested that it was Natorp’s criticism of Husserl that forced 
Heidegger to reconfigure his methodological configurations by appropriating Dilthey’s notion 
of non-theoretical, hermeneutic “understanding” which brought about his hermeneutics of 
formal indication [Formale Anzeige].  
 In the lectures of Kriegsnotsemester, Heidegger refers to these criticisms in the third 
chapter of the lecture Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem, titled 
“Urwissenschaft als vortheoretische Wissenschaft”, in which he talks about Husserl’s 
descriptive reflection: The phenomenological method is executed through the act of reflection 
[Die phänomenologische Methode bewegt sich durchaus in Akten der Reflexion] (Husserl, Ideen 
I).228 The reflections are themselves experiences and can be further reflected. Reflection itself 
belongs to the sphere of experience and is a characteristic of it. As Natorp says, in reflection we 
grasp the fleeting stream of experience, we “still the stream”.229 Further on, Heidegger says that 
Natorp has up to now provided the only noteworthy objections against phenomenology, and that 
Husserl had yet to respond to them.230 Natorp insisted that the act of phenomenological 
reflection objectified experience and hence only accessed it as mediated through objectifying 
language.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Friedman 2000, p. 3, my emphasis. 
228 GA 56/57, p. 99. 
229 GA 56/57, p. 101. 
230 “[…]wir ‘stellen den Strom still’, wie Natorp, der bis jetzt als einziger wissenschaftlich beachtenswerte Einwände 
gegen die Phänomenologie vorgebracht hat. (Husserl selbst hat sich bis jetzt dazu nicht geäußert.)” (GA 56/57, pp. 
100-101). Tanja Staehler pointed out to me that Husserl does respond to Natorp’s criticisms, about ten years later, in 
his C-Manuscripts.  
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 The objections of Paul Natorp against Husserl’s “pretheoretical science of experience” 
deemed intentionality as already theoretical. Heidegger responds thus: “But how is a 
pretheoretical science of experience at all possible? For its ‘object’ is the ‘experienceable as 
such’ (Erlebbares überhaupt: ZBP 115f.) which is not an object at all”.231  
 Natorp raises these objections against Husserl, but these objections affect Heidegger as 
well and elicit his hermeneutics of “formal indication”. Natorp’s objections were: (1) “How is 
the nonobjectifiable subject matter of phenomenology to be even approached without already 
theoretically inflicting an objectification upon it?”; and (2) “Phenomenology claims merely to 
describe what it sees. But description is circumspection into general concepts, a ‘subsumption’ 
under abstractions. The concrete immediacy to be described is thereby mediated into abstract 
contexts. There is no such thing as immediate description, since all expression, any attempt to 
put something into words, generalizes and so objectifies (ZBP 101, 111)”.232  
 Heidegger found Natorp’s critique, stemming from the particular theoretical standpoint 
of the Marburg School, so difficult [schwierig] that he would not venture [wagen] to extensively 
treat it (he does so the year after).233  
 Heidegger thought that Natorp’s own reconstructive method also suffered from the very 
critical weaknesses that Natorp raised against Husserl: reconstruction is also objectifying 
because as reconstruction it is constructive, and as such theoretical.234 Heidegger undertook a 
thematic “destruction” of Natorp’s reconstructive method the following year during his lecture 
“Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression” (GA 59).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Kisiel 1993, p. 47. 
232 Ibid, p. 48. 
233 “Die Kritik Natorps und seine eigenen positiven Auffassungen sind so schwierig und vor allem ganz aus der 
Grundposition der Marburger Schule heraus gewachsen, daß ich nicht wagen darf, sie hier extenso zu besprechen. 
[…] Der ganze wissenschaftliche Typus der Marburger ist also in unser Problem hineingekommen, so daß ich gerade 
deshalb Natorpsche Einwände hier einfließen lassen kann, weil sie vom Standpunkt des Theoretischen selbst 
herstammen” (GA 56/57, p. 102).   
234 “Leistet die Methode der Rekonstruktion das, was sie leisten soll? Kann sie es überhaupt leisten? Nein. Denn 
einmal ist sie Objektivierung […] Denn auch Re-konstruktion ist Konstruktion […] und als solche theoretisch” (GA 
56/57, p. 107).  
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 In any case, Heidegger initially holds that Natorp’s criticism fails to appreciate the 
phenomenological attitude and its non-objectifying nature. Heidegger will insist that Husserl’s 
principle of principles does not offer any conceivable theory.235   
 However, Heidegger will gradually become critical of Husserl. Whilst initially 
Heidegger will argue that the “principle of principles” is nontheoretical in nature, implying that 
the reduction leads to a “radically nontheoretical science”, even if Husserl had not gotten around 
to saying it, he will later on become dissatisfied with it. Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with 
Husserl’s method gradually emerges: he will start complaining about Husserl’s linguistic 
infidelities that betray a theory, and also point out that Husserl’s method relies on replacing one 
“attitude” for another, which was too reflective. 
 Heidegger will eventually reject the very notion of “attitude” [Einstellung] as that 
which characterizes the distinctive character of phenomenology, and he turns towards a more 
Aristotelian vocabulary in order to demarcate the phenomenological approach from the 
theoretical-scientific. In this context, it is interesting to note the effect that Emil Lask had on 
Heidegger. Heidegger praises Lask for being the one who had gone far enough to see the 
problem of the theoretical in its essence and genesis.236 My hypothesis is that it was through 
Lask that Heidegger focuses on Husserl’s “Aristotelian moment” in the form of categorial 
intuition, and from there turns to the useful Aristotelian vocabulary in subverting the reflective 
elements that infiltrated Husserl’s transcendental turn. Heidegger distances himself from the 
reflective reconception of phenomenology of Husserl, selectively appropriating from Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations (1900).237 
 Certain commentators, such as Theodore Kisiel and Stephen Crowell, have pointed out 
that Heidegger’s response to these Natorpian objections against Husserl’s method was his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 “Das methodische Grundproblem der Phänomenologie, die Frage nach der Weise der wissenschaftlichen 
Erschließung der Erlebnissphäre, steht selbst unter dem ‘Prinzip der Prinzipien’ der Phänomenologie. Husserl 
formuliert es so: ‘Alles, was sich in der ‘Intuition’ originär...darbietet, [ist] einfach hinzunehmen…als was es sich 
gibt.’ Das ist das ‘Prinzip der Prinzipien’, an dem ‘uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen’ kann. Verstünde man 
unter Prinzip einen theoretischen Satz, dann wäre die Bezeichnung nicht kongruent” (GA 56/57, p. 109). “Es ist die 
Urintention des wahrhaften Lebens überhaupt, die Urhaltung des Erlebens als solchen, die absolute, mit dem Erleben 
selbst identische Lebenssympathie” (GA 56/57, p. 110). 
236 Kisiel 1993, p. 56. 
237 See Phenomenology: Responses and Developments, Volume 4, ed. Leonard Lawlor, (Durham: Acumen, 2010), p. 
132. 
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hermeneutic of formal indications, which addressed the issue of the formation of philosophical 
concepts. Through the hermeneutic of formal indication, Heidegger opposed the theoretical 
conceptual paradigm and responded to the Natorpian criticisms.238 Heidegger’s solution was 
this: “Instead of objectifying concepts which seize life and so still its stream, this spontaneous 
access that life has to itself provides the possibility of finding less intrusive precepts or pre-
concepts which at once reach back into life’s motivation and forward into its tendency”.239  
 In trying to develop a method that grounds philosophy back to life’s motivations and 
tendencies, Heidegger establishes a new account of the phenomenological process that 
eventually leads him to mood. Heidegger shifts attention to the enactmental character of 
philosophy that will allow him to avoid reducing it to another theoretical attitude or 
objectivizing attitude. This starts being formed in his Winter semester of 1919-1920 
(Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie) and Summer semester of 1920 (Phänomenologie der 
Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung).  
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
Heidegger inherited from neo-Kantians the project of bringing together philosophy and the truth 
of Logos (logic) with sensibility, in the context of a transcendental project (as opposed to a 
psychologistic reduction). This aim was important in his initial endorsement and adoption of 
Husserlian phenomenology, but also in his radicalization of certain aspects of it. Paul Natorp’s 
criticisms against Husserl’s reflective method helped to define Heidegger’s radicalization of 
Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger, following the Husserlian (and Diltheyan) notion of 
comportment radicalized Husserlian phenomenology from within and offered a way to resolve 
the objections posed by Natorp.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Note that while Kisiel took this to indicate that Heidegger accepted Natorp’s criticism against Husserl, Crowell 
disagrees in that he thinks Heidegger thought that he was only forced to explicate what was already inherent in 
Husserl’s phenomenological attitude, so as to say that Heidegger did not see himself as accepting that Natorp’s 
criticism was effective. My own opinion, attested through Heidegger’s gradual but steady and irreversible distancing 
from Husserl, is that initially Heidegger thought that Natorp simply misconstrued Husserl; however, Heidegger’s 
more radical ditching of Husserlian vocabulary later on (i.e. the altogether rejection of the word “Einstellung” and 
Schauung), with the increasing adoption of Aristotelian vocabulary (“Haben”), indicate that he came to find more 
merit and effectiveness in Natorp’s critical remarks. 
239 Kisiel 1993, p. 48. 
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 This entailed a move away from the early Husserlian conception of phenomenology as 
an attitude [Einstellung] towards an enactmental understanding, which reattached (grounded) 
propositional truth and understanding back to the pre-reflective motives and tendencies of 
factical life which supply the binding necessity and starting point of philosophical enactment. 
On the one hand, “binding necessity” refers to the necessary justification that underlies and 
indeed binds together [Verbindlichkeit] the act of a valid logical propositional judgment; on the 
other hand, it refers to the force that motivates a praxis, without reducing this force to “natural 
causality” but also without compromising the sense of urgency [Notwendigkeit] that drives the 
act of truth. 
  This engagement with neo-Kantian positions and criticisms enabled Heidegger to show 
how philosophical concepts as well as judgments emerge without a radical break from the flow 
of life, without stilling the stream, but from within a pre-reflective understanding in its 
togetherness to factical life. As we will see in the upcoming chapters, Heidegger felt the need to 
analyze Logos in terms of originating motives [Motive] and directional tendencies [Tendenz], 
terms which enabled Heidegger for the first time to thematize the affective states which he will 
later on more consistently call “moods”. The truth of judgment gets grounded [begründet] into 
the pre-reflective act of understanding, without a radical break, rather than the act of reflection 
which presupposes a break of the conceptual object and seeks a speculative reconstruction of 
subjectivity.  
 In this context, we will see how Heidegger’s employment of the notions of Gehaltssinn 
(content-sense), Bezugssinn (sense of relation) and Vollzugssinn (sense of enactment), which 
marks Heidegger’s early phenomenological analyses of the Situation240 through which his first 
breakthrough to the pre-reflective, affective realm of intentionality is achieved, is developed out 
of Husserl’s terminology. A very important, albeit not so well known, γιγαντοµαχία µάχη περί 
της ουσίας has taken place, concerning the early years of Heidegger’s career and the way he 
managed to achieve a “breakthrough” into non-reflective phenomenology. On the one side 
stands the genealogical interpretation supplied by Theodore Kisiel (and also endorsed and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 “Bezugssinn, Vollzugssinn, Gehaltssinn ergeben die Urstruktur der Situation” (GA 58, p. 261).  
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further consolidated by John van Buren), which holds that Heidegger’s early breakthrough into 
a non-reflective phenomenology, via his discovery of “formal indication” [Formale Anzeige], 
which developed into his ontological breakthrough and later to the ‘Event of Being’, with his 
metaphysics of subjectivity (i.e. his short “stint” with Husserl) being an exception to the rule. 
On the other side stands Stephen Crowell who sees Heidegger’s phenomenological inquiries, as 
well as the ontological turn that culminates in BT, opened up by Heidegger’s discovery of 
Formal Indication in continuity with neo-Kantian problems but especially through Husserlian 
phenomenological terminology.241 In this context, “Crowell argues that Heidegger developed 
formal indication for two main reasons: 1) to resolve some problems with the phenomenological 
method and 2) to reveal the method’s existential sources”.242 As has been shown, I side with 
Crowell on this reading. 
 In the next chapter, we will see how various relevant concepts operate in Husserl and 
how Heidegger radicalizes them in order to resolve, from within phenomenology, the problems 
that Natorp raises with respect to the reflective character of the Husserlian method. In this 
context, we will spend some time identifying the way Husserlian reflective regard and the 
epochē relate to the Husserlian notions of feeling [Gefühl] as well as emotion [Gemüt], and 
generally how affective aspects of phenomena figure in Husserl’s phenomenology and how they 
relate to the intentional grasp of categorial intuition. As we will see, for Husserl emotional 
intentions are founded, and hence derivative forms of intentionality, whose foundation is 
presentive intentionality and whose truth is expressed in propositional judgment which have a 
corresponding state of affairs [Sachverhalt].  
 Husserl sees the relation of founded emotional intentions [Gefühle] to foundational state 
of affairs as analogous to the relation between founded value-laden affairs [Wertverhalt] and 
foundational state of affairs. In this regard, one could discern how the theoretical regard’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 As Matthew I. Burch writes: “Two major approaches have emerged: some argue that formal indication is 
Heidegger’s first pass at a non-reflective approach to what he would later call the ‘Event of Being’; others contend 
that the method is Heidegger’s refinement of Husserlian phenomenology. Theodore Kisiel offers the most developed 
version of the former thesis, while Steven Crowell lays out the best defense of the latter. […] On the one hand, Kisiel 
represents those who argue that Heidegger dedicated his career to the ‘Event of Being’, with the exception of a 
notable (and errant) voyage into the metaphysics of subjectivity” (Burch 2011). 
242 Ibid. 
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priority over practical affairs, both in the methodological sense as well as in an ontological 
sense, reflects the way Husserl takes state of affairs to be foundational, with Wertverhalten and 
Gefühle being founded acts. The radicalization that Heidegger bears from within Husserlian 
phenomenology involves a reversal of priorities, from Einstellung to Vollzug, from the 
theoretical to the practical/enactmental, which amounts to a reversal in Husserlian priority from 
Sachverhalt to Wertverhalt. This will be one of the things that Heidegger will subsequently 
subvert: namely, that the state of affairs underlying intentional act of truth has always already a 
certain emotion.  
 At this precise point, as we will see, Heidegger sides with Heinrich Rickert, who 
(according to Heidegger’s own reading) held that judging [Urteilen], contra presentation 
[Vorstellen], does not happen in an “indifferent consideration” [teilnahmslosen Betrachten], but 
rather belongs in the same class as feeling [Fühlen] and willing [Wollen], which opposes the 
class of presentation. Heidegger takes note of Rickert’s ascription of a practical comportment 
[Verhalten] to the act of judgment, and in addition to the fact that Rickert says that what holds 
true [gilt] for judgment must also be valid of cognition243 [Erkennen]; in this context, cognition 
is deemed to be a process [Vorgang] that is determined through feelings, that is, through desire 
[Lust] or slackness [Unlust], and thus feelings foundationally connect with the act of judgment 
and knowing in general.  
 Furthermore, according to Heidegger, Rickert determines the feeling that accompanies 
the experience of judgment as the certainty [Gewißheit] of evidence [Evidenz] which constitutes 
the bindingness of judgment, giving to the judgment the character of necessity [Notwendigkeit]. 
It is crucial to note that Heidegger does not reappraise the foundational importance of feelings, 
with respect to truth, by a mere exchange of the two kinds of acts (from Einstellung to Vollzug, 
or from Sachverhalt to Wertverhalt): rather he manages to “deconstruct” Sachverhalt down to 
its ground from within the Husserlian descriptions and identify its enactmental character, as 
well as locate (following Husserl) the foundational characteristic of motive [Motive] to be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 I have translated Erkennen here as cognition. Other possibilities: recognition, knowledge.  
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pre-reflective unity of experience which cannot be expressed in the propositional format of 
judgment.  
 By adopting Husserl’s thematization of the operation of motive in Ideas II, Heidegger 
will manage to bring into prominence a silenced element in Husserl’s discoveries that will lead 
him to the subversion of the priority of the truth of propositional judgment qua state of affairs 
[Sachverhalt], in its neutrality, objectivity, and universal validity [Allgemeingültigkeit], and a 
more originary level of the operation of truth will be identified in Dasein’s comportment 
[Verhalten].244 It is through a reappraisal of the significance of motives and tendencies operative 
in comportment that Heidegger will, for the first time, formally indicate the pre-reflective 
phenomenon that will eventually be identified as mood [Stimmung].    
 It is the notion of motive that will serve as the fundamental notion that Heidegger will 
initially adopt from Dilthey and Husserl in order to refer to the pre-reflective aspects of 
facticity, which will later develop into mood. The transformation and development into mood is 
a slow one and not so straightforward; however, there are strong and cogent indications that 
establish this connection: firstly, as we will see, there are sporadic references to mood 
[Stimmung] in Heidegger’s analyses of motive; secondly, the examples he gives of phenomena 
that the young Heidegger calls motives are the ones he will later call mood [Stimmung], the 
most important of these examples being love [Liebe, ἔρως] and wonder [Erstaunen, 
θαυµάζειν];245 thirdly, some of the fundamental and defining characteristics that Heidegger later 
ascribes to mood and disposition [Befindlichkeit] – as, for example, bindingness necessity of 
truth, the archē of philosophy, and concatenation of experience – are also ascribed to motives. 
Hence, we can safely assume a continuity between what the young Heidegger calls motives and 
the later notions of disposition and mood. Of course, one important difference between motives 
and mood and disposition is the lack of reference to an ontological question, or the ontological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 It is important, of course, not to miss the fact that Heidegger’s radicalization remains within the “spirit” of 
Husserl’s terminology since he will use a linguistic variant of the same root: from Sachverhalt to Verhalten. To my 
knowledge, no scholar has yet picked up on, in a meaningful way, this shift from Husserlian Sachverhalt to 
Heideggerian Verhalten, something that still maintains a relation by way of etymology.  
245 Even if Heidegger will later not consider love or wonder as fundamental moods, they are still moods. 
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difference, but that does not constitute a problem, since at the time that Heidegger was writing 
about motives, he had not yet explicitly raised the ontological question.                 
 In this context, we will see how Heidegger identifies the Husserlian moment of Vollzug 
of the act of phenomenological regard and is able to redefine phenomenology, from an attitude 
[Einstellung] (as Husserl clarified it in Ideas I) to the enactment [Vollzug] of the attitude. In 
effect, Heidegger redefined phenomenology from within Husserlian terminology, bringing the 
practical aspect of the act of phenomenological regard and understanding to the forefront. This 
enabled Heidegger to radicalize the Husserlian notion of “truth” from state of affairs to the truth 
of comportment in its enactment. In this context, we will also see how Husserl already identifies 
motive as that which supplies the concatenation of experience, out of which propositional 
judgment and state of affairs emerge. From then on, Heidegger will insist that the task of 
phenomenology is to identify the motives and tendencies inherent in understanding, and by 
doing so, to go further in a direction that was already implicit in Husserl’s own phenomenology.  
 We will trace Heidegger’s redefinition of phenomenology from an attitude to an 
enactment and to formal indication, and see how this manages to resolve the problems that 
Natorp posed against the Husserlian reflective method. We will then proceed with a 
presentation and respective analysis of how the young Heidegger understands and employs the 
key notions of content-sense [Gehaltssinn], sense of relation [Bezugssinn], and sense of 
enactment [Vollzugssinn], and how Heidegger relates these notions to motive and tendency, and 
mood.      
  
 
 
 
 
 
	   91	  
Chapter 2: Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough: from intentionality to motivation  
 
I. Husserl’s first phenomenological breakthrough: intentionality and categorial intuition 
Introductory remarks 
In the previous chapter we saw the general neo-Kantian problems that shaped the context in 
which Heidegger’s early hermeneutic phenomenology of facticity emerged. It was through his 
encounter with those problems that Heidegger came to reappraise the disclosive character of the 
affective level of experience primarily manifested through moods, by throwing into relief the 
way philosophical understanding [Verstehen] opened up by comportment [Verhalten], which is 
the way the self relates to that which is given in intuition [Anschauung]. What is given to 
intuition is already conditioned by the way we relate to this intuition and find ourselves 
meaningfully bound to it.  
 Heidegger came to see how comportment itself is grounded in the affective, pre-
reflective, level of intentional life, which Heidegger initially indicated through the appropriated 
Husserlian (and Diltheyan) notions of motivation and tendency, and later on by the notion of 
mood [Stimmung]. In the following chapter we will see how Heidegger first analyzed factical 
life in terms of the underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen]. But 
before we look at Heidegger’s own analyses of factical life, we need to look at Husserl’s 
phenomenological breakthrough, especially in the way he utilized these concepts. This will 
enable us to better trace the genealogy of Heidegger’s phenomenology of mood, and will also 
show how Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn to mood does not constitute an abandonment of 
Husserlian insights, but rather a radicalization of them. This genealogical reading will allow us 
to frame the issue at hand in a way that illuminates the philosophical problems Heidegger was 
trying to resolve, and the direction his phenomenology of mood took.  
 Heidegger’s early hermeneutic phenomenology utilized the notions of Verhalten, 
Motivation and Tendenz, and was based on the combined insights of Husserl and Dilthey, as 
part and parcel of a response to Natorp’s forceful critical objections to phenomenology. 
Heidegger followed Husserl in responding to the neo-Kantian predicament that transcendental 
philosophy was left with an unbridgeable cleft between “being” and “logic”. The problem that 
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persisted had to do with the distinction and relation between real thought processes that have 
factual being, and the ideal sense of logical validity that they intend.246  
 Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl’s account of categorial intuition, insofar as it 
afforded a non-linguistic, pre-conceptual intuition of being, and he repeatedly identified this 
contribution by Husserl as the most important one for his own work.247 In the Sixth Investigation 
Husserl connected essence with intuition and grounded the discovery of categories not in the act 
of judging, which is a complex act, but in the direct and simple act of intuition. Categorial 
intuition is the capacity of intentionality to intuit ideal objects, i.e. categorial objects, from 
simple universality and essentiality to complex relational intentions of state-of-affairs 
[Sachverhalte], all forms of predication, conjugation, synthesizing etc., including the meaning 
of “is”, that is, being.248 Husserl offered an account of intentionality that resolved the “truth vs. 
being” dichotomy and grounded judgment and understanding in intuition, by identifying a form 
of intuition that is able to intuit “true being”. Not only that, but this intuition, categorial 
intuition, constitutes a moment in which the initial categories or forms first present themselves 
as simply given in pre-reflective experience.  
 Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition, and his account of the way it binds truth and 
being, provided a breakthrough for Heidegger particularly because it grounded the truth of 
being (and being of truth) on the basis of a non-reflective experienceability instead of reflective 
knowability.249 Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition enabled Heidegger to identify in 
Husserl an account of originary intuitive experience wherein the Dasein lives in truth.250 As we 
will see, Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition offers an account of non-objectifying, pre-
reflective intuition of truth and being, which constitutes a phenomenological precursor to a non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Friedman 2000, p.39 
247 Heidegger on quite a few occasions identifies the Sixth Investigation of the Logical Investigations as the most 
important contribution of Husserl that inspired his own thought. For example, see his essay ‘My way to 
phenomenology’ (1963). 
248 Zahavi 2003, pp. 35-36. 
249 Kisiel 1993, p.35. 
250 In fact, Heidegger borrowed the phrase “living in truth” - a phrase that signifies a shift from phenomenology qua 
gnoseology (conditions of possibility of knowledge), to phenomenology qua aletheiology (knowing the truth of 
being, living in the truth) - from Lask. Heidegger borrowed the Laskian term in the context of his interpretation of 
Husserl’s Sixth Investigation. See Kisiel, 1993, p. 516. 
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reflective grasp of the factual “whole” that resists Natorp’s objections concerning the reflexivity 
of the phenomenological regard.   
 Heidegger believed that Husserl’s early phenomenology offered a way of reconnecting 
the “two realms” of ideal logic and being, by grounding the understanding and validity of 
propositional judgments in the givenness of intuition, thereby overcoming the neo-Kantian 
predicament. This overcoming was achieved through categorial intuition, which is a mode of 
sense-perception. This was first described in the Logical Investigations, where Husserl 
grounded the logical truth of a “state of affairs” [Sachverhalt] in intuition.  
 Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl’s “phenomenological regard”, which he saw as 
offering a change in the way these epistemological problems were approached, recognizing how 
theories of judgment and understanding are grounded in, and dependent on, theories of relation 
[Bezug] between the subject and the object, the act of judgment and the state-of-affairs, truth 
and being.251 The truth of judgment is seen as grounded [begründet] in the non-reflectively 
enacted categorial intuition which grasps “being”. Not only that, but categorial understanding 
offers an intuitional, non-reflective and experientially immediate way that the “world” as such, 
in its totality, is phenomenologically given. In effect, categorial intuition grasps the truth of 
being as totality, in a non-reflective experience.  
 For Heidegger, Husserl’s categorial intuition offered an initial route into an explanation 
of how it is that the Dasein, the human being, can intuit a totality of the world and a totality of 
being, in a way that is not reducible either to the object in sensuous intuition, or to the identity 
of the logical expression that makes up a judgment. Categorial intuition is, for Heidegger, as 
close as the early Husserl got to discovering a factical way of grasping being and truth as such, 
or, in other words, the truth and being of facticity itself.  
 Categorial intuition is a pure perception of the state-of-affairs in its totality, given pre-
linguistically and thus before propositional judgment. In fact, it will be categorial intuition that 
grounds propositional judgment and furnishes the necessary intuitive evidence and legitimacy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 I am explicitly referring to Logical Investigations, not Ideas I. 
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for it. This is important for several reasons, including the fact that this insight predated 
Husserl’s transcendental work that was susceptible to Natorp’s critical objections.  
 Categorial intuition anticipates certain structures that Heidegger will ascribe to moods. 
They have a similar operational significance: Mood will be the way Dasein discloses totality 
before logical judgment, but also the way it discloses a certain “determinacy” of the world, a 
certain “objectivity”, the “facticity” of the being of the world as a whole, in a direct, non-
reflectional way.252 Husserl’s account of categorial intuition does not, however, neatly 
correspond to Heideggerian mood since mood is not a form of intuition.  
 Once we identify the crucial breakthrough offered by Husserl’s analysis of categorial 
intuition in terms of granting access to truth and being, we will see how Husserl’s reformulation 
of phenomenology in Ideas I jeopardizes the immediacy and ontological access that his initial 
approach offered, making his phenomenological method susceptible to Natorp’s critical 
objections. In this context, we see that Heidegger opts to focus on certain terminological 
moments in Husserl’s analyses, whilst rejecting others. Heidegger dispenses with the reflective 
aspects of Husserl’s transcendental method by grounding the phenomenological regard in the 
enactmental aspects of experience, and through that achieves a way into the hermeneutics of 
facticity from within Husserl’s phenomenology.     
  The key characteristic of Husserl’s first phenomenological breakthrough was his 
rediscovery of the phenomenon of intentionality [Intentionalität], which allowed him to expand 
the field of philosophical research and thus move beyond the naturalism of psychologism and 
the narrow, scientific objectivism of neo-Kantianism. In his analysis of the structure of 
experience, commencing from the Logical Investigations, Husserl paid particular attention to a 
group of experiences that are characterised by their being a consciousness of something, that is, 
the experiences that possess object-directedness.253 This is, in essence, the phenomenon of 
intentionality. By looking at intentional experience, Husserl achieved two crucial aims: firstly, 
he was able to expand what counts as an object and was thus able to investigate objective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Michel Haar 2002, p. 162.  
253 Zahavi 2003, p. 24. 
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meaning as opposed to merely empirical, real, objects. This turned philosophy into a 
phenomenology of consciousness that is able to study all forms of objectivity beyond the 
restricted way that the empirical sciences study it or presuppose it.  
 Secondly, the phenomenon of intentionality enabled Husserl to distinguish between the 
intended object and the act of consciousness, i.e. to distinguish the transcending objectivity 
from the immanent experience of consciousness, thus avoiding the reduction of the object to the 
intramental subjective content - a reduction that psychologism was guilty of. Intentionality is 
the phenomenon that shows how the subject is able to transcend itself and is able to refer to 
(other) things or states-of-affairs that transcend the immanent side of consciousness, that is, its 
own experience. 
 Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the intended object and the intentional act in 
the Logical Investigations enabled him to offer a theory of truth of propositional judgment 
based on intuition, founding the transcendental validity of truth on the self-evidence of intuitive 
givenness. Husserl offered an account of acts of judgment, i.e. of acts that involve 
understanding, that stayed within the realm of intuition, with no appeal to reflective speculation. 
This enabled him to bring together understanding with intuition (sensibility). 
 Husserl’s phenomenological account of intentional acts moves beyond straightforward 
intuition of simple objects given to perception to cover complex acts of judgment whose 
intentional meaning, and the pertinent truth (and being) of their fulfillment, is relational, ideal, 
categorial, and mereological. We will see what this means when we look at the bifurcation of 
intuition into sensuous and categorial intuition. In this context, there are two characteristics that 
we will need to keep in mind, vis-à-vis the relevance of intentional intuition with the affective 
level of feelings and moods.  
 Firstly, the fact that Husserl offers a breakthrough in thinking about the foundations of 
truth, shifting its foundation from the content-based account of the state-of-affairs of a 
propositional judgment to the relational aspect of the enactment of the judgment. This was an 
important breakthrough that Heidegger embraced and incorporated in his own 
phenomenological analyses, which was expressed as “comportment” (disposition).  
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 Secondly, we must keep in mind how Husserl’s account of intuition, which is the 
foundation of all judging experience and of ontological understanding, was still restricted to a 
kind of neutral, presentive, grasp that excluded value and feeling at its most basic level. 
According to Husserl, acts of judgment are complex acts that are further reduced, or are based 
on, a more fundamental level of act that is presentive, stemming from direct sensuous intuition. 
Intentional acts that include value or feeling or ontological understanding are also founded 
levels of intuition. This will be something that Heidegger will turn on its head: Husserl’s failure 
to see how feeling acts are foundational will be something that Heidegger will subvert. Let us 
now turn to the pertinent analyses that Husserl provides in the Logical Investigations.  
The discovery of intentionality 
In the Fifth Logical Investigation, entitled “On intentional experiences and their ‘contents’” 
[Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre „Inhalte"],254 Husserl gives a distinctive, 
phenomenological definition of the experience of objects, one that involves the reappraisal of 
the relation between the mental act and the intentional object. He invites us to distinguish 
between two different ways of grasping the relation between the conscious subject and the 
perceived object. On the one hand, we have the real, causal relation, and on the other hand, the 
intentional relation. The latter is one in which the conscious act of relating to an object, as it is 
given in a phenomenological manner, is different in kind from the relation that involves 
“empirically real existence”.255 The phenomenological concept of intentional consciousness 
does not describe the relation [Beziehung] in the empirically objective sense, as empirical 
sciences do.256  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 LI, p.77. 
255 “Mental acts are often called ‘activities of consciousness’, ‘relations of consciousness to a content (object)’, and 
‘consciousness’ is, in fact, at times defined as a comprehensive expression covering mental acts of all sorts” 
[Psychische Akte bezeichnet man ja oft als „Betätigungen des Bewußtseins", als „Beziehungen des Bewußtseins auf 
einen Inhalt (Gegenstand)", und mitunter definiert man „Bewußtsein" geradezu als einen zusammenfassenden 
Ausdruck für psychische Akte jeder Art.] (LI, p. 80). 
256 “We may now point out that this concept of consciousness can be seen in a purely phenomenological manner, i.e. 
a manner which cuts out all relation to empirically real existence” [Es sei nun gleich darauf hingewiesen, daß sich 
dieser Erlebnisbegriff rein phänomenologisch fassen läßt, d. i. so, daß alle Beziehung auf empirisch-reales Dasein] 
(Ibid, p.82).   
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 However, Husserl is not interested in rejecting or excluding the objectified, content-
oriented sense of relation; what he tries to do is to redescribe the unity of the intentional 
experience in toto, by addressing the subjective parts that are involved in relationality, and thus 
by implication also maintaining the distinction between the immanent aspects of the conscious 
act of relation and the objective correlates of it. While the subjective side of the intentional act 
has an immanent relation to the object - it contains the object in the phenomenological sense - 
this does not imply that it really contains it in the empirical sense, or that the subjective side’s 
contents and relations exhaust the truth and being of the object (in other words: Husserl is not a 
metaphysical idealist).  
 According to Husserl, the content of what appears in consciousness, the object qua 
content, is not itself the experience of the intentional act, it does not exhaust the act. The 
intentional object, which is “had” by the experience, is not an empirical object, and vice versa. 
The relation established within the act of experience is not one that can be thought in terms of 
two empirical objects whereby the relation is that of a real object contained within an empirical 
ego.257 In order to illustrate the difference between phenomenological experience and “popular 
experience”, Husserl draws on the distinction between real content [reellem Inhalt] and 
intentional content, which he combines with the notion of “having” [Haben]: the intentional 
content is that which is had.258 (Note how the category of “having” re-emerges here as a 
phenomenological notion of relation.)  
 Based on these distinctions - distinctions that are enabled through the 
“phenomenological reduction” of the empirical ego - the criterion by virtue of which experience 
is epistemologically legitimized, and objectivity qua truth is attained, lies solely within the 
powers of intuition: the evidence is had and yielded by phenomenological perception itself, but 
without either reducing the content of objectivity to the intramental and the merely subjective, 
or deferring the content of objectivity to a metaphysical realm that is never given in intuition but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 “If we ourselves appear to ourselves as members of the phenomenal world, physical and mental things (bodies and 
persons) appear in physical and mental relation to our phenomenal ego. This relation of the phenomenal object (that 
we also like to call a ‘conscious content’) to the phenomenal subject (myself as an empirical person, a thing) must 
naturally be kept apart from the relation of a conscious content, in the sense of an experience, to consciousness in the 
sense of a unity of such conscious contents (the phenomenological subsistence of an empirical ego).” (Ibid, pp. 83-84). 
258 Ibid, p. 85. 
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only to speculative reflection. In Husserl’s own words: “What is adequately perceived, whether 
expressed thus vaguely or left unexpressed, constitutes the epistemologically primary, 
absolutely certain focus yielded by the reduction, at any given moment, of the phenomenal 
empirical ego to such of its content as can be grasped by the pure phenomenologist.”259  
 Thus, even if Husserl’s notion of the intentional object is expanded to include anything 
that can be phenomenologically intended, this does not mean that there are no criteria by virtue 
of which we can attain fulfillment, or perceive the inadequacy, of knowledge. The cornerstone 
of Husserl’s epistemology is the phenomenological givenness of the intentional object, is its 
self-evidence in the presentive act: the coincidence of the intention with the percept, perception 
being the evidence of fulfillment. This regards simple presentive acts of intentionality that 
involve simple correlative objects. But what about the more complex intentional acts of 
judgment whose intentional correlates are not objects but states-of-affairs? What about the more 
complex acts of categorial intuition (i.e. understanding)? Here lies Husserl’s ontological 
radicalization of the grounding capacities of phenomenological intuition, which Heidegger will 
find most intriguing.  
State-of-affairs: being and truth 
Husserl followed Brentano in classifying mental phenomena into presentations [Vorstellungen], 
judgments [Urteile] and emotions [Gemütsbewegungen]. These mental acts differ in the manner 
in which they refer to their respective objects. According to Husserl, there are essential 
differences between the intentional relation of the different acts: the manner in which a “mere 
presentation” refers to its object differs from the manner of a judgment, which treats a state-of-
affairs as either true or false.260 The act of judgment does not have a single object as its 
intentional correlate; rather its objective correlate is the state-of-affairs.261 In Husserl’s own 
words:  
In the judgment a state of affairs ‘appears’ before us, or, put more plainly, 
becomes intentionally objective to us. A state of affairs, even one concerning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259Ibid, p. 88. 
260 Ibid, p. 96. 
261 Ibid, p. 115. 
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what is sensibly perceived, is not, however, an object that could be sensibly 
perceived and apparent (whether to our ‘outward’ or to our ‘inward’ 
sensibility). In perception an object is given to us as having full-bodied 
existence. We call it something which now is, in so far as our percept serves as 
our basis for judging that it is. […] What plays the part of object to judgment 
and opinion we call the state of affairs judged: we distinguish this in reflex 
knowledge from the judging itself, the act in which this or that appears thus or 
thus, just as in the case of perception we distinguish the perceived object from 
the presentation as act.262  
 
 The fulfilment of categorial acts, i.e. the acts of judgment, is also founded on intuition; 
however, there is a special kind of intuition involved. Husserl makes the distinction between 
sensuous intuition and categorial intuition: the former involves the intuition of individual 
objects (in the phenomenological sense), whereas the latter involves the intuition of categories 
that correspond to a state-of-affairs.263 It is therefore possible to achieve phenomenological 
fulfilment of an act of judgment, which is about an object having a predicate, but for this 
purpose mere sensuous perception (intuition) does not suffice because a categorial relation is 
never given in simple sensuous intuition. Rather, fulfilment of a categorial act depends on 
categorial intuition: the kind of intuition that is able to grasp the state-of-affairs in the categorial 
format of “S is P”. Categorial intuition enabled Husserl to resolve the neo-Kantian 
epistemological contrast between sensibility (intuition) and understanding,264 allowing him to 
ground the truth of judgment - the truth of categorial intentional acts, which are acts of 
understanding - in intuition, in the intuitive act, as opposed to grounding it in a transcendental 
atemporal realm of validity, as Paul Natorp did.  
 As a matter of fact, Husserl specifically names Natorp as one of his critical targets in 
this context, when he complains that for Natorp the richness of consciousness pertains to 
contents alone.265 The problem in Natorp’s position is that he collapses the distinction between 
(the act of) consciousness and content, the distinction between the manifold of the intentional 
experience and the objective being, or referent, of an intentional act. This holds true for all 
intentional experiences, simple presentations as well as judgments. But by focusing on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Ibid, p. 139. 
263 Ibid, p. 186. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid, p. 106. 
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judgments, we come to see how Husserl’s phenomenological account overcomes the neo-
Kantian problematic conception of the truth of judgment, and offers a way out of the neo-
Kantian predicament of separating the realms of validity and being.  
 Traditionally, states-of-affairs are the objects of categorial sentences in the format of “S 
is P”. States-of-affairs in themselves are considered to be facts (cf. Husserl’s notion of 
Tatsächlichkeit) whose being is independent of the sentence-sense that refers to it, i.e. the act of 
judgment or the proposition. Thus, states-of-affairs in themselves cannot be either true or 
false.266 Rather, states-of-affairs either “obtain” [gilt], or they do not; they either “are” or “are 
not”, exist or do not exist, and in the case that a false propositional judgment is made then the 
judgment will simply have no corresponding state-of-affairs. Only a true judgment will have a 
corresponding state-of-affairs.267 In effect, the state-of-affairs is distinguished from the 
propositional judgment thus: states-of-affairs are truth-makers, whereas propositional 
judgments are truth-bearers.268 This means that the two sides differ in ontological status: states-
of-affairs can either exist or not exist - being falls exclusively on their side - but propositional 
judgments always have the same ontological status, i.e. they exist in the same way, they are 
always expressed, but what varies is their truth-bearing status: they can only be either true or 
false.269  
 Husserl’s notion of truth, as it is supplied in the Logical Investigations, moves beyond 
the traditional correspondence theory of truth. As we already said, on the one hand, the 
phenomenological intentional object of the judgment, the intentional state-of-affairs, does not 
pertain to empirical matters of fact [Tatsächlichkeit]. The intentional object is not restricted 
natural facts. On the other hand, the intended state-of-affairs is not intramental either, because it 
transcends the act of judgment. However, the validity of the state-of-affairs is manifested in and 
through the enactment of judgment, as given to categorial intuition, and it is indeed attached to 
an understanding of being. This involves a radicalized intertwining of “understanding”, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Peter Simons, P. “Aristotle's Concept of State of Affairs”, in Antike Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie. Ed. M. F. 
Gigon. (Frankfurt: Verlag Peter Lang. 6: 100, 1988). 
267 Ibid, p. 101. 
268 Ibid, p. 100. 
269 Ibid, p. 101. 
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“intuition”, “truth” and “being”. What Husserl’s categorial intuition shows is how categorial 
knowledge itself, i.e. a true proposition, becomes understood as valid by being given to 
intuition, through being adequately had by the act of judgment, and this involves the act of 
judgment having the states-of-affairs, and thus already having being. Both truth and being are 
given to intuition simultaneously, and are phenomenologically “had” by the intentional act 
itself.  
 It is important to note here how truth and being can coincide, where the understanding 
of a valid act of judgment is ontological. The key to the relation of truth and being, as James 
Mensch writes, is the double correlation of thought (in this context: understanding) to 
perception, and perception to being: the achievement of knowledge is “the correlation of 
perception to being. Within this schema, we can say that the ‘interpretation of categorial acts as 
intuitions’ clarifies ‘the relationship between thought and intuition’ by making thought, which is 
taken by Husserl as a categorial activity, capable of intuition […] with respect to entities.”270 In 
effect, the achievement of categorial intuition is the bringing together of intuition with 
ontological understanding. To quote Mensch again, on how categorial intuition counts as the 
thought that intellectualizes sensible intuition:  
[T]he meaning of this intellectualization can be seen by noting that Husserl 
equates authentic thought – i.e., the capacity for categorial acts – with the 
understanding […] The thrust of the doctrine of authentic thought is, then, that 
of making the faculty of understanding intuitive. It is in some sense to be 
judged as an alliance with Plato and against Kant, the latter having declared 
that understanding is not intuitive.271  
 
 Husserl brings together intuition, understanding and being in a way that distinguishes 
his account from Natorp’s and from other neo-Kantians. What is more, Husserl offers an 
expanded notion of consciousness as intuition of objective being, which is precisely what his 
analyses of intentional experience show. But in order to attain objective knowledge, i.e. truth, 
intentional experience must be intuitively fulfilled. True understanding, true judgment, attains 
its grounding in and through intuition. Ultimately, it is intuition that bestows epistemological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 James, R. Mensch. The Question of  Being in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 
p. 68. 
271 Mensch 1981, p. 69. 
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legitimacy. As Husserl writes: “Should intuition fall wholly away, our judgment would cease to 
know anything. […] Knowledge always has the character of a fulfilment and an identification: 
this may be observed in every case where we confirm a general judgment through subsequent 
intuition, as in every other case of knowledge.”272 
 The attainment of truth is given in intuition, but this does not mean that truth, intuition, 
and being, are restricted to objectified being, as it also does not mean that truth is fulfilled 
through reflection. On the contrary, in this context, i.e. the Sixth Investigation, Husserl 
addresses fundamental aspects of truth and being that are not objective and are not reflectively 
given, within the context of intentional experience, which constitutes an effective response to 
Natorp’s objections. 
 Initially, Husserl addresses the more foundational and basic manner of fulfillment, 
which involves simple intentional acts in which the “concrete act of propositional meaning 
permits of a fulfilling identification with an objectively complete intuition of a matching 
material.”273 Husserl is in this context addressing truth in the fullest possible sense, namely, 
ultimate fulfilment where a presentative intention has achieved its last fulfilment,274 and where 
the “object is actually ‘present’ or ‘given’, and present as just what we have intended it.”275 
Fulfilment, then, is a matter of coincidence, a matter of identification between the intuitively 
given and the intentionally meant. Identification itself is an objectifying act and its correlative 
being is “being in the sense of truth”.276 Husserl wants to expand the traditional ontological 
conception of truth so as to ascribe truth and being not only to absolute, simple objects, but also 
to states-of-affairs. In his own words:  
The concepts of truth, rightness, the true, are generally interpreted more 
narrowly than we have done: they are connected with judgments and 
propositions, or with states of affairs which are their objective correlates. 
‘Being’ is meanwhile mainly spoken of in relation to absolute objects (not 
states of affairs), though no definite lines are drawn.277 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 SLI, pp. 342-343. 
273 Ibid, p. 327. 
274 Fulfillment is a technical term employed by Husserl, which means that what is initially emptily indicated in an 
expression becomes adequately presentified in intuition, so that the demonstration becomes grounded in the state-of-
affairs as given in originary perception. 
275 SLI, pp. 328-329. 
276 Ibid, p. 331. 
277 Ibid, p. 333. 
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II. Transcendental phenomenology as a change of attitude: epochē, enactment and 
motivation 
In Ideas I, Husserl “relaunches” phenomenology as “eidetic seeing”: a kind of intuition that 
grasps ideal, necessary and universal meanings. He makes a distinction between two kinds of 
intuition, which are operative at the same time: one pertains to the intuition of existence, the 
individual Dasein, the other pertains to the intuition of essence. Both are necessary, says 
Husserl, and neither is given without the other.278 But Husserl focuses on essential seeing, and 
further reduces it to eidetic seeing, because that is where necessity [Notwendigkeit] and 
universal validity [Allgemeingültigkeit], that which a proper science should be looking for, lie. 
Eidetic universality is “pure” and absolutely “unconditional”.279 Eidetic judgment has a 
corresponding state-of-affairs, and eidetic seeing involves the consciousness of necessity per 
se.280 Husserl here continues on the neo-Kantian path, trying to ground the universality and 
necessity of ideality in intuition. In this context, Ideas I offers a new beginning, and Heidegger 
is interested precisely in the problem of beginning.281 
  According to Husserl, this is achieved through a change in attitude that involves an 
instituting of an ontological epochē (an abstaining from ontological judgment), and by adhering 
to his epistemological “principle of principles”. The principle of principles defines the ultimate 
epistemological criterion: every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of 
cognition.282 This restricts phenomenological truth to cognitive intuition. In addition, Husserl 
further qualifies the phenomenological method by imposing a firm distancing of the 
phenomenologist from the “natural attitude”: “Instead of remaining in this attitude 
[Einstellung], we propose to alter it radically”. 283 The natural attitude involves generally 
positing that the real surrounding world is “a factually existing “actuality” [daseiende 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Ideas I, 10. 
279 Ibid, p. 13. 
280 Ibid, p. 14. 
281 The crucial issue for Heidegger was the originary genetic aspect, that is, the problem of the beginning, in the sense 
of Urpsrung: how is it that phenomenological analysis, eidetic seeing, is enacted in the first place? How is it that we 
effectuate the kind of formalization that is specific to phenomenological seeing and discover eidetic intuition? 
282 Ideas I, p. 44. 
283 Ibid, p. 57.  
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Wirklichkeit]”.284 What the phenomenologist has to do, according to Husserl, is to “exclude” or 
“put out of action” the natural attitude of everydayness - to suspend it. In a sense, it is a kind of 
doubt that stems from, and enables, perfect freedom.285 But the phenomenological epochē 
[ἐποχή], Husserl says, is not a form of an other positing [Setzung], i.e. a positing of the negation 
of the factual being of the world [zeitliches Dasein], as in Descartes’ case, but rather a kind of 
“not taking into account”, a kind of ignoring.  
 Husserl’s transcendental turn was an effect of his discovery of the epochē, which was 
meant to be his own version of the “Copernican Revolution”.286 In Ideas I, as well as in his 
Cartesian Meditations, Husserl understands the epochē in terms of reflection, whose function is 
“to break with the world and transcend the natural attitude”.287 In his latest text, entitled “The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to 
Phenomenological Philosophy”, Husserl will introduce new concepts in order to describe the 
phenomenological attitude, one of them being the concept of Besinnung (and Selbstbesinnung), 
in the context of rectifying problematic interpretations of his earlier works, partly stemming 
from his commitment to reflection [Reflexion]. Besinnung will be a case of existential self-
meditation in which a person reflects upon the ultimate sense of his existence [Dasein], 
something that will enable a regressive inquiry into the ‘original motivation’ 
[Ursprungsmotivation] – a concept-reflecting that was central to his so-called genetic 
phenomenological enquiry.288289 
 The ascription of “perfect freedom” to the enactment of the phenomenological attitude, 
and the way it suspends Dasein, as well as the reflective character of it, is precisely what 
alienated Heidegger from Husserl’s early transcendental turn. Perfect freedom is discovered, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Ibid.  
285 “The attempt to doubt universally belongs to the realm of our perfect freedom: we can attempt to doubt anything 
whatever […]”, Ibid, p. 57. 
286 Dermot Moran, Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 41. 
287 Ibid, p. 60. 
288 Ibid, pp. 49-50. 
289 In Husserl’s own words: “Here we can also say more simply and, at the same time, in preliminarily generalizing 
way: The reflection in question is a particular case of that self-reflection in which man as a person seeks to reflect 
upon the ultimate sense of his existence [Dasein], We must distinguish between a broader and a narrower concept of 
self- reflection [Selbstbesinnung]: pure ego-reflection [Ichreflexion] and reflection upon the whole life of the ego as 
ego; and reflection [Besinnung] in the pregnant sense of inquiring back into the sense or teleological essence of the 
ego.” (Crisis, p. 392). 
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operates, on a purely eidetic realm, but the question still remains concerning the way of 
enactment of this attitude: how is it that it comes about?290 Heidegger will find the way out of 
this methodological predicament from within Husserl’s own terminology, by focusing on the 
enactmental character of the epochē. We must penetrate deeper into the discourse of Ideas I. 
 Any intentional act has three aspects to it: the content of the intentional object (the ideal 
meaning itself,291 which applies to both the noetic and the noematic content); the establishing 
relation (the way the intentive act relates to the intended object)292; and the enactment of the 
intentional act. Heidegger comes up with three notions that he uses in his own analyses, which 
we can reapply to Husserl’s phenomenological analyses in order to make sense of Heidegger’s 
own interpretation of Husserl: the notion of Gehaltssinn (content-sense) for the first aspect of 
the intentional act, the notion of Bezugssinn (relational-sense) for the second aspect, and the 
notion of Vollzugssinn (enactmental-sense) for the third aspect.  
 In the case of eidetic judgment, the content-sense is the formal, pure, eidetic universal: 
the eidetic state-of-affairs. The relational-sense of an eidetic act refers to the “referential 
character” of the act, that is, the way the act itself intentively refers to its object (in this case, the 
eidos). The referential character can vary according to the object: for example, in the eidetic act 
of judgment the relation established is not a “real” spatiotemporal relation or a relation of a 
psychological nature. The relational-sense refers to the way the intentional act relates to the 
object: in perception it is a perceptual relation, in imagination an inventive relation, in liking a 
liking relation, in willing a willing relation, etc.293 Finally, the enactmental-sense refers to the 
very way the phenomenological attitude is instituted. It concerns the “actuality” of the 
comportment [Verhaltung] that is in place and enables and determines the kind of intuitive 
analysis that ensues. 
 Heidegger’s early phenomenological analyses focus on the enactmental-sense that 
actualizes the phenomenological attitude, and thus, eventually, formally bring into relief the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Cf. the enactment of authenticity (from within inauthenticity) in BT.  
291 Ideas I, p. 214. 
292 Ibid, pp. 214-215. 
293 Ibid, p. 76. 
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fundamental affective experiential elements involved in it, the aspects that are dynamic, in the 
sense of genetic, pre-reflective and non-objectifying. Focusing on the enactmental sense of 
intentional acts enables Heidegger to radicalize phenomenology from a pure theoria to a praxis, 
uncovering the Aristotelian elements in Husserl’s own phenomenology. This interpretation also 
explains Heidegger’s explicit shift to Aristotle. 
 It is crucial to recognize that “enactment” is not externally imported into Husserl’s own 
phenomenological account. The operation of enactment permeates the whole of Husserl’s 
phenomenological analysis, albeit in a covert way. For example, an ideation is indeed 
enacted.294 Eidetic seeing is enacted.295 But even more fundamentally, the very change of 
attitude involved in the genesis of phenomenological seeing is a matter of enactment.296 The 
epochē is enacted,297 and so are the reductions and the accompanying reflections.298 This does 
not mean that enactment is an actualization in the sense of a “real action” that takes place in 
space and time, replacing one real natural act with another. Enactment should not be understood 
in the sense of “positing” a new judgment, a new thesis or a new “motivation”;299 it simply 
grasps the practical aspect of actuality in a phenomenological sense.  
 The notion of “enactmental-sense” enables Heidegger to phenomenologically indicate 
the “lived experience” as such, bringing into relief the “concrete” level of intentional and pre-
intentional life, and enabling him to address the very problem of beginning, the generation of 
phenomenology as such in its vividness. The enactmental-sense accounts for the founding level 
of any philosophical experience, not just of the experience of a phenomenological “world”, but 
any philosophical experience, including those that produce a mere Weltanschauung. Heidegger 
picks out Husserl’s parlance of enactment and further analyses it in terms of its motivational 
character, something that enables a comprehensive and genetic analysis of the unified structure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Ibid, p.10 
295 Ibid, p. 156. 
296 “I appropriate to myself the arithmetical world and other similar “worlds” by effecting the suitable attitudes 
[durch Vollzug der entsprechenden Einstellungen zueigne]”. (Ibid, p. 55). 
297 “The phenomenological ἐποχή will deserve its name only by means of this insight; the fully conscious effecting 
[Vollzug] of that ἐποχή will prove itself to be the operation necessary...” (Ibid, p. 66). 
298 “Instead, then, of living naively in experience and theoretically exploring what is experienced, transcendent 
Nature, we effect [vollziehen] the ‘phenomenological reduction’ (Ibid p. 113). 
299 Ibid, p. 59. 
	   107	  
of intentional life itself. It is this route into Husserl’s own analyses that enables Heidegger to 
radicalize Husserl’s accounts from within, something that culminates in uncovering the 
grounding role of affects, while at the same time offering a genetic account of how 
phenomenology itself is brought about. This is an account of the beginning of philosophy and 
phenomenology that does not involve reflection or the theoretical positing of “principles”. This 
also effectively responds to the objections raised by Natorp against Husserlian phenomenology.  
 In his winter semester lecture of 1919/20, entitled Grundprobleme der 
Phänomenologie, Heidegger states that phenomenology is the original science 
[Ursprungswissenschaft] of life itself.300 In that lecture, Heidegger explicitly thematizes the 
problem of the beginning of phenomenology, complaining about Husserl’s “reflective” account 
of how phenomenology is “set in motion” by the notions of epochē and the principle of 
principles. He speaks about how the methods of the phenomenological science “must grow 
from the origin itself, out of the origin in original generation and in constant renewing 
preservation and evident fulfillment of its tendencies”.301 Later on he says: “Indeed, we should 
not reflect on the beginning, but rather factically begin!”[Reflektieren wir doch nicht über das 
Anfangen, sondern fangen faktisch an!]302 Insofar as phenomenology is an original science, says 
Heidegger, then its task is to arrive at an original understanding of itself 
 
 
through the generation of its task and through the genuine effectuation of its 
ownmost motives in the clarification and execution of the ‘task’ by way of 
research. […] In other words, only the genuine, concrete realization and the 
actualization [Vollzug] (following) of the “tendencies” operating in original 
science lead to it itself and to its ownmost problem area, which only responds 
when it is taken into the basic tendency of phenomenology itself.303 
 
 In other words, Heidegger here calls for 1) a phenomenology that does not begin by a 
certain theoretical reflection upon its own beginning - one that would entail the establishment of 
principles - as that already alienates the concreteness of the enactment of phenomenology by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 BPP, p, 2. 
301 Ibid, p. 2. 
302 Ibid, p. 3. 
303 Ibid, p. 2. 
	   108	  
focusing on cognition and abandoning the pre-cognitive aspects of intentional life; and 2) a 
phenomenology that can indicate, or embrace, in a non-reflective manner, its own motivational 
foundations. Heidegger calls for a certain radicalization that even turns against 
phenomenological principles themselves, and in a way, “against the very master”, that is, 
Husserl. In Heidegger’s own words:  
The genuine actualization [echten Vollzug] of phenomenology lies in its 
radicalism in questioning and critique. And this “radicalism of phenomenology 
needs to operate in the most radical way against phenomenology itself and 
against everything that speaks out as phenomenological cognition. There is no 
iurare in verba magistri [swearing to the words of a master] within scientific 
research. The essence of a genuine generation of researchers and of subsequent 
generations lies in its not losing itself on the fringe of special questions, but 
rather to return in a new and genuine way to the primal sources of the 
problems, and to take them deeper.304 
 
 Heidegger is in effect declaring that he will try to radicalize Husserl’s own 
phenomenology by “taking it deeper”, by reattaching the spiritual discoveries of Husserl to their 
motivational, factical, basis. Heidegger thought that this was a murky aspect of Husserl’s own 
account, that is, the question of beginning. By keeping in view the way in which Husserl based 
the phenomenological reduction on enactment [Vollzug], and how (as we will see later in this 
chapter) the foundational unity, the concatenation, of spiritual (intentional) life is identified, by 
Husserl, as founded by Motivation, we shall come to see how Husserl provided the impetus for 
Heidegger’s turn to the hermeneutics of facticity and the affective.  
 Heidegger, presumably due to Natorp’s criticisms, identified this double-character in 
Husserl’s phenomenology and pointed out how Husserl had not achieved full clarity in his own 
methodical discoveries; that he did not achieve full clarity concerning his own motives and 
tendencies; and that this came down to the fact that he maintained a “double-direction” and a 
tension between “descriptive psychology” and “genetic-explanatory psychology”.305 According 
to Heidegger, phenomenology should therefore turn towards its own beginning, towards its own 
motivation and tendencies; but this cannot be achieved by seeing phenomenology as an 
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“attitude” [Einstellung] in the way that Husserl defined it in Ideas I, as that is too cognitive a 
beginning – a beginning that conceals the lived aspects of the enactment.  
 Heidegger is already countering Husserlian Einstellung with a “letting-open-up” [Offen-
Lassen], a precursor of Gelassenheit.306 Insofar as phenomenological research is scientific 
research, it must be able to begin from the motivations and tendencies that form the factical 
foundations of intentional life, thus offering a genetic account- this necessisates a method that 
can only be a letting-open-up.307 
 Heidegger’s focus on enactment and motivation is, as already mentioned, derived from 
within Husserlian analyses. Motivation is a Husserlian notion that became central in Ideas II, 
even though it was there already in the Logical Investigations. Let us turn to Husserl’s accounts 
of motivation in order to see how, on the one hand, Heidegger’s phenomenology of factical life 
is in a sense a radicalization of what is already there, albeit suppressed, in Husserl’s own 
accounts, and how, on the other hand, Husserl’s own “genetic turn”, in the face of Natorp’s 
objections, is not a radical reconception of phenomenology but a thematic re-appraisal of an 
ignored part of Husserl’s own investigations. It is of important scholarly value to trace, if not 
exhaustively then at least schematically, the way motivation figures in Husserl’s 
phenomenology, since one of the central arguments made in this genealogical account is that 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of moods, his initial turn to facticity via motivation, does not 
constitute an abandonment of Husserl but rather a radicalization of his work. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 In GA 29-30 (the lecture course titled ‘Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics’), Heidegger argues that working 
towards achieving a particular attitude [Einstellung] that emerges and is mediated through theories of consciousness 
and the stream of experience, won’t get us anywhere it terms of granting access to a certain level of consciousness-
interconnections [Bewußtseinszusammenhängen]. What we need is a releasement, i.e. Gelassenheit : “Es kommt 
gerade nicht darauf an, eine Region von Erlebnissen zurechtzupräparieren, uns in eine Schicht von 
Bewußtseinszusammenhängen hineinzuarbeiten. Wir müssen gerade vermeiden, uns in eine künstlich zurechtgelegte 
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Unmittelbarkeit des alltäglichen Daseins zu erhalten und festzuhalten. Es gilt nicht die Anstrengung, uns in eine 
besondere Einstellung hineinzuarbeiten, sondern umgekehrt, es gilt die Gelassenheit des alltäglichen freien Blickes - 
frei von psychologischen und sonstigen Theorien von Bewußtsein, Erlebnisstrom und dergleichen." - GA29-30, §22. 
307 BPP, p. 21. 
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III. Motivation in Husserl 
General	  remarks	  
Heidegger’s first methodical phenomenological analysis of life through the notion of motivation 
(and tendency, as we will see in the next chapter), in which he, for the first time, explicitly and 
thematically speaks about passions and Angst, is his 1920-21 lecture course on the 
Phenomenology of Religious Life. Heidegger analyses religious life in terms of the underlying 
motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies [Tendenzen] that permeate factical life. Motivation 
and tendency are in fact the two key formal indications, or “categories”, that Heidegger employs 
in order to phenomenologically analyse how theories, belief-systems, or Weltanschauungen, 
factically emerge from within life itself.  The point here is to see how Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of religious life in that 1920-21 course - whereby the afflictions of the person, 
their moods, passions and temptations take centre stage - is enabled from within a Husserlian 
account of the self (the “person”) as it is described in Ideas II. But we first need to look at how 
the notion of motivation gains prominence in Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of spiritual 
life.  
 Husserl’s notion of motivation, as it figures in Ideas II, was affected by the Munich-
based phenomenologist Alexander Pfänder. The other philosopher who drew Husserl’s attention 
to motivation, apart from Pfänder, was, by Husserl’s own admission, Wilhelm Dilthey. It is not 
only Dilthey who incorporated Husserl’s insights from the Logical Investigations (and we’ve 
seen before how Heidegger himself credits Dilthey for being instrumental in the general 
acknowledgment of Husserl’s contributions), but it was also Husserl who incorporated some 
Diltheyan insights, as early as the decade 1910-20, as we can see in his (then) unpublished notes 
that would later be published as Ideas II.  
 Motivation is a relatively well-known basic concept of Husserlian phenomenology. 
Husserl referred to motivation in order to describe non-causal relations between intentional and 
non-intentional experiences in general.308 The notion was already used in the first edition of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Genki Uemura and Toru Yaegashi. “Alexander Pfänder on the Intentionality of Willing” , In A. Salice (ed.), 
Intentionality Historical and Systematic Perspectives. (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2012), p. 269.  
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Logical Investigations to designate “the relation between a perception of a sign and an act 
intending what is indicated by the sign”.309 But in the Logical Investigations it was a marginal 
concept. The concept only became a fundamental one for the first time in Ideas II, where it also 
attained a much broader meaning.310311  
 Let us see how Husserl turned to Motivation as disclosed through the personalistic 
attitude.  
Husserl on Motivation 
As mentioned earlier, Husserl had a marginal role for motivation in the Logical Investigations. 
In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl investigated the “sphere of Desire and Willing” in the context 
of the connection between intentional and non-intentional experiences [Erlebnissen].312 For 
Husserl, willing pertains to the question concerning the operation of motivation itself, and leads 
to an understanding of the deep interconnections [Zusammenhänge] that operate in the realm of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Ibid. 
310 Uemura and Yaegashi 2012, p. 270. 
311 Before we look at the way Husserl employed this notion, though, we must respond to this reasonable question: if 
the concept became a fundamental one for Husserl in Ideas II, and Ideas II was only posthumously edited and 
published by the Husserl-Archives in 1952, how is it possible that Heidegger could have (actively) inherited the 
concept of motivation from Husserl and not from someone else? 
 We have no concrete proof that Heidegger took it from Husserl, as Heidegger never explicitly says this. But 
the circumstantial facts allow us to plausibly put this hypothesis forward. Ideas II was composed “in one stroke” by 
Husserl, in “pencil manuscript”, right after the completion of Ideas I, in 1912. In 1915 Husserl further elaborated and 
rewrote the text, and Husserl noted on the first page of the manuscript that the writings stem from lecture courses 
held between 1913 and 1915. The parts of the manuscript in which Husserl expands on the constitution of the world 
of spirit, where the concept of motivation takes centre stage, comes from the manuscript called “H-folio”, dating from 
1913. This manuscript, the H-folio, was incorporated into the second redaction made by Edith Stein in 1918. It must 
be noted that Husserl further expanded this section in 1923 when Ludwig Landgrebe became his assistant. Husserl 
incorporated further annotations and other writings from the H-folio that Stein had not used. The manuscript was 
finished and was ready for publication in 1925, but Husserl kept revising the document up to 1928. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no indisputable evidence concerning which paragraphs of the pertinent part III of Ideas II 
Heidegger would have read and incorporated in his analyses of motivation and tendency. But we do know for a fact - 
and this is by now an established belief among Husserl scholars - that Husserl was circulating his manuscripts 
amongst his students and assistants. We also know for a fact that section three was written in 1913. Judging from the 
content in Heidegger’s phenomenological lectures between 1919 and 1921 and from the way he employs the notions 
of “motivation” and “tendency”, and comparing this with what Husserl had written about these concepts in section III 
of Ideas II, it is more than highly probable that Heidegger had read these sections and was perhaps even working 
together with Husserl on those notions. 
 I submit, then, that Heidegger adopted these phenomenological concepts from Husserl, incorporated the 
jargon of motivation into his own analyses, and applied them to certain paradigmatic experiences that Husserl had not 
considered up to then, notably those of religious life. This is attested to not only by the fact that Heidegger employed, 
in the aforementioned analyses, the notion of “motivation” in a way that is consistent with the way Husserl 
reconfigures the concept in Ideas II (the parts that were edited by Edith Stein around the time that Heidegger was 
preparing to teach the phenomenology of religious experience), but it is also attested to by the fact that Heidegger’s 
turn to religious life, the life of the religious individual, fits well within the “personalistic attitude” that enabled 
Husserl to thematize motivation. In that context, Husserl’s turn to the  “personalistic attitude” (opposed to the 
“theoretical attitude”) enabled Heidegger to turn to religious experience from within Husserlian phenomenology. See 
Ideas II, pp. XI-XIII. 
312 Marta Ubiali. Wille – Unbewusstheeit – Motivation, (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2012), p. 241. 
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spirit [Geist] in general. Motivation is that which pertains to the connection [Zusammenhang] 
that moves [bewegt] and determines [bestimmt] spiritual wishings, willings and doings.313  
 So the issue is that of the enactment of spiritual movement itself: finding a way to 
phenomenologically describe this deep structure of subjectivity without falling back into 
naturalism. In Ideas II, Husserl's description of motivation is indeed guided by the same aim as 
Pfänder's: to emancipate the enactmental character of the spiritual world, the phenomenological 
world, the sphere of immanence, from the categories of natural causality. Motivation in Ideas II 
is indeed the “ground law of the spiritual world”, the interconnection [Zusammenhang] of the 
“Why and Because” that belongs to spirituality [Geistigkeit]. It is the phenomenological 
equivalent of causality [Kausalität].314   
 But Husserl offers us a concept of motivation that is broader than the one offered by 
Pfänder. The broadening of the notion of motivation enables Husserl to describe the lawfulness 
[Gesetzlichkeit] that covers the whole area of spirituality; this is spirituality in the sense of 
understanding, not just “willing”, because for Husserl spirituality is the area of understanding 
[Verständlichkeit]. Thus, every act, every intentional act, can be indicated as “motivated” and 
enquired into in terms of the underlying motivation, without recourse to a naturalized causal 
reference.315 
 Beyond its aforementioned broadening, Husserl’s notion of motivation differs from 
Pfänder’s in another crucial way: while for Pfänder motivation concerns the active moments of 
willing, excluding the passive (i.e. the “affective”), Husserl’s notion of motivation includes both 
the active and the passive. The importance of this difference cannot be overstated. The twofold 
nature of motivation in Husserl makes it possible to account for the intertwining aspects of the 
spiritual sphere: the rational and the irrational, the active and the passive or affective.316 This 
resolves the problem that Husserl identified in Pfänder, namely the fact that he left the entire 
sphere of passivity to naturalistic accounts of causality.317 But it also opens the way for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Ibid, p. 253. 
314 Ibid, p. 256. 
315 Ibid, p. 258. 
316 Ibid, p. 259. 
317 Ibid, p. 262. 
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Husserlian phenomenology to account for the genetic, constitutive levels of subjectivity that are 
pre-reflective and non-intentional.  
 Motivation, as we will see in the penultimate section of this chapter, will be identified 
by Husserl as the very foundation of the enactment of intentional life itself: that which 
establishes all meaningful acts, simple and complex, and which connects different acts among 
themselves. It is that which enables the internal constitution of a direct act of adequate as well 
as inadequate perception; it is that which enables the constitution of the more complex acts of 
judgment; but it is also that which enables the connection of different acts themselves (for 
example, as in the case of connected syllogisms).  
 It is important to acknowledge both aspects of the constitutive character of motivation: 
on the one hand, the dynamic, actively directing and referencing element of it, and on the other 
hand the affective, passive aspect of it, which already captures this foundational level of the 
spiritual self not as a solipsistic auto-affection, but rather as affected by something, or someone, 
other, an exteriority which motivates without this exteriority being reduced to nature: 
something that acknowledges the otherness of the constitution of the meaning of the “world” (or 
object) intended. As we will see, Husserl’s turn to the phenomenon of motivation signifies not 
just a turn in his phenomenology towards a genetic understanding of the “other-directed” 
character of spiritual life; it also achieves a certain overcoming of the otherwise strict 
“cognitivist perceptivist” approach, since, as we will see, motivation does not actually meet the 
strict epistemological criterion of “self-evidence” which sets the standards of scientificity and 
legitimizes intuition as the basis of the phenomenological science. Before we see how 
motivation gradually comes to the fore of Husserl’s analyses in Ideas I and, in particular, Ideas 
II, let us remind ourselves of the way it was defined, only to be immediately marginalized, in 
the Logical Investigations.     
Motivation in Logical Investigations 
The definition - and, by virtue of that very definition, the very marginalization of motivation - 
takes place in the First Logical Investigation, in which Husserl demarcates the area of 
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phenomenological science by making the essential, founding distinctions of his descriptive 
phenomenology. Husserl is after an identification of the ideal aspects of knowing by 
distinguishing between the temporal part of the act of knowing and the ideal part of knowing, 
i.e. ideal meaning, which is the intentional object. He therefore tries to clear the ground so as to 
enable the focus on acts that have ideal meanings and constitute “logic”, as opposed to those 
that don’t, and to focus on those ideal meanings themselves and the conditions that enable their 
fulfillment. The centre of phenomenological attention is therefore the “meaningful expression”: 
signs that express meaning. The distinction between meaning [Bedeutung] and expression 
[Ausdruck] must be maintained, since the former is the ideal intentional object, whereas the 
latter is the temporal manifold of the meaningful act; this distinction will constitute the 
cornerstone of his response to psychologism. But before Husserl picks up on meaningful 
expressions and embarks on the phenomenological analysis of them, he makes some other 
distinctions that are crucial to the study of motivation.  
 The first important distinction made is between indication [Anzeichen] and 
expression.318 Both expressions and indications are species of signs [Zeichen]. Signs that have 
the capacity to refer to an ideal meaning are expressions. But not all signs are expressive. Some 
of them are signs that indicate something without linguistically expressing something. These 
signs are not of interest to the project of the Logical Investigations because the “linguistic sign” 
is part of what enables Husserl to seek the foundation of scientific language, that is, of pure 
logic.319 Only meaningful expressions provide intuitive givenness that can qualify as scientific 
evidence [Evidenz] and is adequately “insightful” [Einsichtig].320  
 The diagram below helps orient ourselves around the distinctions that Husserl makes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 SLI, pp. 103-104. 
319 Diego D’Angelo. “The Foundations of Alterity. Husserl on Referencing and Indicating”, Investigaciones 
Fenomenológicas, n. 10, 2013, p. 57  
320 Walsh, p. 71. Philip, J. Walsh, “Husserl’s Concept of Motivation: The Logical Investigations and Beyond”, In 
Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, edited by Meixner, Uwe and Newen, Albert. (Münster: mentis, 2011), p. 
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On the right hand side we have expressions and their essential characteristics: they are 
linguistic, they can have ideal meaning, and they are fulfilled through self-evidence. On the left 
hand side, we have indications: their essence is non-linguistic, they motivate belief in 
inapparent other being, and they are fulfilled via “felt” conviction. Bear in mind that while it is 
the essence of indications that is non-linguistic, as the schema shows, this does not imply that 
there cannot be any indications that are linguistic. It only means that even in the case of an 
indication that is enacted linguistically, the essence of the indicative relation would not lie in the 
linguistic part itself, but rather in the non-linguistic part of the indication.   
 Husserl does not offer a clear technical definition of what a sign is per se, but he does 
say that the most important characteristic of it is its capacity to refer to something other than 
itself. A sign is relational: it establishes a relation between that which appears in experience, be 
it linguistic (such as in meaningful expression) or non-linguistic (such as a gesture, picture, 
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generic symbol, etc.) and that other which is not itself given.321 Husserl does not offer a detailed 
account of the referencing aspect of signs in general, but gives an analysis of it for one kind of 
sign: the indication. The only definition of “referencing” we have is that of indicative reference, 
and that is where we find the operation of “motivation”: 
In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain 
objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual 
knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of 
affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced 
(though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the 
reality of the other. This relation of ‘motivation’ represents a descriptive 
unity among our acts of judgment in which indicating and indicated 
states of affairs become constituted for the thinker.322 
 
 Upon analysing indication, we get an account of referencing, of other-directedness, 
which is established through motivation. To put it the other way around: motivation is the way 
that referencing to an other being is achieved. But because it is the way indication achieves its 
relations, Husserl does not pursue it further because he considers it “impure” and not based on 
intuitive evidence. Examples that Husserl gives are how Martian canals indicate the existence of 
intelligent beings on Mars, or how fossil vertebrae are signs of the existence of prediluvian 
animals.323  
 What we have, therefore, in the phenomenon of indication, is a species of signification 
which is able to motivate a belief in a certain state-of-affairs, and/or motivate an other act of 
judgment which is not itself founded on intuitional evidence. Motivation is that which 
“connects”, that which establishes the relational togetherness [Zusammenhang] between 
different acts of judgment through the experience of “felt” togetherness, whereby the referent, 
the secondary judgment, is not itself based on intuitive givenness. Husserl writes that in 
indication the intuitively given state-of-affairs “A” summons an other state-of-affairs “B”, “but 
we usually feel their connection forcing itself upon us, a connection in which the one points to 
the other and seems to belong to it” [Ruft A das B ins Bewußtsein, so sind beide nicht bloß 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 D’Angelo 2013, p. 56. 
322 SLI, p. 104. [In ihnen finden wir nun als dieses Gemeinsame den Umstand, daß irgendwelche Gegenstände oder 
Sachverhalte, von deren Bestand Jemand actuelle Kenntnis hat, ihm den Bestand gewisser anderer Gegenstände oder 
Sachverhalte in dem Sinne anzeigen, daß die Überzeugung von dem Sein der Einen von ihm als Motiv (und zwar als 
ein nichteinsichtiges Motiv) empfunden wird für die Überzeugung oder Vermutung vom Sein der Anderen]. 
323 Ibid. 
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gleichzeitig oder nacheinander bewußt, sondern es pflegt sich auch ein fühlbarer 
Zusammenhang aufzudrängen, wonach eins auf das andere hinweist, dieses als zu jenem 
gehörig dasteht.]324 
 Indication establishes a unity between the intuitively given state-of-affairs and the 
indicated, non-intuited states-of-affairs; and this commonality [Gemeinsamkeit], established 
through motivation, reaches into the realms of emotional phenomena [Gemütsphänomene] and 
phenomena of willing [Willensphänomene].325 Thus, the binding unity that is afforded by 
motivation is not one that is found in ideal logical space given in intuition, but one that is 
afforded by a certain experiential “feeling” of unity between two acts.  
 But indication is not only an issue of non-linguistic signs, in which a certain state-of-
affairs indicates, or motivates, the belief in another state-of-affairs that is unavailable to 
intuition, such as the presence of smoke indicating a fire behind that wall, i.e. the intuition of 
smoke motivating the belief in the being of a fire behind the wall. Indication also refers to the 
way beliefs are formed concerning subjective intentionality in the case of communicative 
speech acts, or non-verbal aspects of a communicative act, such as voluntary or involuntary 
gestures. That is, indication also includes the way a speech act can motivate a listener to form a 
belief concerning a state-of-affairs that cannot possibly be intuitively given, such as the case of 
a speech act indicating the state of mind of the speaker herself: her desire, willing, emotion, etc.  
 In this context, Philip Walsh offers the example of a speaker telling the hearer “Please 
pass the salt”.326 The act of desiring the salt belongs to the speaker and the desire cannot be 
directly intuited by the hearer, yet somehow the hearer experiences the speaker’s desire. This 
experience of one act of judgment connecting to another by indicating a state-of-affairs that is 
not, and cannot, itself be intuitively given, is enabled through motivation. It seems to me, 
therefore, that the subcategory of signs whose foundation is motivation, i.e. indications, is what 
pertains to the area of rhetoric, i.e. the phenomena of everyday language that has to do with 
doxa and pistis and the unity of the speech act with the emotion and mood motivated in the 	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326 Walsh 2011, p. 74. 
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hearer. This is the area of language that is traditionally marginalized in favour of logic, because 
of the difference in the way truth is “given” and the stark difference in the demanded kind of 
evidence. Heidegger moved into a phenomenology of everyday logos, offering a hermeneutics 
of everydayness, and uncovered, through an Auseinandersetzung with Aristotle, the deep bond 
between motivation and affects (and moods), as these were operating in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
Let us now see how Husserl further developed the notion of motivation in Ideas I and Ideas II.  
Motivation in Ideas I & II 
In Ideas I, Husserl does not offer a thematic analysis of motivation per se, but in the few 
instances that he does, it is already evident that a shift has taken place. He appeals to motivation 
in an interesting way in certain key instances, in order to appeal to that which sets up the unity 
of experience, the concatenation of experience out of which concepts and judgments are 
fashioned.327 Motivation is found at the very foundational kernel of the concatenated unity of 
experience [Erfahrungszusammenhang]:  
 
Experienceableness never means a mere logical possibility, but rather a 
possibility motivated in the concatenations of experience 
[Erfahrungszusammenhänge]. This concatenation [Zusammenhang] itself is, 
through and through, one of “motivation,” always taking into itself new 
motivations and recasting those already formed. With respect to their 
apprehension-contents or determination-contents, the motivations differ, are 
more or less rich, are more or less definite or vague in content depending on 
whether it is a matter of physical things which are already “known” or 
“completely unknown,” “still undiscovered” or in the case of the seen physical 
thing, whether it is a matter of what is known or unknown about it. It is 
exclusively a matter of the essential structures of such concatenations which, 
with respect to all their possibilities, can be made the objects of a purely eidetic 
exploration.328  
  
 In Ideas I, Husserl speaks about how each kind of act “comes together” with an 
appropriate, correlative object. He speaks of the noematic and the noetic having a certain unity, 
and he appeals to motivation in order to explain how the interconnection of the noetic and the 
noematic is achieved. For example, an act of perception, which is in the originarily presentive 	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328 Ideas I, pp. 106-107. 
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mode, will have an appropriate and compatible noema corresponding to the noesis, and the 
fulfilment of the being of the noema will be achieved in a particular way that belongs to this 
complex. Likewise, an act of imagination will have its own set of noesis and noema, act and 
object. To each act “belongs” a correlative being and way of fulfilment.  
 The fulfilled noematic being is motivated by the noetic: for Husserl, in the case that 
fulfillment is achieved through evidence, the originary relation between the posited and the 
positing is achieved through motivation that results from originary givenness.329 Motivation 
indicates this phenomenological effective relation by virtue of which fulfilment (i.e. truth) is 
enacted. In Husserl’s words: “The word motivation is particularly suited to the relation between 
the (noetic) positing and the noematic positum in its mode of fulfilledness.”330 
 We must highlight the dramatic change in Husserl’s position as regards the notion and 
operation of motivation. As previously noted, in the Logical Investigations Husserl does not 
ascribe any kind of scientific importance to the notion of motivation, since he takes it to be the 
way the “other-directedness” of indication is established - indication being, because of its 
impurity, a non-scientific way of signification (as it is not based on intuitive evidence, as 
expressions are). In this context, one can distinguish the two sides, indication and expression, as 
involving a distinction between “pure logic” and “rhetoric”. In Ideas I, however, Husserl 
seems to change his mind and approach. His transcendental turn, which already carries within it 
an intention to provide a deeper genetic account of logic itself, takes motivation to have a 
central role in the very genesis of “logos”. In other words, his appeal to motivation is part and 
parcel of a phenomenological critique of logic itself, which he had not supplied in the Logical 
Investigations. And in this context, he appeals to motivation in order to explain how logic and 
rational structures emerge.  
 Looking at the 1910 programmatic text ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’ can help us to 
better contextualize Husserl’s realization of how phenomenology can, and must, offer a critique 
of reason - something that he tries to do in Ideas I through the phenomenon of motivation. In 
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the beginning of that essay, in the context of articulating philosophy as systematic and 
scientifically rigorous, he argues against the degeneration of philosophy into doctrines and 
worldviews [Weltanschauungen]. Philosophy must be self-critical and presuppose nothing. In 
this regard, Husserl commends Descartes, Kant and Fichte for realizing the critical impulses of 
science.331 However, he criticizes Hegel, whom he characterizes as “romantic”, for failing to 
provide “a critique of reason, which is the foremost prerequisite for being scientific in 
philosophy”.332 It is this critique that Husserl tries to provide in Part Four of Ideas I, entitled 
“Reason and Actuality” [Vernunft und Wirklichkeit]. 
 In Chapter Two of Part Four, entitled “Phenomenology of Reason”, Husserl analyses 
rational objects, objects whose truth and actual givenness is grounded in rationality, and says 
that the spoken expression, the logical statement, must be something which can be rationally 
demonstrated.333 Husserl speaks about how a posited, rational, noematic characteristic is 
fulfilled if and only if an originarily presentive sense is given.334 The grounding of rational 
expression in the phenomenon given is explained in terms of “belongingness”: the emergent 
rational position [Setzung] that corresponds to the expression “belongs” [gehört] to that which is 
given, in the sense that it is “one” with the presentified (given) object/state-of-affairs. This 
“belonging” is then further explained in terms of motivation: the rational position belongs to the 
given in the sense that it is “motivated” by the appearing, that is, “rationally motivated”.335  
 Husserl argues that intellectual seeing, evidence of any kind, is “the unity of a rational 
position with that which essentially motivates the position – this whole situation being 
understandable as noetic and also as noematic”.336 Thus, Husserl holds that if we are to look at 
how rationality, logos, is fulfilled, we need to look at the motivation by virtue of which the 
noetic and the noematic are unified. But apart from the cases of fulfillment, Husserl is also 
interested in instances in which conditions of fulfillment are not met, i.e. when evidence is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 See “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” trans. In Q. Lauer (ed.), Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. 
(New York: Harper, [1910] 1965), p. 168. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ideas I, p. 326. 
334 Ideas I, p. 327. 
335 Ideas I, p. 328. 
336 Ibid. 
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ideal. According to Husserl, the issue of fulfillment is not one of an absolute either/or, that is, 
either we have knowledge or nothing at all: there are various degrees in evidentiary weight, and 
these degrees are also analyzed in terms of motives and, as he says, “counter motives” 
[“Gegenmotive”], such as in the case of conflicting or rival appearances.337  
 As Husserl digs deeper into the structure of intentional life, the life of the spirit, the 
truth of logos, exploring the unity that is at the foundation of epistemic fulfillment, he uncovers 
the constitutive phenomenon of motivation: motivation is that which sets up the unity of 
experience, the concatenation of experience out of which concepts and judgments are fashioned. 
Motivation is that which enables the interconnection, the concatenation [Zusammenhang] of 
spiritual life. But what is this Zusammenhang and what is its significance?  
 Before the final part of this chapter, in which I present Husserl’s influential (in 
Heidegger’s case) analysis of motivation in Ideas II, it would be useful to provide an excursus 
that focuses on the Husserlian notion of Zusammenhang,338 in order to see its role in the unity of 
experience and in science itself, since it is precisely this characteristic that brings motivation to 
the centre of phenomenological attention following the “genetic turn”. 
Excursus: Zusammenhang as science 
As noted above, in the Logical Investigations the notion of motivation is marginalized as it is 
connected to the phenomenon of indication, which cannot afford scientific evidence. However, 
the notion of Zusammenhang, which is later identified by Husserl as being constituted by 
motivation, appears to have a central role with respect to the very definition of science itself, as 
early as the time of the Logical Investigations. The very definition and legitimacy of science 
itself will turn out to lie in the way it establishes (identifies) necessary unities, i.e. 
interconnections, between objects and their respective fulfilling acts. But let us see what Husserl 
writes on Zusammenhang. 
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338 There is no consensus on how to translate the word. It is variably translated into English as “interconnection”, 
“concatenation” or “nexus”. Each of these English words brings out a different aspect, and the pertinent implications, 
involved in the notion of Zusammenhang. For this reason, I prefer to leave the word untranslated. 
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 In the first volume of the Logical Investigations, Husserl lays down the criteria of what 
makes science science. In Chapter 11, entitled “The idea of Pure Logic”, Husserl states that 
what makes a science science [Wissenschaft] is the establishing of an ideal interconnection 
which gives acts a unitary objective relevance and an ideal validity [ein gewisser objektiver 
oder idealer Zusammenhang, der ihnen einheitliche gegenständliche Beziehung und in dieser 
Einheitlichkeit auch ideale Geltung verschafft].339 In science a particular unity of 
interconnection obtains and is expressed. However, not every unity, or “putting together of 
truths”, is a science. A certain unified, demonstrated interconnection must be in place in order 
for knowledge to be scientific; thus unity must be grounded in demonstration, in the sense of 
having the interconnection of these truths manifested as necessary - something that would 
elevate the interconnection to the status of a law.340 This necessary unity given through 
interconnection is twofold: on the one hand, it pertains to the interconnections of the “things”, 
i.e. the states-of-affairs; on the other hand, it pertains to the interconnections of truths. Both of 
them are given a priori and are inseparable, even though they are not identical (cf. the four 
definitions of truth in the Sixth Logical Investigation). In Husserl’s own words:  
Two meanings can be attached to this objective interconnection [dem 
objektiven Zusammenhang] which ideally pervades scientific thought, and 
which gives ‘unity’ to such thought, and so to science as such: it can be 
understood as an interconnection of the things [der Zusammenhang der 
Sachen] to which our thought-experiences (actual or possible) are intentionally 
directed, or, on the other hand, as an interconnection of truths [der 
Zusammenhang der Wahrheiten], in which this unity of things comes to count 
objectively as being what it is. These two things are given together a priori, 
and are mutually inseparable. […] What hold of single truths, or single states 
of affairs, plainly also holds of interconnections of truths or of states of affairs 
[Offenbar gilt dasselbe, was von einzelnen Wahrheiten, bzw. Sachverhalten 
gilt, auch von einzelnen Wahrheiten, bzw. von Sachverhalten]. This self-
evident inseparability is not, however, identity. In these truths or 
interconnections of truths the actual existence of things and of interconnections 
of things [Zusammenhänge der Sachen] finds expression. But the 
interconnections of truths [Wahrheitszusammenhänge] differ from the 
interconnections of things, which are ‘truly’ in the former.341  
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 In this early account of Zusammenhang, Husserl seems to refer to the way things 
themselves are interconnected, giving a static account which does not pertain to the 
interconnection between the truths and the things themselves, the nexus that internally unifies 
the act of expression and the nexus that unifies (i.e. holds) for the corresponding states-of-
affairs. Husserl will later expand the notion of Zusammenhang into a more dynamic notion that 
will describe the way the two sides of intentional relation, i.e. the expressive part of the act and 
the objective side of the act, relate to one another, come together and mutually belong to each 
other in the form of interconnection [Zusammenhang]. Even though Husserl did not dwell on 
the notion of Zusammenhang in the Logical Investigations, the notion retained its centrality 
after the transcendental turn.  
 In ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, Husserl notes how psychology’s task involves the 
exploration of the psychophysical nexuses of nature.342 Psychology discovers the laws that 
determine the way psychophysical nexuses are caused, come into being and disappear.343 
According to Husserl, psychology indeed studies the Zusammenhang of the psyche, and in that 
respect it is a science. But it does so from a naturalistic standpoint and thus falls prey to 
Weltanschauung.  It seems therefore that here Husserl is starting to think of Zusammenhang 
generally as the interconnection that concerns not just things-themselves, die Sachen selbst, but 
that continuum which permeates the attitude and the truth and things that correspond to it, in the 
genetic sense (cf. Heidegger’s interpretation of ἕξις as continuum). Thus, psychology is able to 
reveal the lawfulness of the interconnections that concern psychophysicality and, as we’ll see, 
phenomenology will be the Urwissenschaft that studies the psychical interconnections from a 
different attitude.  
 The problem with empirical psychology is that it is deceived into adopting a scientific 
method that is “modelled on that of the physicochemical method”, and thus “suffers from a false 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 PRS, p. 171. 
343 Ibid: “It is the task of psychology to explore this psychic element scientifically within the psychophysical nexus of 
nature (the nexus in which, without question, it occurs), to discover the laws according to which it develops and 
changes, comes into being and disappears.” [Dieses Psychische nun, im psycho-physischen Naturzusammenhang, in 
dem es selbstverständlich da ist, wissenschaftlich erforschen, es objektiv gültig bestimmen, die Gesetzmäßigkeiten 
seines sich Bildens und sich Umbildens, seines Kommens und Gehens entdecken, das ist die Aufgabe der 
Psychologie].  
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imitation” that reifies consciousness.344 This means that subjective, conscious appearances are 
treated in a naturalistic, spatiotemporal way, as having real properties - something that also 
determines the interconnection characteristic of the lawfulness of this unity as one of 
spatiotemporal causality. In Husserl’s own words: 
[T]hey stand there as temporal unities of enduring or changing properties, and 
they stand there as incorporated in the totality of one corporeal world that 
binds them all together, with its one space and its one time. They are what they 
are only in this unity; only in the causal relation to or interconnection with 
each other do they retain their individual identity (substance), and this they 
retain as that which carries “real properties.” All physically real properties are 
causal. Every corporeal being is subject to laws of possible changes, and these 
laws concern the identical, the thing, not by itself but in the unified, actual, and 
possible totality of the one nature. Each physical thing has its nature (as the 
totality of what it, the identical, is) by virtue of being the union point of 
causalities within the one all-nature.345  
 
 The important claim here is how Zusammenhang is a requirement for science, a 
criterion with reference to which it is decided whether a study constitutes a science or not. Even 
though not every Zusammenhang signifies a science, every science identifies a Zusammenhang: 
a structural law that interconnects things. As seen in the above quotes, science is defined in 
terms of its being able to reveal unity in the acquired knowledge. Psychology is a science 
because it studies such structures. The area of each science is then defined in terms of the kinds 
of conscious structures it occupies, studies, orders and reveals, and the respective objects of 
knowledge that belong to these structures. The implication here is that all types of 
consciousness that qualify as “knowledge” are grouped in accordance with object categories and 
(each) science studies the essential connection [Wesenzusammenhang] and relation between the 
object categories and the forms of conciousness, as given, belonging to them.346     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Ibid, p. 178. 
345 Ibid, p. 179. In the original: “Ihre ‘Natur’ aber besagt: In der Erfahrung in mannigfach wechselnden ‘subjektiven 
Erscheinungen’ sich darstellend, stehen sie doch als zeitliche Einheiten bleibender oder wechselnder Eigenschaften 
da, und stehen sie als eingeknüpft da in den sie  alle  verknüpfenden Zusammenhang der  einen  Körperwelt mit dem  
einen  Raum, der  einen  Zeit. Sie sind, was  sie sind, nur in dieser Einheit, nur in der kausalen Beziehung zu- oder 
der Verknüpfung miteinander erhalten sie ihre individuelle Identität (Substanz) und erhalten dieselbe als Trägerin 
von ‘realen Eigenschaften’. Alle dinglich-realen Eigenschaften sind kausale. Jedes körperlich Daseiende steht unter 
Gesetzen möglicher Veränderungen, und diese Gesetze betreffen das Identische, das Ding, nicht für sich, sondern das 
Ding im einheitlichen, wirklichen und möglichen Zusammenhang der  einen  Natur. Jedes Ding hat  seine  Natur (als 
Inbegriff dessen,  was  es ist,  es:  das Identische) dadurch, daß es Einheitspunkt von Kausalitäten innerhalb der  
einen  Allnatur ist.” 
346 Ibid, p. 173. In the original: “Alle Bewußtseinsarten, so wie sie sich unter dem Titel "Erkenntnis" sozusagen 
teleologisch ordnen und, näher, sich den verschiedenen Gegenstandes-Kategorien gemäß gruppieren - als die ihnen 
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 Psychology indeed counts as a science of the psyche, but falls into the trap of reducing 
the lawfulness of psychical interconnections to the level of psychophysicality and natural 
causality. Phenomenology, in contrast, studies phenomena that do not have “substantial unity”, 
that have no “real properties”, no real parts, changes nor are subject to causality.347 
Phenomenology studies the interconnections, the Zusammenhänge, and the unity of judgments 
that have adequate experiences (i.e. adequate givenness of states-of-affairs): what is contained 
in the experience of essences, and “how essences of a certain genus or particularity are 
connected with others” [mit gewissen anderen zusammenhängen] – how, for example, 
“intuition” and “empty intention,” “imagination” and “perception,” “concept” and “intuition” 
unite with each other [mit einander vereinen]”,348 and how on the basis of such necessarily 
“unifiable” essential components  “intention” and “fulfillment” come together. Husserl does not 
explicitly supply a connection between Zusammenhang and motivation - he will do in detail in 
Ideas II. However, a few pages later in the same text, in the context of addressing historicism, 
he approvingly addresses the important discoveries of Dilthey’s historicist approach as regards 
the “motivations and unities of structures” of spiritual life.349 Husserl commends Dilthey’s 
discoveries for supplying a kind of insight into the motivations of historical spirit, thus enabling 
“understanding” [Verstehen], explication [Erklärung], and the being peculiar to it [seiner 
Eigenart des “Seins”] to be relived from within in their structural togetherness.350 This is how 
Husserl puts it:  
Whatever seems to be enduring is but a stream of development. If by interior 
intuition we enter vitally into the unity of spirit-life [die Einheit des 
Geisteslebens], we can get a feeling for the motivations at play therein and 
consequently “understand” [“verstehen”] the essence and development of the 
spiritual structure in question, in its dependence on a spiritually motivated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
speziell entsprechenden Gruppen von Erkenntnisfunktionen - müssen sich in ihrem Wesenszusammenhang und ihrer 
Rückbeziehung auf die zu ihnen gehörigen Formen des Gegebenheitsbewußtseins studieren lassen. So muß sich der 
Sinn der Rechtsfrage, der an alle Erkenntnisakte zu stellen ist, verstehen, das Wesen von begründeter 
Rechtsausweisung und von idealer Begründbarkeit oder Gültigkeit völlig aufklären zu lassen, und zwar für alle 
Erkenntnisstufen, zuhöchst für die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis.” 
347 Ibid, pp. 179-180. 
348 Ibid, p. 182. In the German: “Jedes Urteil, das zu adäquatem Ausdruck bringt, in festen adäquat gebildeten 
Begriffen, was in Wesen liegt, wie Wesen gewisser Gattung und Besonderung mit gewissen anderen 
zusammenhängen, wie z. B. ‘Anschauung’ und ‘leere Meinung’, wie ‘Phantasie’ und ‘Wahrnehmung’, wie ‘Begriff’ 
und ‘Anschauung’ usw. sich miteinander vereinen, aufgrund der und der Wesenskomponenten notwendig ‘vereinbar’ 
sind, etwa zueinander als ‘Intention’ und ‘Erfüllung’ passen, oder umgekehrt unvereinbar sind […]” 
349 Ibid, pp. 186-187. 
350 Ibid. 
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unity and development. In this manner everything historical becomes for us 
“understandable,” “explicable,” in the “being” peculiar to it [in seiner Eigenart 
des “Seins”], which is precisely “spiritual being,” [das eben “geistiges Sein”] 
a unity of interiorly self-questioning moments of a sense and at the same time a 
unity of intelligible structuration and development according to inner 
motivation. […] With a view to such a philosophy there arises the enormous 
task of thoroughly investigating its morphological structure and typology as 
well as its developmental connections and of making historically 
understandable the spiritual motivations that determine its essence, be reliving 
them from within. That there are significant and in fact wonderful things to be 
accomplished from this point of view is shown by W. Dilthey’s writings 
[…].351 
 
 Husserl here does not offer a clear or systematic appraisal of Dilthey’s insights, and 
thus we cannot be sure which of them Husserl identifies with and is ready to take on board. For 
example, we know that later on, in Ideas II, he will follow up on some of the notions he 
mentions here and directly appropriate the notion of motivation and the way it relates to the 
constitution of the interconnection and unity of spiritual life. This much we know. But he seems 
to hesitate about the notion of “being” and “historicity”. This hesitation should not come as a 
surprise since in this text Husserl’s positive remarks on Dilthey are already qualified by the 
former’s reservations concerning the latter’s failings: Husserl believed that an historicism, such 
as Dilthey’s, even though it offers remarkable and important insights into the unity of spirit-life, 
and even though it is not a naturalistic approach, still falls prey to scepticism because it does not 
believe in universal and absolute validity.352 However, what we must note in these references to 
Dilthey is the way Husserl commends Dilthey’s work for (vaguely) bringing together 
Motivation and Zusammenhang. Husserl himself will finally – for the first time – make clear the 
connection between Zusammenhang and Motivation in Ideas II. Our excursus on 
Zusammenhang ends here, and we can return to the issue of Motivation as it appears in Ideas II 
– the last part of this chapter and of this study’s direct engagement with Husserl. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Ibid, p. 186. In the original: “Alles scheinbar Feste ist ein Strom der Entwicklung. Leben wir uns durch innerliche 
Intuition ein in die Einheit des Geisteslebens, so können wir die in ihm waltenden Motivationen nachfühlen und damit 
auch Wesen und Entwicklung der jeweiligen Geistesgestalt in ihrer Abhängigkeit von den geistigen Einheits- und 
Entwicklungsmotiven "verstehen". In dieser Art wird uns alles Historische "verständlich", "erklärlich", in seiner 
Eigenart des "Seins", das eben "geistiges Sein", Einheit innerlich sich fordernder Momente eines Sinnes ist und dabei 
Einheit des sich sinngemäß nach innerer Motivation Gestaltens und Entwickelns. [...] Es ergibt sich also im Hinblick 
auf solche Philosophie die große Aufgabe, die morphologische Struktur, die Typik derselben, sowie ihre 
Entwicklungszusammenhänge zu durchforschen und durch innerstes Nachleben die ihr Wesen bestimmenden 
Geistesmotivationen zu historischem Verständnis zu bringen.”  
352 Ibid, pp. 186-187. 
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Motivation as the ground of the unity of intentional experience 
Husserl provides a rather comprehensive analysis of Motivation in Section Three of Ideas II, 
entitled “The Constitution of the Spiritual World”. Husserl again begins by marking the area of 
phenomenological analysis, in contrast to the area of naturalistic explanation and the terms that 
come with the naturalistic attitude. In §48 he distinguishes between soul and spirit, upon which 
the opposition between nature and world of spirit depends.353 He contrasts the natural-scientific 
theory of the soul with the theory of the person (Ego, Egology) that phenomenology offers.  
 Husserl notes that this distinction is crucial for phenomenology, and he –again, as in the 
essay ‘Phenomenology as Rigorous Science’ - commends Dilthey for having recognized and put 
forward the position that modern psychology, being a “natural science of the psychic”, is 
incapable of providing the foundation for the specific essence of the concrete human sciences.354 
Husserl here introduces the notion of the “personalistic attitude”, which is the 
phenomenological attitude that brings into relief the constitution of the phenomenological ego, 
and the deep phenomenon of Motivation, which constitutes the unity of spiritual life. Once we 
change attitude and replace the naturalistic attitude with the personalistic attitude, then we get 
access to the unity of spiritual life, the grounding unity of the interconnectedness of intentional 
life qua Motivation. It is noteworthy how in this context Husserl uses the notion “personalistic 
attitude” [personalistische Einstellung] interchangeably with “motivational 
attitude”[Motivationseinstellung] and the practical attitude. This is important because in a 
certain sense this analysis, and the continuity between the personalistic, the motivational and 
the practical, anticipates Heidegger’s own shift towards the personalistic (in his 
phenomenological analyses of religious life, as it is performed as an encounter with Augustine 
and Luther) and the practical (in his phenomenological encounter with Aristotle).  
 Motivation will be revealed as the fundamental law of spiritual life. It will be found to 
be the ground of the unity of spiritual experience, the experiential unity and interconnection of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Ideas II, p.181. 
354 In Husserl’s words: “In the first rank Dilthey has here earned for himself everlasting merit. It was he who for the 
first time recognized the essential distinction here and first reached a lively awareness of the fact that modern 
psychology, being a natural science of the psychic, is incapable of providing for the concrete human sciences the 
scientific foundation they require according to their specific essence” (Ibid, §48, p.181). 
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intentional life, that which genetically explains the way the ego, the person, is able to achieve 
knowledge of objects and states-of-affairs. It is the ground upon which the transcendence of the 
“other-directedness” of intentionality is based. In this context, motivation will be that 
“stimulating cause” that drives intentionality. In Husserl’s own words: 
[I]f we place ourselves on the terrain of the intentional relation between subject 
and Object, the relation between person and surrounding world, then the 
concept of stimulus acquires a fundamentally new sense. Instead of the causal 
relation between things and men as natural realities, there is substituted the 
relation of motivation [Motivationsbeziehung] between persons and things, and 
these things are not the things of nature, existing in themselves—i.e., the things 
of exact natural science with the determinations claimed there to be the only 
Objectively true ones—but are experienced, thought, or in some other way 
intended and posited things as such, intentional objects of personal 
consciousness. […] Phenomenologically, the unities of things (the noematic 
unities) are points of departure for more or less “strong” tendencies [“starken” 
Tendenzen]. Already as conscious but not yet grasped (hovering in the 
background of consciousness), they draw the subject to themselves, and if the 
“stimulating power” is sufficient, the Ego “follows” the stimulus, “gives in” 
and turns in that direction [es “gibt nach” und wendet sich zu]. Then the Ego 
exercises on these things explicating, conceiving, theoretically judging, 
evaluating, and practical activities. They now engage its interest in their being 
and their attributes, in their beauty, agreeableness, and usefulness; they 
stimulate its desire to delight in them [sie erregen sein Begehren sie zu 
genießen], play with them, use them as a means, transform them according to 
its purposes, etc. They then function in ever new strata as stimuli for its being 
active (and also, not to neglect the negative, for its being passive). Besides, the 
subject of motivation can at one time yield to the stimuli and at another time 
resist them. All these are phenomenological relations which can be found and 
described only in the purely intentional sphere. In a very broad sense, we can 
also denote the personal or motivational attitude as the practical attitude [In 
einem weitesten Sinn können wir die personale oder Motivationseinstellung 
auch als die praktische bezeichnen]: that is, what we have here is always the 
active or passive Ego and indeed in the proper intrinsic sense.355  
 
 In Chapter Two, entitled “Motivation As The Fundamental Law Of The Spiritual 
World” [Motivation als Grundgesetz der geistigen Welt], Husserl identifies the dynamic 
character of the constitutional ground of intentional life through analyzing Motivation in terms 
of “passivity” and “activity”.356 In this respect, Motivation captures both aspects of the 
originally subjective Ego: both the “active” and the “passive”. We never have one without the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Ibid, p. 199. 
356 Ibid, p. 223. 
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other. As Husserl says, “the Ego is always passive at the same time whenever is active”, and 
activity always includes a minimal level of “receptivity”, that is, “affectivity”.357   
 By describing Motivation, the deep phenomenon of the constitutive lawfulness of 
spiritual life, as both active and passive, Husserl resolved the problem of determining the deep 
structure of the Ego in the restricted sense that Pfänder had adopted. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, Pfänder determined the Ego, the “Ich”, as a willing whose enactment [Vollzug] is a 
“conscious projection” that is delimited by “blind striving and counterstriving”. In this respect, 
willing has a motive and is not a simple blind striving; rather willing is the internal force that 
moves the “Ich”. Pfänder’s account of motivation and the will is naturalistic and also based on a 
dichotomy that Husserl finds too restrictive in the way it addresses spiritual movement 
[Bewegung] as it consolidates the “inside-outside” structure. Husserl’s account of Motivation 
emancipates the accounts of spirit from naturalism but also from the “conscious”- 
“unconscious” (i.e. blind) dichotomy.  
 Husserl’s introduction of the notion of motivation undermines the very “active-passive” 
dichotomy on various levels. One of the ways it does this is through a reframing of 
intentionality itself as a mutual, dynamic relation between the subject and the object: 
intentionality is not a mere “active” positing whereby the subject posits the object, but also the 
subject is affected by the intentional object. Thus, Husserl writes how “the subject comports 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 The exact wording is this: “Therefore we find, as the originally and specifically subjective, the Ego in the proper 
sense, the Ego of “freedom,” the attending, considering, comparing, distinguishing, judging, valuing, repulsed, 
inclined, disinclined, desiring, and willing Ego: the Ego that in any sense is “active” and takes a position 
[stellungsnehmende Ich]. This, however, is only one side. Opposed to the active Ego stands the passive, and the Ego 
is always passive at the same time whenever it is active, in the sense of being affected as well as being receptive 
[sowohl im Sinn von affektiv als rezeptiv], which of course does not exclude the possibility of its being sheer passivity 
[bloß passiv]. To be sure, the very sense of the expression, “receptivity,” includes a lowest level of activity even if not 
the genuine freedom of active position-taking [Freiheit der tätigen Stellungnahme]. The “passive” Ego (in a second 
sense) is then also subjective in the original sense as the Ego of “tendencies,” [das Ich der “Tendenzen”] the Ego 
that experiences stimulation from things and appearances, is attracted, and simply yields to the attractive force. In 
addition, the “states” of the Ego [die “Zustände des Ich”] are subjective as well, states of the mourning, of 
cheerfulness, of passive desire, and of renouncing as a state [Zustände der Trauer, der Fröhlicheit, passives 
Begehren, Entsatzung als Zustand]. “Being touched” [Das “Betroffenwerden”] as originating in a tiding is something 
subjective whose source is the Object; to “react” against, to revolt against, or to pull oneself together is something 
subjective whose source is the subject. From the properly subjective (the Ego itself and its comportment 
[Verhalten]—both the active as well as the passive) we must now distinguish, on the one hand, the objective, that 
over and against which the Ego comports itself [verhält] actively or passively, and, on the other hand, the material 
substratum of “stuff” upon which this comportment [Verhalten] is built. For in any life of consciousness whatsoever 
the stratum of position-taking [Stellungnahmen], of acts in general, is built upon substrata [Unterschichten].” Ibid, 
pp. 224-225.  
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itself [verhält sich] toward the Object, and the Object stimulates or motivates the subject […] 
The Object ‘intrudes on the subject’.”358  
Motivation as pre-intentional unity 
But Husserl’s analysis here not only pertains to intentional subjectivity; it not only introduces an 
aspect of passivity in the subject-object relation, but it goes deeper into grasping the non-
intentional and pre-intentional aspects of spiritual life. The problem of the “active-passive”, 
“conscious-unconscious” dichotomy can also be grasped from another perspective: the 
opposition between “intentional-non-intentional” spiritual experience, which ultimately leads 
back to the issue of “understanding”. If the ground of the enactment of understanding, i.e. 
motivation, is grasped as a “pure activity”, then understanding itself will be restricted to 
consciousness and intentionality: understanding and spiritual life in general are restricted to 
intentional acts. Husserl’s account of motivation, however, includes passivity, and thus his 
account of the ground of intentional life includes non-intentional levels, levels of passivity. The 
twofold nature of motivation in Husserl makes it possible to account for the intertwining aspects 
in the spiritual sphere: the rational and the irrational, the active and the passive (or affective), the 
intentional and the non-intentional. Motivation is thus a structure, a foundational stratum, of 
position-taking, the background of “understanding” which is neither active nor passive but both 
at the same time.  
Husserl describes the way into the stratum of the Ego and intentional life thus: 
Running backwards through the strata of the constitution of the thing, we 
arrive finally at the data of sensation as the ultimate, primitive, primal objects, 
no longer constituted by any kind of Ego-activity whatsoever but, in the most 
pregnant sense of the term, pregivennesses for all of the Ego’s operations. 
They are “subjective,” but they are not states or acts of the Ego; rather, they 
are what is had by the Ego, the Ego’s first “subjective possession [die erste 
„subjektive Habe” des Ich].359 
 
 Husserl uncovers a deeper structure of subjectivity that subsists “beneath” the Ego, 
which he indicates as the “having” of the Ego that is not posited by it through acts, but is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Ibid, p. 231. 
359 Ibid, p. 226. 
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already existing “comportment” [Verhaltung] that is pre-given. It is at this level, and from 
within this perspective and way of grasping the deep structure of the spiritual life of the subject, 
that the notion of Motivation is to be analyzed. Husserl here is explicitly moving away from a 
“phenomenology of the cogito” and offers an account of pre-reflective structures that are 
grasped once one abandons Egology and grasps spiritual life from the perspective of 
comportment and “having”. This is indeed close to Aristotle’s account of the self and the 
intellect qua ἕξις (habit). Let us conclude this section by going into some more detail concerning 
what Husserl says about Motivation. 
 In §55 Husserl explicitly identifies motivation as the fundamental lawfulness of 
spiritual life: we speak of the spiritual or personal Ego, the subject of intentionality; “we see 
that motivation is the lawfulness of the life of the spirit.”360 He then goes on to provide thematic 
analyses of how motivation forms the fundamental structure of various aspects of spiritual life. 
He describes the “motivation of reason” which pertains to the way perceptions motivate 
judgments and the way judgments are justified and verified in experience: how the attribution of 
a predicate is confirmed by the concordant experience of it, how being in contradiction with 
experience motivates a cancelling negation and how a judgment is motivated by another 
judgment. He also writes about how surmises or questions are motivated, how feelings, 
desirings, willings are motivated, and how position-takings in general are motivated.361 Husserl 
explicitly says that it is precisely here that the instance of logical grounding belongs: logical 
assertions and the full-lived experiences have “a connection of motivation”.362 
 Apart from the analysis of rational life in terms of motivation, Husserl also analyses 
association and habit: the entire realm of associations and habits fits in the area of spiritual life 
constituted by motivation. Here it is not a matter of a motivation of logical position-takings by 
other position-takings (active theses by active theses), as is the case of motivations of reason, 
but of lived experiences of any sort whatsoever. Motivation of association is not active position-
taking, motivated directly by another active position-taking. Rather, it concerns passive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Ibid, p. 231. 
361 Ibid, pp. 231-232. 
362 Ibid, pp. 232-233. 
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apperceptive unities that are not accomplishments of reason per se, but which refer to the 
apperceptive unity motivated by “psychic grounds” that belong to the sphere of passivity, some 
of which are a-rational.363  
 Motivation of association and habit is a “passive motivation” that is explained in terms 
of tendency: once a connection is formed in the stream of consciousness, we then have a 
tendency for a newly emerging connection similar to the previous one: the tendency to continue 
in the direction of similarity, and to strive towards completion in a nexus similar to the previous 
one. Association is a law of motivation that concerns existential positings.364 Husserl also 
describes these demands for complementary existential positings as demands of reason: as 
rational motivations that can also extend to taking up positions of belief, feeling and will. Thus, 
it seems to me that Husserl’s critique of reason here tries to reground reason in the multifaceted 
phenomenon of lived experience. It is a critique of reason that brings rational life back to the 
dynamic way that life expresses itself; it implies bringing reason back together with belief, 
feeling and will.  
 Husserl also speaks of how motives “are often deeply buried but can be brought to light 
by ‘psychoanalysis’ […] In some cases it can be perceived. In most cases, however, the 
motivation is actually present in consciousness, but it does not stand out; it is unnoticed or 
unnoticeable (‘unconscious’)”.365 Again, this is important to note, since this is reminiscent of 
what Heidegger will later say concerning moods: a mood can be there, can be “had”, but be 
“asleep” and in need of being “awoken”. This is also consistent with the hermeneutic intricacies 
involved in addressing the pre-reflective, non-objective aspects of experience, the way they are 
always already there and yet either unnoticed or even denied on the conscious level.  
 Husserl extends his analysis of motivation on various levels and facets of spiritual life, 
but we do not need to get into all of them here, as the ones covered suffice for the purposes of 
this investigation. Let us now turn to the last part of this chapter in which I address Husserl’s 
account of feeling and mood, and show that it is Husserl’s account of Motivation that is a 	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364 Ibid, p. 235. 
365 Ibid, p. 235. 
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precursor to Heidegger’s account of affective phenomena, rather than Husserl’s account of 
affective acts, since Husserl, up to the 30s, maintained that affective acts are founded 
(derivative), not founding. 
IV. Feeling [Gefühl] as founded act, founded on presentive acts 
Husserl’s views on the “affective” and his phenomenology of mood are not compatible with 
Heidegger’s own understanding of mood, since mood for Heidegger is what grounds 
philosophical understanding in general. Mood is a founding level of spiritual being and 
understanding that fundamentally discloses the worldhood of the world and that, as said in the 
previous chapter, provides the necessary bindingness and direction of phenomenological 
understanding itself.  
 The Husserlian notions of feeling [Gefühl], emotion [Gemüt] and affective phenomena 
generally, are founded, and hence derivative forms of intentionality, whose foundation is 
presentive intentionality and whose truth is expressed in propositional judgments that have 
corresponding states of affairs [Sachverhalten]. Husserl saw the relation of founded emotional 
intentions [Gefühle] to foundational states-of-affairs as analogous to the relation between 
founded value-laden affairs [Wertverhalt] and states-of-affairs: both Wertverhalten and Gefühle 
are founded acts.  
 Husserl’s commitment to the epochē led to the prioritization of originary presentive 
intuition [originär gebende Anschauung].366 Husserl took the presentive level of intentional acts 
to be founding, and he took intentional acts of feeling and value to be founded. But his position 
that acts of feeling are founded acts was not shaped after his explicit adoption of the epochē; it 
was a position he already held in the Logical Investigations. Husserl’s treatment of feeling 
[Gefühl] takes place in the context of his analysis of intentionality in the Fifth Logical 
Investigation. Husserl seems to uncritically accept Brentano’s classification of mental 
phenomena, that is, intentional acts, into “presentations”, “judgments” and “emotions”.367 Even 
though Husserl acknowledges significant differences between these kinds of acts, the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 See Ideas I, §24. 
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remains that to him there exists a relationship of sedimentation and dependence between the 
acts, which is to say that some kinds of acts depend, or presuppose, another kind; thus we have 
founding acts and founded acts. In this context, emotional acts are founded; Husserl explicitly 
says that “[e]motional intentions are built upon presentive or judging intentions” 
[Gemütsintentionen bauen sich auf Vorstellungs- oder Urteilsintentionen].368  
 Husserl’s analysis of feeling is an attempt to defend two claims: firstly, that acts of 
feeling are, as I already said, founded acts; but equally importantly, that acts of feeling are also 
different acts from the pertinent founding act. Husserl’s distinction between acts of feeling from 
presentive acts in this context is meant to provide a response to Natorp’s ascription of the 
richness and multiplicity of consciousness exclusively to the contents of it, marginalizing the 
importance of the act itself. Thus, Husserl draws attention to the various types of acts and their 
correlative objects (or states-of-affairs) in trying to show that “feeling” is not just something 
that belongs to the subjective side of the act, but is part of the richness to be found both in the 
intentional content as well as its corresponding act. Husserl here counters those who question 
the intentionality of feeling, holding that feelings are mere states, not intentions, not acts 
[Gefühle sind bloße Zustände, nicht Akte, Intentionen], and that feelings owe their relation to a 
“complication” with presentation.369  
 Husserl takes this position to be one for which feeling itself does not add anything 
qualitatively different to the intentional content itself or have any inherently intentional 
qualities: the intention is one and the same, and feeling is not an essential part of the act or the 
intentional content.370 So in order to defend the position that the richness of the content of the 
intentional act is co-formed by the act itself, Husserl adopts Brentano’s position that acts of 
feeling are indeed intentional acts, but they are different acts from presentive acts. Thus, in 
trying to argue for the importance of feeling as part of the intended object, as part of the 
“content” of the intentional act, Husserl ends up preserving the Brentanian ordering of the 
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various kinds of intentional acts, relegating the act of feeling and its intended object to one of 
derivative status compared to the founding presentive sensuous act.  
 In the context of that first reference to “experiences of the genus ‘feeling’ [Gefühl]”,371 
Husserl asks whether intentionality is only accidentally and unnecessarily a part of this class of 
experiences or whether it is an essential part. The crux of the problem pertains to the issue of 
whether intentionality only belongs to the founding presentive level of the act, upon which the 
feeling is then added - something that would mean that the feeling is epiphenomenal to the 
foundational essence of the intentional act: the presentation. This question arises because, as 
Husserl himself holds, some experiences have intentionality and some don’t, and he himself 
identifies the non-intentional level of acts as consisting of “sensory feeling” [Empfindung], 
something that indeed sounds like feeling but is not the same phenomenon as feeling.  
 The problem here is one of equivocation, says Husserl. Husserl is forced to highlight 
the distinction between sensory-feeling and intentional feeling. The former concerns non-
intentional sensory experiences, that is, physical experiences, such as the experience of pain 
from burning oneself or being burnt.372 Sensory-feelings do not belong to the same class of 
phenomena as the class of feeling; rather, they belong “among tactual, gutatory, olfactory, and 
other sensations”,373 even though we do indeed in both cases speak of “feelings”. The sphere of 
feeling-acts is analogous to the sphere of desire and volition, argues Husserl;374 having a feeling 
is a complex, founded act, whose unity lies precisely in its intentional reference, and its richness 
is not alongside the act but precisely in it.375  
 Husserl gives the example of joy [Freude] and sorrow [Unfreude] as feelings that are 
indeed always intentional, are always about something. In speaking about joy we can also speak 
of lustful pleasure [lustvolles Wohlgefallen] in something, and instead of sorrow we can speak 
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of a painful dislike, aversion, etc., an alternative way of addressing the act that reveals its 
intentional, relational, structure.376  
A feeling is essentially intentional as it is a relational phenomenon. As Husserl writes, 
“[p]leasure without anything pleasurable is unthinkable […] because the specific essence of 
pleasure demands a relation to something pleasing.”377  
 But despite Husserl’s ascription of epistemic significance to feeling, and despite the fact 
that he appears to be interested in a fully-fledged phenomenological account of feeling that 
would include the way acts of feeling are fulfilled, something that he does not manage in the 
end, he still remains committed to the Brentanian view that feeling acts are not founding acts, 
but founded acts, having presentations as their foundations. As for Brentano, so for Husserl: one 
can have a founding intention of a presented object without having feeling, but not the other 
way around.378 The point here is that we have two different acts, and the fact that the feeling act 
is a founded act, founded upon the founding presentative act, does not mean that the latter 
produces the former.379 But despite providing arguments against treating feeling as an 
epiphenomenon, Husserl does not provide a clear account of how exactly the act of feeling is 
constituted. He is clear, however, in saying that the presentative part and the judgment part of 
the act are fundamental to the act of feeling in the sense that they constitute the ground for the 
act. In his own words: 
On such a structured act (whose members may themselves be further 
structured) a new act may be built, e.g. a joy may be built on the assertion of a 
state of affairs, a joy in that state of affairs. The joy is not a concrete act in its 
own right, and the judgment as act set beside it: the judgment rather underlies 
the joy, fixes its content, realizes its abstract possibility for, without some such 
foundation, there could be no joy at all. Judgements may similarly serve as 
foundations for surmises, doubts, questions, wishes, acts of will, etc., and the 
latter acts may likewise serve to found other acts in their turn.380 
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 Beyond this, Husserl does not explore or provide a detailed description of how acts of 
feeling are fulfilled,381 nor does he provide an account of how we could perhaps attain insight 
into the pre-reflective and/or non-intentional aspects of the act of feeling. In trying to establish 
the legitimacy of feelings as intentional acts, he seems to obfuscate or even deny the existence 
of non-intentional aspects of feeling, or passivity in acts of feeling, apart from mentioning the 
equivocation with “sensuous-feelings” that are described in naturalist, corporeal terms.  
 As mentioned before, Husserl introduces the notion of intentionality in the Fifth Logical 
Investigation, where he identifies the double-character of experience: on the one hand, 
intentional consciousness, on the other hand, non-intentional experience. Intentional experience 
is only a part of consciousness, but not all of consciousness is intentional; thus we have two 
classes of experiences: intentional and non-intentional. What is of interest here is that Husserl 
seems to hold that non-intentional aspects of experience provide the basis for intentional 
experience, as the underlying stratum upon which the intentional stratum is founded.382 This 
means that the latter cannot exist without the former, but we can indeed have an entity that 
exists without having intentional experiences.  
 According to Nam-In Lee, even though Husserl tries to discern and make a sharp 
distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional, i.e. that which is an act in itself 
providing a relation to an object and that which is not an act, an experience which does not 
relate to an object, he fails to secure the distinction as it is laden with many ambiguities that he 
fails to resolve.383 
 Although Husserl seems to indeed show without great difficulty how the basic class of 
intentional acts, the presentive acts, are based on the non-intentional stratum, when he tries to 
show the same relation for the sphere of feeling-acts, the distinction between the intentional and 	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“Husserl’s Original Project for a Normative Phenomenology of Emotions and Values”, in Value: Sources and 
Reading on a Key Concept of the Globalized World, ed. Ivo De Gennaro (Brill, 2012), p. 280. 
382 Nam-In Lee, “Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology of Mood”, in Alterity and Facticity: New Perspectives on 
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the non-intentional seems to become untenable, with the intentional subsuming the non-
intentional. Thus, when he enquires about the existence of intentional feelings and tries to see if 
the feeling of the intentional relation extends to the non-intentional stratum of the act, he falls 
back on the Brentanian position whereby feeling is indeed an intentional act in its own right, 
different from but still dependent upon the founding presentive act. According to this position, 
“feelings with an intentional element owe a part of their intentionality to themselves, and not to 
something external”,384 something that maintains both a difference from mere presentive acts 
and a reference to them. 
 This is not bad per se, since one could argue that Husserl manages to preserve the 
“dignity” of the feeling-act, in the sense that it is not reducible to another act, that is, it is not 
resolved into the presentive act, and further, it does not become a mere “internal” state.385 For 
example, in joy, as Panos Theodorou shows, we do not only have the perception of the 
enjoyable object and the psycho-physical feeling, but we also have the intentional act of liking 
(Gefallen) that interprets the pertinent sensory feeling as a transcendent “objective property”.386 
In effect, the feeling of enjoyment is attached to the already represented object as a new 
“objective property”, without however having an effect on the underlying object of the founding 
presentive act.387 
 Despite the fact that Husserl tries to ascribe to feeling a certain uniqueness in the way it 
contributes to our intentional life, in his account feelings remain subject to a certain 
“derivativeness”. Husserl distinguishes between primary and secondary intentions, one built on 
the other; the presentive intention is the primary, founding one and the intentional feeling is the 
secondary, founded one.388 Husserl writes that each intentional experience is either an 
objectifying act or has as its basis an objectifying act, thus conceding primacy to the intentional 
over the non-intentional, and this shatters his previous distinction between the intentional and 
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the non-intentional (feeling-sensation).389 In effect, this is the precise problem that will be an 
obstacle to Husserl’s phenomenology of feeling, especially from a Heideggerian perspective, 
since Husserl does not allow for pre-objective aspects of feeling to emerge. And in any case, 
when feeling does emerge, it is a particular kind of intentional relation that is founded upon the 
more basic presentive intention, and thus feeling has no grounding role to play, as fundamental 
moods have in Heidegger.  
 After the Logical Investigations, Husserl’s position on acts of feeling  - that they are 
founded upon more basic presentive acts - remains unchanged, despite the fact that he 
introduces new ways of analysing intentional experience and its qualities. In Ideas I, he analyses 
intentional life from various perspectives, one of them being the so-called “quality” of the act. 
In this context, Husserl identifies the relational nuances that accompany each objectivizing act, 
and how these affect the regarding ego. As he says: “This Ego-regard to something varies with 
the act: in perception, it is a perceptual regard-to; in phantasying, an inventive regard-to; in 
liking, a liking regard-to; in willing, a willing regard-to; etc.”390 Husserl draws analogies 
between value and feeling: “[I]n the act of valuing, we are turned toward the valued; in the act 
of gladness, to the gladsome; in the act of loving, to the loved [im Akte der Freude dem 
Erfreulichen, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten][…]”391 In that 
context, he says that all of these acts are founded acts, but he also explicitly says that the acts of 
valuing are simpler than the acts of emotion and the acts of willing [die Gemüts- und 
Willensakte], which are founded on higher levels.392 
 Husserl’s position on the foundedness of feeling as well as other analogous qualities, 
such as value, remains unequivocal and unchanged. This could not be clearer than when he 
writes that the “noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing […] are founded on objectivations”.393 
And as is the case with feeling, the same holds with values: the founding stratified whole is 
established on the level of direct perception, which is of the primary “state-of-affairs”: the 	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predicatively formed affair-complex which is the mere lay of things [Sachlage] that serves as 
the founding substratum of a predicatively formed value-complex [Wertverhalt].394 
 Before we bring this section to a close, one last aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology 
needs to be addressed: his phenomenology of moods. In his essay ‘Edmund Husserl’s 
Phenomenology of Mood’, Nam-In Lee brings to our attention Husserl’s own 
phenomenological account of mood in his M-manuscripts from the years 1900-1914.395 In the 
concluding remarks to his essay, Lee raises the plausible question of whether Heidegger had 
read these analyses, and urges us to consider the “real possibility that the M-manuscript might 
be one of the ‘unpublished investigations’ which Husserl handed to Heidegger at that time and 
that the phenomenology of mood which was developed in this manuscript might be one of those 
‘diverse areas’ through which Husserl influenced Heidegger”.396 Whereas this question is a very 
plausible one, and one could indeed assume that Heidegger had read and – perhaps to a certain 
extent – been inspired by Husserl’s account of mood, it cannot be the case that Husserl’s 
account of mood played any significant role in Heidegger’s turn to mood, for the following 
reasons. 
 On the one hand, it is indeed interesting how for Husserl mood is a non-intentional 
structure and can be taken to be a background horizon “on which the character of individual 
feelings arising in the stream of consciousness can be determined”;397 thus mood is a certain 
non-intentional, passively constituting ground upon which a particular class of intentional acts, 
that is, acts of feeling, are based. On the other hand, while this horizonal constitutive aspect of 
experience, identified as mood, is reminiscent of Heidegger’s accounts of mood, the role that 
Husserl ascribes to mood is so restricted that it does not fit within Heidegger’s general schema 
or with the ontological significance that Heidegger ascribes to moods. 
 A mood, according to Husserl, argues Lee, is a unity of feelings that arises when 
individual feelings fuse together.398 One problem is that Husserl seems to imply that mood is 	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actually made up of various individual feelings that merge together, thus ascribing a certain 
constitutive priority to the intentional feeling rather than the non-intentional level of mood. It’s 
not clear whether it is the predicative, intentional state-of-affairs of a feeling act that constitutes 
the mood, or whether it is the mood, the (purportedly) non-intentional, that grounds the 
intentional. Apart from this problem, even if we accept that Husserl’s position is that mood is 
the non-intentional founding aspect of feeling-acts, this non-intentional background still refers 
only to intentional acts of feeling and the objects that belong to that specific class of objects. 
Even if the mood is a vague halo “surrounding” the intentional object of the feeling-act, 
something that surrounds the whole of the object of feeling, the fact still remains that mood does 
not constitute a part of the natural thing’s object-constitution, something that occurs at the 
foundational level of intentional life: the presentive level.399 As Panos Theodorou notes, in 
Husserl, “the moods contribute, unfortunately, only to something like a superficial colourful 
‘decoration’ of an already constituted world as a horizonal unity of beings.”400 Husserl failed to 
identify any deep foundational role for mood. His account of founding consciousness is that 
upon which all judgmental phenomena, all predicative states-of-affairs, are founded; and this 
ultimately gets reduced to presentive acts. But as we’ve already seen, the phenomenon that the 
middle and later Husserl will identify in Motivation, is a constituting phenomenon that shares 
many more characteristics with Heidegger’s notion of Grundstimmung. 
V. Concluding Remarks  
In this chapter we have seen how Husserl fits within a genealogical narrative of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological attentiveness to the facticity of life, from within the neo-Kantian 
environment. In this context, the guiding question is that of the possibility of philosophy itself, 
the origin of a phenomenological opening to the space of meaning qua being. Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic turn was heavily influenced by Husserl’s discoveries, and his hermeneutic 
radicalization of phenomenology must be seen in light of his serious engagement with 
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Husserlian phenomenology, as well as the critical objections of Paul Natorp, and the way Emil 
Lask read Husserl, as well as how Wilhelm Dilthey and Husserl mutually affected each other.  
 We have seen how Husserl’s phenomenological breakthrough indicated how the 
philosophical understanding [Verstehen] of truth is bound up with, and opened up by, 
comportment [Verhalten], which is the way the subject relates to that which is given in intuition 
[Anschauung]. Intuitive givenness and interpretive understanding are tied together at the 
foundational, pre-reflective and pre-intentional level of experience; the enactmental character of 
intentional life is unified in and through motivation, as a dynamic other-directedness that is 
constitutive at the originary levels of subjectivity, which is neither merely active or passive, but 
is rather both active and passive, both projective and receptive.    
 Heidegger’s first analyses of factical life, where for the first time moods attain a central 
function, was explained in terms of underlying motivations [Motivationen] and tendencies 
[Tendenzen]. Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn to mood does not constitute an abandonment of 
Husserlian insights, but rather a radicalization of them. This chapter has identified how 
Heidegger’s early hermeneutic phenomenology utilized the notions of Verhalten, Motivation 
and Tendenz and was based on the combined insights of Husserl and Dilthey, as part and parcel 
of a response to Natorp’s forceful critical objections to phenomenology. 
 We have also seen how Husserl’s accounts of feeling and mood should not be seen as 
the direct precursor to Heidegger’s own attention to feeling and mood. Rather, it was Husserl’s 
categorial intuition that offered an initial way of indicating how it is that Dasein can grasp the 
totality of the world and the totality of being, in a way that is not reducible either to the 
sensuous object or the expressed judgment. As I have tried to show, the categorial intuition is as 
close as Husserl got to discovering a pre-reflective way of grasping being and truth as such, or, 
in other words, the truth and being of facticity itself. It is the kind of intuition that intuits states-
of-affairs in a non-reflective and non-objectified way.   
 It is important to keep in mind how Husserl’s breakthrough of categorial intuition 
offered an account of authentic thinking that predates the transcendental turn, which is enabled 
through the epochē. Thus, it is a phenomenological account of authentic thinking that is not 
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tainted by the reflective and “negating” aspects that Husserl’s transcendental accounts in Ideas I 
contain (due to the fact that they are founded on the quasi-skeptical and quasi-voluntarist 
epochē and the “principle of principles”).  
 Heidegger appropriated certain fundamental characteristics that Husserl accorded to 
categorial intuition, and existentially radicalized them and ascribed them to Stimmung: the way 
categorial intuition discloses states-of-affairs in terms of parts and wholes, and thus the way it 
discloses an ontological relationship of “being-in” and “having”: a part-being-in-the-whole, a 
whole-having-a-part. It is through categorial intuition that mereological states-of-affairs that 
have the relational character of being-in or being-a-part-of become manifested in a non-
reflective way. In Being and Time Heidegger turns Husserl’s account on its head: the pre-
reflective awareness of the “whole” is found to be the foundational one rather than the founded 
one, and it is also distanced from the very act of “intuition” [Anschauung].  
 Despite the breakthrough offered by categorial intuition, several issues remained: 1) the 
fact that categorial intuition is founded, with the founding act being simple sensuous intuition, 
devoid of affects; 2) Husserl’s transcendental reconfiguration of the phenomenological method 
entangled it in a reflective change of attitude [Einstellung] through the epochē; 3) Husserl’s 
account thus came too close to a particular interpretation of Platonic theoria that was unable to 
account for the facticity of the life-world, as its starting point entailed a kind of voluntarism that 
closed off the factical and the affective; 4) thus Husserl could not provide a complete 
phenomenological account of feeling, or an account that would ascribe a foundational role to 
feeling or moods.  
 However, in Ideas II Husserl offered another breakthrough through his analyses of 
Motivation, identified as the very foundation of the enactment of intentional life itself: that 
which establishes all meaningful acts, simple and complex, and which interconnects different 
acts. It is that which enables the internal constitution of a direct act of adequate as well as 
inadequate perception. On the one hand, motivation is the dynamic, actively directing and 
referencing element of intentional enactment. On the other hand, motivation is the affective, 
passive aspect intentional enactment that already captures this foundational level of the spiritual 
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self not as a solipsistic auto-affection, but rather as affected by something, or someone, other, 
an exteriority which motivates without this exteriority being reduced to nature: something that 
acknowledges the otherness of the constitution of the meaning of the “world” (or object) 
intended. Husserl’s turn to motivation opened the way for Heidegger to relaunch 
phenomenology from within and enabled him to thematize the factical and the affective and find 
it at the centre of spiritual life. 
 It is in the context of his analyses of Motivation that Husserl turned to the “personalistic 
attitude”, something that anticipated Heidegger’s own shift towards the personalistic (in his 
phenomenological analyses of religious life, as they are performed as encounters with 
Augustine and Luther) and the practical (in his phenomenological analysis of Aristotle). 
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Chapter 3: Heidegger’s phenomenology of enactment: motivation and tendency 
  
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw some basic Husserlian themes that pave the way for a better 
understanding of Heidegger’s “affective turn”. We saw how Husserl offered a “breakthrough” 
as regards the intuitive, pre-reflective foundations of categorial (and ontological) thinking. We 
then saw his transcendental reconfiguration of phenomenological beginning, whereby Dasein 
was suspended and shut out from the reach of reflective analysis. We then saw the 
“enactmental” character in Husserl’s analyses, as well as the way he identified and analyzed the 
pre-intentional unified structure (Zusammenhang) of intentional life in terms of Motivation. 
Finally, we saw how he never reflected upon moods with sufficient seriousness, taking them to 
be founded intentional acts.    
 The main theme in this chapter is Heidegger’s own reorientation of phenomenological 
analysis, from intentional structures of consciousness to pre-intentional constitutive structures 
of enactment. This is an important moment in Heidegger’s development because it captures how 
and why affective phenomena become central in Heidegger’s analyses- in ways that are not 
necessarily inconsistent with some of Husserl’s own analyses. 
 In his early Freiburg years, Heidegger’s thought was undergoing a formation process 
that saw him radicalize phenomenology from within, while retaining Husserlian terminology. 
The process involved a selective appropriation of Husserlian insights that enabled the shift of 
focus to the factical ground of Dasein. This necessitated the dismissal of the reflective 
methodological character that Husserl employed in his transcendental reconfiguration of 
phenomenology, and the associated “theoretical Attitude”.  
 Heidegger followed Husserl in re-grounding the origins of intentionality in Motivation, 
without abolishing factical life (as Husserl’s epochē had done), but rather by showing how 
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Motivation is precisely the way in which factical life structures and enacts its movement. In this 
context, Heidegger redefined the arena and methods of phenomenological description, bringing 
into relief the motivational origins of understanding. This shift of attention from the conscious, 
abstract level of activity, to the pre-reflective, factical ground (necessitated by Natorp’s 
challenges to Husserl’s methodological beginning), paved the way for his later phenomenology 
of fundamental moods. 
 In this chapter, we will examine six distinct –albeit interconnected- issues in 
Heidegger’s early Freiburg lectures. Firstly, the way Heidegger’s early “constitutional 
reflections”401 raised the question of philosophy itself; this enabled him to articulate 
phenomenology as “originary science” whose region of analysis is factical life itself, i.e. the 
way philosophical understanding is enacted. Secondly, Heidegger’s critique of the Husserlian 
determination of phenomenology as a “change of attitude” [Einstellung] that institutes the 
epochē. Thirdly, we will see the basic terminology that Heidegger employs in his own 
constitutive analyses, which look at the ground of intentional life with a new freshness. In this 
context, we will see how Heidegger utilizes “locutions such as ‘having’ (haben), [and] 
‘comporting’ (verhalten) […] in order to emphasize that original, unthematic ‘having’ or 
‘comporting’ is for the most part not some deliberate, meditative act of knowing something.”402 
In this context, comportments will be structured by Motivation and Tendenz - the precursors of 
Befindlichkeit and Stimmung. Fourth, we will look at Heidegger’s exemplary interpretations of 
religious life, in which moods take centre stage. This is an important moment in Heidegger’s 
development since for the first time he will speak about the fundamental mood of Angst. 
Finally, we will see how the notion of authenticity first appears in relation to a way of having a 
mood. 
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II. Phenomenology as ‘originary science’ 
Originary science and factical life 
As early as 1919, Heidegger was redeploying phenomenology as fundamental ontology, as the 
original science whose Sache is the origin of spirit in and for itself.  In the 1919-20 Winter 
Semester lecture course entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology (BPP)403, Heidegger defined 
phenomenology as the science of the absolute origin of the spirit in and for itself – ‘life in and 
for itself’, a science that must ruthlessly reject “every attempt to place itself outside of the vital 
return to the origin and the vital emergence out of it.”404 Heidegger calls our attention to the 
genuine, concrete realization and the enactment of spiritual life and it is in this context that he 
thematized the importance of feelings and moods, especially ἔρως (Liebe).  
 Heidegger’s early phenomenological accounts constituted a response to those aspects of 
Husserlian phenomenology which remained problematic, with Heidegger’s own hermeneutic 
phenomenology turning towards the factical richness of phenomenological life. Heidegger 
revealed those pre-reflective, affective states to be the very origin, the very beginning, of 
phenomenological understanding. In this context, Heidegger’s early fundamental ontology 
supplanted the residual “active” elements of Husserl’s transcendental egological 
phenomenology, by further pushing for a phenomenology based on the category of 
comportment and the ground of Motivation and Tendenz, thus supplying an account of origin 
and beginning that is not purely active or voluntaristic, but is neither active nor passive.  
  In BPP, Heidegger is struggling with the threat of objectivization, as this was 
articulated by Natorp against Husserlian phenomenology, trying to come up with an account of 
the beginning of phenomenology that would render the Natorpian objections ineffective. He is 
trying to offer a phenomenological account of intentional life, while at the same time 
identifying and resisting the tendency toward objectivization.  
 Heidegger begins by identifying the problem of scientific beginning. In §1, Heidegger 
makes it clear that phenomenology is the original science [Ursprungswissenschaft] and as such 	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it is the science of the absolute origin of the spirit. Original science is then defined in terms of 
enactment of motivation: it is the science whose task involves an understanding of its own self 
and this is achieved through the genuine enactment of its own motives, by way of research.405 
The only way that this science can be led towards its most recalcitrant area, the area of its vital 
origin, is by way of the manifestation and enactment of the very tendencies inherent to the 
science itself. As such, the method of this science cannot be imposed from the outside, for 
example from the special sciences, but rather the method must grow from the origin itself and a 
renewal of the tendencies inherent within it.406 The problem is already one of expression: the 
way concepts grasp life without distorting the origin of life itself. In this context, the theoretical-
scientific paradigm is what needs to be overcome.  
 In a rather typical hermeneutic manner, Heidegger is trying to probe and identify the 
intellectual space of phenomenology and in doing this he is addressing his immediate 
predecessors as well as the predominant figures of his time. Thus, any hermeneutic attempt to 
understand Heidegger’s own breakthrough must come to see how he responds to his 
contemporary philosophical context. 
 Heidegger makes it clear that he is aiming at developing phenomenology as originary 
science. This involves overcoming the theoretical-reflective character of Husserl’s method, i.e. 
the way to begin, but in this he unqualifyingly accepts Husserl’s definition of the structural 
origin of spiritual life in terms of Motivation and enactment, and the issue is how to grasp it and 
articulate it. 
 Heidegger also offers a critique of neo-Kantianism, but without being totally 
dismissive. He distinguishes between the two schools of neo-Kantianism, and approvingly says 
that the Marburg School (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer) is predominantly concerned with advancing 
and radically grounding logic, whereas the Southwest School was predominantly a philosophy 
of value that was preoccupied by the problem of history.407 Heidegger urges his students not to 
ignore the achievements of neo-Kantian philosophy since in both schools, “genuine motives are 	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alive and […] philosophical work is being accomplished”.408 Despite the fact that neo-Kantian 
philosophy leans towards creating worldviews [Weltanschauungen] and does not critically 
question many of the presuppositions it inherits concerning philosophical systematicity, it is still 
important in the challenges it poses to phenomenology. Clearly, Heidegger takes neo-Kantian 
objections to phenomenology seriously, and he has in mind Natorp’s objections to Husserl. 
 In addition to neo-Kantians, Heidegger also notes the contributions of Dilthey, whom 
he finds to have opened up a new aspect of intellectual history, despite his failure to penetrate 
the origin of meaning itself. Finally, Heidegger notes Henri Bergson, as well as Georg Simmel, 
as important figures.  
   Heidegger addresses the issue of the scientificity of philosophy, and how great 
philosophers have oriented themselves towards a “rigorous scientific philosophy” – an obvious 
reference to Husserl’s essay on phenomenology as rigorous science. 409 But in this, both the 
notion of “science” and that which it is meant to overcome, namely “worldview”, remain 
unclear, and thus the starting point of philosophy, as well as its “object”, also remain unclear. 
The reference to an “object” of study leads to a reflective reversal that involves a “subject” that 
is undertaking the study, and this is part of the problem that Heidegger wants to resolve. 
Heidegger says that the point of departure must be the “factical life experience”, even though 
philosophy seems to be leading us out of factical life experience.410 
 Factical life experience is peculiar since it is that in which philosophy is enacted, and it 
is not merely the experience of cognising something, but rather it “designates the whole active 
and passive pose of the human being toward the world”.411 The peculiarity of factical life 
experience is the fact that the manner of experiencing things, the how, merges with the what, the 
content of experience, to the extent that we become absorbed in the content, whilst also 
becoming indifferent to the manner of experiencing.412 Thus, factical life attains its 
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characteristic self-sufficiency (we will see later on what this means).413 This is precisely what 
originary science must analyze: factical life experience in its self-sufficiency, and the way it is 
enacted.  
 The way factical life is experienced is not as a complex of lived experiences or a 
conglomeration of acts and processes, or as an ego-object, continues Heidegger, but rather it is 
experienced “in that which I perform, suffer, what I encounter, in my conditions of depression 
and elevation, and the like.”414 Heidegger is indeed tacitly challenging Husserl’s 
phenomenology, which is concerned with, and reveals, the transcendental complexes of acts and 
processes, i.e. the “ultimate structural complexes of objecthood in general”.415 But for 
Heidegger, this approach amounts to a restricted mode of cognition that needs to be overcome; 
Heidegger wants to attain a mode of cognition other than “taking-cognizance-of” 
[Kenntnisnahme], which is the mode of cognition that characterizes Husserl’s phenomenology 
that fails to take account its own motivational ground. 
 How is this other mode of cognition to be motivated, then? This has to take place from 
within factical life itself, says Heidegger. As we shall see in the next section, the starting point 
of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology was precisely the suspension of the factical, so as to 
bring into relief the “phenomenological world”; hence Husserl’s explanation of how we go 
about the philosophical ascent, how phenomenological intentionality arises from the factical 
ground is not immanent, in the sense that he does not provide a phenomenology that is 
immanent to the factical. The everyday, the factical, hinders philosophy, and philosophy entails 
its overcoming. Heidegger, on the other hand, wants to show how phenomenology emerges out 
of the factical, and this is a paradox since it emerges out of something that hinders it! Science 
emerges out of non-science (cf. δόξα and ἐπιστήµη).  
 Heidegger proposes something that encounters the very paradox: while factical life is 
that which essentially hinders philosophy itself, it contains within itself the very motivation out 
of which philosophy springs! Thus, philosophy must perform a U-turn and return to that from 	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which it emerged. It has been customary for philosophers to degrade factical life. In 
Heidegger’s own words:  
Our considerations here have thus only increased the difficulty of the 
self-understanding of philosophy. How is a mode of cognition other than 
taking-cognizance-of to be motivated? Factical life experience itself, 
through its indifference and self-sufficiency, always covers up again the 
philosophical tendency that might surface. In its self-sufficient concern, 
factical life experience constantly falls into significance 
[Bedeutsamkeit]. It constantly strives for an articulation in science and 
ultimately for a “scientific culture.” Apart from these strivings, however, 
factical life experience contains motives of a purely philosophical 
posture [rein philosophischer Haltung] which can be isolated only 
through a peculiar turning around of philosophical comportment 
[philosophischen Verhaltens]. […] Heretofore, philosophers made an 
effort to degrade precisely factical life experience as a matter of 
secondary importance that could be taken for granted, despite that 
philosophy arises precisely from factical life experience and springs 
back into it [wieder in sie zurückspringt] in a reversal that is entirely 
essential.416      
   
 In this context, Heidegger directly refers to moods and the way degrading the factical 
precisely plays itself out in an indifference towards the role of moods, since instead of seeing 
moods in their motivational operation, we transpose their meaning back to the content, i.e. the 
object of significance. Facticity is itself a certain indifference to the way we comport ourselves 
and, as such, everything is experienced as the content of significance. Thus, we become 
indifferent to moods themselves, says Heidegger, and the difference between moods is 
experienced merely from the perspective of intentional content.417 Thus, a philosophy that 
degrades the factical also misses the motivations inherent in the factical, out of which the 
philosophical comportment arises: “We have to look around in factical life experience in order 
to obtain a motive for its turning around.”418 This is, then, the task of the originary science: to 
investigate the motivations in the factical way that the philosophical comportment is enacted. 
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Criticizing Husserl 
The redefinition of philosophy as originary science, and the rethinking of the direction it must 
take, is partly a response to Husserl. Heidegger hints at where he thinks phenomenology needs 
to go, and that is, in a way, against Husserl himself. As Heidegger says:  
 
[The] radicalism of phenomenology needs to operate in the most radical way 
against phenomenology itself and against everything that speaks out as 
phenomenological cognition. There is no iurare in verba magistri [swearing to 
the words of a master] within scientific research. The essence of a genuine 
generation of researchers and of subsequent generations lies in its not losing 
itself on the fringe of special questions, but rather to return in a new and 
genuine way to the primal sources of the problems, and to take them deeper.419 
 
 Phenomenology is a radical science and, as such, it must maintain its radicalism by 
pressing on presuppositions and principal formulations so as to reach deeper into the primal 
sources, the origins. Phenomenology is a science that must not emulate the “progressive 
character” of the other sciences. In this context, Heidegger explicitly mentions Husserl as being 
at fault in creating this illusion about phenomenology, foremost in the way he formulates the 
issue in the essay ‘Philosophy as a Strict Science’, where he exemplifies mathematical science 
as the ideal science that other sciences should emulate.420  
 We should not underestimate Heidegger’s “internal revolution” against Husserl in the 
way it involved the reappraisal of moods. When Heidegger speaks against the “master” to his 
students, he is indeed speaking about Husserl. Let us recall here what Heidegger wrote in the 
essay “My Way into Phenomenology” a few decades later concerning his relationship with 
Husserl in 1919, the year the lecture course in question took place. Referring to how he took on 
the practice of phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl's proximity, and how 
his interest leaned anew toward the Logical Investigations, Heidegger spoke of how he “begged 
the master again and again [baten wir –Freunde und Schüler- immer wieder den Meister] to 
republish the sixth investigation which was then difficult to obtain.”421 Husserl was indeed the 
“master”, and Heidegger and other students were practising phenomenology alongside him, 	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whilst also espousing their own views on how phenomenology should be executed and what 
sort of problems it should address. In this context, Heidegger will seek to redirect 
phenomenology towards the facticity of life and with that to achieve more clarity as regards the 
origins of phenomenological regard itself. 
 Heidegger believed that Husserl’s transcendental turn came at a cost, as Husserl’s 
account for the beginning of phenomenology was too “negative” insofar as it involved a certain 
reflection that moved away from the factical level of experience, from the Dasein itself, and 
involved a certain abstraction and a sort of voluntaristic freedom on the part of the subject that 
failed to make sense of life itself. In BPP, Heidegger tells his students how, despite Husserl’s 
breakthrough, Husserl himself was not entirely clear about his own discoveries (referring to the 
way Husserl did not realize the ontological significance of categorial intuition).422 What was 
overlooked, not only by Husserl himself but also by the way others received Husserl’s initial 
breakthrough, was the transcendental motives and tendencies, amounting to the problem of 
transcendental constitution inherent in the factical descriptions of the second volume of the LI. 
In effect, Heidegger believed that the LI had already performed the transcendental analysis of 
constitution, without being tainted by the reflective, sceptical character that Husserl introduced 
in Ideas I. It is precisely the introduction of the reflective attitude of Ideas I that Heidegger will 
take issue with. As Denis McManus writes, the “notion [of the theoretical Attitude] […] looms 
large in Heidegger’s understanding of how he broke with Husserl—the latter supposedly 
remaining in that Attitude’s grip.”423 
 The first and most fundamental concern for Heidegger is the very beginning of 
phenomenology- a question of both method and content. Heidegger asks us not to reflect on the 
beginning, as Husserl did in Ideas I, but rather to begin factically. In Ideas I, Husserl re-
articulates phenomenology by instituting particular methodological demands, in typical 
Cartesian (i.e. reflective) spirit. In §32 he announces the phenomenological epochē, which 
establishes the criterion by virtue of which the phenomenological region is defined. In this 
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context, the phenomenological region is defined precisely in terms of a “shutting out” of 
(zeitliches) Dasein, which entails the suspension of the factical.424  
 This very same methodological beginning was also announced in the 1911 
programmatic essay entitled “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”, in which Husserl defined 
scientificity in terms of Zusammenhang (as was shown in the previous chapter). Husserl wrote 
that pure phenomenology as science, so long as it is pure and makes no use of existentially 
positing nature, can only be investigation of essences, and not at all an investigation of Dasein. 
Phenomenology can recognize only essences and essential relations, and studies the “origin” of 
all formal-logical and natural-logical principles. 
 It is this Husserlian beginning that Heidegger found problematic, because it shuts out 
the factical Dasein and thus marginalizes the everyday, limiting phenomenological inquiry in 
such a way that it leaves a region of being out of reach. Heidegger’s reformulation of 
phenomenology as an ontology of facticity that “lets the open” region manifest itself is repeated 
again in a similar way in the late period as Gelassenheit, which is again introduced as a radical 
alternative to the Husserlian beginning: In §22 of the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
(1929-30)425, in a very similar wording to the 1919 lecture course where he calls for a deepening 
of phenomenological research contra the master, Heidegger says the following: 
Now we can see for the first time what is decisive in all our methodological 
considerations. It is not a matter of concocting a region of lived experiences, of 
working our way into a stratum of interrelations of consciousness 
[Bewußtseinzusammenhänge]. We must precisely avoid losing ourselves in 
some particular sphere which has been artificially prepared or forced upon us 
by traditional perspectives that have ossified, instead of preserving and 
maintaining the immediacy of everyday Dasein. What is required is not the 
effort of working ourselves into a particular attitude, but the reverse: what is 
required is the releasement [Gelassenheit] of our free, everyday perspective – 
free from psychological and other theories of consciousness, of the stream of 
lived experience and suchlike.426   	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  Heidegger’s “break” from the Husserlian beginning is more evident, in the sense of 
elaborate and nuanced, in the 1920-21 lecture course entitled Introduction to the 
Phenomenology of Religion (PRL).427 There he poses anew the problem of beginning, thus: 
“How do we arrive at the self-understanding of philosophy?”428 Heidegger says that if one 
grasps the problem radically, then one finds that philosophy arises from factical life experience, 
something that is at odds with grasping philosophy as a cognitive comportment that falls prey to 
the ideal of an exact, theoretical science.429 Here, Heidegger also explicitly relates the concept 
“factical” with the concept of the “historical”, by saying that the “factical” is not that which is 
naturally real or causally determined, but rather it can only be made intelligible by means of 
historicity. So while Husserl’s point of departure after his “transcendental turn” is the 
suspension of the everyday Dasein, the temporal and the factical that reveals the eidetic 
structures of meaning, Heidegger goes in the opposite direction and begins not from a reflective 
change of attitude, but rather from within that very “sphere” which Husserl has suspended: 
factical life experience itself.430 
 Commencing with Ideas I, Husserl reconfigured the phenomenological method via a 
transcendental turn, something that raised new challenges for him. In articulating the way we 
“enter” into phenomenological analysis he configured the reductions in terms of a change of 
attitude (Einstellung), involving a particular kind of ontological suspension, the so called 
epochē. This re-introduced reflection and risked devivification and objectivation of intentional 
life.  
  The problem of transcendental constitution then, which is a central problem of 
phenomenology, must be posed in terms of factuality, that is, it must be explored in terms of its 
vital grounds in life, posing it as a radical problem of origin, without this analysis to fall back 
into an empirical psychology. In Heidegger’s own words, genuine problems will not be solved 	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by the invention of another system or world-view, or by starting from an already constituted 
idea of “science” (as Kant and the neo-Kantians did), but rather “by letting the problems 
themselves become problematic in their factuality […] and then pos[ing] radical problems of 
origin.”431 Thus, Heidegger identifies life as the original region of phenomenology. Life will be 
the dynamic way that intentionality is enacted, Dasein’s factical flow and fulfilment. (We will 
see how Heidegger defines ‘life’ in the next section).   
 As original science then, phenomenology must study the motivations and tendencies 
that shape world-views and sciences in general; studying the tendencies is the primary research 
task of phenomenology which involves a letting-open-up [ein Offen-Lassen] of perspectives.432 
Phenomenology opens up to the concrete, it concretizes “abstract” problems, and it is through 
phenomenology that the concrete is enacted. This means that phenomenology, as the science of 
the original region [Ursprungsgebiet], involves an original mode of experiential apprehension 
[erlebendes Erfassen] of an origin which is still “far” [fern].433 The original region is hidden 
from life, it is not given in life itself since life’s basic aspect itself is self-sufficiency 
[Selbstgenügsamkeit].  
 In this context, Husserl’s “beginning” of transcendental phenomenology shows itself to 
be inadequate, and indeed it becomes Heidegger’s object of criticism. Heidegger’s appeals to 
the letting-open-up the original region is a radicalization, a subversion of Husserl’s “principle of 
principles” and the change of attitude that the epochē involves. “Indeed, we should not reflect 
on the beginning, but rather factically begin!” says Heidegger in the 1919 lecture course, right 
before he refers to this “letting-open-up”, the precursor of Gelassenheit, to this originary region 
that is the object of phenomenology.434 So instead of a radical change of attitude [Einstellung], 
which is the way Husserl introduces the phenomenological beginning, Heidegger proposes 
something that, at a first glance, appears to move in the opposite direction to Husserl. 
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 Heidegger further clarifies what the sense of “historical” is and how we are to relate to 
it; in this context he clearly critically demarcates his own approach from Husserl’s. Heidegger 
holds that even though every “attitude” [Einstellung] is a “relation” [Bezug], not every relation 
is an attitude. An attitude, says Heidegger, is a type of comportment [Verhalten] that is 
absorbed in the material complex [Sachzusammenhang].435 Heidegger then points out the 
ambiguity in the very word Einstellung, which can also mean “to cease”, and starts constructing 
a critique based on this double-meaning. As he says: “With this ‘attitude’ [Einstellung] the 
living relation to the object of knowledge has ‘ceased’ [‘eingestellt’]”.436 Heidegger thus wants 
to distinguish phenomenological understanding from attitudinal understanding, something that 
is at odds with Husserl’s programmatic proclamations in PRS and in Ideas I. And a few pages 
later, he explicitly shows how Husserl’s phenomenology is not radical enough. 
 As was noted in the previous chapters, Heidegger’s most important hermeneutic 
discovery was the notion of “formal indication” [formale Anzeige] which was a radicalization of 
Husserl’s phenomenological formalization which Heidegger carries out as a result of Natorp’s 
critique. Formal indication was Heidegger’s response to the question of how can a philosophy 
attend to the stream of life without objectivizing it and, thus, without “stilling the stream”. 
Heidegger thought that to see philosophy as a matter of attitude allowed for such criticisms to 
be raised as it involved a cessation, and because it made it impossible to turn towards the 
factical in a way that would not reduce it into a region of being that would be just one part of 
the totality of all beings. This is a metaphysical problem that Husserl’s phenomenology falls 
foul of, since the way it formalized consciousness turned the latter into a region of being, the 
most general region of being and, as such, subjected it to the regional consideration of 
transcendental phenomenology.437 A new way into the phenomenological was thus sought, and 
as we will see in the following section, this will be founded on an earlier Husserlian distinction: 
the distinction between generalization [Generalisierung] and formalization [Formalisierung]. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 PRL, p. 33. 
436 Ibid. 
437 Ibid, p. 39. 
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 Heidegger focuses his attention on this distinction made by Husserl in the Logical 
Investigations. Heidegger was to deepen the distinction so as to resolve the issues 
phenomenology faced. Generalization is the categorization of experience and the subsequent 
ordering of the categories into a hierarchy. For example: joy is an affect, and affect is an 
experience.438 So generalization entails a metaphysical ordering, and it is one whose enactment 
is contained within a certain material domain. Formalization, on the other hand, is not an 
ordering, and it is not the material domain, as it is free from material contents and involves the 
formal predication of phenomena and objects of “essences” and “things, free from any order of 
stages. The formal character arises out of the relational meaning, which is motivated by the 
sense of the attitudinal relation itself [Einstellungsbezug].439  
 But phenomenological analysis must go deeper than the attitudinal relation of 
formalization that Husserl enacted, in order to see how this relation itself, which is theoretical, 
is an enactment [Vollzug]. Husserlian formalization is still dependent on generalization, 
according to Heidegger, in that it stands within the meaning of the “general” (a logic of logical 
“ordering”).440 At first glance, Heidegger’s analysis of formalization here, in terms of 
materiality, that is, in terms of the general, sounds awkward. How can he both acknowledge that 
Husserlian formalization moves away from the content-based general to the relational-formal, 
whilst also saying that formalization still relies on materiality? How can Heidegger say that 
Husserlian formalization stands within the meaning of the general, of the “content”, since 
Husserlian formalization says nothing about the content, the what, and does not prejudice 
anything on that level? 
 Heidegger says that exactly there lies the problem: because the formal determination is 
indifferent to the content, this is decisive for the way the formal relation is determined. The fact 
that it is indifferent to the content hides the enactmental character which is more originary.441 
This is the fate of Husserl’s theoretical “principle of principles” and the epochē! Formal 
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440 Ibid, p. 41. 
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indication goes deeper than Husserlian formalization, in that it is more original and has nothing 
to do with a region and also falls completely outside of the attitudinally theoretical.442 It allows 
for the enactmental aspect of formalization to appear as such, and thus instead of turning away 
from the factical, it allows for the factical and the motivational to appear and be described. 
Thus, formal indication allows for the pre-reflective, affective, character of factical life to 
emerge as that which grounds and, at the same time, motivates the enactment, something that 
Husserl’s phenomenology concealed. 
III. Heidegger’s enactmental phenomenology 
Heidegger’s own analyses aimed at analyzing deeper structures of knowledge and being, by 
virtue of fresh formal indications. Heidegger further radicalized Husserlian “formalization”, by 
trying to create notions that would formally indicate the enactmental character of factical life.In 
this context, Heidegger employed the notions of Gehaltssinn (content-sense), Bezugssinn (sense 
of relation) and Vollzugssinn (sense of enactment), which formally “organized” his early 
phenomenological analyses of the factical situation443 through which his first breakthrough to 
the pre-reflective, affective, realm of intentionality was achieved. This was developed out of 
Husserl’s terminology, not against it.  
 Heidegger picked up on Husserl’s notion of Vollzug, i.e. of the enactment of the 
phenomenological regard, and was able to bring into relief the praxial elements of Husserl’s 
phenomenological regard. In effect, Heidegger redefined phenomenology from within 
Husserlian terminology, bringing the practical aspect of the act of phenomenological regard and 
understanding to the forefront. This enabled Heidegger to radicalize the Husserlian notion of 
“truth” from an issue of correspondence legitimized by an objective sense of correlative states-
of-affairs, to the truth of comportment as the enactment of a pre-reflective kinetic (as opposed to 
static) relating.  
 Husserl tried to describe the structure of intentional experience by addressing the unity 
of, but also the distinction between, the immanent aspect of relationality (intentionality) and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
443 “Bezugssinn, Vollzugssinn, Gehaltssinn ergeben die Urstruktur der Situation” (GA 58, p. 261).  
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objective correlate. According to Husserl, the content of “what” appears in consciousness, the 
“object” qua “content”, is not itself the experience of the intentional act - it does not exhaust the 
act. The relation established within the act of experience is not one that can be thought in terms 
of two empirical objects whereby the relation is that of a real object contained within an 
empirical ego. In order to illustrate the difference between phenomenological experience and 
‘popular experience, Husserl drew on the distinction between real content [reellem Inhalt] and 
intentional content which he combines with the notion of “having” [Haben]: the intentional 
content is that which is had.444 Thus, Husserl appealed to the notion of “having” in order to 
illustrate the unity of intentional life from a phenomenological perspective. He analyzed 
categorial intuition in terms of “having” and effectively opened the way for an account of 
categorial knowledge as a matter of comportment: a proposition becomes true by being 
adequately had by the act of judgment. This involves the act of judgement having the states-of-
affairs, and thus already having being. Both truth and being are given to intuition 
coterminously, and are phenomenologically “had” by the intentional act itself. Without the 
“having”, the relation compromises the ontological transcendence of the state-of-affairs. 
 Thus, as was indicated in the previous chapter, in categorial intuition Husserl points at a 
way for truth, being and thought to coincide, and this is achieved on a pre-reflective level. Truth 
is given in intuition, but this does not mean that truth, intuition and being, are restricted to 
objectified being, as it also does not mean that truth is fulfilled through reflection. On the 
contrary, in the Sixth Investigation, Husserl addresses fundamental aspects of truth and being 
that are not objective and are not reflectively given, within the context of intentional experience. 
In the Sixth Investigation, Husserl offers an account of how “authentic thinking” can be fulfilled 
through categorial intuition. Husserl in this context offers an account of authentic thinking that 
predates the transcendental turn as it is enacted through the epochē. It is a phenomenological 
account of authentic thinking that is not tainted with the reflective and “negating” aspects that 
Husserl’s transcendental accounts in Ideas I contain.  
  As mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger took inspiration from Husserl’s 	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account of categorial intuition, insofar as it afforded an intuition of being, and he repetitively 
identified this contribution by Husserl as the most important one, for his own work.445 The truth 
of judgment gets grounded [begründet] in the non-reflective understanding of the enacted 
categorial intuition. This already offers a way out of Natorp’s objections to Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology, and it offered Heidegger a first account of how ontological 
understanding, a grasp of the “whole”, is given and fulfilled in experience.  
 Returning to the 1919 Kriegsnotsemester lecture course, we can now make better sense 
of Heidegger’s hermeneutically charged sentences on how the original open region that 
phenomenology tries to bring into relief is, at the same time, the closest but also the farthest. 
Phenomenological science must begin by looking at life itself; that is practical life as it is 
manifested in everydayness. It is in this life of self-sufficiency that the motivation and tendency, 
the very beginning of phenomenology itself, the open region, is to be found.446 However, at the 
same time, the original region is not in life itself, it is not in this self-sufficiency of life itself, as 
life in itself is not philosophical but rather pre-philosophical. Hence, there is a need for an 
encounter with factical life, so as to formally indicate its structures and identify therein the 
tendencies and motivations out of which the original region emerges. 
Factical life: enactment and self-sufficiency 
Husserl’s crucial contribution to philosophy, from Heidegger’s perspective, was his rediscovery 
of intentionality and the way it bifurcates into sensuous intuition and categorial intuition. 
Husserl had also (already before Heidegger had become his assistant) started to analyze the pre-
intentional levels of subjectivity through the notion of motivation, and started to become 
sensitive to Natorp’s critique as regards the genetic levels of intentional life. How does 
intentional life, in its dynamic other-directedness constitute itself? Heidegger was precisely 
taking up this problem: the problem of the origin of intentional life, the methodological problem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Heidegger on a number of occasions identifies the Sixth Investigation of the Logical Investigations as the most 
important contribution of Husserl that inspired his own thought. For example, see MWP. 
446 BPP, p. 22 and p.153. 
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of beginning, and the ontological problem of becoming as such, the dynamic character of 
factical life out of which sensuous and categorial intuition emerge. 
 Heidegger was interested in showing how intentional life – intentionality in all its forms 
and variations –  is grounded in the affective, and that would include both the active aspects of 
intentional directedness as well as the passive, receptive aspects. Thus, Heidegger’s early 
project involved the radicalization of the Husserlian-Brentanian notion of intentionality, so as to 
uncover the deeper ground that constitutes the unity of intentional life at the pre-theoretical 
level. In this context, he tried to capture in a non-theoretical, non-psychologistic way that which 
provides the impetus of the directionality of intentional life. Ultimately, Heidegger identified 
ἔρως, Liebe, as the motivation of philosophy, the ground out of which the original region 
emerged. Ἔρως manifests itself as desire and it is important to see how Heidegger’s 
phenomenological account of ἔρως is carried out through an analysis of desire and temptation, 
as these are initially formally indicated by the notions of motivation and tendency. 
 In the summer semester of 1923, during the lecture course Ontology: The Hermeneutics 
of Facticity, Heidegger says that the notion of intentionality [Intentionalität] that Husserl 
inherits from Brentano, ultimately leads back to the medieval conception of directed 
consciousness, itself derived from Aristotelian ὄρεξις (desire).447 Even earlier on, in the winter 
semester of 1920-21 in which Heidegger taught his now well-known lecture course on The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life, we see how Heidegger sees in Augustine a phenomenological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 This genealogical reference made by Heidegger must be properly contextualized. It follows the interaction 
between Husserl and Natorp which, according to Heidegger, exposed the “deficiencies”, or “weaknesses” of 
Husserl’s formulations, especially the reformulations that take place in Ideas I (as opposed to the earlier Husserlian 
formulations in the Logical Investigations) with respect to the way of access granted by phenomenology to 
intentionality, and the way this access manages to entrap intentionality in a theoretical conceptual realm due to the 
reflective nature of access. In order to resolve this problem, Heidegger digs deeper into aspects of intentionality that, 
on the one hand, are indeed to some extent implicit in Husserl’s accounts on the other hand are suppressed by 
Husserl’s accounts. It is in the context of unpacking these suppressed aspects of intentionality that Heidegger referred 
to the connection between intentionality and desire in the Summer Semester of 1923: “Husserl was influenced here 
by the work of Brentano, and this was the case not only regarding his method in that he adopted Brentano’s method 
of description, but also regarding the basic definition of the domain of experience as his subject matter. Brentano had 
characterized consciousness of something as intentionality. This concept arose in the Middle Ages and had at that 
time a narrower sphere of application, it meant a volitional being-out-for-something and going-toward-it (ὄρεξις) 
[desire]” (OHF, p. 55). “Hierfür wurde Brentanos Arbeit wirksam, und nicht nur methodisch, sofern Husserl die 
deskriptive Methode übernahm, sondern auch die Grundbestimmung der region. Brentano hatte Bewußtsein von 
etwas charakterisiert als Intentionalität. Dieser Begriff entspringt im Mittelalter und hat da eine engere Sphäre, er 
bezeichnet das willentliche Aussein auf etwas (ὄρεξις)” (OHF, p. 70).  
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account that considers desire448 as one of the forms of temptation, tentatio, “not in a biological-
psychological and theoretical attitude, but according to the characteristics of the how he has 
factically experienced it”.449  
 The sphere of phenomenology is defined as the ‘presentation’ or ‘givenness’ 
(Gegebenheit) of life.450 Heidegger calls our attention to the ‘genuine, concrete realization and 
the actualization [Vollzug]’ of life.451 Heidegger asks here that life be thought not on the basis 
of the biological disciplines, but rather approached anew on the basis of its own character, so as 
to allow new forms of manifestation and expression to be understood from out of themselves.452 
Heidegger begins by noting an ambiguity in the word “experience”, whereby the substantive 
designation names both the experience itself but also that which is intentionally encountered, 
and so “experience” is inherently twofold, in the sense that it refers to a self as well as to that 
which the self encounters.453  
 Heidegger begins his analysis of experience, intentional life, by prioritizing the 
enactment [Vollzug] of life. Intentional life is enactment. Heidegger takes the fulfillment that 
comes with intentional givenness (i.e. the fact that a being can “intend” an object or a world) as 
the accomplishment of life which shows that life has a certain “self-sufficiency” (Selbst-
Genügsamkeit). “Self-sufficiency” is the form of intentional fulfillment, it is the form that 
achieves transcending directionality. This self-sufficiency is what he also calls the “in-itself of 
life”, which is so invariable in its types that it also includes what we take as ‘the exact opposite 
of the self-sufficiency of life’.454 The self-sufficiency of life is not a structural ‘overcoming’ of 
life (in the sense of a transcendence that is somehow beyond life), but the tendency of life 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Concupiscentia carnis, which is a strong desire of the flesh, and which Heidegger translates as Begierlichkeit. 
449 PRL, p. 157. 
450 BPP, p. 21. 
451 Ibid. 
452 “Let us think about the biological disciplines that are familiar to us today under the name of descriptive sciences 
and not look at the fact and at the attitudinal tendencies that are factically expressed [ausgesprochen] in each case. 
Rather let us pay attention to the basic motives to approach, somehow, the primitive forms of life that were cultivated 
earlier. In this way, with this tendency, there emerge new forms of manifestation and expression that must be 
understood from out of themselves and that one may not explain by providing more or less daring analogies with the 
mathematical natural sciences” (Ibid, p. 40). 
453 In Heidegger’s own words: “Experiencing [das Erfahren] or the experience [die Erfahrung] – the substantive 
designation usually also means yet something else. Not just factical encountering as such but that which is 
encountered is also co-meant […] We intentionally want to leave the double meaning in this word. All effectuation of 
factical life—that means, of the tendencies in which something encounters life itself—and all factical modes of such 
fulfillment we can describe as experiencing” (Ibid, pp. 54-55).      
454 Ibid, p. 25. 
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towards fulfilment from within life itself.455 Self-sufficiency is thus a teleological direction of 
life in itself, characterized in such a way that it takes its motivation from its own factical 
flow.456 We can therefore discern that self-sufficiency is an expression of life. We can rephrase 
it thus: life is a tendency towards fulfilment, towards enactment, towards actualization, whose 
motivation lies within itself.  
 But life is not exhausted by self-sufficiency. Life has the tendency to fulfill itself and 
self-sufficiency is the form of intentional fulfillment, but fulfilment is still motivated by 
tendency, and hence self-sufficiency follows from tendency (not vice-versa). Thus, motivation 
and tendency, the affective dynamism of life, as the interplay of the passivity and activity of 
life, is what essentially comprises the enactment of life. Heidegger here defines selfhood as the 
movement of life that is understood from within life itself, without being reduced to a perfect, 
self-sufficient subject, but as a self-transcending and other-directed being whose movement is 
co-constituted by its finitude. In Heidegger’s own words:  
[Life] itself poses tasks and demands to itself that always remain solely in its 
own sphere, so that it seeks to overcome its limitations, its imperfections, to 
fill out the perspectives [ergebenden Perspektiven auszufüllen] arising within 
it, again and again, only “in” the basic character that is prefigured by its 
ownmost self-sufficiency and its forms and the means derived from them.457 
 
 
 
 The fulfillment of self-sufficiency is never final, says Heidegger, since the tendency-
character of life “unleashes ever-new starting goals, and from there, manifolds of motives and 
motivations are brought into effect”.458 Life’s self-sufficiency is the way in which motivation of 
new tendencies manages to fulfill itself. Self-sufficiency is the basic character of the “self-
world” [Selbstwelt].459  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid, p. 26. 
457 Ibid, p.25. 
458 Ibid. 
459 Remember, at this stage Heidegger has not yet coined the term Dasein. Instead, he uses Selbstwelt. 
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Motivation and Tendenz as the structure of factical life 
Heidegger identifies tendency [Tendenz] and motivation [Motivation] as the basic structures of 
factical life. Even though Heidegger does not here achieve full clarity regarding tendency and 
motivation, he gives us some crucial insights. Firstly, he identifies tendency and motivation as 
the structures that constitute the ground of experience, the so-called “naked homogeneity” 
[nackten Gleichartigkeit].460 This does not mean that tendency is something self-identical, stable 
and always present, since Heidegger acknowledges a plurality of competing tendencies.  
 Tendency accounts for the development of “stability” in our relations, as well as for  
‘the new’ that we may encounter.461 Tendency is that which gives direction, either explicitly, 
consciously posited, or even when it “sneaks up on us”.462 And just as there are many directions 
in life, so there is a multiplicity of tendencies in life, in the things we encounter.463 
 Heidegger’s description of tendency here is –in some respects- reminiscent of his 
description of disposition in BT, and that it is these basic characteristics that will be developed 
into his account of disposition. Tendency accounts for the development of “stability” in a 
similar manner that a basic disposition forms a sense of security and calm; but it also has the 
capacity to disrupt, to open up the encounter of something new and uncanny, and to even “sneak 
up on us”! In addition, there is a multiplicity of tendencies, competing tendencies, just as there 
are moods and counter-moods. 
 It is through tendency that something new becomes available, by an exchange of one 
tendency for another, and it is through tendency that an interruption of the habitus of the self-
world takes place (habitus here denoting developed habits, i.e. tendencies that have become 
stable and have created a certain “structure of everydayness”).464  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Ibid, p.56. 
461 Ibid, pp. 26-27. 
462 Ibid, p. 26. 
463 One cannot easily discern that this notion ultimately refers to pre-reflective affectedness and will later on be 
entirely replaced by mood [Stimmung]. But it is useful to keep that in mind, and take note of the associations that 
Heidegger makes of tendency with emotion, when he says, for example, that the directionality of tendencies “are 
absolutely of a non-theoretical, emotional kind.” (Ibid, p. 31) A concrete example Heidegger gives, connecting 
motivation with emotion is when at the end of this lecture course he says that ἕρως is the motive-ground of 
philosophical enactment: a motive that requires the releasement into the ultimate tendencies of life and a return into 
its ultimate motives (Ibid, p. 198). 
464 Ibid, p. 56. 
	   166	  
 Heidegger seems to use tendency and motivation interchangeably, but if we look more 
carefully we can detect a distinction between the two. Enactment emerges out of motives.465 
Motivation is the “coming-from” [Herkommen] in life.466 On the contrary, tendency refers to the 
“going-forth” [Fortgehen] and the “inclination-toward” that exists in life.467 Tendency and 
motivation are distinguished in relation to one another, i.e. they should not be understood as two 
objective, independent “states” or “parts” of a process, but rather as two ways of describing the 
very same kinesis. Because of this, they can exchange their functions, or their functions can be 
seen to coincide, so that a tendency can become a motivation and vice versa.468 (An example, 
perhaps, would be the automatic opening of a door: “The door is pushed opened” [Fortgehen], 
“The door is pulled opened” [Herkommen]).  
 Finally, Heidegger says that tendency and motivation are what establish manifestation 
[Bekundung]: they are behind the phenomenon of “taking-notice” [Kenntnisnehmen]. They are 
the structure that provides the “directional force” behind the intentional phenomenon.469 
(Heidegger also draws a connection between manifestation and self-sufficiency: manifestation 
is that which self-sufficiency means and achieves.) Therefore, motivation and tendency are what 
enables the world to matter to us, which is one of the basic ontological characteristics that 
Heidegger will ascribe to disposition in BT. 
 “Taking-notice”, sometimes translated as “taking-cognizance-of”, is the mode of 
cognition that Heidegger ascribes to Husserl’s phenomenology, an account of the phenomenon 
of intentionality that needs to be overcome, by a deeper account of factical life itself: that in 
which philosophy is enacted that is not merely the experience of something in cognition, but 
rather as that which “designates the whole active and passive pose of the human being toward 
the world”.470 Heidegger’s focus on factical life in terms of its motivations and tendencies is an 
attempt to account for the deeper originary foundations out of which philosophy springs, deeper 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 PRL, p. 100. 
466 BPP, p.196. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid. 
469 The phenomenon of “taking-notice” [Kenntnisnehmen] is “motivated in each case by the prevailing tendency of 
expectation and receives directional force from it” (Ibid, pp. 88-89). 
470 Ibid. My italics. 
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than the cognitive accounts that the early Husserl gives. In this context, Heidegger will speak of 
the origin of intentional life, and of philosophy itself, in terms of motivation (as opposed to a 
reflective epochē)- and the first motivation that Heidegger will identify will be that of ἔρως.  
Ἔρως as the first motivation of philosophy 
The first time Heidegger mentions (Platonic) ἔρως is in the end of the lecture course Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, where he identifies the very motivating ground of philosophy, 
where for the first time he identifies the factical ground out of which philosophy originates! In 
the notes of Oscar Becker, we encounter the following paragraph:  
The true philosophical posture is never that of a logical tyrant who through his gaze 
scares life away. Rather, it is Plato’s ἔρως. But it has an even more lively function 
than it has in Plato. Ἔρως is not only the motivating ground of philosophy, rather it is 
the philosophical activity itself that demands for a self-loosening towards the last 
tendencies of life and a return to its last motivations. The posture that opposes 
phenomenological philosophy is a self-attaching onto something. That philosophy 
demands a self-loosening towards life, though not towards its surface, rather what is 
called for is an absorption of the self in its originariness.471 
 
 After this scant but crucial reference to Platonic ἔρως, which seems to be the 
culmination of where the lecture was leading up to in terms of motivation, Heidegger offers a 
more nuanced and deeper analysis of ἔρως in his Augustine lectures. But the path that enabled 
the turn to ἔρως, the passion of factical life, has already been laid down in BPP: the emphasis on 
the self-world [Selbstwelt], with Christianity as the historical paradigm for the shift in focus into 
the facticity of the self-world.472 
 This shift was carried out from within Husserlian terminology since, as pointed out in 
the previous chapter, in Ideas II Husserl’s breakthrough into motivation, as the concatenating 
ground of spiritual life, was enabled through the personalistic attitude. Further to this, 
Heidegger deepened the analysis into the factical life of the self-world, by further focusing on 
the enactmental character, formally indicating the way motivations and tendencies shape and 
direct the flow of experience of the self, in terms of habit. It is this approach that will finally 
bring Heidegger closer to Aristotle’s ethics and revive an Aristotelian account of truth, albeit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 BPP, p. 263. 
472 Ibid, §14. 
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from a phenomenological perspective. However, before Heidegger turned to Aristotle in 1924, 
the afflictions of the person, his or her desires, passions and temptations, took centre stage 
through his re-reading of Augustine. It is there that his first serious account of affects takes 
place.  
IV. Religious experience, love and joy 
Phenomenology of religious life and the self 
In this section we will turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine and look at the thematic 
account of ἔρως which it offers. Heidegger’s first analyses of factical life are not direct first-
person phenomenological descriptions, but they materialized through interpretations of early 
Christian life as described by Paul and Augustine.    
 In the Winter Semester of 1920-21, Heidegger focuses on Augustine’s confessional 
accounts of how he experiences his own life in relation to God. Heidegger identified in 
Augustine an account that articulates desire473 in a phenomenological way, i.e. as one of the 
forms of temptation [tentatio] described “not in a biological-psychological and theoretical 
attitude, but according to the characteristics of how he has factically experienced it.”474 For 
Augustine, factical life gets reduced to the experience of temptation: “life is really nothing but a 
constant temptation.”475  
 Heidegger identified Augustine’s notion of temptation with his own phenomenological 
notion of tendency. Temptation, as we see in the Augustine lecture notes, is defined by 
Heidegger as tendency and is the fundamental character of factical life.476 It seems that 
Heidegger finds common ground with Augustine in his definition of the unity of factical life: 
while Augustine identifies the unity of factical life as temptation, Heidegger translates 
temptation back into the phenomenological notion of tendency, which is the notion through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473  Concupiscentia carnis, which is a strong desire of the flesh, and which Heidegger translates as Begierlichkeit. 
474 PRL, p. 157. 
475 Ibid, p. 152. 
476 “Different meanings of tentatio: tentatio deceptionis [temptation of deception]: with the tendency to bring-to-a-
fall; 2. Tentatio probabtionis [temptation of prohibition]: with the t[endency] to test. In the first sense, only the devil 
(diabolus) tempts, in the second, God tempts too” (Ibid, p. 206). [Tentatio: Verschiedener Sinn von tentatio. 1. 
Tentatio deceptionis: mi der Tendenz des Zu-Fall-bringens, 2. Tentatio probationis: mit der T[endenz] zu prüfen. Im 
1. Sinn versucht nur der Teufel (diabolus), im 2. Sinn auch Gott].   
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which the unity of factical life is constituted. Heidegger’s rendering of tentatio, normally 
translated into English as temptation, as Tendenz is not unwarranted; on the contrary, Heidegger 
is conventional here since Tendenz is etymologically derived from the Latin tendentia, from 
tendo (or tento, or tempto), which is the root of tentatio, the primary meaning of which is “to 
handle, touch, feel a thing”.477 Hence, it is not at all far-fetched to point out that Tendenz is to 
feel.  
  As mentioned in the previous section, Heidegger’s turn to the phenomenology of the 
factical self, as exemplified in religious experience, chronologically coincides with Husserl’s 
shift to the personalistic attitude. I submit that Husserl’s turn to the personalistic attitude in 
Ideas II, the turn to the person, and Heidegger’s turn to religious life, the facticity of the 
religious self, are connected. Heidegger’s turn to religious experience is not done for theological 
reasons, but rather in the context of a formal analysis of the way the self factically exists. 
Religious experience is important for Heidegger not because of God, but because of the way the 
facticity of the self becomes transparent. Part and parcel of this turn to the self is the analysis of 
experience through the unifying notions of motivation and tendency, which are the 
phenomenological “categories” that account for the spiritual equivalent of causality 
[Kausalität].478  
Augustine and love  
Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine will turn out to be crucial in his development of the 
hermeneutic of facticity as, through his encounter with Augustinian thought, he will develop 
some of the key insights and terminology that constitute the existential analytic of Dasein in 
BT.  
 In looking at some aspects of his reading of Augustine, we come to see how Heidegger, 
thematizes the pre-reflective aspects of factical life, its grounding motives and tendencies, with 
affects and moods taking central role. Heidegger will identify concern [Bekümmerung], cura, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 These are the etymologies given in Tufts Perseus library online. The same meaning is also given though in 
Michiel de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the other Italic Languages: tempto, -are 'to feel, test' [v. I] 
(P1.+; also tentare). 
478 Ubiali 2011, p. 256. 
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the unified character of the manifold of ways of enactment factical life. Various ways of 
concern are the various ways that the self enacts, has, its own factical life. Concern is the way 
that Dasein becomes absorbed in the world and in this context Heidegger identifies in Augustine 
three ways of having of factical life: the mode of dealing-with [Umgehen],479 the mode of 
looking-about-oneself [Umsehen],480 and the mode of self-significance [Eigenbedeutsamkeit].481 
Heidegger also identifies in Augustine a certain overcoming of these inauthentic ways of having 
factical life through continence [continentia], which involves the affirmation of authentic 
anxiety-inducing experience and the radical ungroundedness of the factical self.482 It is crucial 
to note that it is in these very analyses that Heidegger will, for the very first time, refer to Angst, 
as the mood that is associated with authentic experience of nothingness and the overcoming of 
fallen ways of having the factical life. It is in this very analysis that the cornerstone of what later 
in BT becomes the mood that corresponds to the “understanding of oneself in one’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being”483, as the anxiety of conscience discloses, will be laid.  
 What is also important in the account is how Heidegger arrives at Angst, as indicative of 
understanding of the ungroundedness of the self, through Augustine’s existential account on 
love [Liebe] that seems to be the motivation directing the various ways of self-understanding of 
factical life, i.e. the various ways of having factical life. Scholarship seems to have overlooked 
how the first account of Angst comes about through an experience of love. What is more, in his 
reading of Augustine’s Confessions, Heidegger does not only account for the fundamental mood 
of Angst but also mentions for the first time how other moods are awakened: wonder [Wunder], 
astonishment [Staunen], joy [Freude], sadness [Traurigkeit], startled dismay/alarm 
[Erschrecken], alarm/shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], and dread [Gruseln]. Before we move 
into a more detailed analysis, let us make some general remarks concerning Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Augustine.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 PRL, pp. 159-162. 
480 Ibid, p. 128. NB: In Being and Time this is translated as “circumspection”. 
481 Ibid, p. 170. 
482 Ibid, p. 180. 
483 BT, §60, p. 342. 
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 Heidegger read Augustine in a way that allowed for the enactmental character of the 
Confessions to be formally indicated. In this context, he focused on particular parts of the text 
that he deemed to offer an existential breakthrough. In particular, Heidegger chose Book X as in 
this book Augustine moves beyond an account of his own past and into the experience of the 
present, talking about “what he is now”.484 Book X is more important for Heidegger since it is 
there that Augustine gives a phenomenological-existential account of the experience of the 
enactment of factical life.  
 According to Heidegger, Augustine manages (at certain points) to go beyond the 
objective-historical account and offer an existential account of facticity that goes beyond the 
natural-scientific attitude. Augustine’s existential breakthrough comes by way of his confession 
that his relation to God is one of faith and, as such, it is not a matter of comprehension 
[Begreifen]. Thus, Augustine offers a different relational account to the Christian worldview. 
This different way of relating is primarily enacted485 through the certainty that Augustine lives 
in the love of God. It is in the love of God that he sufficiently intends God.486 This, Heidegger 
adds, indicates an existential stage “which can ‘hear’ and see, that is, the stage in which loving, 
in such loving, is opened up for something definite” (i.e. God).487 Heidegger here in effect 
analyses intentionality and worldhood in terms of love: it is love that establishes a relation to 
God, and opens up the religious world itself. The “opening” is not explained in terms of the 
natural-scientific attitude since it is made sense in terms of the affect of love, a motivation that 
enacts religious experience. Meaningfulness is not explained in terms of a subject intending an 
object present-at-hand.  
 As already mentioned, Heidegger’s initial opening towards love was made in the lecture 
course Basic Problems of Phenomenology where the turn to ἔρως, the passion of factical life, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 PRL, p. 128. 
485 Heidegger does not explicitly use the notion enacted (vollzieht) here, but he uses the Husserlian phrase “what 
gives a fulfilling intuition” [was dem >erfüllende Anschauung< gibt]. According to my reading, Heidegger’s 
reversion to Husserlian notions does not constitute a regression from his own discoveries that he so insistently 
distinguishes from Husserl’s own. It is precisely for this reason that he uses fulfilling intuition in inverted commas. I 
do not think it would constitute any kind of hermeneutic violence to replace fulfilling intuition with enactment here; it 
is supported by the context.     
486 PRL, p. 130. 
487 Ibid. 
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had already been laid down by referring to Plato. Heidegger was interested in indicating how 
philosophical understanding stems from factical life, and further analysis into the enactmental 
character of it would indicate the motivations and tendencies that shape and direct the flow of 
experience of the self. In that respect, ἔρως was the motivation of philosophy. And this is not a 
strange comment to make concerning Plato’s philosophy since it was he who associated 
philosophy with ἔρως, notably in the Symposium. 
 But while in Plato ἔρως is the motivation, in Augustine it is identified with tendency. 
As it was noted in the previous section, tendency and motivation are two aspects of the very 
same phenomenon, each emphasizing a different aspect of the enactmental structure, so to treat 
these two notions as separate events or entities is unwarranted. However, Heidegger’s exchange 
of one for the other when it comes to ἔρως does signify a shift in his perspective, a shift which 
indicates Heidegger’s own turn from a static transcendental account of origin, to an ecstatic 
opening up of the philosophical endeavour itself towards a “letting-go”, an open-ended 
structure. 
 As Tatjana Noemi Tömmel writes, Heidegger wants to go beyond Plato; for Plato ἔρως 
is only a “motivator”, a moment that initiates philosophy but then ceases to be an inherent part 
of the ongoing philosophical activity, whereas Heidegger wants to show how ἔρως is not only a 
grounding motive of philosophy, but rather the philosophical endeavour [Betätigung] itself 
which demands a letting-go [ein Sichloslassen] in the ultimate tendencies of life and a return to 
its last motives.488 Thus, love for Heidegger is not a “cause” that stands behind the philosophical 
kinesis, or an ὑποκείµενον that stands “below” it, but rather it enactmentally accompanies the 
experience, it “has” the experience as the ground of the enactment that dynamically persists. For 
Heidegger, ἔρως is not just “in the past”, as the moved mover of the happening, but it is there in 
an ecstatic way, both within the immanent experience as well as in the potential and 
actualization for ecstasis. Heidegger’s ἔρως has a futural element, and hence renews its letting-
go into an enacted anticipated future (cf. the temporality of Angst). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Tatjana Noemi Tömmel, Wille und Passion: Der Liebesbegriff bei Heidegger und Arendt, (Berlin: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 2013) p. 77. 
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 Heidegger believes that Augustine’s account overcomes the theoretical attitude, 
offering an account of how the person experiences her or his own facticity in relation to the 
absolute intentional object, that is God. The breakthrough identifies in love the many tendencies 
of enactment. It is important to see how this constitutes a radicalization of the Husserlian 
personalistic attitude: it takes it one step further by connecting the structure of motivation with 
the affective, something that Husserl had not done, without either reducing that which is “had” 
to the affective and collapsing everything to the affect, or by reducing the affective to a 
naturalistic state (as psychologism did).489 The breakthrough comes in the fact that the intended 
object (God) is not reduced to a theoretical object, and nor is the experiencing person reduced to 
a natural subject. Rather, we get to examine the relational character of factical life, as it is 
manifested in Augustine’s confessions, and that which motivates and affords the tendencies of 
this opening: love.  
 Metaphysical understanding is grounded in love. Love, for Augustine, is an absolute 
starting point that provides the necessary certainty by virtue of which he orients his radical 
inquiry. Love is what characterizes the way Augustine has his own experience. Heidegger will 
follow Augustine in identifying conflicting tendencies of love, centered around the distinction 
between the authentic way of how oneself “has” this love, that is how the “having-of-oneself” is 
enacted as the authentic having of historical facticity, and the inauthentic ones which give in to 
the possibility of “falling”, that is, of becoming self-absorbed and lost in the secular world. The 
former will be identified by being directed and keeping with the love of God, sustained by 
continence [continentia], which enacts the overcoming of inauthentic “having”. The latter will 
be identified with the manifold ways that love diverges into the various ways that love directs 
itself at the secular world. In rough terms, this corresponds to the two distinct aspects of love, 
ἔρως and ἀγάπη, erotic love and divine love.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489  “You, God, bestow this honor upon the memoria by living in it. But “in qua ejus parte maneas, hoc considero” [in 
what part of it, I now consider]. I have not found You in the representations of material things and not “ubi 
commendavi affectiones animi mei” [where I had committed the affections of my soul], where I entrusted the 
experienced conditions and moods [Zustände und Stimmungen]. […] You Yourself are not an “affectio, vivendis, 
qualis est cum laetamur, contristamur, cupimus, metuimus, meminimus, obliviscimur, et quidquid hujusmodi est; ita 
nec ipse animus es, quia Dominus Deus animi tu es” [affection of a living person, such as when we rejoice or are sad, 
or when we desire, fear, remember, forget, or anything of that kind; nor are You the soul itself, for You are the Lord 
God of the soul]” (PRL, p. 149).  
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 Heidegger begins at the place where Augustine’s confesses that the only certainty, what 
he knows, is that he loves God. Augustine then quickly turns this into a question: Quid autem 
amo, cum te amo?: But what do I love when I love you? Heidegger considers Augustine’s 
question from a phenomenological perspective: “Augustine attempts to find an answer to this 
question by investigating what there is that is worthy of love […] or what gives a ‘fulfilling 
intention’ if he lives in the love of God, what suffices for, or saturates, that which, in the love of 
God, he intends”.490 
 Augustine turns his question concerning the soul that seeks God into a question of 
seeking beata vita, that is, the happy [glücklich] life that is the way knowledge of God enacts 
itself. The objective seeking of God is thus reflected, or phenomenologically “reduced”, into the 
affective certainty of love that accompanies this relation to the object sought, and is thus turned 
into an inquiry into the mode of having, a how of seeking and of having the happy life. The 
relational correlate of the seeking and loving of God is the seeking and loving of beata vita. 
Augustine’s question of “how do I search for God” becomes a question of “how do I search for 
the good life”, which turns into the how of having the happy life.491 Heidegger is interested in 
how Augustine leads his inquiry from an objective-theoretical seeking into an existential 
question about the motivation and tendencies that characterize this factical life.   
 The shift from seeking and loving God to seeking and loving beata vita marks a shift 
from seeking for, loving and having an objective correlate, to seeking for, loving and having the 
enacted relation itself. In this regard, the being of God, and the search for the being of God, is 
turned into a mode of “having”, or, to put it the other way round, the “having” is appropriated 
such that it becomes the meaning of the “being” of God (without this passing any ontological 
judgment on the being of God). In Heidegger’s own words: “The primacy of the relational 
sense, or of the sense of enactment, is remarkable.— What it is: this question leads to the How 
of having it. The situation of enactment, authentic existence.—Appropriate the ‘having’ such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Ibid, p. 130. 
491 Ibid, p. 141. 
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that the having becomes a ‘being’”.492 In other words, Heidegger argues that Augustine 
manages to turn the questions of “what is God?” and “where do I find Him?” into a discussion 
about the conditions of experiencing God, which essentially turns to the problem of the self.493 It 
is the same question, albeit in a different form of enactment. This enables Augustine to turn to 
the way one desires and loves the happy life. 
 Having established then that love supplies the ground, in the form of certainty, of his 
knowledge about God, and how the intuition of God is enacted in love,494 he then inquires 
whether and how he can find God “therein”.495 Since God is not given in enactments of 
sensuous intuition, Augustine turns to other forms of enactment, in memory in particular.496 
Augustine’s turn to memory is noteworthy, as it signifies an introspective reversal, from the 
outward to the inward, a reflective tendency whose progressive outcome will be the culmination 
in the fall into inauthenticity. But the first moment of this inward turn is connected with two 
particular fundamental moods: astonishment [Staunen] and wonder [stupor; Wunder]!  
 Augustine encounters the “enigmas” of enactment, and he discovers in memory, in 
which God may be found, a “vast and infinite interior”.497 He wonders at how such an infinite 
interior belongs to him, and yet he cannot grasp it: “Stupor apprehendit me”! “I am seized by 
wonder”, writes Augustine. In the face of this infinity, something wonderful is enacted 
[Wunderbares vollzieht] that awakens astonishment. 498499 Augustine then asks whether the “I”, 
the self to which this infinity belongs, is God after all: perhaps “I” am what I am seeking? But 
Augustine immediately rejects that, determined to continue the investigation “until the one [he] 
wants is awakened [wecken].”500  
 Before we move on, it is crucial to note two things here. Firstly, we must take note of 
how the fundamental moods of wonder and astonishment are for the first time invoked in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Ibid, p. 143. 
493 Ibid, p. 150. 
494 Ibid, p. 130. 
495 Ibid, p. 132. 
496 Note how the Platonic dialectic between knowledge and memory is repeated in Augustine, and is also a recurrent 
motif throughout Heidegger’s works, one way or another, for example through Heidegger’s invocations of 
forgetfullness, retrieval, awakening, etc. 
497 Ibid, p. 133. 
498 Some translators use “amazement”. 
499 Ibid, p. 134. 
500 Ibid, p. 133. 
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Heidegger. Even though Heidegger does not offer a thematic analysis of these moods, they are 
clearly given a central role, and it seems that what Heidegger writes later on these moods 
remains within the spirit of this initial context, expanding on it and further analyzing it.501 
Secondly, the way these moods are manifested, the dialectic of emergence and concealment of 
fundamental moods, is similar.  
 Both astonishment and wonder are moods associated with the disclosure of an infinite 
presence that overwhelms understanding. Astonishment and wonder are begotten by infinity 
given as presence, and associated with “the distress of not knowing the way out or the way in”, 
that is, “a not knowing the way out of or into this self-opening ‘between,’ […] in which man 
arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first time experiences, but does not explicitly consider, 
that which we are calling ‘in the midst’ of beings”.502 The mode of givenness of being is in 
essence the same as with θαυµάζειν, the mood that, according to Heidegger, grounded ancient 
Greek philosophy, the so-called “first beginning”.503  
Awakening a fundamental mood 
The way a fundamental mood conceals and unconceals itself is articulated in accordance with 
the paradigm of wakefulness and sleep.504 Finding God is here reduced to the enactment of a 
fundamental mood, which belongs to the finding of (i.e the fulfillment of intending) God.  
 Augustine experiences astonishment and wonder, but he quickly “rejects” them because 
they are not the moods that fulfill the intention of God: the mood he wants is still not awakened. 
The implication here is that while the fundamental mood that accompanies the fulfilled 
intention of God, i.e. the knowledge of God, is in a certain way already in place, it still is not 
enacted as such, but lies rather hidden as if asleep. Thus, it needs to be awakened.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 Heidegger offers a detailed analysis of θαυµάζειν and its relation to Sichwundern (wonder), Staunen (amazement), 
Bestaunen (admiration), Erstaunen (astonishment), and Erschrecken (terror/shock) in the Winter semester 1937-38 
lecture course entitled Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte “Probleme” der “Logik”, volume 45 of the 
Gesamtausgabe. (Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy Selected "Problems" of "Logic", trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) 
502 BQP, p. 132. 
503 One difference is that for Plato, who is emblematic of the first beginning, disclosure of the infinite present-at-hand 
had to do with the world as φύσις, whereas in Augustine it arises upon reflection onto the self. 
504 I am indebted to my colleague Patrick Levy for bringing to my attention the problem of sleep in Heidegger’s work. 
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 The fundamental mood that opens up to the presence of God is not that of love, as, 
despite the fact that love is already felt and enacted, the affect that signifies the presence of God, 
joy, remains hidden/absent. This is the first time Heidegger will encounter the problem of 
awakening a fundamental mood. While Heidegger only mentions the notion of “awake” twice in 
this lecture course, the dialectic remains in place and is invoked again and again, such as in BT, 
but especially in the 1929-30 lecture course Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics where he 
says that the fundamental mood of his time, which will turn out to be boredom [Langeweile], 
needs to be awakened. 
 So the mood intended but not enacted is joy [Freude]. Joy would confirm the presence 
of God; but this is still sought as it is still hidden. Heidegger follows Augustine in searching for 
this “apodictic” mood that would confirm the presence of God, which is “somehow already 
there” in memory. Memory is a mode of givenness: it is that in which something is vaguely 
given as an object (of memory) and yet not partaking in the enactment, not enactmentally “had”. 
What sort of givenness is this then? According to Heidegger, in memory we have things “ad 
manum positum”, that is, things that are present-at-hand in the sense of being “ordered” at one’s 
disposal [zur Verfügung]. Memory is a mode of givenness that is present-at-hand but which is 
somehow “alienated” from the act.  
 What is at one’s disposal in memory is not only “material things”, not only “objects”, 
but rather anything that can be intended as such, including affects [affectiones]. The way affects 
are “had” in memory is distinct from the way they are “had” enactmentally, in that the latter is 
present as “lived”, vivid and not objectified, whereas the former is enactmentally absent, 
vaguely present in an objectified way.505 In memory, affects are “had” in a different manner 
than they are “had” in current experience. In other words, the way the affect is given in memory 
does not coincide with the way the affect is enacted in the situation, as the former is objectified 
in intentionality whereas the latter is pre-reflectively experienced. Heidegger gives the example 
of how one can intend joy [Freude] while experiencing sadness [Traurigkeit]. It is important to 
note that at this stage, while Heidegger distinguishes between the intended affect and the lived 	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affect, he does not technically distinguish between “affect”, “feeling”, “emotion” and “mood”, 
as he uses interchangeably Affekte, Gemütsbewegungen and Stimmungen.           
 The distinction made here by Heidegger between the affect as intended in memory and 
the affect as experienced, implies a certain hierarchy in the mode of disclosure: the affect as 
experienced is non-intentional, that is, it founds and structures the intentional experience itself, 
but without being discharged into the objective side of intentionality, whereas the affect as 
intended does not partake in the enactment, as it is thematically grasped. This confirms that the 
manner of intentional “having” differs from the enactmental “having”.  
 But the relation between these two modes of having, which are fundamentally 
implicated and yet distinct, is peculiar and demands clarification. The fact that the intentional 
act can enactmentally have one affect but intend an other, different affect, even the opposite 
affect, means that some aspects of the founding enactment do not extend into the object itself. 
How can an affect that grounds the intentional act recede and not discharge into the 
objectification itself? And wouldn’t this neat distinction between the act as experienced and the 
object of the act make the two poles impossible to be unified? Or would it not make the 
communication between these two poles reciprocal, whereby an objectively grasped affect 
would be re-introduced back into the enactment and thus be “re-awakened”?506  
 A “communication” between these two modes of having is needed in order to: a) be 
able to speak of a founding level of having upon which another way of having is founded; b) 
retain even a minimal truth in the object intended, and; c) allow for a “reverse enactment” 
whereby what was once pre-reflectively had, and then objectified, can be re-enacted, 
“awakened”. Heidegger finds a way to make sense of this nexus, but in order to achieve this he 
is forced to modify Husserl’s analysis. This is the moment phenomenology undergoes the 
hermeneutic modification; the moment phenomenological regard attains its hermeneutic 
dimension, opens up to its hermeneutic nature and attains maturity with regard to the impurity 
of intentionality itself, the finitude in relating to objects as well as in self-relating. Intentionality 	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becomes hermeneutic. But the way Heidegger radicalizes Husserlian intentionality is unclear at 
this stage, and it takes some effort for the differences to be unpacked.     
 In Heidegger’s account of Augustine’s confessions, of the experienced affect as 
distinguished from the intended affect, indeed closely resembles Husserl’s own account in Ideas 
I, where Husserl differentiates between the various kinds of “having” joy. In Ideas I, Husserl 
distinguishes between the reflecting act that objectivizes joy as it regards it, and joy as it is lived 
but not regarded. Concerning lived joy that is not reflected upon, Husserl says: “The first 
reflection on the rejoicing [Freude] finds it as actually present now, but not as only now 
beginning. It is there as continuing to endure, as already lived before, only not looked at”.507 
Here, Husserl already ascribes a specific temporal character of the reflective “having” of the 
affect, which Heidegger reiterates in BT: the affect that is reflected upon has the temporal 
character of “having-been”, i.e. pastness. The reflected affect is given to intentionality as 
something that belongs to the past and hence something that is in memory. In teasing out the 
distinction between the two ways of “having” joy, Husserl writes that:  
with respect to the rejoicing which has subsequently become an object, we 
have the possibility of effecting a reflection on the reflection which 
objectivates the latter and of thus making even more effectively clear the 
difference between a rejoicing which is lived, but not regarded, and a regarded 
rejoicing; likewise the modifications which are introduced by the acts of 
seizing-upon, explicating, etc., which start with the advertence of regard.508 
 
It seems that according to Husserl the reflective regard involved in memory objectivizes and 
thus neutralizes the affect. As he says:  “In the neutrality modifications of rememberings, […], 
we have attentional potentialities the transmutation of which into actualities yield, to be sure, 
“acts” (cogitationes), but entirely neutralized”.509 Thus, a reflective having of an affect in 
memory, reflecting on affect, cannot bear an existential awakening of the affect. This is 
consistent with Heidegger’s own analyses regarding awakening a fundamental mood.  
 But a problem arises here that Heidegger does not explicitly address at this stage. If 
affect grounds the worldhood of the world, along with intentional acts, and if it enables the very 	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508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid, pp. 266-267. 
	   180	  
opening up and revealing of the world, along with the encountering of intended objects in that 
world, this means that the affect always already partakes in the way the object is given. In other 
words, insofar as the affect grounds the experience, then it must extend to permeate the 
intentional act on the whole, also “tinting” the intended object itself. An analogy would be this: 
if sight grounds the encountering of visible objects, then any object encountered will be visible. 
In the case that a green filter is fixed on the lens, then all objects will appear in variants of 
green. How can a red object be encountered if the lens is green?510 
 If the lived affect is that of sadness, how can the object itself be experienced in a joyfull 
manner; even worse, how can the very affect of joy be intended in sadness? How can the 
fundamental affect be sadness when the object intended is joy itself, the opposite of sadness? 
Can there be “sad joy”? To repeat this in Augustinian terms: how can Augustine intend joy (in 
seeking it) when what he feels is love? 
  This need not be a problem for Husserl, since he does not consider affects as part of the 
foundation of the act; the act at the foundational level is devoid of affects, and thus the 
correlative object intended is also “neutral” at the foundational level. For Heidegger, on the 
other hand, no act is devoid of affect; in fact, all acts are constituted by affect (mood). Insofar as 
an affect is foundational, the intended object must always already be tainted by that affect, such 
that even when the object intended is an affect, the affect grounding the act must somehow also 
characterize the affect as intended object. Hence, we may intend “joy” while feeling sad. How 
can we make sense of this without admitting absurdity? 
 Focusing on the distinction between the ways of “having” helps us make sense of this 
paradox. Despite the fact that Husserl takes the act of feeling to be grounded on objectivation 
(the “noeses of feeling, of desiring, of willing […] are founded on objectivations”),511 Husserl 
draws a distinction that helps us resolve the apparent paradox: the distinction between the way 
of “having” the object from the perspective of the act, and the way of having the object in the 
sense of seizing the object itself.  
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511 Ibid, p. 276. 
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 The matter of seizing the object is a neutral regard that has nothing to do with the 
quality of the act, and the affect is part of the quality of the act. Husserl writes that “in the act of 
valuing, we are turned toward the valued; in the act of gladness, to the gladsome; in the act of 
loving, to the loved [im Akte der Freude dem Erfreulichen, im Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten, im 
Akte der Liebe dem Geliebten][…]”512 Being turned lovingly to a thing, in this case the thing 
being “happiness”, does not mean that the affect that accounts for the quality of the act is in the 
object itself, despite the fact that the affect is the quality of the intending act.513 The way we 
have the quality of the act is not reduced into the way we have the object itself. The pure object 
remains unaffected by the qualities of the act. This distinction between the quality of the act and 
the intended object allows for Husserl to say that the act can have the quality of sorrow while 
the intended object is “joy” itself, which would be an object whose essence does not include 
affective qualities. The distinction lies in the way the act and the object are respectively “had”, 
which amounts to two distinct modes of relating.   
 If we turn this distinction on its head, we start making sense of Heidegger’s analysis of 
Augustine on love and joy. Husserl’s distinction shows that the affective act is ultimately 
grounded in the neutral object and the neutral, presentive act, whose state-of-affairs is pure 
objectivity. The distinction hence undermines the transcendental status of the affective act 
deeming it as a derivative kind of act: a loving act (an affective act) can intend sadness because 
sadness as objectified is in essence unaffected by the quality of the act. Heidegger, on the other 
hand, in accepting and maintaining the distinction between act and object, does not do so in 
order to undermine the affective quality of the act, but rather undermines the “neutrality” of the 
object (the neutral object that belongs to the neutral presentive act, upon which the derivative 
affective act is founded), and argues that the way we “have” the quality of the act is grounding 
and prior to intentionally having a neutralized object: the former “having” is part of the 
experience at the foundational level, whereas the latter is abstract, derivative, and somehow 
alienated from the ground. Thus, it is indeed possible to have the affect of joy that indicates that 
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joy itself as experienced is “somehow there” in memory, without it being explicitly enacted: it is 
vaguely given “ad manum positum”, present-at-hand, “alienated” from the enactment and yet 
somehow relating to it.  
 In adopting the Husserlian terminology of intentionality, Heidegger still needs to 
overcome the static subject-object vocabulary, as Heidegger’s intention is not only to show how 
objectification is a derivative mode of givenness, but at the same time not to compromise for 
subjectivism. The enactmental aspect of givenness is not ontologically rehabilitated because of 
a privileged “subjectivity” contra an “alienated” object. Heidegger’s aspiration is to make 
manifest a more originary level of experience that has affect at the deepest level of constitution, 
and at the same time overcome the subject-object dualism. 
 If we are to apply the Husserlian stratified economy of givenness on Heidegger’s 
analysis of Augustine, on the problem of seeking the affect of joy as given in memory while 
enacted through love, then we still need to explain how Heidegger overcomes the subject-object 
economy. As noted earlier, Heidegger appeals to the dialectic of wakefulness and sleep so as to 
explain the two modes of givenness of affects: the affect of enactment is “awake”, whereas the 
affect as intended is “asleep”. The Husserlian distinction between the two different ways joy is 
given, the subject-object distinction, appears incongruent with the paradigm of “awakening”. If 
joy as an object of memory is taken to be an object intended that is relationally understood in 
opposition to the lived act, and joy as enacted is lived, then the dialectic of sleep and 
wakefulness helps clarify how the subjective and the objective are not understood as polar 
speculative opposites, but are rather two modes of givenness that are not a matter of speculative 
inversion or reconstruction of two opposing realms.  
 How can the act itself correspond to wakefulness, while the intended object corresponds 
to sleep? From a Husserlian perspective, this would be a category mistake: the act and the object 
are not “opposite categories”. The act and the object, or the subject and the object, are not just 
opposing poles as Natorp would have it, whereby the object is what is given and the subject is 
the opposite pole that is not given and must be reconstructed. In Husserlian phenomenology, 
and this is a defining characteristic of phenomenology in general, both subject and object, act 
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and intended states-of-affairs, are given, albeit in different ways. Subject and object signify 
distinct ways of givenness, two distinct ways of “having”. How then could we describe one pole 
as “wakefulness” and the other as “sleep”, or, to use the Aristotelian categories, how can we 
describe the subjective act as “actual” and the intended object as “potential”, without bluntly 
opposing one side to the other? How can we avoid sentencing the object to death, as a frozen 
moment of the dynamic subjective, an inanimate object present-at-hand that is infinitely distant 
from the act? And how can we allow for a “reverse enactment” whereby what was once pre-
reflective, pre-objective, can be re-enacted, “awakened”? The problem is thus already one that 
pushes phenomenological understanding beyond transcendental epistemology: it is not simply 
an issue of understanding and interpretation, but it is at the same time a genetic issue of 
“beginning”, of enacting the fundamental mood that is at the constituting origin of metaphysical 
understanding.  
 As already mentioned, Heidegger’s shift to the enactmental aspect of understanding is 
the moment phenomenology undergoes the hermeneutic modification. The issue of how 
Heidegger’s turn to the paradigm of “wakefulness” and “sleep” is best clarified by turning to 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic structure of formal indication, as was already pointed out in the 
previous section of this chapter.  
 Even though Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine resembles Husserl’s analysis of 
“having joy” in memory from Ideas I, we must remember how Heidegger criticized the way 
Husserl’s formalization remained dependent on “generalization”, and remained anchored on 
materiality and content in the sense of presence-at-hand (which is what enabled Natorp’s 
critique to attain its force). Heidegger’s formalization involves a radicalized way of grasping the 
intentional experience itself, opened up by way of a formal indication that does not objectify. 
This allows for the phenomenologist to indicate the general situation and see the act and the 
intentional object as moments of a structural nexus. From this perspective, the intentional object 
is indicated as something that is not a natural object present-at-hand, but is rather a way that 
Dasein manifests itself and relates to the world. At the same time, the act itself, the enactment, 
is a mode of givenness that is not reduced to the subjective side of a metaphysical dualism. Both 
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subjective and objective are seen from the perspective of an originary “in-between” and thus 
neither the subjective nor the objective have self-grounding legitimacy, rather they are 
manifestations of the grounding “in-between”. Viewed from this perspective, both object and 
subject, intended object and act, are not substantiated entities present-at-hand, but rather formal 
indications, expressive variations of enactment.  
 Heidegger does not offer a clear account of this in his Phenomenology of Religious Life, 
but the hermeneutic nexus in operation is the same, albeit at an incipient stage, as that in BT. 
Applying the tripartite hermeneutic structure of §2 of BT helps seeing how Augustine’s search 
for God is enacted as love, given as love, whose saught after object is the joy coterminous to 
God, the joy of beata vita that is given in memory as if “asleep” and needs to be “awakened”. 
Let us turn to BT then. 
 In BT Heidegger’s definition of philosophy as phenomenology is strongly hermeneutic, 
and the hermeneutic character of his inquiries will remain in place even in the later period when 
he will no longer associate his project with the transcendental. Philosophy will be the finite 
process of starting from that which is phenomenologically given and trying to uncover the 
foundations that ground the phenomenon, while knowing that the very process of uncovering is 
finite and cannot discover unadulterated, pure, transcendental, foundations. Philosophical 
reflection as it takes place in BT is, in a way, reminiscent of Augustine’s Confessions, the 
practice of interpretation of pre-reflective elements of Dasein’s world involvement. And 
interpretation is the articulation of Dasein’s pre-reflective understanding of being.514 
Heidegger’s discovery of “formal indication” concerns, and affirms, the hermeneutic nature of 
understanding and conceptuality, whereby the concept that indicates an originary phenomenon 
is delimited by indeterminacy: it lies between conceptual determinacy and indeterminacy, it is 
vaguely present and thus somehow necessarily absent. Therefore, Augustine has a vague 
understanding, knowledge, of beata vita, of holy joy, and the very act of indicating it does not 
amount to an objective presentification of it, nor to a self-transparent experience of it.  
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 Heidegger explicitly addresses this problem and the proposed solution of it, indeed in 
PRL where he argues that philosophical concepts themselves arise out of ‘factical life 
experience’ and then point back to tasks of performance,515 i.e. of enactment. Once we come to 
see concepts as arising out of factical being-in-the-world, then we can also see how and why 
concepts, however explicit or vague, formal or informal, must be seen as embedded within a 
structural nexus of meaning-relations.516 Invoking and interpreting a concept then involves the 
process of transformation of experience whereby the re-interpretation and reflection recovers 
the covered-up experiential aspects that enable the arising of vague understanding in the first 
place. And a repetition and analytic “refinement” of this vague understanding explicates the 
originary existential circumstances- a process that resembles the phenomenon of “awakening”. 
Hence, that which is initially conceptually given, as δόξα, is a legitimate starting point that 
conceals, but in that concealing, or rather, because of it, unconcealment and awakening of 
originary experience and understanding is made possible.      
 In §2 of BT Heidegger’s hermeneutic ontological project, the question of Being, is a 
project structured in terms of three formal aspects: the Gefragtes, the Befragtes and the 
Erfragtes. The Gefragtes corresponds to what is intended by the question: Being. The Befragtes 
corresponds to what is interrogated as regards what is sought: “beings” are interrogated with 
respect to their Being. As it will turn out, the preferred Befragtes will be Dasein itself. The 
Erfragtes refers to that which will be disclosed through the interpretation, and that is the 
meaning of Being (as time). If we apply this structure on Augustine’s search of God, we get the 
same hermeneutic structure, whereby what is sought is not Being itself but rather God.  
 Applying the formal structure on the Augustinian inquiry then, “Being” is replaced by 
“God”, “Dasein” by the “having of love”, and the “meaning of Being” by the “joy of beata 
vita”. For Augustine, what is intended, the Gefragtes, is God; what is interrogated, the 
Befragtes, is the person as the one who enactmentally experiences (i.e. “has”) the love of God; 
and that which is provisionally, formally, indicated, the Erfragtes, in this confessional self-
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interpretation, is the joy of beata vita, the joy of the “happy life” in which God’s meaning is 
present. At this initial hermeneutic stage then, love is the sense of enactment, it is that which 
enables the relation to God, which opens up the experience and constitutes the Christian world. 
It is, in other words, the affect that indicates how being in the Christian situation is enacted, the 
“how of having” God. 
 As mentioned earlier, in encountering his own memory Augustine is apprehended by 
astonishment, but he rejects his own memory as a satisfying result of his inquiry. He must 
proceed until the one he wants is awakened, and that is joy. Love is that which is “had now” and 
joy is that which is sought, intended in memory. Even if joy is “lost”, still having lost something 
is a mode of having it.517 The real motive behind this inquiry then is the joy, as having this joy is 
having beata vita. Joy is the end of concern [delectatio finis]: it is joy that everyone wants in 
wanting beata vita.518 But not all joy is the same: Augustine is not endorsing affective 
relativism. It is possible to pursue another joy than the one that pertains to the truth of God.519 
Love of joy bifurcates into an authentic way of having life, and an inauthentic way of having it. 
Both possibilities involve the experience of life as a constant temptation [ständige Versuchung; 
tentatio] and what is at stake is how one comports oneself and relates to this factical situation. 
Authenticity then involves a way of having the experience, which will be shown to be 
continence, which does not involve a change of the content of experience itself, rather a 
modification in the way we comport ourselves to the situation. Inauthenticity, likewise, involves 
ways of comporting ourselves to the factical situation, which are ways of “giving in” to factical 
life, becoming absorbed by it and “falling”. Let us firstly analyze these inauthentic ways of 
having factical life before we turn to the authentic way of having God, which opens up an 
authentic relation to world in general.  
   Through Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine, we come to see how the joy of beata vita, 
the joy of the truth of God, which is self-sufficient life in-itself, is opened up by the experience 
of ἔρως itself. The ambiguous status of joy in memory, as something intended that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 PRL, p. 140. 
518 Ibid, pp. 143-145. 
519 Ibid, p. 145. 
	   187	  
contemporaneously present and absent, reflects back on the very love of the enactment, bringing 
into the open the double character of love itself, the inherent ambiguity of love which is both 
ἔρως and ἀγάπη, erotic love and divine love: desire that lacks and intends the Other in and 
through insufficiency and radical absence, and love that achieves self-sufficiency.     
VI. Authenticity and Continence 
Loving as having joy 
Heidegger follows Augustine in identifying conflicting tendencies of love, centered around the 
distinction between the authentic way of how oneself “has” love, that is how the “having-of-
oneself” is enacted as the authentic having of historical facticity, and the inauthentic ones which 
give in to the possibility of “falling”, that is, of love becoming self-absorbed and lost in the 
secular world. The former will be identified by being directed and keeping with the love of God, 
sustained by continence [continentia] enacted as the overcoming of inauthentic having. The 
latter will be identified with the manifold ways that love diverges into the various ways that one 
loves the secular world.                
 No matter how the happy life is had, writes Augustine, everyone desires it [volunt] 
because they love it. Loving and desiring are coterminous to having and knowing: “we can love 
[the happy life] only by somehow knowing about it”.520 What we desire in the happy life is the 
very taking delight, the joy [freuen].521 Heidegger notes then that the real motive behind the 
desire for the happy life is “the desire to take delight (or the desire to avoid pain)” [Das 
Sichfreuenwollen (bzw. Vom Leiden wegwollen) is also dabei eigentliches Motiv: die Freude zu 
haben].522  
 But this desire and love that indicates that we “have” (as an end) the happy life, is not a 
guarantee of authenticity in itself. Not everyone strives for the authentic happy life, notes 
Heidegger. Some ways of loving/having are inauthentic. Heidegger quotes Augustine:   
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cadunt in id quod valent, eoque contenti sunt’ [they fall back upon what they 
have the strength to do, resting content with that]. They fall back upon what 
is in their power to do, what is at their disposal in the moment [was gerade 
ihnen verfügbar ist], what is conveniently attainable for them of the 
surrounding-worldly and other significances of the self.523 
 
Thus seeking the authentic happy life ceases to be significant as they lose interest in it. This 
comes with a reversal: the person ceases to love and desire the authentic happy life, and they 
actually come to hate it. In this hatred, they take what they already have at hand as the 
authentic, and love it.  
 The most striking example that Augustine gives concerning this reversal and fall into 
inauthenticity, is the joy we get when we experience truth [veritas]. Everyone wants the truth, 
says Augustine, because everyone enjoys the truth.524 And the happy life is precisely that: the 
experience of truth! Here Augustine makes the same connection between desire, enjoyment and 
truth that Plato does. Wanting the happy life is wanting the truth: the “happy life is the joy of 
truth”.525 The desire for the happy life is therefore guided by the rejection of deceit and the 
delight of truth [delectatio veritatis].526  
 But a sustained analysis brings Augustine to the realization that most people do not 
authentically love the truth. They become intensely occupied by other things and are captured 
by the activity in which they are absorbed, something that makes them lose the happy life more 
and more. Through the absorption by the activity, one is already occupied with, “the real truth 
is not being loved but rather hated”.527  
 Absorption in factical life is an abandoning of oneself over to it, writes Heidegger. This 
factical life becomes that which fulfills the effort toward truth. In Augustine’s words: “Hoc 
quod amant velint esse veritatem”: what the love they want to be the truth. “[W]hat is loved at 
the moment, a loving into which one grows through tradition, fashion, convenience, the anxiety 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Ibid, p. 145. 
524 Ibid, p. 146. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid, p. 147. 
	   189	  
of disquiet, the anxiety of suddenly standing in vacuity; precisely this becomes the “truth” itself, 
in and with this falling enactment”.528 Heidegger continues with his interpretation:  
Amant eam lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem” [They love the truth when it 
enlightens them, but they hate it when it reprehends them]. They love it, when it 
encounters them as glitzy, in order to enjoy it aesthetically, in all convenience, just 
as they enjoy every glamour that, in captivating, relaxes them. But they hate it 
when it presses them forcefully. When it concerns them themselves, and when it 
shakes them up and questions their own facticity and existence, then it is better to 
close one’s eyes just in time, in order to be enthused by the choir’s litanies which 
one has staged before oneself.529 
 
Augustine leads his confession deeper into an analysis of factical life. The experience of 
desiring the authentic good life becomes a striving that deforms and disperses life. One’s “life is 
no cakewalk” [Spaziergang]; rather, one becomes a burden to one’s self: “Oneri mihi sum” [I 
am a burden to myself].530 Factical life is characterized by dispersion [Zerstreuung], what 
Heidegger will later call “falling”. Augustine experiences the facticity of life as molestia 
(trouble): a burden of life that drags life down.531 The burden of life and the possibility of being 
dragged down grows out of the enactment of experience itself (cf. mood as burden in BT). 
 Augustine experiences the love of God and the desire for the good life to be as concern 
for joy: delectatio finis curae.532 Love itself, in its ambiguity, opens up the experience of factical 
life as a constant concern that is directed at joy. And this can be enacted in various ways and 
possibilities. Factical life is a concern for joy that tends to pull life towards a dispersion, a 
dissolution “into the many”: in multa defluere.533 This pull towards dispersion is enacted, 
according to Augustine, as timere (fearing) and desiderare (desiring; erwünschen) as well as 
cupiditas (lust).534 In concernful life, desire for joy is at the same time experienced as a counter-
movement: concern is an interplay between desire for something, towards something, but also 
aversion from something: in prosperity I fear adversity, while in adversity I desire prosperity.535  	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 At this precise moment of the analysis, Heidegger powerfully introduces for the first 
time the affects of Angst and shock [Schrecken]. As concernful life seeks to fulfill its desire for 
joy and fulfill its potential for self-sufficiency, it becomes absorbed by factical life. Remember 
that ontologically speaking, these “ways of being” are ways of being in truth, ways of knowing 
truth: the way we exist and comport ourselves is the way we unconceal the truth of being. Or, to 
put it the other way around: truth is always going to be effectively “reduced” to a mode of 
being, a way of comporting ourselves, towards the world and ourselves. Hence, an analysis of 
the way we comport ourselves towards factical life reveals something about truth itself. The 
intentional character and self-sufficiency (cf. Husserlian “fulfilment”) that can be achieved by 
factical life pertains precisely to the way we understand truth. Insofar as affects are the ground 
of factical life, their role in the experience of truth is foundational. 
 In desiring the joy of beata vita, that is the joy of truth, the self may become absorbed 
by what is immediately given in the factical situation. Thus, through tradition, custom and 
convenience, what is given in the moment is loved and the given becomes truth itself.536 The 
obverse of this habitual comforting in identifying truth with what is given is, “the anxiety of 
disquiet, the anxiety of standing in vacuity” [Angst vor Unruhe, Angst davor, plötzlich im 
Leeren zu stehen].537 The identification of truth with the given, the love and happiness with the 
given, is coterminous with an aversion towards that which can radically disrupt it: the aversion 
towards becoming startled or shocked! In loving the given as the truth, “they do not want to be 
shocked [Sie wollen sich von hier nicht aufschrecken lassen].”538  
  This is the initial context in which the fundamental moods of shock and Angst emerge; 
both of them follow love, they belong to, if I may put it thus, an economy of love. I am not 
arguing that shock and Angst are modes of love, since they are different affects, but the way 
Heidegger describes their emergence in the Augustine lectures does connect them with the love 
of God. Because of this affective trajectory, it is worth looking at the temporal character of 
shock comparatively, that is, in relation to the temporal character of love and Angst.  	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 Shock and Angst are the counterparts of a “fallen” relation to, an inauthentic having of, 
factical life’s desire to fulfilment of truth. In desiring fulfilment, the self identifies the readily 
given with truth and fulfills its desire. To repeat this in Augustinian parlance: the love of God 
and the desire for the good life manifests itself as a concern for joy, conveniently fulfilled by 
that which is given in secular everydayness. God’s (divine love’s) absence develops an aversion 
to vacuity, an aversion to shock and Angst, and this aversion makes the self find truth in 
facticity. According to Heidegger, this “fallen” way of loving truth is fulfilled by error, whereby 
the apparent aversion to being shocked is motivated by “truth.”539 Thus, they end up loving 
error more than truth.   
  But we must not be misled into thinking that Heidegger here interprets truth as a mere 
psychological effect. Heidegger points out how tendency has three possibilities: to love, to 
know and to be.540 This shows that love, knowledge and being are three manifestations of the 
same essence, they are three distinct possibilities, which are essentially united in “having”. This 
also explains why even though in the Augustine lectures the ontological question is not 
thematically addressed, that does not sever facticity from ontological understanding, but rather 
the analysis does not thematically pursue it from that perspective.  
 Augustinian truth is not reduced to a psychological effect then, and not only because 
Augustine’s perspective is not psychological, but also because he maintains a distinction 
between the truth of God and the affects that open up the relationship to God. God is not 
identical to the affections, and Heidegger takes note of how Augustine confesses this non-
coincidence between God and affect: he is not where Augustine had committed the affections of 
his soul, “where [he] entrusted [his] experienced conditions and moods [Zustände und 
Stimmungen].”541 This also shows that Heidegger is not reading Augustine as a metaphysician 
of affect. God is not reduced to an affection of a living person, joy or sadness, desire or fear.542 
God is not joy.543 How does desire fit in factical life then? 	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 Augustine experiences life as a constant temptation [ständige Versuchung];544 this is 
how he comports himself to factical life. Thus, ἔρως is experienced as a continuous “conflict” 
that cannot be resolved, as there is no resolving “middle ground” but always conflicting 
possibilities and counter-possibilities. According to Heidegger, life is experienced as concern, 
as a “determinate manner of enactment according to their own sense—the sense of finis curae 
delectatio.”545 Experience is always insecure about itself because, in the complex of experience, 
“there is no medius locus [middle ground] where there are also counter-possibilities […] In 
experiencing, a devilish being-torn-apart has been uncovered”.546 It is this dispersion in life that 
constitutes for Augustine the phenomenon of temptation [tentatio], what turns life into a 
constant temptation and a trial. As Augustine says, “vita est tota tentatio sine ullo interstitio 
[life is all trial without intermission]”.547  
 Heidegger considered Augustine’s notion of temptation to be the equivalent of his own 
phenomenological notion of tendency, which is what constitutes the unity of factical life; 
tendency explains the intentional character of factical life. However, temptation, tendency, is 
not experienced as simple unity. Rather, it is unity with differentiation, a unity in difference 
whose overcoming does not involve the abolition of movement or the overcoming of it, nor 
does it involve the absorbtion of either side into the other, i.e. the reduction of the “outside”, the 
object, into a subject, an “inside”, but rather involves the more originary experiencing of affect 
enactmentally from the perspective of the originary in-between.  
 Before we see how Augustine accounts for the authentic experience of unity though, let 
us see the inauthentic ones, i.e. the ways the experience of factical life “falls” into inauthentic 
ways of having tendency, that is, the inauthentic ways of relating to the very “erotic structure” 
of intentional life. Let us turn to the forms of temptation that Augustine identifies, according to 
Heidegger’s interpretation, and see how desire and love determine these existential possibilities.  
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Inauthentic forms of temptation  
Augustine identifies three forms of temptation: concupiscentia carnis (desire of the flesh), 
concupiscentia oculorum (desire of the eye) and ambitio saeculi (secular ambition).548 
According to Heidegger, Augustine derives the distinction between these three forms of 
temptation from John, through a juxtaposition of the divine with the secular: “Μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν 
κόσµον µηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσµῷ. ἐὰν τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κόσµον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν 
αὐτῷ· ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσµω, ἡ ἐπιθυµία τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυµία τῶν ὀφθαλµῶν καὶ ἡ 
ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ κόσµου ἐστίν”: do not love the world, 
neither the things in the world. If anyone loves the world, the Father’s love is not in him. For all 
that is in the world, the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the secular ambition, is not 
the Father’s.549 
 Temptations, manifested as desires, are attached to secular things in the world, and thus 
constitute the inauthentic way of being; they belong to the phenomenon of falling 
[Verfallsphänomen].550 Heidegger argues that while “it looks as if Augustine only gave a 
convenient classification of the different directions of concupiscentia, of ‘desire’ 
[Begierlichkeit]”, he does not merely describe these phenomena objectively.551 Rather, “he 
confesses how temptations grow on him through these phenomena and in this posture 
[Grundhaltung]”, and how he relates, or tries to relate to them, through the fundamental posture 
of confession (the “how” of relating).552  
 The three forms of temptation correspond to different ways of “having” our factical life, 
three different ways of enacting concern [Bekümmerung, cura]: the mode of “dealing-with” 
[Umgehen], the mode of “looking-about-oneself” [sich-umsehen], and finally the mode of 
“secular ambition”. (These modes of relating to facticity are reiterated by Heidegger in BT). For 
the purposes of this analysis and for matters of economy, we can skip the first two forms of 
temptation which, according to Heidegger, “aim at something that has to do essentially with the 	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surrounding world, and not with the self [Selbstliches]” and as such they see the significance of 
the object.553 Concerning these first modes of “having” facticity, what needs to be mentioned is 
that Heidegger explicitly connects some fundamental moods with “looking-about-oneself” 
[sich-umsehen]: fear [Furcht], shock [Schrecken] and horror [Gruseln].554 But also boredom is 
here, in my opinion, implicitly associated with this mode of enactment, as Heidegger says that 
in this mode of enactment, the temptation to know, the desire to know, gets superfluously 
directed at entertainment, and being entertained by something is about “passing time” 
[Zeitvertreib].555 Here, curiosity also finds its place. As Heidegger says: “Curiositas, curiosity 
as the greedy desire for the new [Neugier], ‘cupiditas, nomine cognitionis et scientiae palliata’ 
[the lust, hidden under the title of knowledge and science]”.556  
 Whereas Heidegger in the earlier part of the lecture-course analyses Angst and shock in 
tandem, as we see he later on distinguishes them in terms of their respective modes of 
enactment. (Angst will be associated with secular ambition). What does that mean then with 
respect to Michel Haar’s analysis of terror and Angst? Heidegger’s remarks here concerning 
shock and Angst are made in passing, and, therefore, we do not have much textual help. But we 
can indeed make sense of Haar’s thesis precisely by reference to Heidegger’s distinction 
between the two respective modes of enactment.   
 “Looking-about-oneself” is the desire to know that gets absorbed by entertaining 
epistemic edifices. Thus, when this desire fails, experience of failure will be such that it 
involves an affect appropriate to the mode of enactment. Shock will be an affect that amounts to 
the experience of vacuity after the failure of the pertinent kind of epistemic givenness. 
Heidegger associates epistemic givenness of this enactmental kind with “perverse science”, 
namely, a science that from the beginning gives up any criticism about its own sense of 
enactment.557 This epistemic structure is reiterated after the Kehre, precisely in the context of 
analyzing shock.  	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 In the Winter Semester 1937-38 Basic Questions of Philosophy lectures (GA 45), 
Heidegger describes shock as the basic mood of the other beginning.558 Here, Heidegger 
mentions Nietzsche as the thinker through whom “the other need comes into play”, that is, the 
need for the other beginning.559 Heidegger is here already thinking from a historical perspective, 
where wonder is the fundamental mood of the first beginning, and shock is the fundamental 
mood of the other beginning, revealing “a dark emptiness of irrelevance and a shrinking back in 
face of the first and last decisions.”560 But despite the turn to a historical account of the truth of 
Being, from an epistemic standpoint the structure attached to shock is reminiscent of “looking-
about-oneself” from the Augustine lectures: “This terror [shock] becomes aware that truths are 
still claimed and yet no one any longer knows or questions what truth itself is and how truth 
might belong to beings as such”.561 The sense of enactment of metaphysics, from the beginning 
of wonder to the other beginning of shock, is in essence the same. It is through this sense of 
enactment that the very history of metaphysics, both its beginning as well as its failure, makes 
sense. From the standpoint of “looking-about-oneself”, metaphysical understanding begins with 
wonder and ends in shock.  
 Angst then comes about only from a different sense of enactment, which apparently 
does not find an equivalent after the Kehre. It is the sense of enactment that pertains to the self, 
the Selbstliches.562 It is the sense of enactment of secular ambition where “the self articulates 
itself enactmentally in a certain way, insofar as this form explicitly revolves around the self 
itself.”563 This sense of enactment also has its corresponding possibilities of being authentic or 
inauthentic, of experiencing fulfilment and the void, and the affect associated with the 
experience of the void is Angst. 
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Self-significance and Angst 
The joyful end [finis delectationis] of secular ambition is self-significance itself, which involves 
the communal-worldly contexts of life and the issue of self-validation (the equivalent of Mitsein 
in BT).564 It is the mode of “having” of facticity that appraises selfhood.   
 The first concern [curare] that comes in this form of temptation is timeri velle (wishing 
to be feared) along with amari velle (wishing to be loved). The concern at work is one of 
gaining a particular position in relation to the communal world, “consciously organizing one’s 
life such that one is feared or loved by others”.565 Heidegger interprets it thus:  
 
In the timeri velle, one views oneself as the superior one, and makes an effort 
at such communal-worldly assertion. In the amari velle, one takes oneself to 
stand out as the valuable one who deserves the esteem of others.—Both velle 
can be the expression of a certain inner vehemence of existence, but they are 
just as much, and mostly, motivated by cowardly weakness and insecurity, the 
dependence upon models, a need of being allowed to go along, or by the 
concealing prevention, and pushing away, of confrontation. (In giving in to this 
tentatio, the self is lost for itself in its ownmost way).566 
 
 The second concern is amor laudis, the love of praise. This is the desire to validate 
oneself, which is motivated and enactmentally maintained by a certain self-importance 
[Selbstwichtignahme].567 As Heidegger says, the “bustling activity for the sake of praise, for a 
communal-worldly standing of validity, is a cura [concern] for being liked or being pleasing 
[Gefallen].”568 According to Augustine, the problem with giving into his temptations is that it 
marginalizes God and makes him unimportant, since care is shifted from the truth of God to the 
opinion of human beings.569 This means that the one desiring to be praised and loved partakes 
in the deposition of God, since one prefers to be loved and esteemed in God’s place.570  
 Finding joy in being praised is a falling, since the human being is “nothing” on its own 
regard: through praise we can experience joy for a while, but then we “fall” as joy leaves us, as 
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we -again- need validation from the others.571 It is interesting to note that Heidegger repeats this 
very economy of recognition in the context of his analysis of the fundamental mood of the first 
beginning, namely wonder [Erstaunen, θαυµάζειν], in BQP. There, Heidegger offers an in-depth 
analysis of the various ways that we have historically related to wonder, especially an account 
of the inauthentic ways. In this context, Heidegger identifies amazement [Sichwundern], 
marvelling [Verwundern], admiration [Bewundern], astonishment [Staunen] and awe 
[Bestaunen]. What is interesting to note is that Heidegger describes admiration in a very similar 
way that he describes self-significance in the Augustine lectures, which culminate in Angst. 
While self-significance involves the desire to validate oneself, motivated by self-importance, 
admiration [Bewundern] involves the desire to bestow admiration and thus to judge the admired, 
something that involves self-affirmation. In Heidegger’s own words:  
No matter how wholly and genuinely admiration may be carried away by what 
fulfills it, yet it always involves a certain freedom over and against what is 
admired. This occurs to such a degree that all admiration, despite its retreating 
in face of the admired, its self-deprecating recognition of the admired, also 
embodies a self-affirmation [so etwas liegt wie ein Sich-selbst-mit-zur-
Geltung-bringen]. Admiration claims the right and the capacity to perform the 
evaluation which resides in the admiration and to bestow it on the admired 
person. The admirer knows himself – perhaps not in the ability to accomplish 
things, though indeed in the power to judge them – equal to the one admired, if 
not even superior. Therefore, conversely, everyone who allows himself to be 
admired, and precisely if the admiration is justified, is of a lower rank. For he 
subordinates himself to the viewpoint and to the norms of his admirer. To the 
truly noble person, on the contrary, every admiration is an offence.572  
 
In similar vein, the Christian self, the Dasein of the Christian individual, can fall into a love of 
being praised which ultimately leads to a falling into nothingness and into the void [ins Leere 
und Nichts verflüchtigt]. Different possibilities result as different modes of rejoicing, always 
taking oneself as important, as the highest good, the bonum: a) taking as important what one 
does, one becomes conceited; b) elevating the self into taking ones goods as if they are one’s 
own (self-appropriation); c) taking the self as worthy of the “gift”, deserving the bonum; d) 
even if the self possesses the joy of the good [gaudium bonum] without deserving it, the self 
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finds joy not in sharing it with others but in keeping it locked up and not wishing it for others 
(pride, self-love, conceit).  
 In all these possibilities, the direction of pleasing [placere] and joy [Freude] is moved 
into the self in a way that self-world becomes the dominant communal world, and in this the self 
is lost.573 The more the self engages in self-concern [Selbstbekümmerung], the more the self is 
taken as less important and is lost. Thus, in this manner, giving in to these inauthentic ways of 
having the factical self culminates in a fall into the void and the nothing. According to 
Heidegger, it is through this falling that the self is able to have its full facticity; thus, what in 
one sense looks like a nihilistic falling, in another sense it is only through this falling, these 
tendencies, that the self can overcome the falling. According to Heidegger, Augustine 
recognizes this double-character: self-concern is precisely the most difficult: the more the self 
engages in self-concern, the more the self is taken as important and is lost. In this context, 
“Augustine clearly sees the difficulty and the ultimately ‘anxiety-producing character’ of 
Dasein in such having-of-oneself (in full facticity) [letztlich ‘Beängstigende’ des Daseins in 
solchem Sichselbsthaben (in der vollen Faktizität)].”574      
Overcoming temptation: continence as a way of having tendency 
As it was mentioned earlier, tendency is what constitutes the unity of factical life. Temptation is 
not experienced as simple unity, but rather it is unity in difference whose overcoming does not 
involve the abolition of movement or the overcoming of it, nor does it involve the absorbtion of 
either side into the other, i.e. the reduction of the “outside”, the object, into a subject, an 
“inside”, but rather involves the more originary experiencing of affect enactmentally, from the 
perspective of the originary in-between.   
 There exists, for Augustine, a mode of enactment, a way of relating to the temptations 
that make up our factical life that overcomes [Überwindung]575 the dispersion and the fall into 
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574 Ibid, p. 180. 
575 For the capacity of continence to “overcome”, see Ibid, p. 177. 
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inauthenticity: continence [continentia].576 It is a kind of “counter-movement” against the 
dispersion, against the falling apart of life, demanded by God. Through continence, “we are 
brought into the One”.577  
 According to Heidegger, continence is a kind of “containment” [Zusammenhalten], a 
“pulling back” from dispersion. However, it is not a “negation” of relation, it is not a counter-
positing in the sense of “abstinence” [Enthaltsamkeit] that annuls or denies the desires. Rather, 
it is a new way of relating to these desires, a way of having, which in a certain sense brings the 
person closer to the desire, makes them think of the desire and accept that “life is really nothing 
but a constant temptation”, a constant desire.578 It is through continence that Augustine is able to 
experience life as a constant temptation and endure it as such, without turning the burden into a 
delight, without a dialectical overcoming (in the sense of Aufhebung). It is in this precise 
direction that temptation finds its sense and motivation.579 
 Continence “represents the mode and direction of the overcoming and the halting of the 
fall [Aufhalten des Abfallens], but it does not move away from the unrest of facticity.580 
Continence therefore has a peculiar character. While it is that which “contains” the self and in a 
certain sense constitutes a counter-movement to dispersion, it is one whereby the experience of 
this very dispersion through the temptations is accentuated: it is through continence that life is 
experienced as a constant temptation and as a burden.  
 What then of love? Is there a way of being continent and loving? As we’ve seen above, 
the temptation that manifests itself in the pleasure we take in being praised and loved is a fall 
from authenticity. However, the reverse is not: to love and praise is the authentic conduct in the 
communal-worldly life context. This is because praising and loving the Other is the refraining 
from the love of things, but it is the love of the Other because of the gift he or she was given by 
God.  
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 The continent way of loving lacks the direction of pleasing others [placere aliis] but 
also represses the communal-worldly. In effect it involves the overcoming of the love of praise 
[amor laudis].581 Continence involves the demand for justice [iustitia] and “love’s bringing-
toward, leading-toward, and genuine direction of concern. Iustitia is the authentically and 
originally sense-like directedness […], in its entirety, of the factical experience of 
significance.”582 This involves, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, a competition 
[certamen] between two directions of loving: the loving of oneself that comes in the direction of 
pleasing that points towards the communal world, and the loving of God’s gift in the other.  
 Heidegger identifies in Augustine a way of loving and praising that is at the very heart 
of authentic experience of the joyful end [finis delectationis] of the form of the temptation of 
secular ambition, an authentic way of relating to self-significance through love. The pressing 
question though is this: if Heidegger ends up appropriating so many notions from Augustine 
why does he not also follow Augustine on the affect of love?  
 If we carefully read Heidegger’s interpretation of Augustine’s analysis of the sense of 
“self-importance” right to the very end, we come across the evidence for why Heidegger will 
later prioritize Angst rather than love. Heidegger’s analysis of Angst in BT seems to follow from 
his interpretation of Augustine on love. Taking delight in the love of God and/or his gift to an 
Other person ultimately leads to the experience of Angst.  
 If we give in to the temptation of taking delight in being loved and praised, then this 
constitutes a falling into inauthenticity, in which lurks the danger of “taking-oneself-to-be-
important”. This involves a number of different possibilities of experiencing the Dasein of the 
self-world, all of which are states of excessive self-importance and conceit.583 All of these 
hubristic possibilities end in the self-world becoming a communal world, in the sense that the 
self-world is still dominated by the communal world, a “worldly” positioning whereby the 
“self” is actually lost.584  
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 On the other hand, the overcoming of the temptation (via continence) “can lead to 
insight and self-revelation […] A genuine enacting or understanding of enactment”.585 In that 
mode whereby the self no longer attributes importance to itself and rejoices before God, the 
enactment of concern becomes novel: it becomes an experience whereby  
through this hidden “movement” everything falls into the void, inanescit 
[becomes vain or void], and everything is invalidated […] In the last and most 
decisive purest concern for oneself lurks the possibility of the most groundless 
dive [abgründigsten Sturzes], and of authentically losing oneself. 
(“Groundless,” because the dive has no longer any hold, and it cannot be 
enacted before anything, so that one could finally turn it into a secular 
importance after all[…]). […] Really: self-concern is precisely the most 
difficult, taking oneself to be less and less important by engaging the self all 
the more”.586 
 
In other words, through the love and praising of God or of God’s gift, we come to authentically 
experience the groundlessness of self-importance. And this leads to the experience of a 
fundamental Angst. As Heidegger writes: “Augustine clearly sees the difficulty and the 
ultimately “anxiety producing character” of Dasein in such having-of-oneself (in full 
facticity)”.587 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Ibid, pp. 179-180. 
586 Ibid, p. 180. 
587 Ibid. 
	   202	  
Chapter 4: Aristotle on πάθος, διάθεσις and λόγος 
 
I. Introduction 
 The young Heidegger was interested in offering a more originary account of intuition in 
its relation to truth, the formation of conceptuality and the way it grasps Being. Heidegger tried 
to provide a deeper account of intentional life as enacted and as constituted. In this context, he 
appropriated notions from Dilthey and Husserl, such as the notions of “having” [Haben], 
“comporting” [Verhalten] and “understanding” [Verstehen] in order to emphasize how knowing 
is for the most part unthematic and pre-reflective, and not some sort of deliberate, meditative act 
of knowing something.588 It is in this context that Heidegger also employs the notions of 
Motivation and Tendenz, in order to describe the way intentional life is a matter of comportment 
that is twofold in its unity and concatenation [Zusammenhang], whilst also dynamic and 
diverse. Affects are loosely identified as the constitutional element of the disclosure of meaning. 
But it is not until Heidegger turns to Aristotle that his affective phenomenology attains a 
terminologically determinate footing, where intentionality and judgment itself are shown to be 
constituted in affective experience.  
 For this reason, it is of crucial importance to our study to look at Heidegger’s early 
lectures on Aristotle. First, his interpretation of Aristotle comprehensively shapes the 
ontological project that culminates in BT, in the account of the fundamental moods of Angst 
and fear. Second, the notion of Befindlichkeit that is central in Being and Time (BT) takes us 
directly back to Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato. Thus, looking at his early 
Aristotle lectures is crucial for our genealogical account of mood.  
 Concerning the contextual importance of the Aristotle lectures, Theodore Kisiel writes 
that “[i]t was against this academic backdrop that the project of BT first came into being and 
underwent its initial drafting.”589 In the summer semester of 1921, Heidegger gave the first of a 
series of lectures on Aristotle, which would last without interruption every semester until the 
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end of 1924.590 The Lebensphilosophie language of BT perhaps conceals the depth of the 
relationship between Heideggerian phenomenology and Aristotle.591 However, there are certain 
facts that betray this strong bond, without hermeneutic violence: the fact that before BT 
Heidegger was writing a “book” on Aristotle; that in the 1950s, Heidegger advised his students 
to postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years, 
etc.592 What is more, many scholars, such as Franco Volpi593 and Walter Brogan,594 have noted 
the homologies between the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and BT.   
  I identify three (overlapping) ways in making sense of the turn to Aristotle: the first has 
to do with Heidegger’s well-known general interest in the question concerning the meaning of 
Being, a problem that directly descended from Aristotle’s Metaphysics; the second has to do 
with Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theoretical, cognitivist, approach, and Heidegger’s 
radicalization focusing on the practical, enactmental, elements of it (under the influence of 
Lask’s interpretation of Husserl, and Natorp’s critique of Husserl); third, in the context of the 
aforementioned radicalization of Husserlian phenomenology, the terminology Heidegger chose 
in order to formally indicate facticity was strongly reminiscent of Aristotelian notions, hence 
already anticipating a return to Aristotle.595 (In essence, I am arguing here that Volpi’s thesis 
concerning the homologies between NE and BT must extend to parts of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology even before his explicit encounter with Aristotle).596 These issues have already 
been described in section one, but a more explicit analysis of the third way of making sense of 
the turn to Aristotle is in order. 
 Α genealogical investigation into the notion of Befindlichkeit as defined in BT leads us 
back to Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato. In addition to the philological fact 
that the word Befindlichkeit first appears in Heidegger’s work as a translation of the Aristotelian 	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591 Thomas J. Sheehan, “Heidegger, Aristotle and Phenomenology”, Philosophy Today, (Summer 1975), p. 87. 
592 Ibid. 
593 See Franco Volpi, Heidegger e Aristotele, (Padova: Daphne Editrice, 1984). 
594 See Walter Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being, (New York: SUNY, 2005).  
595 I am referring here in particular to the notions mentioned above: the notions of “having” (haben), “comporting” 
(verhalten), and “understanding” (verstehen). 
596 I am not saying that earlier lecture notes and notebooks should be equated with Being and Time in terms of 
systematicity, as that would be hermeneutically impermissible. BT is a treatise, whereas lecture notes are not.  
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notion of διάθεσις (disposition),597 Heidegger himself makes certain suggestive hints as to such 
a relation in his analysis of Befindlichkeit in BT, when he names Aristotle as the first 
philosopher to have investigated the πάθη (passions) in his Rhetoric.598  
 Heidegger considered Aristotle’s Rhetoric to be “the first systematic hermeneutic of the 
everydayness of Being-with-one-another”,599 and thus saw it as particularly relevant for 
grounding understanding within the accompanying moods from which, on an ontological level, 
it had wrongly been separated. In BT, Heidegger complains that “[w]hat has escaped notice is 
that the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life in general has been able to make 
scarcely one forward step worthy of mention since Aristotle”.600 I take these remarks to be clues 
for the conceptual genealogy of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s own philosophy.   
A fully comprehensive comparison between Heidegger and Aristotle on this topic 
would require more space.601 However, the basis of this encounter can already be set by 
exploring Heidegger’s understanding of the Aristotelian notion of διάθεσις. The most fruitful 
point of entry into this genealogy is through the early Aristotle Freiburg lecture, but most 
importantly the Marburg lectures that immediately followed. Indeed, a genealogy of the 
problems and characteristic interpretations offered by Heidegger in Being and Time would have 
to start from the Freiburg lecture entitled Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: 
Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung,602 delivered during the Winter semester of 
1921-22, followed by the lecture titled Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie,603 
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   205	  
delivered during the Summer semester of 1924, and the lecture titled Platon: Sophistes,604 
delivered during the Winter semester of 1924-25. 
The Freiburg lecture course was focused on the theme of human life, “factical life” as 
Heidegger called it, which did not directly take on Aristotle per se, but was rather a preparatory 
introduction for a projected work on Aristotle that Heidegger eventually abandoned. However, 
the course anticipated the themes of the rigorous interpretations of Aristotle that followed.605   
 In the Summer of 1924 lectures on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Heidegger focused on 
Aristotle’s account of the “everydayness” of existence [Alltäglichkeit des Daseins], whereupon 
conceptuality and theoretical activity are founded.606 As Panayiotis Thanassas points out, in the 
1924 lectures, Heidegger explores the “relationship between conceptuality in general and an 
achronic, quasi-eternally existing everydayness”, something that suggests that in these lectures, 
Aristotle functions only as a pretext for the formation of the systematic project of a 
conceptuality founded in everydayness and logos as rhetoric.607 Hence, in this lecture course, 
Heidegger turns to Aristotle in order to indicate how philosophical logos, how propositional 
judgment of philosophical discourse, is grounded in everyday speech, originating from factical 
existence and the way language operates on that level.  
 In this context, Heidegger’s reappraisal of Aristotle puts a new emphasis on language as 
“rhetoric” rather than “logic” (i.e. scientific expression),608 and provides Heidegger an 
opportunity to reconsider the meaning of truth, ἀλήθεια. Insofar as truth is a matter of a 
comportment in the face of an inherited, albeit variable, situation, affects, moods, are that which 	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primarily disclose the heteronomous determination of Dasein, the way the psyche is moved in a 
determinate, yet pre-conceptual, way. Affect is thus a constitutive phenomenon of discursive 
disclosure, and logos is a fundamental characteristic of the Dasein, whose capacity for 
meaningful disclosure is grounded in affect.  
Α genealogical investigation into the Heideggerian notion of Befindlichkeit as defined 
in BT directs us back to Heidegger’s Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato. In addition to the 
philological fact that the word Befindlichkeit first appears in Heidegger’s work as a translation 
of the Aristotelian notion of διάθεσις [disposition],609 Heidegger himself makes certain 
suggestive hints as to such a relation in his analysis of Befindlichkeit in Sein und Zeit, when he 
names Aristotle as the first philosopher to have investigated the πάθη (passions) in his Rhetoric.  
  In his own account of Befindlichkeit, Heidegger will retrieve the character of being-
there as “Being-In” (the World), as well as the character of “turning towards or turn away” from 
mood.610 These are also characteristics in Aristotle’s notion of comportment.  
 
II. Dasein: λόγος, ἀλήθεια and ἕξις (comportment [Verhalten])  
Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle enabled him to retrieve a more primordial account of truth, 
whereby truth is not a matter of adequatio (coincidence) between that which the subject or mind 
perceives and the objective state of affairs, or a matter of validity of a proposition and a 
corresponding state of affairs, but rather is a dynamic revelation (unconcealment), a capacity of 
Dasein to unconceal being(s) through its comportment. Dasein’s capacity to grasp being and 
truth, the truth of being, is intimately connected to its capacity to speak: the having of logos, as 
it permeates the various ways in which it comports itself in the world.  
 Logos and truth have historically been intrinsically connected: the (transcendental) 
value of truth has traditionally been considered to reside in “judgment”, and has been associated 
with the essence of judgment as synthesis and diairesis (σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις), and/or 
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affirmation and negation (ἀπόφασις and κατάφασις).611612 Heidegger follows Aristotle’s 
definition of judgment as constituted by affirmation and negation, and wants to go deeper and 
see how the truth of judgment is actually constituted pre-reflectively and pre-thematically, and 
at that level affects have a crucial constitutive role to play. 
 According to Aristotle, truth is a function of the soul (ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχῆ). As Heidegger 
writes, “Truth is […] a character of beings, insofar as they are encountered; but in an authentic 
sense [aber im eigentlichen Sinne] it is nevertheless a determination of the Being of human 
Dasein itself.”613 This Aristotelian conception of ἀλήθεια as a function of ψυχῆ, is a more 
precise way of articulating the connection that Plato had already seen and expressed in the 
Sophist as ἐπ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ὁρµωµένης ψυχῆς,614 which Heidegger translates thus: “the soul sets 
itself by itself on the way toward truth, toward beings with which Dasein cultivates an 
association.”615  
 Heidegger underlines the connection between ἀληθεύειν and ψυχῆ in order to re-
establish the primacy of a more primordial mode of ἀληθεύειν, which is practical in nature and 
which connects to contingency, choice and deliberation. Heidegger argues that the original 
meaning of ἀλήθεια, as attested by the etymological root of it, is “unconcealment.”616 He argues 
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judgment is based. He then makes sense of both aspects of judgment, being-part-of-something (being-in), i.e. relation, 
as well as quality (affirmation and negation), in terms of comportment. 
613 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p. 16. 
614 Ibid, p. 228c1f. 
615 Ibid, p. 16. 
616 Ibid, p. 11.  
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furthermore that if we remain faithful to this originary meaning of truth, then objectivity is 
equivalent to compliance [Sachlichkeit], “understood as a comportment [Verhalten] of Dasein to 
the world and to itself in which beings are present in conformity with the way they are [der 
Sache nach]. This is objectivity correctly understood. The original sense of this concept of truth 
does not yet include objectivity as universal validity.”617 This original concept of truth qua 
unconcealment does not implicate that truth is necessarily theoretical knowledge or any 
determinate possibility of theoretical knowledge, for example mathematics.618  
 Indeed, the closest [nächste] kind of αληθεύειν is speaking about things (speaking will 
be thematically explored in the Rhetoric). Λόγος takes the primary function of ἀληθεύειν.619  
 Aristotle is interested in describing how the being-there of humans, the ψυχῆ, has the 
capacity to reveal things, the world, and why it is in a position to know, in the various ways that 
it does. In the NE, Aristotle enumerates five ἔξεις of ἀληθεύειν, ἔξεις meaning “habits” or 
“comportments”620: τέχνη (producing), ἐπιστήµη (science), φρόνησις (circumspective insight), 
σοφία (wisdom), and νοῦς (perceptual discernment; cf. Husserl’s categorial intuition).621622 Νοῦς 
is the highest possibility for human beings – it is the highest possibility of being-there, and it is 
that which grounds the disclosive character of comportments, of any encountering as such, as 
well as λόγος. Even though Aristotle does not achieve clarity as regards νοῦς (for example, the 
way it is co-present in all comportments), he declares νοῦς as the condition of possibility for 
anything to be encountered in general, the possibility of “being-opened-up” [die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit ist, das dem Lebenden überhaupt etwas begegnet, für das Leben etwas ist].623 As 
far as I know, Heidegger does not explicitly associate νοῦς with Husserlian categorial intuition, 
but I think that despite the lack of textual evidence, it is plausible to think that Heidegger takes 
Husserlian categorial intuition as a retrieval of νοῦς.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
617 Ibid, p. 17, my italics. 
618 Ibid.  
619 Ibid, pp. 17, 19. 
620 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 3. 
621 Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, p. 15. 
622 Επιστήµη and σοφία constitute the two comportments (έξεις) of επιστηµονικόν. Eπιστήµη is a deficient habit of 
επιστηµονικόν, while the highest habit (βέλτιστη ἔξις) of ἐπιστηµονικόν is σοφία. Allow me to bypass any further 
analysis of ἐπιστηµονικόν and σοφία since we are concerned here with λογιστικόν as that which contains βούλευσις 
(deliberation). 
623 BCAP, p. 135. 
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Grounding νοεῖν in corporeality and πάθος 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, it was mentioned that Husserl did not associate categorial intuition 
(and thinking) with affect (at least not in the Logical Investigations). But when Heidegger turns 
to Aristotle’s νοῦς, he explicitly raises the question of its relationship with πάθος. Heidegger 
asks: what enables νοεῖν? Thinking is a φαντασία (imagination) that makes-present-to-itself the 
world [das »Sichvergegenwärtigen« der Welt], and φαντασία is the ground for νοεῖν [Die 
φαντασία ist das Boden für das νοεῖν].624   
 Heidegger argues that Aristotle acknowledges the tension between νοῦς, which is in its 
pure actuality itself ἀπαθές, “that which nothing can touch”, with ψυχή. Νοῦς is something more 
than the human being can be, insofar as the human being is being-in, because being-in is 
determined by πάθη.625 The question that Aristotle poses but does not answer regards the being 
determined in the genuine being-in-the-world, humans as having being-in-the-world-there-
opened, discoveredness, openedness of being-in-the-world [im eigentlichen Sinne das Sein des 
Menschen als In-der-Welt-sein bestimmt ist; ob das Sein des Menschen als In-der-Welt-
aufgeschlossen-Dahaben, Entdecktheit, Aufgeschlossenheit des Seins-in-der-Welt], whether all 
of this is determined and grounded in νοῦς,626 and whether νοῦς arises in being of the human 
beings or enters from the outside [daß er im Sein des Menschen aufgeht [oder] von außen her in 
den Menschen hineinkommt].627 
 Insofar as νόησις is the highest possibility for the human beings, the entire being of 
human beings is determined so that νόησις must be apprehended as the bodily being-in-the-
world of human beings (otherwise it makes no sense to speak of human δια-νόησις). Heidegger 
points out that we have to read Aristotle as having provided an account that only begins in 
phenomenology, namely, with no division between “psychic” and “bodily” acts.628 In this 
context, Heidegger writes that “one must note that the primary being-there-function of 
bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of human beings” [Man muß darauf sehen, daß 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624 Thinking: this is an appeal to φαντασία “making-present-to-itself” of the world. [Denken: Es wird nicht rekurriert 
auf einen Gehirnvorgang, sondern auf die φαντασία,] Φαντασία is the ground for νοεῖν.  
625 Ibid. 
626 Ibid, pp. 134-135. 
627 Ibid, p. 135. 
628 Ibid, p. 134. 
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die primäre Daseinsfunktion der Leiblichkeit sich den Boden für das volle Sein des Menschen 
sichert.]629 Despite the fact that there is no explicit, decisive, argument made with regard to an 
establishing connection between πάθος and νόησις, because Aristotle himself is not entirely 
clear on that point,630 this is what Heidegger is interested in here, by pointing out that in 
phenomenology (and he counts Aristotle as a phenomenologist!) the psychic and the bodily are 
not divided. Heidegger wants to show that Aristotle discusses passions in this context of the 
ψυχή in its capacity to διανοείσθαι, which is all that constitutes the being of a living being.631 
Heidegger asks whether νοῦς belongs to the concrete being of human being, whether it is a 
passion of the soul, or whether νοῦς is a separate part of the psyche [µέρος της ψυχῆς χωριστὸν]. 
Aristotle’s answer is based on evidence: the human νοῦς is a διανοείν, not pure, and hence it is 
also “encountered with a view to its corporeality.”632 The νοῦς of human beings, the “making 
present”, depends on fantasy, is grounded in fantasy, the retrieval of what once was present (cf. 
Augustine on love and having the beata vita, in the previous chapter): “In this way, the νοῦς of 
human beings is related to φαντασία, and so is related to αἴσθησις and the πάσχειν of the 
σῶµα.”633 Hence, a relation between disclosing, logos-infused comportments, and disclosure, is 
established. 
 Heidegger goes even deeper in pursuing the relation between the grounding of νοῦς, 
that is, the capacity of grasping everything beyond the human being and its concrete being, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
629 Ibid, p. 135. 
630 Aristotle’s ambiguous position on the relation between the soul and the intellect is precisely what allowed Aquinas 
to argue that Aristotle taught personal immortality, because the agent intellect can be read as somehow being a 
faculty of the soul: “[I]n his interpretation of Aristotle's De anima Thomas defends a view that was as contested in his 
own time as it is almost an orphan in our own. Among the tenets of so-called Latin Averroism was the view, first 
held by Averroes, that the move from perceptive acts to intellection is not one from a lower to a higher set of 
capacities or faculties of the human soul. Aristotle contrasts intellection with perception, and argues that the former 
does not employ a sense organ because it displays none of the characteristics of perception which does employ an 
organ. Thus insofar as sensation can be said to be in some respects material and in others immaterial, intellection is 
said to be completely immaterial. But on the Latin-Averroistic view, Aristotle is not thus referring to another capacity 
of the human soul, the intellect, but, rather, referring to a separate entity thanks to whose action human beings engage 
in what we call thinking. But the cause of this, the agent intellect, is not a faculty of the soul. (Aristotle had 
distinguished at least two intellects, a possible and an agent.) The proof for incorruptibility which results from an 
activity that does not employ a corporeal organ is therefore a statement about the incorruptibility of this separate 
entity, not a basis for arguing that each human soul is incorruptible because it has the capacity to perform incorporeal 
activities. The Latin-Averroists consequently denied that Aristotle taught personal immortality.” Ralph McInerny and 
John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2015 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/aquinas/, on 16 June 2015.  
631 BCAP, p. 135. 
632 Ibid, p. 136. 
633 Ibid. 
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the πάθη, and for the first time raises the crucial event of losing comportment.634 In De Anima, 
Aristotle investigates the extent to which νοῦς is a basic characteristic of human being. Νοῦς 
differs from all other ways of grasping because it grasps “the whole”, τὰ πάντα; it is a possibility 
of grasping that grasps all possible beings, so that the being in question need not necessarily be 
objectively present (cf. categorial intuition).635 Heidegger argues that in connection to the 
question of what grounds this possibility of grasping that goes beyond the concrete being that is 
in the moment, Aristotle discusses the πάθη as those phenomena in which it is shown that the 
concrete being of human beings can only be understood if one takes it in its fullness, and on the 
basis of various considerations. “It is, above all, decisive that we lose composure, as in the case 
of fearing without encountering something in the environing world that could be the direct 
occasion of fear. In this being-a-matter-of-concern of the πάθη, corporeality is co-encountered 
in some mode or another.” [Vor allem ist entscheident daß wir aus der Fassung geraten in der 
Weise des Fürchtens, ohne daß wir der Umwelt uns etwas begegnet, das direkter Anlaß der 
Furcht sein könnte. In diesem Angegangenwerden von der πάθη wird die Leiblichkeit in 
irgendeiner Weise mitbetroffen].636  
 It is unclear whether Heidegger is arguing here that (a) losing composure by the 
experience of fear in the absence of something fearsome grounds the possibility for 
experiencing corporeality in its wholeness, corporeality as such, which is tied to the particular 
situation of the corporeal moment, without any grounding connection to νοῦς (and so what is 
grounded here is only the experience of corporeality), or (b) losing composure shows precisely 
that what grounds the possibility of νοῦς is corporeality, passions. I believe that this dilemma is 
beside the point though, a false dichotomy. It is clear from the context that Heidegger is trying 
to draw connections between the grounding of νοῦς to human passions, and both arguments 
establish that losing composure reveals “the whole”, and “what whole” is revealed, even if that 
“whole” refers only to corporeality, the fact remains that revealing “wholes” is νοῦς! Besides, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time Heidegger explicitly connects the event of losing comportment 
with the development of grasping the whole. 
635 Ibid, p. 139. 
636 Ibid, pp. 139-140. 
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Heidegger here is trying to overcome the dichotomies of corporeal vs. spirit, perception vs. 
intellect, and he does this by way of an account of the passion of fear. 
    
III. Λόγος as πίστις: Speaking and Hearing  
Rhetoric: The possibility of speaking and being-with-one-another 
In Chapter 3 of his 1924 lectures on Aristotle, Heidegger turns his attention to Aristotle’s 
analysis of being-there, the ψυχή, in its capacity (or possibility) to speak to each other, and this 
is a crucial part of the being-there and the way truth is disclosed by human beings, whose being-
there is defined as λόγον έχον.637 The chapter is entitled “The Interpretation of the Being-There 
of Human Beings [Daseins des Menschen] with regard to the Basic Possibility 
[Grundmöglichkeit] of Speaking-with-One-Another guided by Rhetoric.” 
 Λόγος had a much broader sense to the Greeks than it does so nowadays, argues 
Heidegger. For the ancients, it meant conversation and discourse [Gespräch and Rede].638 The 
Greeks, so Heidegger claims, “were serious about the possibility of speaking. That is the origin 
of logic, the doctrine of λόγος” [Sie machten Ernst mit den Möglichkeiten des Sprechens. Das 
ist der Ursprung der Logik, der Lehre vom λόγος].639 In this context then, “[r]hetoric is nothing 
other than the interpretation of concrete being-there, the hermeneutic of being-there itself” [Die 
Rhetorik ist nichts anderes als die Auslegung des konreten Daseins, die Hermeneutik des 
Daseins selbst].640 The one who has ἀρετή and εὐδαιµονία has ability to let something be said by 
others and by himself, and this is λόγον ἔχον in a new respect: “He lets something be said 
insofar as he hears […] This ability-to-hear is a determination of ὄρεξις”, and ὄρεξις here is that 
which Aristotle also indicates as ἄλογον – because it receives logos without being itself logos.641 
 Heidegger connects the ability to speak with the ability to hear, and he believes that 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric supplies an account of the “everydayness” of existence, whereupon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 Ibid, p. 72. 
638 Ibid, p. 74. 
639 Ibid, p. 75. 
640 Ibid. 
641 Ibid, p. 76. I take it that when Aristotle refers to ὄρεξις as ἄλογον he means that whilst it refers to logos, and can 
receive logos, it still is “not-yet” logos-like, and in that respect not logos (albeit not entirely incapable of receiving 
logos)! 
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conceptuality and theoretical activity are founded. Here it is indicated how philosophical logos, 
how propositional judgment of philosophical discourse, is grounded in everyday speech, 
originating from factical existence and the way language operates on that level. An analysis of 
logos in terms of speaking and hearing is part and parcel of Heidegger’s emphasis on language 
as “rhetoric” rather than “logic”. Aristotle’s Rhetoric constitutes “the first systematic 
hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another”,642 and thus Heidegger saw it as 
especially relevant for grounding understanding within the accompanying moods that it had 
wrongly been separated from on an ontological level. 
 Heidegger begins by pointing out how the being of human beings has the character of 
speaking, which is πρᾶξις µετά λόγου;643 this is associated with the basic possibility of Dasein 
for concept-formation [Begriffsbildung],644 and it is in this expression of life, the possibility of 
speaking, that Being-with-One-Another [Miteinanderseins] has its basic possibility.645 
In Miteinanderseins, one is the one speaking and the other is the one hearing 
[Hörende].646 Speaking on its own is meaningless though, since one cannot speak if there is no 
one to hear, but this does not necessitate the presence of another person, since one can speak 
and hear themselves (think of auto-affection). Hence, the mode of being of λόγον ἔχoν also 
includes the possibility of hearing oneself.647Aristotle’s analysis of the πάθη in the Rhetoric has 
the intention of analyzing “the various possibilities of the hearer’s finding himself, in order to 
provide guides as to what must be cultivated on the part of the hearer himself” [die 
verschiedenen Möglichkeiten des Sichbefindens beim Hörer selbst ausgebildet werden muß].648  
 But the Rhetoric is also about setting forth the hearer’s determinations in order to direct 
the speaker herself as to what is to be taken into consideration when she chooses the προαίρεσις 
(of the ήθος). Πάθη are that through which a change [Umschlag] sets in for us, is on the way, 
from one Befindlichkeit to another. It is that which differentiates the self from the self with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
642 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 138. 
643 BCAP, p. 71. 
644 Ibid. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid, p. 115. 
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respect to the position [Stellung] and the view [Ansicht] of Dasein.649 Πάθη is the changing 
itself; it is the very undergoing of the change. 
 Heidegger here explicitly associates this double character of logos, logos as speaking as 
well as hearing/listening (ἀκούειν/ὑπακούειν) with όρεξις, the precursor of intentionality (see 
previous chapter). Hearing/listening is one way that concernful being is enacted. This possibility 
of hearing, the ἀκουστικόν, is found together with όρεξις, and every concern has Tendenz in 
itself [Jedes Besorgen hat in sich Tendenz], that is, it has a “being-after” [Aussein] that listens to 
what is spoken.650 
  
The three πίστεις: ἤθος, λόγος, πάθος 
Plato’s negative depiction of rhetoric cast a lot of shadows and disrepute over public speaking 
and the art of “convincing”, but Aristotle’s approach was different. He offered a rehabilitating 
account of rhetoric whereby it was rearticulated in terms of its possibility [δύναµις] of making 
manifest, in seeing, what is given in the moment.651 Rhetoric is a power in the sense that it sets 
forth a possibility to speak and hear in definite ways. Its task is not to convince as such, to 
merely cultivate a particular conviction (which is sophistry), but to point out, to make visible, to 
“see” that which is possible in each case, the περί ἕκαστον πιθανόν.652 As Heidegger notes, 
rhetoric “gives an orientation with regard to something, περὶ ἕκαστον” [Sie gibt eine 
Orientierung über etwas, περὶ ἕκαστον].653 Speaking is therefore seen as a mode of being-there 
which deals with the situation [Situation] and the particular circumstances of being-there 
[Sachlage], and this situated speaking is what grounds concept-formation, ὁρισµός.654  
 Heidegger zeros in on the essential relationship between rhetoric and πιστεύειν, 
something that will enable him to further analyze rhetoric (logos, in general) in terms of 
comportment, disposition, passion, and their temporal character. Heidegger hence defines 
rhetoric thus: the capacity to see “that which speaks for a matter” [was für eine Sache spricht] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649 Ibid. 
650 Ibid, p. 72. 
651 Ibid, p. 78. 
652 Ibid, p. 79. 
653 Ibid, p. 80. 
654 Ibid. 
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and “to cultivate, in speaking itself, πιστεύειν with those to whom one speaks, specifically, 
about a concern [Angelegenheit] that is up for debate at the time; to cultivate a δόξα.”655 
Πιστεύειν literally means “believing”, having “faith”. Heidegger associates it with holding a 
“view” [Ansicht], a δόξα “on which speaking depends, and which, therefore, is presumably 
something that governs, or guides, [leitet, beherrscht] the everydayness of being-there, the 
being-with-one-another, […] upon which discourse itself depends”.656 
 It is important to follow Heidegger’s analysis of πίστις, because it clarifies the way in 
which passion (which he will later call Stimmung) is grasped, and the crucial operation it has in 
grasping and disclosing the (possible) future (and, by extension, the truth of Being). Πίστις is 
that which cultivates a πιστεύειν, in the sense of πιθανόν (the possible), that is, it cultivates a 
possibility of ἄληθεύειν.657 Aristotle distinguishes between πίστεις that we can artfully 
accomplish, and those that are not brought about in self-accomplishment, and Heidegger wants 
to focus on the former, since rhetoric is talk about the ἐνδεχόµενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, sets forth 
the ἐνδεχοµενον πιθανόν. It is a speaking-with-one-another that has three ἔντεχνοι πίστεις: (1) 
speaking-being itself, ἤθος (Haltung); (2) speaking about something (λόγος); and (3) speaking 
to someone (ἀκούων, πάθος).658  
 We are mostly interested in πάθος here, but let me also briefly explain what the other 
two are. Ἤθος refers to the comportment of the speaker [die Haltung des Sprechenden], the way 
s/he comports himself/herself in his/her discourse. Prior to Aristotle, treatises held that ἤθος 
“contributes nothing to what is πιθανόν”, but Aristotle subverts this. Actually, for Aristotle, 
one’s comportment is “the most excellent” πίστις. Πίστις is also expressed in λόγος: Λέγειν is 
πίστις as the basic function of being-there itself. In speaking, what is ἀληθές is exhibited as what 
is possible.659660 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 Ibid, p. 81. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid, p. 95. 
659 Ibid, p. 83. 
660 Heidegger identifies three distinct types of λόγος, based on the different τέλη in the hearer, the ἀκροατής. Λόγος 
comprises the speaker, the “about which”, and the hearer. The τέλος is in the hearer (ibid, p. 86). Because the τέλος is 
in the hearer, and because Aristotle identifies three ways a hearer can be, Aristotle identifies three distinct kinds of 
λόγος: deliberative discourse (συµβουλευτικός), judicial (δικανικός) and eulogy (ἐπιδεικτικός) (ibid). Deliberative 
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 But most important for the purposes of this study is how πίστις is brought about in 
mood, how passion is one of the ways in which πίστις is enacted. Πίστις also refers to the ἐν τῷ 
τὸν ἀκροατήν διαθειναὶ πως: “in the bringing-into-a-disposition”, [in dem In-eine-
Befindlichkeit-bringen] “in the manner by which the hearer is brought into a definite 
disposition”, [in der Weise, wie in eine bestimmte Befindlichkeit gebracht wird der Hörer], the 
hearer who also belongs to λέγειν.661 How the hearer is also positioned toward the matter, which 
position he is in, the manner and mode of bringing-the-hearer-into-a-disposition [Wie der Hörer 
sich dabei zur Sache stellt, in welcher Stellung er ist, die Art und Weise des Den-Hörer-in-eine-
Befindlichkeit-Bringens, darin liegt eine-πίστις, etwas, das für die Sache sprechen kann. Die 
διάθεσις des Hörers bestimmt seine κρίσις, seine “Ansicht”…].662  
 The διάθεσις of the hearer, their Befindlichkeit, affects their view, their belief and their 
judgment. Being sympathetic or unsympathetic, sad [traurig] or happy [uns freuen], the πάθη, 
the “affects” [die “Affekte”], are decisive.663 Not only is the passion decisive for the hearer’s 
judgment, but it also reflects on the speaker himself, since “[t]he one discoursing must himself, 
in his discourse, have his eye toward transposing the ἀκροατής into a definite πάθος, toward 
inspiring the hearer as to a matter” [Der Redner selbst muß im Reden es darauf absehen, den 
ἀκροατής in ein bestimmtes πάθος zu versetzen, die Hörer für eine Sache zu begeistern].664 Still, 
despite the fact that πάθος also affects the speaker, as a πίστις it indicates the being of the 
hearer, it is πίστις that lies on the side of the hearer (or the speaker as hearer).  Heidegger 
further clarifies the ontological significance of passions, and the homology with what he writes 
in BT on Befindlichkeit is glaringly obvious: “These πάθη, ‘affects,’ are not states pertaining to 
ensouled things, but are concerned with a disposition of living things in their world, in the mode 
of being positioned toward something, allowing a matter to matter to it. The affects play a 
fundamental role in the determination of being-in-the-world, of being-with-and-toward-others” 
[Diese πάθη, “Affekte”, sind nicht Zustände des Seelischen, es handelt sich um eine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discourse points out the βλαβερόν or συµφέρον; judicial points out the δίκαιον or ἄδικον; the eulogy points out καλόν 
αs opposed to αἰσχρόν (ibid, p. 86). 
661 Ibid, p. 83. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Ibid. 
664 Ibid. 
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Befindlichkeit des Lebenden in seirer Welt, in der Weise, wie er gestellt ist zu etwas, wie er eine 
Sache sich angesehen läßt. Die Affekte spielen eine fundamentale Rolle bei der Bestimmung des 
Seins-in-der-Welt, des Seins-mit-und-zu-anderen].665 
Ἤθος and πάθος constitute λέγειν  
Taking his lead from Aristotle’s Rhetoric B1 and NE B4, Heidegger juxtaposes διαλέγεσθαι 
with rhetoric, everyday discourse – a juxtaposition which enables him to focus on the 
constitutive, grounding role of πάθος (and ἤθος). Rhetoric is not situated in the realm of 
διαλέγεσθαι because there is a definite concrete orientation, a βουλεύεσθαι (deliberation), and 
therefore who speaks, his/her ἤθος makes a difference (whereas in διαλέγεσθαι the ἤθος of the 
speaker and the πάθος of the hearer are irrelevant). As far as rhetoric, everyday speaking, is 
concerned, Heidegger is explicit on the grounding role of ἤθος and πάθος: “For both of these 
determinations [ἤθος and πάθος] ground the manner and mode in which δόξα is possessed” 
[Denn diese beiden Bestimmungen begründen die Art und Weise, wie die δόξα gehabt wird, 
wie der, dem die Ansicht beigebracht werden Soll, selbst zur Ansicht steht].666 Ἤθος and πάθος 
are constitutive [konstitutiv] of λέγειν itself.667 
 The “object” that rhetoric grasps and addresses is one that cannot be transmitted within 
a science (διαλέγεσθαι), because rhetoric deliberates about situations that change, circumstances 
that are contingent and alterable; rhetoric is about cultivating a decision, a judgment, a κρίσις, 
according to the concrete circumstances of being-there [Angelegenheiten je nach Umständen 
des Daseins selbst]; therefore, mood is constitutive of the view, the Ansicht, and the change of 
mood is indicative of an essential characteristic of being-there. For this reason we must 
concretely consider the ήθος [Haltung] of the speaker and the πάθος, disposition 
[Befindlichkeit], of the hearers.668 
 The way disposition constitutes being-there and shapes the respective λόγος can also be 
illustrated differentially, i.e. by pointing out how some dispositions are “weightier” than others, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665 Ibid. 
666 Ibid, p. 81 and p. 109, my italics. 
667 Ibid, p. 111. 
668 Ibid, p. 110. 
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how disposition supplies a criterion by virtue of which the truthfulness of expressed λόγος is 
ascertained. As Heidegger writes:  
[It makes a great difference] in the conveying of what speaks for something, 
especially in deliberations, but also in the judicial court, how the speaker 
appears and accordingly how the hearers consider his disposition 
[Befindlichkeit], and also whether they themselves [the hearers acquire], at that 
time, the right disposition [die rechte Befindlichkeit] [i.e. attitude toward the 
discussed matter]. The manner and mode in which the speaker appears is 
weightier in deliberation, and the disposition of the hearer at the moment is 
weightier above all in the judicial court.669 
 
Later on in the lecture course, Heidegger is even more determinate as regards the very 
grounding of deliberation, of λόγος, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Πάθη are the ground of λόγος [Die 
πάθη als Boden für den λόγος]: Insofar as humans come into disquiet, they become deliberative 
– fear makes humans deliberative! [Aristoteles sagt: Sofern der Mensch in diese Unruhe kommt 
[…] wird er bereit zum Beraten [Rhet. B 5, 1383 a 6 sq.: ὀ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ]]. It is 
precisely the passion of fear that shows itself to be the disposition that brings to speaking [die 
Furcht als diejenige Befindlichkeit, die zum Sprechen bringt].670 As Heidegger says: “The πάθη 
are topics insofar as they are co-decisive for the manner and mode of λέγειν, how the λόγος has 
its basis in the πάθη themselves” [der λόγος in den πάθη selbst seinen Boden hat].671  
 Here, in his reading of Aristotle and his analysis of fear, Heidegger will explicitly 
introduce the more originary counterpart of anxiety and dread, as the originary foundation of 
speaking, in relation to the uncanny [unheimlich]! In his own words: 
What appears here in the circle of everydayness is a phenomenon that has a 
much more originary foundation [ein viel ursprüngliches Fundament hat], 
insofar as, in the being-there of human beings, it can be a question of fear in 
another sense, what we designate as anxiety or dread [was wir als Angst oder 
Grauen bezeichnen]: where it is uncanny for us, where we do not know what 
we are afraid of. If it is uncanny for us, we begin to discourse [wo es uns 
unheimlich ist]. This is an indication of how the γένεσις of speaking is measured 
by being-there, as speaking is connected with the basic determination of being-
there itself, which is characterized by uncanninness.672 
 
The πάθη are not merely an annex of psychical processes, but are rather  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 Ibid. 
670 Ibid, p. 175. 
671 Ibid, p. 119. 
672 Ibid, p. 175. 
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the ground out of which speaking arises, and which what is expressed grows 
back into [der Boden, aus dem das Sprechen erwächst] […] The primary being-
oriented [orientiert], the illumination of its being-in-the-world, is not a knowing 
[Wissen], but rather a finding-oneself [Sichbefinden] that can be determined 
differently, according to the mode of being-there of a being.673  
 
But before we further analyze passion and the way fear is constitutive of, and related to, the 
uncanny, we must look at Heidegger’s analysis of ἕξις. The reason for looking at ἕξις is because 
through it we begin to understand the πάθη, as those determinations that characterize the 
audience, and because passions only make sense insofar as there is ontological comportment. 
 
IV. Πάθος and ἕξις (comportment) 
Πάθος from an ontological point of view 
In his lecture course on Aristotle, Heidegger offers the first and most comprehensive account of 
passion from an ontological point of view, and explains the role it plays in the establishing of 
different ways of being, as well as its constitutive role in the understanding of being, its role in 
interrupting established ontological composure. The philosopher, argues Heidegger, must 
consider the passions neither in terms of their materiality, nor their eidos, but rather in terms of 
their “being” as such.674  
 Passion is analyzed in terms of its “being”, from the perspective of ἕξις, composure (a 
mode of “having”), namely as a phenomenon of the soul of ontological significance.675 It is thus 
crucial to understand that the phenomenon of passion is made sense of in terms of comportment, 
and Heidegger stresses this point. Comportment is what raises the whole phenomenon of 
passion to an ontological level. It is by “looking at πάθη through ἕξις [that] we can see the πάθη 
as possibilities of finding-oneself, of being-seized.”676  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673 Ibid, p. 176. 
674 Ibid, p. 138. 
675 Heidegger in this context argues that “only Dilthey has tried to analyze philosophically the doctrine of the πάθη in 
his ‘The Worldview and Analysis of Human Beings since the Renaissance and Reformation’” (ibid, p. 81 and p. 120). 
676 Ibid, p. 121. 
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 Comportment characterizes the manner and mode [die Art und Weise] in which we are 
in such a πάθος.677 In a sense, the eidos of passions is a comporting-oneself to other human 
beings, a being-in-the-world. Only from this standpoint can the materiality of passions be 
examined [Das εἶδος der πάθη ist ein Sichverhalten zu anderen Menschen, ein In-der-Welt-sein. 
Von daher ist die ὕλη der πάθη erst eigentlich erforschbar.]678 One can already see that 
Heidegger is here subjugating passions to the more general, ontological category of 
comportment, that is, makes sense of passions in terms of comportment, in a manner similar to 
that of BT in relation to Stimmung and Befindlichkeit. 
 Ἕξις is the πώς ἔχοµεν πρὸς τὰ πάθη, “how we carry ourselves” [wie wir uns halten], 
“what composure we have” [in welcher Fassung wir sind] with such a πάθος. The πάθη can be 
had; in having there lies a relation to being. With the orientation of πάθη towards ἕξις, the πάθη 
are themselves oriented towards being-there as being.679 Thus, the πάθη, the affects, are not 
merely “of the soul”, but because of their relation to ἕξις, which is a determination of being, 
πάθη themselves are determinations of being. They express the being of human beings.680 
 Heidegger, in typical Aristotelian fashion, argues that passion has various meanings, 
and identifies three basic meanings: 
(1) the average, immediate meaning is that of “variable condition” 
[veränderliche Beschaffenheit]; (2) a specifically ontological meaning, which is 
important for the understanding of κίνησις: πάθος in connection with πάσχειν, 
what one most translates as “suffering” [Leiden]; (3) a resulting meaning: 
variable condition in relation to a definite concrete context, variable condition 
within a definite being-region of life: “passion.” [Leidenschaft] Πάθος in this 
last sense is the topic of the Rhetoric and the Poetics.681 
 
It is the third meaning that Heidegger is most interested in. The proper context in which this 
meaning becomes visible is Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle begins the 
investigation into what αρετή is, the γένεσις of αρετή. Ψυχή is the ousia of the ζώον, its being-
in-the-world, and in the ψυχή three things are variables, “come to be”: πάθη, δυνάµεις, έξεις 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Ibid, p. 113. 
678 Ibid, p. 139. 
679 Ibid, p. 119. [Die πάθη können gehabt werden, im Haben liegt eine Beziehung auf das Sein. Mit der Orientierung 
der πάθη auf die ἕξις werden die πάθη selbst orientiert auf das Dasein als Sein]. 
680 Ibid, pp. 119-120. 
681 Ibid, p. 113. 
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[drei verschiedene Weisen seines Werdens].682 Passion is here important in its genetic capacity, 
that is, in its capacity to form comportment, and the possibility of disrupting it. In fact, being-
composed [Gefaßtsein] or losing composure [aus der Fassung bin] are graspable only by way of 
undergoing various situations involving risk [gefährliche Situationen durchgemacht werden], 
which are enabled through passion!683 
 Even though the genetic operation of passion here is suppressed, one could plausibly 
simply connect the dots and see how the notion of having a passion, the way a comportment 
“has” the passion, is homologous to Heidegger’s own schema of Dasein authentically having, 
owning up to, the fundamental mood that strikes Dasein. Once this homology is brought to the 
fore, we can more clearly see passion as that which “makes or breaks” the comportment, and 
how passion partakes both in the constitution “having”, as well its disruption. It is about the 
authentic “having” of a fundamental mood, and how passion, the interruption of comportment 
by passion, constitutes the genesis of this “having”.  
 Heidegger further focuses on this interruptive capacity of passion, and the necessary 
relation to comportment. The most important way of “having” a Grundstimmung (πάθος) is by 
“[a]cting in such a way that [one] is thereby βεβαίως καὶ ἀµετακίνητως ἔχων,” “stable and not to 
be brought out of composure [fest und nicht aus der Fassung zu bringen].”684 This is defined in 
terms of πάθος which is defined as δι᾽ ὅσα µεταβάλλοντες – we are brought out of one frame of 
mind to another [wir geraten aus einer Fassung in die andere].685 The characteristic here is not 
the resulting condition [nicht das Resultat, das In-eine-andere-Fassung-Gekommensein], but 
rather the having-lost-composure, being on the way from one state to another, the peculiar 
unrest that is given with πάθος itself in relation to φόβος (fear) characterized as ταραχή, 
“tumult” [perplexity/confusion] [sondern das Aus-der-Fassung-Sein, das Unterwegssein von 
einem Zustand zum anderen, die eigentümliche Unruhe, die mit dem πἀθος selbst gegeben ist, 
bezüglich des φόβος als ταραχή charakterisiert, “Verwirrung”].686  	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683 Ibid, p. 120. 
684 Ibid, p. 123. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid, p. 124. 
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 Heidegger is explicit in the ontological significance he ascribes to passions. Passions 
are modes of being itself [Weisen des Seins selbst] and insofar as we are living they are modes 
of becoming [Weisen des Werdens] relating to being-in-a-world [Sein-in-einer-Welt].687 What 
we designate with πάθος defines being-in-the-world in a fundamental sense [in einem 
fundamentalen Sinne bestimmt]; it is fundamental in the cultivation of κρίσις, as this is made 
manifest from within an analysis of the everydayness of Dasein qua speaking-being, that is, as a 
rhetorical being.688     
 Πάθος is defined in the same way as µεταβολή and γένεσις, as change and genesis, as 
becoming: it is a “changing” [Umschlagen], and therefore a determinate “coming to be” 
[Werden zu] out of an earlier situation, but without having its own course set for itself. But the 
only way to make ontological sense of πάθος is as a mode of finding-oneself in the world [eine 
Weise des Sichbefindens in der Welt] and so only in relation to comportment [Verfassung].689  
 Πάθος (Stimmung) is a relation to comportment and is enabled by comportment, 
because changing from frame of mind into another frame of mind (Verfassung) and being in a 
new one, in relation to the old one, “has in itself the possibility of being-seized, being-overcome 
[hat in sich selbst die Möglichkeit des Ergriffenwerdens, Überfallenwerdens]. The manner and 
mode of losing-composure, being-brought-out-of-composure [Aus-der-Fassung-Kommens, Aus-
der-Fassung-gebracht-Werdens], is, according to its sense, such that it is able to be composed 
once again. I can regain my composure once again. I am, at a definite moment, in a dangerous 
situation [in einer Gefahr], in a moment of terror [im Moment des Schreckens], in a state of 
composure [Fassung]. I can relate the disposition characterized by terror to a possible being-
composed with regard to it.” Thus, Heidegger argues, “πάθος already has within itself the 
relation to ἕξις.”690 Let us take a closer look at how the ontological categories of comportment 
and disposition are constituted, while also considering their distinction, before we finally return 
again to the interruptive operation of passion. 
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Comportment and disposition 
Heidegger’s account of disposition [Befindlichkeit] occurs in the context of analyzing human 
comportment. The notions of disposition and comportment denote the same phenomenon, in a 
similar manner to the way in which Heidegger’s Verfassung and Befindlichkeit denote the same 
phenomenon in BT.691 They also retain a technical difference in Aristotle, even if they denote 
the same kind of quality.692 Disposition is how comportment is grasped in the moment of 
resolved, i.e. virtuous, praxis. As such, disposition is the resolved moment of comportment. 
Heidegger analyses comportment in relation to human praxis, which he calls existence.693  
Insofar as the grasping is virtuous, it is accompanied by resoluteness [προαίρεσις]. 
Resolute comportment is directed towards the moment, the καιρὸς. Heidegger argues that 
resolute comportment captures the particular being-there in Aristotle’s understanding of Dasein. 
In Heidegger’s own words, resoluteness is a comportment that shows being-there “more 
precisely in its particularity […] The Being of human beings, human being as being-there is 
particular, at the moment”.694 At that very moment, comportment is grasped as disposition: in 
the moment of resolution, the human being grasps its Being-there as disposition.695 In other 
words, in the authentic moment of resolute grasping, comportment is grasped as disposition.    
Despite the concrete particularity of the situation, the virtuous grasp of the moment is 
meant to “seize the moment as a whole”.696 This means that the moment is indeed concrete and 
particular, yet it also belongs to and maintains a relation with a structural unity as the whole.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691 According to my reading, the distinction between Befindlichkeit and Verfassung is hermeneutically precarious as 
both notions refer to the same factical phenomenon. Yet, each grasps the phenomenon from a different angle. The 
safest way to distinguish the two notions is by looking at how Heidegger employs them while keeping in mind the 
etymologies entailed in each word. Verfassung refers to the aspect of the existential structure that accounts for the 
possibility of falling, insofar as falling is a certain movement that presupposes a stratum. In this context, Heidegger’s 
question contextualizes the very notion of Verfassung eloquently: „Welche Struktur zeigt die »Bewegtheit« des 
Verfallens?” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 177). Verfassung accounts for the structure that allows 
Befindlichkeit to fall. In Heidegger’s own words: „Die Befindlichkeit erschließt nicht nur das Dasein in seiner 
Geworfenheit und Angewiesenheit auf die mit seinem Sein je schon erschlossene Welt, sie ist selbst die existentiale 
Seinsart, in der es sich ständig an die »Welt« ausliefert, sich von ihr angehen läßt derart, daß es ihm selbst in 
gewisser Weise ausweicht. Die existenziale Verfassung dieses Ausweichens wird am Phänomen des Verfallens 
deutlich werden“ (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 139). According to my reading, the duality of Befindlichkeit 
and Verfassung emulates the Aristotelian duality of ἕξις and διάθεσις, as Heidegger interprets them.    
692 Aristotle, Organon 8b. 
693 BCAP, p. 176. 
694 Ibid, p. 180. 
695 Ibid, p. 175. 
696 Ibid, p. 191. 
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Heidegger further explains how for Aristotle disposition occupies a particular position 
within the structural whole. Disposition is a “middle” [µεσότης]; it is an orientation that 
maintains the mean, in the sense of “middle position”. Heidegger defines this middle position as 
that which we “apprehend as being-equally-far-away from the ends […,] that which is equally 
far removed from both ends is addressed as µέσον of the matter itself”.697   
Despite the quasi-quantitative delimitation of disposition, Heidegger insists that 
Aristotle acquires here an existential understanding of disposition that grasps the character of 
Dasein’s particularity [καθ᾽ἕκαστον]. Heidegger juxtaposes disposition with geometrical 
position, which is also a grasping of the particular point of relational character embedded into a 
structural whole. However, it is mathematically measurable and as such it is oriented towards 
grasping the being of a thing, such as a line. In distinguishing the two, Heidegger explains that 
for Aristotle disposition is a virtue and virtue is neither a thing in its constitution nor does it 
have a thing as its object. 
Insofar as Aristotle defines virtue as a middle-position, thinks Heidegger, “one can 
determine the mean of a thing geometrically”.698 However, insofar as Aristotle is offering an 
interpretation of the being of Dasein, the matter is not one of pertaining to a thing [πρᾶγµα], 
rather it is something that relates to us as it appears to us [πρὸς ἡµᾶς γνωριµότερον], relative to 
our own being. In this context, Heidegger warns against understanding virtue as normative 
ethics. Rather, virtue signifies a “basic relation to the being-there of human beings”.699     
Disposition as comportment 
The analysis of disposition in Heidegger’s lectures takes place in the context of the discussion 
of πάθος. What is of interest to Heidegger is how pathos is a fundamental characteristic of 
beings that have the capacity to move.700 In analysing the kinetic phenomenon of πάθος, 
Heidegger holds that its structure can only be understood in relation to comportment, which 
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characterizes the “manner and mode in which we are in such a πάθος”.701 In a certain sense, 
comportment supplies some sort of ontological “basis” for the experience of change through 
pathos: “πάθος is a ‘changing,’ and accordingly a determinate ‘coming to be…’ out of an earlier 
situation, but not a changing that would have its course set for itself. Rather, it is a mode of 
finding-oneself [Befindlichkeit] in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation 
to ἕξις”.702  
 According to Heidegger’s interpretation, comportment provides the “place” of human 
movement in which movement can be appropriated or “had” as a way of being. Heidegger 
shows how comportment is the actuality [ἐνέργεια] of having [ἔχειν]: ἕξις is the ἐνέργεια of 
having and of what is had.703 Heidegger thus offers an analysis of how Aristotle understands 
human comportment through an analysis of having. 
  Even though “having” has several meanings for Aristotle, Heidegger identifies a 
unified underlying meaning. Heidegger articulates the unified meaning to indicate “beings with 
the being-character of being after a definite being-possibility, or its negation, which, in the case 
of negation, is the same as that of holding off something from being genuinely as it would like to 
be” [des Abhaltens davon, eigentlich zu sein, wie etwas sein möchte] (cf. Augustinian 
continentia in previous chapter).704  
This shows that the structure of comportment is not static and therefore its relational 
character is kinetic. In explaining the character of this kinetic relationality, Heidegger 
introduces the Aristotelian notion of continuum. According to Heidegger, one of the meanings 
that Aristotle ascribes to “having”, which is the actuality of comportment, is that of “holding 
off” something from moving [κωλύειν].705 This “holding off” has the character of continuum, 
says Heidegger, insofar as it has both the character of togetherness, as well as the character of 
movement.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 Ibid, p. 168. 
702 Ibid, p. 171. 
703 Ibid, p. 175. 
704 Compare this with what Heidegger writes in Sein und Zeit: „Die Stimmung erschließt nicht in der Weise des 
Hinblickens auf die Geworfenheit, sondern als An- und Abkehr” (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 135).  
705 BCAP, p. 173. 
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But herein lies a problem: Heidegger explicitly mentions that continuum is drawn from 
Aristotle’s Physics where the issue is how beings of nature move.706 Besides, one can readily 
confirm that continuum pertains to the movement of physical objects present-at-hand from the 
examples given to illustrate “having” in the sense of “holding off”: the example of Atlas 
holding the vault of heaven not letting it fall, and the example of pillars holding weights.707 It is 
evident that even though the context of discussion pertains to Dasein’s affective life, the 
paradigm of movement used pertains to natural objects present-at-hand. In addition, Heidegger 
also points to the fact that the actuality of “having” is also characterized to be an “in-between”, 
a characteristic of continuum that is attached to Heidegger’s analysis of continuum as it is 
developed in Aristotle’s Physics. 
In addition to this, it is not only the notion of continuum that bears the character of 
natural objects present-at-hand. Another characteristic of the “having” of comportment supplied 
in those pages is that of being a container [περιέχον] that has the character of “being-in”.708 The 
having of the container, the phenomenon of containing, is defined by Aristotle as the same kind 
of having that the whole [ὅλον] has of its parts [µέρη]. To this extent, comportment is ascribed 
the unity of the whole that has parts, in the same sense that a container contains items inside it. 
Again the examples given by Aristotle betray a world that consists of things present-at-hand: the 
example of a basin containing water and the example of a ship having sailors, etc.709 Therefore, 
even though disposition qua moment (i.e. in the sense of a part), which maintains a relation to 
the whole, is supposed to be a mode of being radically different from a geometrical quantitative 
account that refers to human existence, Aristotle’s notion of “container” fails to deliver such an 
existential account.  
Because of Aristotle’s “contaminated” view of continuum and containment, his 
understanding of comportment is grounded within a conception of the world qua physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706 Ibid, p. 174. 
707 Ibid. 
708 Ibid, p. 173. 
709 Ibid. 
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world. It makes up a mode of being-in-the-world whose components make comportment a 
category that betrays a world whose structural unity and wholeness is a “quantifiable sum”.710 
It is still important to see in more detail how continuum is analysed in Heidegger’s 
lectures. In looking at Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s understanding of geometry, we will 
see that geometrical position has a relational character, and as such it has the character of 
continuum. In this context it is important to note that the continuous character of position and 
disposition is precisely their relational character, which is found to be the same: continuous. In 
following this path of analysis we will also uncover how continuum is explained in Aristotle’s 
Physics, and how the characteristics of continuum identified there are also found in the 
continuum of comportment. 
 
Geometrical position and continuum 
The structure of geometrical position is analyzed by Heidegger in his lecture course titled 
Plato’s Sophist (GA19), delivered during the Winter semester of 1924-25. The discussion of 
geometry takes place as Heidegger tries to show how theory involves a countermovement 
against the immediacy of that which is given in sense-perception [αἴσθησις], that which is given 
in the particular [καθ’ἕκαστον], even though indeed it does take sense-perception as its point of 
departure.711  
 Aristotle grounds the grasp of geometrical position to sense perception. Geometrical 
structures are grasped in mere sense-perception.712 Geometrical objects, such as the triangle, 
maintain a kinship to the structure grasped by sense-perception in that they possess a continuous 
structure: “This peculiar structure of the αἰσθητὸν is preserved in the geometrical, insofar as the 
geometrical, too, is continuous, συνεχὲς. The point [the geometrical position, θέσις] presents 
only the ultimate and most extreme limit of the continuous”.713 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710 Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, p. 81. 
711 Ibid, p. 98. 
712 Ibid, p. 117. 
713 Ibid, p. 112: „Diese eigentümliche Struktur des αἰσθητὸν erhält sich noch im Geometrischen, sofern auch das 
Geometrische stetig, συνεχὲς, ist. Der Punkt stellt nur die letzte und äußerste Grenze dieses Stetigen dar”. 
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Position therefore depends on the prior grasp of the continuum of the whole object. The 
underlying assumption is that the geometrical position is a moment that denotes relation; it is a 
relating per se. As such, it is a moment within a totality, in the sense that it denotes the limits of 
this totality in a way that does not constitute the position as a self-subsistent entity, but rather 
contains within its being a relationship with other positions within the totality. That which lies 
in-between the positions themselves has the character of continuum. The character of the whole, 
as well as the mode of relation between its moments, its positions, has the fundamental 
character of continuum.   
It is in reference to this mode of relation that the Aristotelian categories of position and 
disposition acquire their relational character. Heidegger, in that very analysis, points out the 
similarity between position, disposition and comportment: “Θέσις has the same character as 
ἕξις, διάθεσις. Ἕξις = to find oneself in a definite situation [sich befinden in einer bestimmten 
Lage], to have something in oneself, to retain, and in retaining to be directed toward something. 
Θέσις= orientation, situation; It has the character of being oriented toward something. ἔστι δὲ 
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, ... θέσις (Cat. 7, 6b2f.)”.714  
Despite the categorical closeness between position and disposition, in that both are 
modalities of continuum, there persists a differentiation between the two that Heidegger 
identifies: sense-perception involved in grasping geometrical structures in their wholeness 
differs from sense-perception that grasps the practical situation in its wholeness. As such, 
insofar as disposition belongs to praxis, its continuum must be grasped differently. 
  In praxis, writes Heidegger, sense-perception maintains its practical character as its 
grasp is characterized as circumspection, whereas in geometrical sense-perception it is a matter 
of pure onlooking, a sheer inspection.715 As such, circumspection grasps the concrete and 
temporally momentary in its practicality,716 whereas inspection grasps that which is eternal in 
the sense of autonomous and unmovable [ἀκίνητον]. We can imagine Heidegger finding in 
Aristotle two different ways of grasping the continuum, one pertaining to geometrical sense-	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715 Ibid, p. 163.  
716 Ibid. 
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perception, and the other pertaining to practical sense-perception; the first supplying the 
understanding of the moment qua an entity’s position, the latter qua Dasein’s disposition. 
However, Aristotle does not give us different accounts of continuum in these two respects; the 
only distinction we find is a continuum that accounts for time and another for space, but 
ultimately the notion of continuum is derived from the Physics. 
Heidegger shows in greater detail how Aristotle acquires the notion of continuum in the 
Physics. Ultimately, continuum is meant to explain the phenomenon of co-presence, the 
phenomenon of “being with and being related to one another”.717 Continuum is determined as a 
mode of connectedness between things whereby “the limit of the one that touches the other is 
one and the same limit”.718 One example of continuum given in that context is when the limits 
of a house are identical to the limits of another house: continuum means that there is nothing in-
between the two related objects.  
Furthermore, continuum is identified as the “in-between” itself [µεταξύ].719 Heidegger 
illustrates this definition of continuum by reciting Aristotle’s example of a boat moving up 
stream, the stream being the “in-between”, the medium through which motion takes place.720 
“Betweenness” is the way Aristotle understands changing being [µεταβάλλον]. In Heidegger’s 
own words: “This basic phenomenon is the ontological condition for the possibility of 
something like extension, µέγεθος: site and orientation are such that from one point there can be 
a continuous progression to the others; only in this way is motion understandable”.721 Ultimately 
the character of continuum extends to characterize both time and place [χρόνος and τόπος].722 
We have thus seen how Heidegger moves into a treatment of Aristotle’s notion of 
continuum through his analysis of geometrical position and its relation to sense-perception. We 
have also seen how Heidegger distinguishes between the grasp of practical sense-perception and 
geometrical sense-perception. Insofar as disposition is a moment of practical life, we would 
anticipate that Aristotle would have supplied a notion of continuum appropriate to Dasein’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717 Ibid, p. 113: „Seins mit oder zu einem anderen”. 
718 Ibid, p. 115. 
719 Ibid, p. 113. 
720 Ibid, p. 114. 
721 Ibid, p. 119. 
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affective life. However, continuum, as Heidegger shows, is a category that emerges out of the 
Physics and indicates the mode of connectedness between physical entities that move.  
The basic distinction between the continuum involved in geometrical position and 
disposition seems to correspond to the distinction between the kind of continuum involved in 
spatial relations that are devoid of movement and the kind of continuum involved in temporal 
relations that have movement. In this context we may even discern in Heidegger’s reading a 
certain hierarchy between spatial continuum and temporal continuum, in the sense that insofar 
as the very notion of continuum occurs in order to explain kinesis of natural objects, the 
continuum involved in geometry is derivative. In sum, the distinction that Heidegger seems to 
find in Aristotle between the continuum involved in disposition and that of geometrical position 
is not one that sustains the distinction between the mode of being of Dasein and the mode of 
being of an entity present-at-hand. Both notions of continuum refer to relations between objects 
present-at-hand.723    
In concluding this section, let me reiterate that comportment is a being-possibility 
[Seinsmöglichkeit], that is, a continuum that establishes spatiotemporal continuity which is 
“related in itself to another possibility, to the possibility of my being, that within my being 
something comes over me, which brings me out of composure” [in sich selbst auf eine andere 
Möglichkeit bezogen ist, auf die Möglichkeit meines Seins, daß innerhalb meines Seins etwas 
über mich kommt, das Mich aus der Fassung bringt].724 Furthermore, being thrown out of 
composure, losing composure, is analyzed in terms of affects, in terms of “positive” and 
“negative” moods, in terms of burden and the alleviation of it. This is precisely the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 Even though, in his lectures on Aristotle, Heidegger does not offer a systematic grounding of quantified space and 
time to a particular mode of manifestation of Nature, he does so in Sein und Zeit. For example: „Das klassische 
Beispiel für die geschichtliche Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft, zugleich aber auch für die ontologische Genesis, ist 
die Entstehung der mathematischen Physik. Das Entscheidende für ihre Ausbildung liegt weder in der höheren 
Schätzung der Beobachtung der »Tatsachen«, noch in der »Auswendung« von Mathematik in der Bestimmung der 
Naturvorgänge – sondern im mathematischen Entwurf der Natur selbst. Dieser Entwurf entdeckt vorgängig ein 
ständig Vorhandenes (Materie) und öffnet den Horizont für den leitenden Hinblick auf seine quantitativ 
bestimmbaren konstitutiven Momente (Bewegung, Kraft, Ort und Zeit)“ (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA 2, p. 362). He 
also makes explicit the connection between nature as present-at-hand and continuum: „Man sieht die Stetigkeit der 
Zeit im Horizont eines unauflösbaren Vorhandenen“ (ibid, p. 423). Further on, he explicitly refers to Aristotle: „Die 
erste überlieferte, thematisch ausführliche Auslegung des vulgären Zeitverständnisses findet sich in der »Physik« des 
Aristoteles, das heißt im Zusammenhang einer Ontologie der Natur. »Zeit« steht mit »Ort« und »Bewegung« 
zusammen” (ibid, p. 428).  
724 BCAP, p. 119. 
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Heidegger will make sense of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung, not only in BT but throughout his 
works. In itself, writes Heidegger, following Aristotle, comportment is the  
sort of being-in-the-world in which the world is encountered in the character of 
συµφέρον, βλαβερὸν, ἡδύ, and λυπηρόν. Our being-in-the-world is always 
characterized by this disposition of being-elevated and being-burdened, 
specifically in a way that we find ourselves within the degrees of a bad mood or 
an elevated mood. Ἕξις is the determinate being-composed within this way of 
being. [Unser In-der-Welt-sein ist immer charakterisiert durch diese 
Befindlichkeit des Gehoben- und Gedrücktseins, und zwar so, daß wir uns in 
den Ausschlägen befinden, von einer Mißstimmung oder gehobenen Stimmung 
mitgenommen.]725 
 
Along with the basic πάθη of ἡδονή and λύπη, a “being-disposed-as-higher-or-lower” [Höher- 
oder Niedergestimmtsein] is co-given.726 
 
V. Πάθος as ἡδονή, λύπη, αἵρεσις and φυγή 
Passions are the ways in which we lose composure, the way κινεῖσθαι occurs. They are “modes 
of being-taken with respect to being-in-the-world.”727 Heidegger organizes them in terms of a 
binary logic, whereby passions will have their positive character and their negative counterparts, 
and they are made sense of in terms of motivation and tendency. So, for example, ὀργή and 
φόβος are given together with ἡδονή and λύπη, and as such they signify definite finding-oneself 
[Sichbefinden], which is either “being-elevated” [Gehobensein] or “being-depressed” 
[Herabgedrügtsein].728A ἡδονή or λύπη is always there at each moment.729 
 Aristotle treats ἡδονή in NE, and it is an affect that accompanies finding the end; it is 
after genuine being-there-completedness, and so is the tendency that sets up intentionality: “[In] 
all beings that are alive there lies the determination that it is after genuine being-there-
completedness. Every living thing is to a certain degree tendentious; it has the tendency toward 
being as being-completed.” [Das will nichts anderes sagen, als daß es aus ist auf die eigentliche 
Daseinsfertigkeit. Jedes Lebende ist gewissermaßen tendenziös, es hat die Tendenz zu sein als 
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726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid, p. 162. 
728 Ibid, p. 113. 
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Fertigsein.]730 Ἡδονή is a fulfillment of seeing, of knowing, and so the strive for knowing, and 
knowing itself, is grounded in it!731 It is the primary “mode of having-itself of a being that is 
there” [Die ἡδονή als Befindlichkeit ist die Weise des Sichhabens eines Daseins].732 Heidegger 
notes how Aristotle constantly says that with every passion, ἡδονή is an inseparable companion, 
and this, in my opinion, is why Heidegger believes that ἡδονή and the way it operates is a 
constitutive part of all affects, which enables him to analyze all affects in terms of the specific 
motivational character of ἡδονή.  
 Heidegger further breaks down ἡδονή in its motivational character, that is, in terms of 
fleeing and its opposite, choice terms that he will reiterate in BT in his analysis of disposition. 
Fleeing and choice are the “basic motivations of being-there.”733 So ἡδονή belongs to the being-
there itself, and has a dual possibility: (1) it is a finding itself that has the character of αἵρεσις; or 
(2) it is a finding oneself that has the character of φυγή. It is a going-forward [Zugehen], a 
seizing [Zugreifen], or a recoiling [zurückweicht], a fleeing [flieht].734  
 In this context, Heidegger turns to fear, which is the affect that corresponds to one of 
these motivations, fleeing. Φόβος is apprehended as λύπη, as a determinate disposition that is 
determined by being-toned-down-in-attunement [φόβος als λύπη gefaßt, als eine bestimmte 
Befindlichkeit, die durch Herabgestimmtsein bestimmt ist].735 Let us conclude this chapter by 
looking at Heidegger’s first detailed analysis of fear, in the context of his interpretation of 
Aristotle. 
 
VI. Φόβος 
Heidegger begins his analysis of φόβος (fear, Furcht, timor) by noting how Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the πάθη had a major influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians, notably St. 
Thomas Aquinas, but also Luther. Generally, Heidegger says, the πάθη are a basic question 
[Grundfrage] in theology that played a special role in the Middle Ages since fear has a special 	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731 Ibid, pp. 164-165. 
732 Ibid, p. 165. 
733 Ibid, p. 166. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid, p. 165. 
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connection with sin.736 See, for example, pure fear (timor) in the presence of God and fear of 
punishment (timor servilis). Fear, in theology, goes all the way back to Augustine, writes 
Heidegger, bridging his account of affects in the lectures on Augustine that preceded his courses 
on Aristotle, with his subsequent turn to Aristotle in the lectures we are covering here.  
 Heidegger points out that Aristotle analyzes fear in the Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 5, 
along two pathways: fear as πίστις and fear as πάθος. The former is an account of “being-afraid” 
as a basic determination of the being-there of the hearer, becoming conclusive about an affair 
that is to be settled [des Daseins des anderen, des Hoerers, mitspricht im Beraten, 
Schluessigwerden ueber eine zu erledigende Angelegenheit],737 and Heidegger explicitly calls 
fear in this regard as one possible determinate disposition [bestimmte Befindlichkeit] in which 
the hearer finds himself.738 The latter is an account of “being-afraid” [Sichfürchten] that 
represents a fully determinate concretion of “being-out-of-composure” [Ausser-Fassung-
Seins].739 
 The φοβερόν, the fearsome [das Fürchtliche, das Furchtbare] is what sends me into 
fear upon meeting it. Fear is “the aspect that constitutes the givenness of the fearsome [das 
Moment, das die Eigentlichkeit des Fürchtlichen ausmacht].”740 
 Heidegger zeros in on the specific temporal character of fear, as it is analyzed by 
Aristotle himself – an analysis that will have lasting consequences in, and comprehensive 
effects on, his own future analyses, in BT and elsewhere. Fear becomes genuinely intelligible 
when Aristotle supplies the πῶς ἔχοντες, the how one has it.741 Aristotle characterizes φόβος as 
λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας µέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ, that is, as sadness in the 
sense of tumultuousness that arises out of imagination of a future bad, detrimental event.742 
What shows itself is something that is not yet there, it is not present in sense intuition, but is 
rather given in imagination, showing itself from itself, through a future that is “noch nicht da” 	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737 Ibid, p. 167. 
738 Ibid, pp. 167-168. 
739 Ibid, my italics. 
740 Ibid. 
741 Ibid, p. 168. 
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but which is a realistic possibility, a possibility that can “bring me out of composure” [aus der 
Fassung bringen kann].743 
 So fear is something like a “toning-down” [Herabgestimmtsein], a disposition that is 
characterized as φυγή, “fleeing”, the opposite of αἵρεσις [keine αἵρεσις],744 in the face of 
tumultuousness. Tumultuousness is a ταραχή, a Verwirrung in the face of the κακόν, the bad 
thing which interrupts my Dasein so that one opts to be led by another, chooses to be through 
an other, a sort of alienation from the self, in the sense that one recoils from oneself, from one’s 
own Dasein. As Heidegger says, ταραχή is characterized as ‘being-led-by-another’ 
[“Durcheinandergeraten”], ‘being-through-another’ [Durcheinandersein]: I recoil from myself, 
my own being [von mir selbst bzw. vor meinem Dasein zurückweiche].”745  
 
The conditions of possibility of fear: threat, proximity and possibility 
Fear, and the fearsome, is further analyzed in terms of its conditions of possibility. What are the 
conditions of possibility of fear? Heidegger tells us: that which we fear must be in proximity 
[σύνεγγυς; in der Nähe].746 What is away [in der Ferne ist] cannot be feared. Here, Heidegger 
crucially refers to Aristotle’s reference to death: “We do not fear death even though know we 
will die, writes Aristotle, because death is not in proximity.”747 In addition, Heidegger takes note 
of Aristotle’s genuine characterization [eigentliche Charakterisierung] of the φοβερόν, the 
situation that presents “what is frightening in the highest sense”, as the “unavoidable, not in an 
absolute sense, but only for me” [das Fürchterliche im höchsten Sinne: das Unabwendbare, aber 
nicht schlechthin, sonder nur für mich.].748 
 It is important to take note of this, because it somewhat undermines the interpretation 
according to which Heidegger’s turn to death in BT is more or less an appropriation of 
Kierkegaardian themes. That is true, and it is, in my opinion, untenable to argue that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 Ibid, p. 170. 
744 Ibid, p. 168. I have corrected the English translation. There is a spelling mistake in the translation, which makes it 
read as if Heidegger is defining fear as the presence of choice as opposed to the absence of choice and the 
phenomenon of fleeing. 
745 Ibid, p. 169. 
746 Ibid. 
747 Ibid. 
748 Ibid, p. 173. 
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Heidegger’s analysis of death in BT is not heavily influenced by Kierkegaard. But this reference 
here shows that Heidegger’s analysis is informed not only by Kierkegaard, but also by 
Aristotle! Heidegger takes inspiration from Aristotle so as to want to bring fear “closer”, 
develop a phronesis that takes into account the end of Dasein, so as to bring fear “closer”. Being 
near is a way of encountering the world that is constitutive of the possibility of being-afraid 
[Konstitutiv für diese Möglichkeit des Sichfürchtens ist diese bestimmte Begegnisart der 
Umwelt].749 Being afraid [Sichfürchten] must be grasped in terms of being-possible [das 
Mögliche]. That which comes towards me has the character of the harmful [Abträglichen]; it is 
both there and not there [da und nicht da] and announces itself in φαντασία (not αἴσθησις).  
 So the fearsome has to have the character of threat [Das, was in der Umwelt begegnet, 
muß den Charakter der Bedrohung haben, das So-in-der-Welt-Sein ist ein Bedrohtsein].750 Even 
though being threatened is a necessary condition for the possibility of fear, being threatened is 
not already being-afraid: In every fearing lies a being-threatened, but not vice versa. 
 The φοβερόν [das Bedroliche] is grasped in three ways: (1) it must show itself [es muß 
sich zeigen] as something, but as something not really present, because it is a possibility, a 
being-possible, in the sense of indeterminate [im Sinne des Unbestimmten].751 The character of 
indeterminacy heightens the possibility of the disposition of fear and heightens the threat; (2) 
The determination of having a lot of “powerfulness” [Mächtigkeit], δύναµιν ἔχειν µεγάλην.752 
This powerfulness is constitutive of the threat. Over and against this threat I find myself in great 
weakness [in einer bestimmten Ohnmacht befinde]; and (3) Πλησιασµός turns threat into danger 
[Gefahr].753 
 It is through πλησιασµός [Annäherung] that the finding-oneself [Sichbefinden] in the 
face of something threatening becomes a situation of danger.754 But πλησιασµός, which enables 
the Befindlichkeit of Furcht, must also be accompanied by belief – it is a sort of belief (οἴεσθαι): 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749 Ibid. 
750 Ibid. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Ibid, p. 170. 
753 Ibid. 
754 Ibid. 
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the one threatened must “believe” [glauben] that the threat threatens him.755 You need belief in 
order to have fear, because being aware of the threatening thing is not enough.  
 Here Heidegger introduces the connection between fear, hope, danger and the power of 
being saved – connections that he will keep throughout his writings, and which seem to have 
their origins in this reading of Aristotle. So if one were to make sense of Heidegger’s statements 
about danger and the saving power of danger, one must begin from these very lectures on 
Aristotle. Heidegger says that the same belief involved in threat and fear also operates in ἐλπίς 
(Hoffnung): one hopes to escape, and here Heidegger draws an internal connection between fear 
and hope: “The ἐλπίς σωτηρίας is as constitutive [ebenso konstitutiv] of being afraid as 
believing is for being threatened.”756  
 Only now is ταραχή (Unruhe) intelligible. Unruhe is the opposition [Gegeneinander] to 
belief and hope, and so it is a sort of totalizing thrown out of composure that interrupts the hope 
in something possible and positive, or the belief in something determinately negative that can be 
overcome: it is an indeterminate hopelessness that does not relate to anything in particular, 
anything possible as such, and the only reaction to this is fleeing. So ταραχή has two aspects, 
δίωξις and φυγή, both of which are basic determinations of the genuine being-moved of being-
there [beides Grundbestimmungen der eigentlichen Bewegtheit des Daseins].757 
 Heidegger finally offers a way of “having”, of not giving in to fleeing from ταραχή: The 
possibility of salvation [Die Möglichkeit der Rettung] must be held fast, and the “recoiling” [das 
eigentümliche “Zurückweichen”] from that which threatens me must operate – λύπη as φυγή, 
must be affirmed, owned up.758  
 Fear as passion has the possibility of a comportment, which is courage [Mut].759 Fear is 
the condition of possibility of courage. It is a question of being afraid in the right manner, and 
thereby coming to resoluteness, which is also Augustine’s thesis: initium sapientiae timor 
Domini [in den rechten Weise sich zu fürchten und dadurch in die Entschlossenheit zu 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755 Ibid, p. 174. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Ibid. 
759 Ibid, p. 175. 
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kommen].760 Thus, from this reading of Aristotle and Augustine, the way towards Heidegger’s 
own account of authenticity, of resoluteness in BT, has been paved.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis is part of a larger project that aims at exploring the role of mood in Heidegger’s 
philosophy, both on the structural level as well as on the level of particular moods that 
Heidegger focuses on.  
 The way I initially grasped the significance of moods for philosophy, was via “the 
problem of beginning” [Anfang] in Hegel’s Logik. I became fascinated by that problem and how 
any account of a beginning would have to focus on the pre-reflective level of experience; in this 
context, I saw this great potential in Heidegger’s focus on facticity through his account of 
mood. 
 Throughout Heidegger’s work, moods have operated as what might be described as 
providing the ground for disclosure, the origin of authentic ontological understanding, the 
defining character of each historical epoch, as well as the enactmental urgency that will bring 
about Heidegger's, famously elusive, “other” cultural beginning. Fundamental mood is 
identified throughout Heidegger’s works, but especially in his later works, as the force behind 
such a beginning – as that which lies at the origin of the philosophical conversion, whereby one 
wonders about the nature of being(s).  
 I was always fascinated by the later Heidegger’s emphasis on mood - both the moods 
associated with metaphysics, as well as the ones connected to the “thinking” to come. But I 
soon realized that before I could tackle the later Heidegger on mood, it was necessary to look 
into his earlier works. There was, in any case, a lacuna, and it is this lacuna that this thesis tries 
to overcome. A better understanding of the emergence of mood in Heidegger’s overall project 
can only be achieved by further investigation into his earlier works. This is not to claim that a 
more comprehensive genealogy resolves these issues, but sometimes it dissolves some of these 
problems by showing how they are wrong-footed. But inevitably, some problems still persist, 
especially as regards questions of what constitutes fundamental moods as fundamental, and 
Heidegger’s choice of particular moods.  
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 The thesis offers a genealogical-exegetic account of Heidegger’s early phenomenology 
of moods, through an analysis of his Freiburg and Marburg lectures that took place from 1919 
to 1925. It reconstructs and analyzes the questions that Husserl's phenomenology attempted to 
resolve, and show how it is in this context that affects become central for Heidegger. The first 
part of the thesis looks at Heidegger’s initial turn to phenomenology, and considers the neo-
Kantian problems that Heidegger faces, as well as how Husserl’s phenomenology affords an 
initial breakthrough in resolving these problems. I explore how Heidegger goes beyond Husserl 
in order to offer a concrete grounding of phenomenological understanding in lived experience 
and provide a concrete account of “beginning”.  
 The thesis also thematically explores Heidegger’s earliest accounts of particular affects, 
as well as the way the affective terminology of BT is developed for the first time in his 
interpretations of St. Augustine and Aristotle, such as love [Liebe], joy [Freude] and Angst (as 
well as astonishment [Staunen], shock [Schrecken], fear [Furcht], and dread [Gruseln]). 
 Several problems persist, but the hope is that this thesis has set the initial cornerstone 
for a better approach into these problems. One question that my future research will attempt to 
take on is a more detailed analysis of how Heidegger turns to mood to ground the 
phenomenological epochē. It seems to me that Heidegger is able to ascribe to fundamental 
mood what Husserl ascribed to epochē, and the key to understanding this relation is once we 
recognize the structural connection of epochē with the category of ἔχειν (and the latter with the 
structure of Befindlichkeit).  
 Another question I would be interested in further researching has to do with the 
fundamental mood of boredom [Langeweile] as described in FCM. According to Heidegger, 
boredom defines the essence of our cultural epoch, but this is not immediately evident since it 
conceals itself and needs to be brought into unconcealment. It is thus the task of the philosopher 
to awaken it. The question concerning the dialectic of emergence and concealment of 
fundamental cultural moods has not been adequately understood. A better understanding can be 
achieved by looking at Heidegger’s early phenomenology of religious life, where he explores 
happiness [Freude], and see how in that context Heidegger develops the paradigm of awakening 
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as a response to Husserl’s analysis of intentionality and affect in Ideas I. In addition, I would 
also look into Heidegger’s reference to Aristotle’s treatise on waking and sleeping [Περὶ ὕπνου 
καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως] in FCM so as to see how sleep is understood in kinetic terms, namely as 
ακινησία, and explore how this leads back to comportment and the issue of overcoming (norms).  
 A third issue would have to do with a careful analysis of fundamental, and leading 
moods as they operate in CP, and in particular try to make sense of the mood of Verhaltenheit. 
 A fourth issue would be a political one. The question of “rootedness” 
[Bodenständigkeit] in its relation to Heidegger’s political choices. A leading question would be 
this: If we think of Heidegger’s focus on facticity and moods as part and parcel of a reaction to 
Husserl, would it be possible to retroactively trace his insistence on rootedness and his remarks 
on “World-Jewry” (in the 30s), back to this earlier reaction to Husserlian phenomenology? 
 A fifth, overarching project would involve the revisiting of the discontinuity thesis from 
the perspective of moods. This would involve an assessment of the Kehre thesis, and the role of 
mood in both the early Heidegger as well as the late Heidegger. My suspicion is that the fact 
that the failure to properly understand and assess Heidegger’s earlier accounts of affective 
phenomena, contributed to the failure to see that the so-called Kehre is anticipated and, hence, 
there was no Kehre after all but only a Wendung. There is systematic consistency between the 
themes of early Heidegger and the themes of late Heidegger.   
 Finally, a sixth overarching research project would be a study of each mood Heidegger 
identifies throughout his works, trying to further analyse the defining character of each so as to 
provide a more organized outlook. Heidegger refers to many moods, but, to the best of my 
knowledge, there has not been a comprehensive account of them all and how they structurally 
relate to one another. Moods include, Angst, boredom, wonder [Wunder], astonishment 
[Staunen], joy [Freude], sadness [Traurigkeit], startled dismay [Erschrecken], shock 
[Schrecken], fear [Furcht], dread [Gruseln], diffidence [Scheu], etc.  
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